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ABSTRACT
The dissertation examines the process of agrarian reform in Livland, 
Estland and Kurland in the period 1765 to 1849 from a provincial/imperial 
perspective. The interaction of provincial privilege and imperial prerogative is 
seen as a major catalyst in the reform process. The perspective not only sheds 
light on the development of agrarian reform in the Baltic provinces but 
illuminates the nature of the Baltic/Russian relationship in the period under 
study.
The research is interpretative and analytical within a chronological 
framework with thematic emphases in each chapter. It attempts to remove both 
the reform initiatives and the historical Baltic/Russian relationship from 
traditional interpretation and provide fresh perspectives.
There are no notable works of synthesis on Baltic/Russian relations in the 
era of reform. This research is a step towards filling that gap. In addition, the 
reappraisal of Baltic/Russian historical relations as well as the comprehensive and 
detailed survey of agrarian legislation in the Baltic provinces from 1765 to 1849 
should be of particular use to British scholars since there is a significant lack of 
writing in Baltic history of the period in English. The major literature used in the 
research was predominantly German and Russian.
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9INTRODUCTION
General Orientation
On 23 March 1816, the serfs in Estland were emancipated. The following 
year, on 25 August 1817, emancipation was declared in Kurland and on 26 March 
1819 the last of the Baltic serfs were emancipated under the Livland emancipation 
reform. These emancipation reforms were granted to the Baltic provinces, as part 
of the Russian Empire, by imperial decree, at a time when public discussion of 
emancipation in Russia itself was considered dangerous to public security.
Traditional Baltic German historiography1 views the emancipation reforms 
as proof that the Baltic German barons were more enlightened than their Russian 
overlords. Where Russia is accorded a role in the Baltic reform process, for 
example in illustrating the liberal nature of Alexander I, it is to underline the fact 
that Russia was too backward for Alexander to carry out such reforms in Russia 
proper. Liberal imperial policies could only be realized in the more enlightened 
atmosphere of the Baltic. Imperial or Russian participation in the Baltic agrarian 
reforms is dealt with only peripherally by Baltic research. Its main emphasis has 
always been the "German" nation. Coloured by the Russification process in the
1 Of which Alexander Tobien is the main representative. His viewpoints have not been seriously 
challenged by more recent research. His Die Agrargesetzgebung Livlands im 19.Tahrhundert 2 vols. 
(Riga, 1899-1911) is a detailed chronology of agrarian reform legislation from the mid-eighteenth 
century to 1866. Despite its apologist standpoint, the work provides useful information, particularly 
on the structure of administration in Livland, and contains documentary sources throughout the text 
as w ell as in the appendices. It is the only comprehensive survey of agrarian legislation in Livland in 
the period under study. Its counterpart for Estland is Axel von Gernet, Geschichte und System des 
bauerlichen Agrarrechts in Estland (Reval, 1901). For Kurland, there is little, comprehensive or 
otherwise, but the traditional viewpoint is represented by Ernst von Rechenberg-Linten, Zustande 
Kurlands im vorigen und diesen Tahrhundert (Mitau, 1858) although it precedes the era of 
Russification and, therefore, re-interpretation. Tobien's later work Die livlandische Ritterschaft in 
ihrem Verhaltnis zum Zarismus und russischen Nationalismus (Riga, 1925) is in essence and substance 
polemical.
latter half of the nineteenth century, Baltic historiography examines the Russian 
side of the relationship mainly in terms of imperial ambition eventually 
overrunning an independent and superior culture. The first half of the nineteenth 
century proves the superior culture, the second half its destruction.
Soviet historiography has conformed to a different formula. The Baltic area 
was simply further along the economic development scale.2 The barons, if not 
explicitly more enlightened, were more bourgeois. The objective laws of economic 
development forced them to adopt reforms, but only to the degree necessitated 
by economic pressure. While the protection of privilege is also acknowledged as 
a prime motivator in Ritter conservative policy, political motivation is generally 
neglected in favour of the economic factor.3
The relationship between the Russian Empire and its Baltic provinces in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has not been covered by Soviet historians. 
An article in a recent Soviet publication, describing the necessity of applying 
perestroika to the study of history, admits deficiencies in past historical 
methodology, amongst which is clearly the lack of attention paid to the history of 
the individual parts of the Russian Empire in their relationship to the whole: "... 
[HJistorians must take part in drawing up new forms of coexistence among the 
different nationalities. They are at the moment badly prepared for this. ... [T]he 
languages and histories of foreign countries have been studied. Everything has
2 A.V.Predtechensky, Ocherki obshchestvenno-politicheskoy istorii Rossii v  pervoy chetverti XIX 
veka, (Moscow-Leningrad, 1957). Predtechensky predictably emphasizes the class struggle of the 
peasantry and the development of capitalist relations as the necessary prerequisites of reform in the 
Baltic, p.365.
3 See, for example, M.M.Dukhanov, Ostzeitsv. Politika ostzeiskogo dvoryanstva v  50-70 gg. XIX 
v. i kritika ee apologeticheskoi istoriografii (Riga, 1978), 457-459. Dukhanov's comprehensive survey 
of Baltic "apologists" (Carl Schirren, Reinhard Wittram, Hans Rothfels, Georg von Rauch, Alexander 
Tobien amongst others) is a useful critical assessment from the Soviet point of view. Ibid., Chapter 
Two, 53-100.
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been studied except the history of the peoples of our own country. No-one has 
studied the Union or the Russian Empire as a whole. Kazakhs have studied 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekis Uzbekistan, Lithuanians Lithuania and Latvians Latvia ...".4
Baltic Soviet historians have naturally concerned themselves with reforms 
in their own area. Their main point of focus has been to determine what 
influence reforms had on social-economic development in the provinces. There 
is no attempt to place them in the larger context of the Russian Empire. Yuhan 
Kahk, however, does recognize the need to do so. "The question as to why a 
comparatively early start was made on agrarian reform in the Baltic can be 
resolved only within the framework of a wider investigation, involving questions 
of social-economic development and the agrarian policy in the whole Russian 
Empire at that time."5 Kahk's conclusion is a valid one. The question is indeed 
part of a larger framework and involves political, social, economic, cultural, ethical 
and agricultural contexts. Not only does a study of agrarian reform require this 
comprehensive approach but it must also involve the details of legislation. It is 
thus an effective focal point for examining Baltic/Russian interaction. Agrarian 
reform necessitated an official and documented interchange between province and 
empire. The attempt to answer Kahk's question provides a history of the impulses 
of the reform process and inevitably leads to a re-assessment of Baltic/Russian 
relations, of which the reform process was an integral part.
There are no notable works of synthesis on Baltic/Russian relations in the
4 "Istoricheskoe Soznanie Obshchestva - Na Uroven' Zadach Perestroika," Voprosi Istorii, no.l, 
(January, 1990), 16.
5 Yuhan Kahk, "K voprosu ob agramoy politike tsarizma v Liflyandii v  nachale XIX stoletiya," 
Istoriva SSSR. no.2 (1962), 127.
era of reform. As Georg von Rauch noted some decades ago, "Baltic relations 
with Russia from 1700 to 1917 is an area of research on the whole not yet 
covered."6 There have been recent attempts to view the Baltic provinces in the 
broader context of the Russian Empire, but the motivating impulse of such 
research is the Russification era of the second half of the nineteenth century, 
which has been well covered by Baltic historians anxious to describe the problems 
of belonging to the Russian Empire.7 Russian policies and attitudes are dealt 
with from this point of view. The preceding era, the age of agrarian reform, is the 
missing first chapter.
The limited amount of research in the area of Baltic /Russian relations in 
the period of agrarian reform has been recognized not only by Soviet writers and 
Soviet Baltic writers but also by German Baltic historians. Georg von Rauch calls 
for continued interest in the agrarian question, its initiatives, its reforms and their 
execution, in both East and West "perhaps even cooperatively." What is missing, 
he continues, is a "comprehensive and comparative survey, which would clarify 
reciprocal effects and influences".8
While the aim of this dissertation cannot be to assume this task, it does 
provide a first step in that direction. It examines the process of agrarian reform 
in the context of provincial/imperial interaction, identifies the different roles
6 Georg von Rauch, "Der russische Reichsgedanke im Spiegel des politischen Bewufitseins der 
baltischen Provinzen," in Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft vol I (Munich, 1954), 183.
7 Edward Thaden is particularly representative of this trend. E.Thaden ed., Russification in the 
Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton, 1981) contains other examples of historians, mainly 
American, of this school of thought.
8 Georg von Rauch, "Politische Voraussetzungen fur westostliche Kulturbeziehungen im 
18.Jahrhundert," in Russen und Rutland aus deutscher Sicht. 18.Tahrhundert: Aufklarung, ed. Mechthild 
Keller, (Munich, 1987), 53.
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played by the provinces and the Empire in reform motivation and legislation9 and 
clarifies the complicated dynamics of the interaction.
Description of Chapters
The provincial/imperial framework is clarified in Chapter I in terms of the 
definition of status and rights, of attitudes and expectations, of provincial 
privilege and imperial prerogative. The perspective of provincial privilege, 
incorporated in the Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti of 1561, within imperial 
parameters is dealt with in detail since the maintenance of this provincial privilege 
within the Empire on the one hand and the imperial management of provincial 
privilege on the other was a major pivot in the history of Baltic/Russian relations 
in the period of agarian reform.
The relationship involved aspects of potential confrontation. Chapter II 
examines the basic German/Russian dichotomy in the eighteenth century context, 
particularly with regard to cultural affinity and political loyalty. The relevant 
aspects of enlightenment, especially the German one, as a background to reform 
are examined as well as the influence of humanitarian Christian ideals and 
practice. Imperial interest in reform in the Baltic is identified and clarified.
Chapter El emphasizes the pragmatics of imperial statecraft in the 
government's attitude to agrarian reform in the Baltic provinces and the provincial 
response to imperial pressure. Other catalysts, mainly economic considerations 
and agricultural realities, are described. The chapter clarifies the impulses and the 
complicated interdependence of cause and effect behind the 1802-1804 reform
9 Identifying the actual decision-makers corrects a deficiency already noted in German Baltic 
research. See Gert von Pistohlkors, "Regionalismus als Konzept der baltischen Geschichte: 
Uberlegungen zum Stand der Geschichtsschreibung fiber die baltischen Provinzen Russlands im 19. 
Jahrhundert," in Tournal of Baltic Studies vol XV, no .2 /3  (Summer-Fall 1984):111.
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period.
Chapter IV sets the contemporary theoretical background to emancipation 
and examines the contradictions in actual practice, with reference to other 
Northern European reforms. The dichotomy of theory and practice, and the 
reasons for it, are explored particularly in the Livland emancipation reform 
debate. The significant role of the Empire in the reform process is clearly 
indicated as is the interdependence of events in each of the three provinces.
The fate of the Baltic emancipation reforms is dealt with in the final 
chapter. Their inherent inconsistencies are examined and their practical 
application assessed. A major focus of the chapter is the development of a firm 
agrarian policy on the imperial side, how it differed from the Baltic emancipation 
reforms and what effect it had on them.
CHAPTER I 
PROVINCE AND EMPIRE
15
PART ONE: PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVILEGE
Dominium Maris Baltici
In 1710 Peter the Great fulfilled Russia's long ambition to gain access to the 
Baltic Sea. One hundred and fifty years earlier, Ivan IV had recognized the 
economic and political significance of the Baltic coast but had failed against 
stronger contenders in his attempts to establish a link with Europe. Through their 
successive control of the Baltic, Poland and Sweden had isolated Russia from 
Europe until a reformed military under Peter was eventually able to overcome the 
power of Sweden.
As dominium maris Baltici, Russia had extended its empire strategically to 
gain the all important window on the West. The port cities of Narva, Reval, 
Pemau and Riga were also significant strategic gains for immediate war aims.1
Although they could not be used as naval ports as such since the Bay of 
Kronstadt was frozen over for half the year,2 these cities could be used as 
deployment centres for military campaigns against Sweden, Poland, Prussia and 
Kurland. From the point of view of Peter's military needs, new territories would 
also provide a source of replenishing his army.3 The new provinces would 
eventually prove to be a source of fiscal revenue, army recruits, bureaucratic 
expertise, and landed estates to give in acknowledgment of services rendered to
1 Reinhard Wittram, Peter der Grofie: Der Eintritt RuBlands in die Neuzeit (Berlin, 1954), 107.
2 Peter did attempt to build a naval port, first at Reval in 1713, but the construction sank into the 
sea. A second attempt was not completed. Ibid., 107-108.
3 The economic situation in the Baltic area, however, had been devastated by war and was hardly 
capable of supporting this new burden.
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the Empire, but of immediate importance was their role in Russia's ability to 
maintain its position as dominium maris Baltici.
Das Schicksalsland
The "window on the West" was not only a geographically, militarily and 
economically advantageous coastal position, however. It consisted of the 
inhabited Baltic lands of Livland and Estland.4 The thirteenth century tribes of 
these lands had succumbed to the papally sanctioned crusade of the Knights of 
the Sword from northern Germany "driven by visions of gaining in Livland a 
heavenly kingdom for the Virgin Mary and an earthly one for themselves."5 The 
Knights later joined forces with the powerful German Order and together they 
ruled the area as part of the Holy Roman Empire until the sixteenth century. The 
eventual disintegration of the Order, undermined by the influence of the 
Reformation, created a power vacuum and subjected the Baltic lands to wars 
fought over their possession by Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, Denmark and Russia. 
Whichever power ruled the Baltic — the dominium maris Baltici —ruled the Baltic 
lands. This historical perspective of the Baltic or Livland ruled by fate rather than 
by choice — das Schicksalsland -  is one favoured by Baltic historiography6 and
4 From the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, under the Teutonic Order, the Baltic area was 
known as Livland. It embraced those areas later known as Estland and Kurland. In the mid­
seventeenth century the name was used for the central area only, the northern part was called Estland 
while Kurland and Semigallia south of the Daugava (Dvina) River were collectively known as 
Kurland. Livland, however, was inhabited by both Letten and Esthen, the original inhabitants of the 
area. The latter belonged to the Finno-Ugrian group. The name Livland is derived from the first tribe 
encountered by the Germans, the Livs, later assimilated into the Letts.
5 Alexander von Hueck, Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse in Esth-, Liv- und 
Curland (Leipzig, 1845), 59.
6 For example, Reinhard Wittram, Baltische Geschichte: Die Ostseelander Livland, Estland, Kurland 
1180-1918 (Munich, 1954), 88. A similar perspective describes the Baltic as das Schlachtfeld der hOchsten 
Politik, literally, the battleground of the highest politics. Hans Rothfels, its main proponent, would  
translate it as " a battleground of fundamental ideas in politics." See Hans Rothfels, "The Baltic
defines the relationship between the Baltic provinces and the Russian Empire as 
one of unavoidable dependence. This dependence, however, contained a strong 
element of independence in the privileges the nobles had established and 
maintained, regardless of their fate otherwise.
Privilege established under Poland
Although the feudal Teutonic Order in Livland eventually failed to match 
its neighbours militarily, it was still very much a presence in the Baltic lands, 
mainly in the form of the Ritter.7 They had gradually assumed political power 
over the medieval ecclesiastical estates and free towns, which had shared the 
ruling of the lands in a loose and ultimately ineffective confederation as part of 
the Holy Roman Empire. The maintenance of this privileged position was 
dependent not only on internal manipulation but also on external tolerance, on the 
dominium maris Baltici. In the mid-sixteenth century the Order sought Poland's 
protection against Russia's attempted conquest of the area and in 1561 a treaty of 
union was effected between the Order and Sigismund Augustus of Poland.8 The 
terms of the union would bring not just military protection but would consolidate
Provinces: Some Historic Aspects and Perspectives," Toumal of Central European Affairs vol.4, no.2 
(July, 1944): 117. Although it was the fate of the Baltic lands to be the Schlachtfeld, literally and 
metaphorically, for greater powers, Rothfels' emphasis leads to a different perspective, namely that 
the Baltic was the battlefield for the Europeanization of the Russian Empire. See Hans Rothfels, 
"Reich, Staat und Nation im deutsch-baltischen Denken," Schriften der Konigsberger Gelehrten 
Gesellschaft Heft 4 (Halle, 1930): 220. The phrase is attributed to Count Peter Shuvalov, the Russian 
Governor General in 1870, who used it in a wider context than Rothfels. See Georg von Rauch, "Der 
russische Reichsgedanke im Spiegel des politischen Bewufitseins der baltischen Provinzen," 
Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft Band 1 (Munich, 1954): 201.
7 Knights. The nobility of the Baltic provinces, remnants of the original Knights of the Order of 
the Sword, referred to themselves as the Ritterschaft. The appellation is significant in its feudal 
associations, very much kept alive by the Ritter. The word is the same in singular and plural; from 
now on it w ill not be italicised.
8 Estland did not become part of Poland but of Sweden. Kurland and Semigallia, as part of the 
union agreement, were given to the last Grand Master of the Order, Gotthard von Kettler, as a duchy 
under Polish fiefdom. This division of the lands into three entities would remain until 1917.
and strengthen the privileged position of the Ritter in their own country. The 
Baltic Ritter had stated their wishes very clearly before agreeing to subject 
themselves to the Polish king. A letter to Sigismund Augustus from his delegate 
in Livland on 8 September 1561 described the Ritter's terms, which included 
recognition of the authority of the Archbishop of Riga in all religious matters and 
the authority of the feudal power of the lord over his vassals, all subject to the 
general dominion of the Polish king. Explicitly, the right to declare and wage war 
is mentioned as part of the imperial domain as well as judicial matters and 
procedures. The Livland demands include recognition of all the nobility's previous 
holdings, laws, privileges and immunities and an insistence on the continuance 
of those offices which would ensure the German language, customs and laws, as 
well as the right to follow the Protestant faith.9 The petition was not out of the 
ordinary. First, Poland's own nobility enjoyed extensive legal and economic 
privileges and rights and dominated the legislative process.10 Secondly, it was 
almost a copy of the Prussian submissions to Poland in 1525.11 On 28 November 
1561, King Sigismund Augustus of Poland granted a charter of rights to the 
nobility of Livland. These rights, the Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti, would 
assume the utmost importance for the Ritter, forming not only the justification for 
their status within the Swedish and later Russian Empire, but also the very basis 
of their existence, the cornerstone of their historical presence.
It was the threat of Russia which had brought the Ritter to Poland and the
9 Carl Schirren, ed., Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des Untergangs livlandischer Selbstandigkeit vol 
III (Reval, 1883), letter 281, pp.233-234. This letter is in Latin and the translation is my own.
10 For a summary of the rights conceded by the Polish sovereign from the fifteenth century on, see 
Norman Davies, God's Playground. A History of Poland: The Origins to 1795 (New York, 1982), 211- 
215.
11 The Prussian Order sought protection from Poland against the undermining of its power in the 
face of mass conversions to Lutheranism. Ibid., 143, 147.
Privilegium did guarantee defence against external enemies, a task which the 
Holy Roman Empire had failed to fulfil. It also promised aid to those rendered 
poor by the years of war, a burden the Ritter were not willing and often not able 
to assume. These immediate aims were, however, not priorities on the list.12 
The first two articles guaranteed the freedom to remain Protestant, with Polish 
support for the maintenance and improvement of churches. The Ritter's political 
and administrative power was guaranteed by the right to continue with their 
German laws (Article IV), by the right to have only local persons of wealth13 
appointed to higher offices, as was the case in Prussia (Article V), and by the 
confirmation of the estates, rights, freedoms and prerogatives as enjoyed by the 
Polish nobility (Article IX). A step towards judicial independence was made in 
the concession to allow courts to be set up in Riga and its members to be chosen 
by the nobility, subject to the King's approval (Article VI). The majority of the 
articles dealt with the economic situation of the Ritter. In order to enjoy political 
privileges, economic well-being and security were essential. Conversely, political 
privilege guaranteed economic rights and security. The interdependence of the
12 Although immediate economic aid to overcome the hardships inflicted by war was the third 
article of the agreement, defence was not dealt with until Articles XI, XII, and XXIV.
I have used the text of the Privilegium as reproduced by Carl Schirren, ed., Die Capitulationen der 
livlandischen Ritter- und Landschaft (Dorpat, 1865), 3-23. Schirren points out, as others do, (see, for 
example, Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 89) that the original of the Privilegium was destroyed. He 
claims the text he uses is the one on which the capitulation to the Russians was based. ("Aus 
Ceumems Theatridium Livonicum. Riga 1690.” Wittram IBaltische Geschichte, 90] describes Caspar 
von Ceumem as a lawyer w ho had come to Livland from Thuringen via Sweden, was ennobled and 
held the office of Secretary to the Ritterschaft from 1657 to 1677, during which time he compiled the 
handbook of Ritter rights, which Schirren uses as his source.) A Latin text, taken from an earlier 
source, is also reproduced. The Roman numerals used refer to the Latin text which is more clearly 
divided into articles than the German text.
Only one source (Latin,1593) earlier than those used by Schirren is given in Eduard Winkelmann, 
Bibliotheca Livoniae Historica. Svstematisches Verzeichniss der Ouellen und Hulfsmittel zur 
Geschichte Estlands, Livlands und Kurlands (Berlin, 1878), 158.
The articles of the Privilegium are also summarized in Geschichtliche Ubersicht der Grundlagen und 
der Entwicklung des Provinzialrechts in den Ostseegouvemements (St Petersburg, 1845), 40-43.
13 In German: nur allein den Einheimischen und Wolbesitzlichen (sic). In Latin: Ut solis indigenis, 
et bene possessionatis.
political and economic rights of the Ritter would be an important perspective in 
their future history. In sixteenth century Europe, land was the basis of economic 
power and the Privilegium guaranteed the Ritter their right to their estates, no 
matter how they were acquired and without written proof of ownership (Article 
VIII). The size of these estates would not be reduced (Article XIII) and nobles 
were allowed to dispose of their property as they wished (Article VII). Property 
could be inherited on the female as well as the male side (Article X) thus ensuring 
continued noble ownership of the land even in the absence of a male heir. 
Violations of property were punishable by death (Article XIX). Without the 
necessary labour force, landed estates were not a source of economic power and 
the Privilegium regulated the landowner's control over his peasants, granting him 
complete jurisdiction over them ,rbecause it had often been the case in Livland 
before that nobles were killed by their own peasants" (Article XXVI). The 
peasants, as before, were bound by corvee and other services to their lords 
(Article XXIII). The Privilegium did not restrict economic advantages to land and 
labour. The Ritter complained about merchants, most of them foreigners, trading 
in animal pelts, grain and other goods to the detriment of the Ritter and the cities, 
i.e. to the detriment of the German population. Article XX of the agreement 
forbade such trading, thus affording the Ritter and the German merchants trade 
protection. The Ritter, but not the merchants, were exempt from custom and other 
dues on commerce (Article XIV). The Privilegium also affirmed the Ritter 
monopoly on the brewing and selling, tax exempt, of beer, as well as the usufruct 
of uncultivated land, such as fields, meadows and woods and any profit from this 
use such as the sale of animal skins (from hunting) or wood (Article XXI). A 
further economic advantage was the use of the same coinage as in Poland and
Lithuania.
Three centuries later the Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti would still be 
cited as a valid and legal support to the Ritter's claims to privileged status.14 
W hat the barons could not defend with might, they would with right, defending 
their privileges "with instinctive terror ... to cling to the ramparts which have 
defended them for six centuries."15 Although the use of the Privilegium to 
defend their status would cast the Ritter in a feudal mould, an anachronism after 
the sixteenth century, the Privilegium is an important leitmotif in the history of 
the Baltic barons in their relation to those governments whose subjects they 
theoretically were. The Ritter considered the maintenance of these rights, 
anachronistic or not, with or without the support of their overlords, their main 
historical task.
The Privilegium was perceived by others as the key to German privileged 
status. Russia accepted it, confirmed and reaffirmed it, limiting commentary to 
questions of interpretation rather than substance. Russia divided the articles, for 
example, into those which were binding for all parts and cities of the Baltic area 
and those which had been granted to specific sections; and into those which were 
permanently binding and those of only temporary validity.16 The absence of 
original documents, however, allowed more severe critics to question the 
authenticity of the Privilegium, thereby questioning the validity of German rights 
in the Baltic. Samarin notes in one of his letters to Baroness Rahden in 1864 that
14 Carl Schirren in Livlandische Antwort an Herm Turi Samarin (Leipzig, 1869) bases his arguments 
for the maintenance of provincial rights on the Privilegium.
15 Baroness Rahden (of Kurland) in a letter to Iuri Samarin in 1864. Loren Calder, ed., The 
Correspondence of Iu. Samarin and Baroness Rahden 1861-1876, (1974), 54.
16 F.Bunge, Geschichtliche Ubersicht der Grundlagen und der Entwickelung des Provinzialrechts 
in den Ostseegouvemements (St Petersburg 1845), Allgemeiner Theil, 86-87. This historical overview  
was prepared in the department of the Imperial Chancery and translated into German.
"the Swedish government (which knows something about it) has never been 
willing to recognize [its authenticity]."17 In the preceding century, articles were 
written to defend the authenticity of the Privilegium.18 Even in this century, 
questions as to its authenticity were raised in the Latvian press (most notably on 
the occasion of the 375th anniversary of the Privilegium), giving rise to a debate 
which continued for some time.19 While the historical motives of those interested 
in invalidating the Privilegium are obvious, the possibility that later copies of the 
original added or subtracted in the interests of the Ritter cannot be definitively 
ruled out.20 The historical authenticity of the demands is less important, 
however, than the demands themselves. Whether completely authentic in the 
documentary sense or not, they were formulated by and in the interests of the 
Baltic Ritter and as such authentically represent the Baltic nobility for as long as 
the Privilegium was used as a historical justification.
Privilege defended under Sweden
The union with Poland did not protect Livland from further wars. In 1592 
Sweden began another attempt to gain a foothold on the Baltic coast. Another 
perspective was added to the military struggle in the form of religion: Catholic 
Poland versus Protestant Sweden. In Livland the teachings of Martin Luther had 
gained ground amongst the Germans in the course of the century and the Ritter
17 The Correspondence of Iu. Samarin and Baroness Rahden, 41.
18 See E.Winkelmann, Bibliotheca Livoniae Historica, 159.
19 Erwin E. Aidnik, "Zur Geschichte des Privilegiums Sigismundi Augusti fur die Livlandische 
Ritterschaft vom 28. November 1561/ in Historische Zeitschrift vol.157 (1937): 69-74. See also Ludwig 
Karstens-Hamburg, "Die Echtheit des Privilegiums Sigismundi Augusti," in Tomsburg. Volker und 
Staaten im Osten und Norden Europas, vol.2 (1938): 247-251.
20 Despite concordance in, for example, the Latin copy of 1593 and the German one of 1690 used 
by Schirren.
had converted to Protestantism. Theoretically, Poland, although strongly Catholic, 
upheld freedom of religious belief and had formally declared toleration in the 
Confederation of Warsaw on 28 January 1573.21 In practice, Catholic supremacy 
in political and social fields in Poland was the order of the day.22 The Protestant 
faith of the Ritter, however, had been formally upheld23 and safely passed over 
into Protestant Swedish hands.24 Under Orthodox Russia, the Ritter would also 
ensure that the freedom to be Protestant was part of their recognized provincial 
rights.
In 1629, Poland ceded its Baltic possessions to Sweden and a new era of 
accommodation to a foreign power began for the barons.25 Although Sweden 
first confirmed their acquired privileges only provisionally,26 the Ritter were still 
able to further consolidate their privileged position considerably. Many of the key 
structures of their self-government have their origins in Swedish times.27 The
21 "We swear... that we who differ in matters of religion will keep the peace among ourselves, and 
neither shed blood on account of differences of Faith, or kinds of church, nor punish one another by 
confiscation of goods, deprivation of honour, imprisonment, or exile ..." Cited in Davies, God's 
Playground, 160.
22 There was more than implicit religious discrimination to contend with. The Polish era in the 
Baltic has been described as a merciless reign of "robbery, murder, dissipation, and injustice against 
the hated Germans," compounded by the ravages of war. See Hueck, Darstellung der 
landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 69-70.
23 Religious toleration was not the rule in the sixteenth century. In May, 1561 King Frederick II 
of Denmark, for example, warned Oesel and Reval against continuing "papish ceremonies" which  
would bring down the wrath of the Almighty. He ordered adherence to the Augsburg Confession 
(Lutheranism). Carl Schirren, ed. Neue Quellen vol.III (Reval, 1885), letter 246, p.124.
24 Under Sweden, the Augsburg Confession was the official religion. Catholics, Calvinists and 
others were deprived of civil rights. Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 91.
25 Estland had been under Swedish rule since 1561. Described as a "privileged colony," it kept its 
autonomous administration. When taken over by Sweden, the wish of the Livland Ritter to be 
incorporated with the Ritter of Estland was not granted. See Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 89.
26 Ibid.
27 "Zur Geschichte der livlandischen Privilegien III", Baltische Monatsschrift, Band 49 (1900): 396. 
The institutions will be discussed in the second part of the chapter, with indications of which stemmed 
from Swedish times.
24
political power of the Ritter was firmly established but their economic position 
worsened as Sweden faced economic difficulties. Decades of war had allowed the 
Swedish nobility to amass and keep large amounts of crown land. Unwilling to 
pay taxes on these huge properties in times of peace, they were forced to reduce 
their holdings voluntarily. When war broke out again in the middle of the 
century,28 the reductions of property halted but by the end of the century 
reducing the landholdings of the Swedish nobility was a firm policy. The Baltic 
lands were subjected to the same policy. Not only would new crown land in the 
Baltic area provide an additional source of revenue for Sweden but the Swedish 
nobility would not be given cause to complain about preferential treatment for the 
Baltic nobility. Sweden began a review of the titles to the landed estates in its new 
provinces and confiscated the land from those landowners who had acquired their 
estates improperly in times of war, in this case mainly Poles. These estates went 
to Swedish families, not the Crown itself. By 1641 two-fifths of cultivated land 
was owned by Swedes,29 and by 1680 almost half of all estates in Livland 
belonged to sixteen Swedish families.30
Sweden's growing commitment to the reduction policy gradually forced the 
Ritter into confrontation with the Swedish king. Although it was the newer 
landowners who were affected by the reductions, such a policy might eventually 
threaten the existence of the traditional Ritter families. It was, they claimed, a 
violation of their confirmed privileges. In 1678, Charles XI was persuaded not 
only to reconfirm their privileges in general but to revoke the next planned
28 With Poland and with Denmark-Norway 1654-60.
29 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte. 93.
30 Ibid., 99.
reduction of property and promise not to act in future without the 
agreement of the Ritter. These were generous concessions and lead to speculation 
as to what the Ritter promised in return, especially in light of the fact that the 
Swedish king proceeded to do exactly what the Ritter wanted. The Swedish 
estates in Livland were confiscated, an obvious economic advantage to the Ritter. 
One-third of cultivated land in Livland was acquired by the Swedish Crown in 
this way.31 A decade later, the Ritter again felt threatened by Sweden's 
commitment to reduction as an expedient fiscal policy and refused to consider the 
king's demands, viewing them once more as a violation of their privileges. This 
time the confrontation did not go well for the Ritter. The King ordered all estates 
acquired after 1561 to be confiscated. In Livland, the number of estates declared 
confiscable was ever eighty percent.32
The policy of reduction was in essence a fiscal policy, but disagreement 
over it focused eventually on the political issue of provincial privilege. The initial 
intention of the Swedish Crown may have been to introduce reduction on a small 
scale in Livland to keep it in line with the rest of Sweden but faced with 
increasing resistance from the Ritter, the Crown was forced to take more drastic 
steps.33 From this viewpoint, the confrontation was as much about the 
possession of provincial privilege by a dependency as it was about the loss of 
land. The Swedish Crown's subsequent attempts to curtail self-government in
31 Ibid., 100.
32 The proportion generally quoted is five-sixths. See, for example, Walther Freiherr von Ungern 
Sternberg, Geschichte der baltischen Ritterschaften (Limburg, 1960), 20.
In the case of Estland where there had been more continuity since the days of the Order, at least 
thirty-seven percent of private landholdings were declared confiscable. Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 
100.
33 This view  is represented in: Juhan Vasar, P ie grofie Livlandische Guterreduktion (Tartu, 1931). 
It is cited in: N.Wihksninsch, Die Aufklarung und die Agrarfrage in Livland (Riga, 1933), 251.
Livland as a means of dealing with the recalcitrant Ritter place the issue of land 
reduction in the centre of the conflict between Swedish absolutism and Baltic 
autonomy.34 This may be a valid perspective in light of the fact that there were 
other issues of disagreement between the Swedish Crown and its Baltic provinces, 
most importantly the agrarian reforms introduced by Sweden to better the lot of 
the serfs.35
In 1690, the issue became clearly one of provincial privilege versus 
sovereign authority. The Swedish King asked for a Baltic delegation to come to 
Stockholm to furnish proof of provincial rights. The ensuing discussions sought 
to define the position of Livland as part of the Swedish Empire and assert the 
legality of provincial rights. After a year imperial agreement had not been 
secured. The Ritter then became more insistent, a stance to which their overlord 
reacted swiftly. The Landtag, the political representative body of the Ritter, was 
closed and the main drafters of the petition were sentenced to death.36 In 1693, 
the unlimited power of the Swedish monarch was confirmed and at the end of the
34 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte. 99.
35 The agrarian situation will be dealt with separately in the second part of the chapter. It is 
relevant here to mention one historical perspective which view s the endeavours of the Swedes to 
improve the material and legal situation of the serfs in the Baltic in the seventeenth century as a 
method of undermining and opposing the German landowners. See K.I.Lander, "Pribaltiskiy kray v  
pervoy polovine XIX veka," in Istoriva Rossii v  XIX veke (Moscow 1909),329.
36 The episode of Baltic resistance to Swedish absolutism contains one of "Livland's historically 
most effective characters." (Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 101.) Johann Reinhold von Patkul was one 
of the Livland delegates and the main drafter of the second petition. He was ordered to Stockholm 
to stand trial and his plea for mercy being refused, he fled in October 1694. Six weeks later, he was 
sentenced to forfeit his honour, life and possessions. Three others - Vietinghoff, Budberg and 
Mengden - received the death sentence which was commuted to imprisonment. After the death of 
Charles XI, they were freed. In exile, Patkul worked for an alliance against Sweden with the aim of 
freeing the Baltic lands into the rule of the Ritter, under Polish protection. By 1703, he was in the 
service of Peter the Great and sent as envoy to Warsaw. He was then handed over by Poland as part 
of a peace agreement (1706 Altranstaedt) to Charles XII of Sweden, w ho had him broken on the wheel 
and beheaded in October 1707. Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 101-103; Ungern-Sternberg, Geschichte 
der baltischen Ritterschaften, 20-21.
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following year self-governing status in Livland was abolished.37 In effect, the 
institutions of self-govemement introduced earlier in the century were cancelled. 
The Ritter were forbidden to assemble as a body except by express command of 
the Swedish sovereign and then only under the chairmanship of the General 
Governor, the Swedish plenipotentiary in Livland. The Ritter were forbidden to 
bring complaints against the government and could only do so individually and 
through the General Governor, even when the complaints were against him.38 
The drastic reductions in landholdings had rendered the economic status of the 
Livland Ritter most precarious and now many of their political privileges were 
abrogated.39 The Ritter had overestimated the strength of their position against 
an absolute monarch.
The existence of the Ritter as a privileged corps might have ended there but 
for the untimely death of Charles XI in 1697, who was succeeded by his fifteen 
year old son, Charles XII. Russia, Poland and Denmark in coalition now saw a 
chance to break Swedish dominion in the North. The campaign, however, did not 
run  as easily as expected and suffered several defeats at the outset from Swedish 
troops led by their young king,40 but by 1710 Peter the Great had broken 
Swedish dominion in the Baltic.
Although Sweden had almost destroyed the Ritter as a corps by the 
removal of many of their rights and much of their land, the Ritter fought on the
37 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte. 103.
38 Ungern-Sternberg, Geschichte der baltischen Ritterschaften, 20.
39 The institutions of self-government in Estland were not affected. Ungern-Sternberg, Geschichte 
der baltischen Ritterschaften, 20. Since the extent of the reductions had been much less in Estland, the 
Ritter were not as resistant. Estland also benefited by having been under Swedish rule since 1561.
40 Notably, the defeat of the Russian forces at Narva in November 1700 and of the Saxons at Riga 
in 1701.
side of Sweden against Russia. Not less than three-fifths of the Swedish army was 
under the leadership of Baltic-German officers41 and a quarter of these officers 
died in battle.42 This was a fight for their privileges, for their Stand, as much as 
for Sweden, since the alternative to Swedish dominion seemed to be a much more 
unlimited absolutism. Absolutism in Russia, as the Baltic Ritter knew, was totally 
unlimited and still wielded with terror. Peter the Great may have been on the 
road to reform but more evident to the Ritter were the reports in the German 
press about the terrible executions he had ordered on his return from Europe to 
deal with the streltsy conspirators.43 Russian barbarism had also been 
experienced first hand in the strategy of devastation employed by the Russian 
troops.44 Since the time of Ivan the Terrible, Russia had been the arch enemy. 
The Ritter would stand more chance of regaining their rights under Sweden than 
establishing them under a more extreme and barbaric absolutism. Their loyalty 
to Sweden was a sign of their determination to fight for their privileges, for their 
survival.
In the face of military catastrophe, however, the Ritter had no alternative 
but to succumb to the Russians. Riga, Pemau and Reval capitulated only after 
long sieges made impossible by plague. It was a move of some political
41 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 104. Ungern-Sternberg, Geschichte der baltischen Ritterschaften,
21.
42 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte. 104.
43 Peter, in order to make an example of opponents of reform, ordered hundreds of executions a 
day, many of them preceded by torture. The German press carried reports that the tsar had chopped 
off heads with his own hands and had ordered the rebels to be hanged, or skewered, boiled in oil and 
water or buried alive. Emily Moepps, "Christian Stieffs 'Relation von dem gegenwartigen zustande des 
Moscowitischen Reichs' und ihr Platz im Umfeld von Presse und Propaganda," in Mechthild Keller, 
Russen und Rutland aus deutscher Sicht 18.Tahrhundert: Aufklarung (Munich, 1987), 64.
44 In 1704 Patkul wrote to the tsar protesting the destruction of the land and the barbaric massacres 
of innocent men, women and children by Russian troops. His letter is reproduced in Schirren, 
Livlandische Antwort, 123-124.
shrewdness that the Ritter negotiated for their privileges and rights. Their 
expectations of Russian absolutism were not high, but they nevertheless sought 
a reaffirmation of their rights as well as a restoration of those which Sweden had 
abrogated. The story of their relations with Russia would be the story of the 
protection of the rights they had almost lost under Sweden.
Privilege confirmed under Russia
Peter confirmed the rights and privileges of the Livland barons,45 re­
establishing the Ritter as a German political and economic power in their own 
lands, with a privileged position within the Russian Empire. The terms of 
confirmation were much the same as those of the Swedish confirmation of 1678. 
In fact, the Swedish decree of 10 May 1678 and the Russian one of 30 September 
1710 are remarkably similar in structure and language. They both confirm in 
general all previous privileges, rights, statutes, freedoms, immunities, as well as 
legally acquired property.46 The essential difference is that the Russian 
agreement was not a confirmation of the status quo but rather a restoration of all 
rights including those revoked under the Swedes. There is explicit reaffirmation 
of the Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti47 and an explicit restoration of property 
unrightfully taken from the Ritter.48 What the Russian confirmation effectively
45 As in the Swedish period, it is the Ritterschaft of Livland which present the historical interest 
for this topic. The Ritterschaft of Estland would have their privileges confirmed by the Russians in 
1712, but since they had not been part of the Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti nor had they lost as 
much in land or status under the Swedes, they had less to defend against Russian dominion.
46 The texts of both are given in German in Carl Schirren, Livland ische Antwort, 147-149.
47 Ibid., 147. The Swedish agreement had confirmed the Corpus Privilegiorum, which Schirren 
claims (Ibid.,154-155) included the Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti, but made no mention of the 
Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti as such.
48 Ibid., 147.
did was to return to the barons in the eighteenth century those feudal rights 
which they had been granted in the sixteenth century as well as those, mainly of 
self-administration, gained under Swedish rule. The barons were once more 
secure in their religious freedom (Protestant), their self-administration (German), 
control of the judiciary and ownership of the land. These were the essentials of 
a privileged status which was more a way of life than a countable list of rights. 
By the early nineteenth century, when the barons once more sought imperial 
reaffirmation of their privileged status, their privileges and rights are reported to 
have run to twenty-three volumes, mostly in German, Latin, and Swedish and 
would have kept four translators occupied for six to eight years.49 Some of these 
rights were gained under Russian rule, as part of the rights normally accorded to 
the nobility,50 but since Russian law lacked codification this only made a 
definitive summary, already elusive due to the historical origins of the majority 
of the rights, most complicated.51
Privilege limited
Despite most of their wishes being granted by the Russians, the Ritter of 
Livland were not satisfied. Their objections, which were not accepted by Russia, 
were to the two reservations contained in the general confirmation52 The
49 Schirren, Livland ische Antwort 45. The results of years of committee work on the part of the 
Germans and Russians on these many volumes are no longer available for examination having been 
destroyed in the great fire of 1862. Ibid., 46.
50 For example, the rights of petition and of deputation and freedom from arrest and imprisonment. 
"Zur livlandischen Privilegien III," 396.
51 Schirren describes the long process, which ended in the fire of 1862, which tried to codify the 
rights of the provinces. Schirren, Livlandische Antwort, 45-46.
52 Michael A. Haltzel, "Baltic Particularism and the Beginnings of Russification," in Edward Thaden 
ed., Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914 (Princeton, 1981), 112.
privileges and rights of the Ritter were confirmed only "as far as they are 
appropriate to the current government and time"53 and were granted by Peter 
"without prejudice and detriment to ours, our state, highness and law".54 It 
would seem a basic of statecraft that Russia, caught up in military campaigns and 
considerations with little time to study the rights and privileges of the barons as 
gathered in various languages over the centuries, would add a conditional clause 
to ensure that any element not found to be in keeping with its own interests or 
contrary to them could be revoked at any time. Had he agreed unconditionally 
to the historical privileges of the Livland Ritter, Peter the Great thenceforth, for 
example, could not have conducted war without the agreement of the Ritter and 
would have had to sanction union with Lithuania.55 It is the condition which 
sets the parameters of the relationship and it is in the condition that an essential 
characteristic of the relationship is reflected: that of province within, and subject
53 In the German text given by Schirren in Livlandische Antwort 148, and in Die Capitulationen 
47, the reservation appears as "so weit sich dieselben auf jetzige Herrschaft und Zeiten applicirin 
lassen." The text is also given in Russian in Die Capitulationen 49-50, and the reservation, given in 
brackets, corresponds. Haltzel (for reference see previous note) uses a different Russian translation but 
in essence the same. Another source quotes the German as "so weit sie mit den allgemeinen Gesetzen 
und Instituten unseres Reiches in Einklang stehen" (in so far as they are in accordance with the general 
laws and institutions of our Empire). N.WihksnihaaKDie Aufklarung und die Agrarfrage in Livland 
(Riga, 1933). This, however, is more the definite formulation which Alexander I would give nearly 
one hundred years later. Wihksninsch's source is: Wysockij, Aufsatze zur Geschichte der Vereinigung 
des Baltikums mit Rufiland (1710-19101. Teil I. "Russkaja Gosudarstwennostij" (Riga, 1910). 
Wihksninsch also introduces some confusion over dates, attributing this first reservation to 30 
September 1712 and the second to 1 March 1712. The confusion is understandable since several 
agreements were signed between 4 July 1710 and March 1712 separately with the cities of Riga, Reval 
and Pemau and with the Ritterschaft of both Livland and Estland. There were capitulation agreements 
and separate imperial confirmations of these agreements. A comprehensive list with a summary of 
the articles each agreement contained is available in Geschichtliche Ubersicht, Allgemeiner Theil, 83- 
107. Schirren documents several of these in Die Capitulationen but his dates do not always 
correspond with the former source.
Peter himself visited the area almost every year between capitulation and peace, eleven times in 
Reval and five times in Riga (Wittram, Peter der Grofie, 108) which occasioned more imperial 
pronouncements.
54 Schirren's version reads, "Doch Uns und Unserer Reiche Hoheit und Recht in alien vorbehaltlich 
und sonder Nachtheil und Praejudice."
55 Schirren, Livlandische Antwort. 154.
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to, an empire. Under Peter, Russia was already an empire and thought of itself 
as such. In 1710, Peter used the titles of Tsar and Emperor to the Ritter of the 
Baltic.56 While the latter may be viewed as no more than a translation of the 
former for a Western audience, it is more likely that Peter was aware of the 
significance of its use in Western terms. An emperor was more than a tsar as the 
Holy Roman Emperor proved.57
The conditional clause was, so to speak, appropriate imperial style. The 
Swedes had also used a reservation clause in their confirmation of 1678 and the 
Russian clause used almost the same words.58 The Russian plenipotentiary's 
answer to the Ritter's protests underlines the almost automatic nature of the 
clause: "It was a terminus generalis and a reservatum customary in such cases and 
which almost all rulers were unwilling to relinquish."59 A significant argument 
against the "automatic" nature of the reservation is that the privileges of the 
Ritterschaft in Estland, who had neither benefited from the Polish Privilegium 
Sigismundi Augusti nor lost so much under Sweden, were granted without any
56 Peter opens the general confirmation with this title. Schirren, Die Capitulationen, 47. Wittram 
(Peter der Grofle, 110) points out the significance of this.
57 The semantic perplexities of Russian political terms are dealt with in Isabel de Madariaga, 
"Autocracy and Sovereignty" in Canadian-American Slavic Studies vol.16, nos.3-4 (Fall-Winter 1982). 
See page 371 in particular for the tsar/emperor aspect.
58 The Russian version:
Doch Uns und Unserer Reiche Hoheit und Recht in alien vorbehaltlich und sonder Nachteil 
und Praejudice.
The Swedish formulation:
jedoch hienachst Unser und des Reiches Hoheit in alien vorbehalten und ohne dessen 
Praejudice oder Schaden.
Schirren, Livlandische Antwort. 147-149.
For several examples of the use of the same clause by previous overlords (for example: Charles V, 30 
October 1527; the Danish king Frederick II 14 March 1562; Queen Christina 17 August 1648) see 
Geschichtliche Ubersicht, Allgemeiner Theil, 101.
59 Cited in Ibid., 153.
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conditions on 1 March 1712.60 This does indicate an imperial awareness of the 
dangers to empire posed by the privileges of the Ritterschaft of Livland. The 
condition, whether automatic or deliberate, however, ensured that German self­
administration in Livland would be subject at any time to the greater Empire. 
The maintenance of German baronial privilege, therefore, was in effect dependent 
on Russian imperial will, just as it had been dependent on Swedish monarchs in 
the previous century. The privileged status of the Baltic Ritter was temporary and 
conditional against the seemingly permanent and absolute power of the Empire. 
The barons, fresh from their experience of conditional approvals from Sweden, 
feared an imperial loophole for future imperial intervention rather than a natural 
imperial safeguard. One hundred and fifty years later, the Ritter would still be 
trying to convince the Russians that the capitulation agreement was valid in 
perpetuity while the conditions were only valid for the term of the government 
which dictated them.61 Peter was prepared to grant administrative autonomy 
but not at the expense of his hard won empire, no matter how badly he needed 
the co-operation of the Baltic provinces for the maintenance of that very empire. 
At the time of the capitulation, Russia was still at war with Sweden62 and Peter 
knew it would be difficult to defend an extended coastline, as Charles XII had 
discovered, and still hope to defeat Sweden overall. To secure the fealty of the 
Baltic lands was a clear military advantage. It would also, as mentioned 
previously,63 provide quartering and deployment possibilities for future
60 M. Haltzel, "Baltic Particularism and the Beginnings of Russification," in Thaden ed.,
Russification in the Baltic Provinces, 113. Schirren, Livlandische Antwort, 153.
61 This view  is represented at its most uncategorical by Schirren, Livlandische Antwort, 154-157.
62 The Peace of Nystadt was not signed until 1721.
63 See page 15 above.
campaigns, as well as deprive Sweden not only of a strategic stronghold but also 
of up to three-fifths of its Baltic officers.64 These must have been primary 
considerations. The preferential treatment accorded the Baltic provinces has been 
explained by the high opinion Peter had of their political institutions, by Russia's 
hunger for European expertise, by the need for dependable support in foreign 
policy in the West, but this perspective stems more from retrospective 
hindsight.65 The Baltic barons may have contributed to the Empire in such ways 
but not in 1710. Peter's concessions were dictated by more pragmatic 
considerations of the moment. In a later justification of his war against Sweden, 
Peter validated his annexation of the Baltic provinces by the right of conquest in 
a just war and even added historical and legal grounds. No reference was made 
to the rights and privileges of the provinces themselves while much was said 
about the rights and powers of the Russian monarch.66
The relationship in eighteenth century terms
Empire
W hen the relationship between the Baltic provinces and the Russian Empire 
formally began at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the reality of political 
terms was different from present assumptions of them. The Russia of Peter the 
Great had come a long way from the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, extending 
territorially to embrace non-Slav elements. In recognition of this, from 1712 on
64 See page 28 above.
65 See Edward Thaden, "Estland, Livland, and the Ukraine: Reflections on Eighteenth-Century 
Regional Autonomy," in Tournal of Baltic Studies vol. XII, No.4 (Winter 1981). This article forms the 
basis, partly verbatim, of Chapter I of Thaden's later published work: Russia's Western Borderlands 
1710-1870 (Princeton, 1984).
66 James Cracraft, "Empire Versus Nation: Russian Political Theory under Peter I," in Harvard 
Ukrainian Studies vol.10 n o .3 /4  (December 1986): 537.
Peter officially used the term Russia rather than Muscovy.67 In addition to the 
extent of empire, the awareness of empire was established. Russia's envoys 
abroad were instructed to refer to the Russian Empire rather than to the Great 
Duchy of Muscovy and Peter himself, as already mentioned,68 referred to 
himself as "Tsar i Imperator vserossiiskiy".69 The concept and reality of empire, 
however, in the eighteenth century was one of a territorially rather than a 
politically united state: "...cessions and unions did not take place with any idea 
of regional individuality being submerged in that of a larger unit. In cases of 
conquest a sense of justice and the limitation of the political instruments of power 
worked together, if not to guarantee completely the constitution and legal system 
of the conquered territory, then at least in allowing them to persist to a large 
degree. (T)he repercussions within an area of a change in sovereignty were only 
very limited."70 The most widely extended empire of the eighteenth century was 
still the Holy Roman Empire, of which the Livonian Order had been a member 
state before its fate as the pawn of greater powers. The Holy Roman Empire 
belonged to a "historical world in which nationality had no political meaning and 
states did not command total sovereignty ... Its goal was not to ... dominate but
67 Wittram, Peter der GroBe, 135. Peter had already referred to Russia rather than Muscovy in the 
1710 confirmation. Schirren, Die Capitulationen, 47.
68 Page 32 above.
69 Schirren, Die Capitulationen. 49. See also Georg von Rauch, "Der russische Reichsgedanke im  
Spiegel des politischen Bewussteins der baltischen Provinzen," in Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft Band 1 
(Munich, 1954): 187. In addition, Wittram points out that the Russian ruler had a right to the title. 
It was bestowed on the Grand Duke of Muscovy as long ago as 1514. Wittram, Peter der GroSe, 135.
70 Dietrich Gerhard, "Regionalism and Corporate Order as a Basic Theme of European History," 
in R.Hatton and M.S.Anderson, eds., Studies in Diplomatic History (London 1970), 158-159. Gerhard 
does go on to say that, with the exception of the Baltic provinces and Finland, "the whole course of 
(Russian) expansion from the days of the Moscow tsars, i.e. from the fifteenth century, followed the 
path of ruthless integration."
rather to order and balance fragmented institutions and multiple loyalties."71
There was not just an absence of political power over its sovereign members but
imperial power was held in check by various representative bodies of princes,
nobility, and cities. This is the practice of empire with which the Baltic barons
were familiar.72 Thus, when the Baltic provinces became part of the Russian
Empire, their expectations were formed by the experience of this other Empire,
expectations perhaps incompatible with the Russian model of empire. The
Russian practice of empire was based firmly on the absolute power of the
monarch, a power without limitations of any kind. This was clearly expressed by
a treatise, most certainly ordered by Peter I, published in 1722 to refute
"contradictions of certain enemies learned in political thought."
"Among the peoples, Slavic and others, the title of majesty (maestat, ili 
velichestvo) is used to designate the highest and unsurpassable honor; it 
is applied to supreme rulers alone. The title signifies not only their 
transcending dignity, than which, after God's, there is no higher on earth, 
but also [their] supreme legislative power -- the power to judge without 
appeal and to issue incontrovertible orders while not being itself subject to 
any laws whatever;"
The treatise uses Western sources to support the validity of unlimited absolutism,
quoting, for example Hugo Grotius: "The highest power (termed majesty) is one
whose actions are not subject to the control of another power, so that they cannot
be rendered void by any other human will save his own."73 As the Russian
71 James J. Sheehan, German History 1770-1866, vol. in The Oxford History of Modern Europe, 
(Oxford, 1989), 14.
72 Since the Empire was in reality almost synonymous with Germany (Ibid., 15), it was especially 
familiar to the German barons in the Baltic.
73 The treatise was entitled Pravda voli monarshei vo opredelenii naslednika derzhavv svoei (The 
right of the monarch's will in designating the heir to his power) and was occasioned by Peter's decrees 
concerning succession. Cited in J.Cracraft, "Empire Versus Nation: Russian Political Theory under Peter 
I," 531. The political absolutism expressed was a departure from the Russian concept of the tsar. In 
Russia of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, "the political realm was inseparable from the 
religious-moral realm" and the tsar was a just judge of his subjects rather than a "secularized 
absolutist." The ideal of harmony between tsar and boyars, not a political ideal but a religious and 
moral one, was the essence of Russian polity. See Paul Bushkovitch, "The Formation of a National
Empire developed in the eighteenth century, the notion of unlimited absolutism 
was strengthened. In the middle of the century, Catherine added a new 
perspective:" The sovereign is absolute; for no other authority except that which 
is concentrated in his person can act appropriately in a state whose expanse is so 
vast. The expanse of the state requires that absolute power be vested in the 
person who rules over it..."74 Thus, the geographical reality of the Empire 
demanded absolute rule. By the end of the century, absolutism as the basis of 
imperial rule was firmly formulated: "Russia is an autocratic state. Its size, the 
variety of its inhabitants and customs ... make it the only natural form of 
government for Russia."75
Russia's actual practice of empire does reveal a seeming lack of consistency, 
some areas being accorded more independence than others. Its treatment of the 
Baltic provinces was preferential in comparison to that of the Left Bank Ukraine, 
which had become part of the Empire some fifty years before. Finland, which 
was incorporated into the Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
retained its independence. These discrepancies are perhaps explained less by the 
degree of usefulness of the new areas to the central government76 than by the 
pragmatic reaction of a still developing central power to its various parts. The 
underlying principle of autocratic, unlimited power, however, was consistent and 
remained the guiding force. It would eventually lead, sooner or later, to an
Consciousness in Early Modern Russia," in Harvard Ukrainian Studies vol.10, nos. 3 /4  (December 
1986).
74 From Catherine's "Instructions" to the Legislative Commission, cited in J.Cracraft, "Empire Versus 
Nation: Russian Political Theory under Peter I," 539.
75 From a 1799 memorandum of Prince Bezborodko to Paul I. Cited in Ibid., 540.
76 Edward Thaden ascribes the preferential treatment of the Baltic provinces to their usefulness to 
Russia and contrasts this treatment with the supposedly less useful Left Bank Ukraine. E.Thaden, 
Russia's Western Borderlands, Chapter 1.
insistence on uniformity and per se "Russification."77
The reality of the Holy Roman Empire with its limited central power was 
soon to become an anachronism. By the end of the century, as power had 
gradually shifted to its member states and new political values and forms had 
developed, the Holy Roman Empire no longer existed. The Russian Empire was 
not founded on the old order and belonged more to the next era when empires 
firmly wielded political power. Thus, the decline of the old order was paralleled 
by the development of the Russian Empire into a political power. This was a 
development which the Baltic Ritter had to adapt to.
If Russia's imperial character was from the outset more political than that 
of the Holy Roman Empire, it was limited by pragmatic considerations to the 
territorial character of the old concept of empire, the concept familiar to the Baltic 
barons. Russia was not capable of providing administration on an imperial scale. 
Its own administrative capacity was just beginning to develop78 and the presence 
of a local administration in the Baltic provinces was a very useful gain for Russia. 
Once the immediate necessity for military expediency had been removed by the 
Peace of Nystadt, Russia was still willing to confirm the privileged status of the
77 The term is used here in the sense of administrative, legal, bureaucratic uniformity rather than 
in the cultural sense. The use of the term often implies, perhaps inaccurately, the existence of a broad 
policy of forced Russian assimilation in all spheres for all parts of the Empire. See similar comments 
in Gert von Pistohlkors, "Regionalismus als Konzept der baltischen Geschichte: Uberlegungen zum  
Stand der Geschichtsschreibung uber die baltischen Provinzen Russlands im 19.Jahrhundert," in 
Tournal of Baltic Studies Vol.XV, N o.2/3  (Summer-Fall 1984): 111.
78 Peter did introduce reforms of centralization and rationalization, mainly for fiscal reasons. In 
1707-1708, for example, the Empire was divided into eight Gouvernements. In 1711, Peter founded a 
Senate and in 1722 the office of the General Procurator to oversee the Senate. His many administrative 
reforms were not always able to be put into practice due to, as one foreign observer remarked in 1715, 
"the Russians not having the necessary knowledge about the newly created offices, totally unknown  
to them before this, and the qualities which such offices demanded." Wittram, Peter der Grofie, 114- 
118. In 1724, the situation was still deemed deficient by the Prussian envoy who reported from Russia, 
"There are no words strong enough to give an accurate idea of the intolerable negligence and 
confusion, in which the most important affairs are conducted, so that foreign and interior ministers 
no longer know where to turn." Ibid., 138.
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provinces. The ten years between the capitulation and the Peace of Nystadt had 
shown that the local administration functioned.79
Although Peter welcomed a local administration in lieu of the 
administrative personnel Russia did not yet have, there were Russian 
administrators in Livland in 1721. Peter's temporary plenipotentiary was a Baltic 
German, J.G.Lowenwolde, but the General Governor as well as the governors and 
commanders of Riga and Reval were Russian. The town council of Riga was 
subjected to Russian control for some ten years.80 In Reval, the town council 
repeatedly refused to answer or consider the requests of the Russian commander 
since they were not written in German.81 Offices and positions had to be won 
from Russians, allegedly with shrewd bribery.82
Administrative necessity as a regulator of the Baltic/Russian relationship 
is another leitmotif in the history of the Baltic provinces and the Russian Empire. 
As Russia developed, it would increase its capacity to administer on an imperial 
level, to replace local authorities with central authorities. To view the relationship 
between the Baltic provinces and the Russian Empire solely in terms of local 
government, however, in terms of Russian interference in the political life of the 
province increasing in proportion to its administrative capabilities, would impose 
a narrow perspective however neatly it leads to the ultimate expression of
79 The Landtag, the political representative body in Livland, met six times between the capitulation 
and the Peace of Nystadt. Schirren, Livlandische Antwort, 131.
80 Wittram, Peter der Grofie, 108. Also Baltische Geschichte, 127-128.
81 Gotthard von Hansen, ed., Aus baltischer Vergangenheit. Miscellaneen aus dem Revaler 
Stadtarchiv (Reval, 1894), 90-91.
82 Wittram, Peter der Grofie, 108; Baltische Geschichte, 127.
uniform administration in the form of Russification.83 It also presumes that 
capability implies intention.
The eighteenth century territorial concept of empire was more acceptable 
to the Baltic Ritter than the developing state concept. Russia's development as an 
empire coincided with its development as a state, as the Russian nation. The 
former encompassed non-Russian elements, the latter emphasized the Russian 
element.84 Once the Russian Empire was perceived to be becoming more 
Russian than empire, to emphasize national rather than imperial interests, the 
Baltic German presence within the Empire felt threatened. There was a difference 
between loyalty to the Russian Empire and loyalty to the nation of Russia.85 "In 
so far as the Baltic nobility fought for its privileges... it fought for a definite idea 
of empire, for the thought that it (Russia) should remain an empire and not 
become6"state."86 Even on the Russian side, the perception of Russia as an 
empire was an issue still raised in the twentieth century. In 1913, the Minister 
President Sergei Witte informed the Senate that one should not speak of a Russian 
tsarstvo but rather of a Russian empire (imperiya) since a third of the population 
were not Russian.87
The use of the word empire is perhaps significantly anachronistic. The 
more contemporary concept of federalism might have been been applied.
83 "Essentially, the Russian government's relations with the empire's borderlands is to be seen as 
an aspect of local government." is the opening sentence and central thesis of Thaden, ed., Russification 
in the Baltic Provinces, 15.
84 This parallel development and the tensions inherent in it are also suggested in Paul Bushkovitch, 
"The Formation of National Consciousness in Early Modern Russia," 375.
85 Rauch describes the conflict between Nationalpatriotismus and Reichspatriotismus. Georg von 
Rauch, "Der russische Reichsgedanke," 204-205.
86 Hans Rothfels, "Reich, Staat und Nation im deutsch-baltischen Denken," in Schriften der 
Konigsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft 7.Jahr Heft 4, (1930): 230.
87 Cited in Georg von Rauch, "Der russische Reichsgedanke," 207.
Federalism, however, based firmly on the sharing of political power among its 
members, cannot coexist with unchecked political absolutism. As long as Russia 
was committed to political absolutism, one cannot speak of Russian federalism. 
The claim that "Russian federalism is an essential part of the history of political 
ideas in Russia" can only be accepted if federalism is viewed in opposition to 
absolutism rather than as an alternative to the Nationalstaat.88 Interpretative 
attempts to reconcile federalism and absolutism (in which the person of the tsar 
is viewed as the binding factor) or to merge the concepts of empire and 
federalism (in which the concept of "federal empire" or Foderativimperium 
emerges)89 may be based more on wishful thinking than on past reality.
Province
The term "province" also has different historical connotations. This 
seemingly neutral term was deemed not accurate enough by a nineteenth century 
observer, who pointed out that the Baltic lands, because of their superior culture, 
were not provinces of the Russian Empire in the Roman sense of the word and 
were better understood as dependencies or foreign elements.90 The objection is 
not in contradiction with the eighteenth century imperial practice of allowing 
"foreign elements" to continue to be foreign. The Baltic provinces were indeed 
foreign not only in origin and language, but in all aspects.91 That the provinces
88 Georg von Rauch, Rutland: Staatliche Einheit und nationale Vielfalt (Munich, 1953), 7.
89 Ibid., 59.
90 August von Haxthausen, Studien fiber die inneren Zustande das Volkleben, und insbesondere 
die landlichen Einrichtungen Ruftlands, 3 vols., (Berlin, 1847-1852); vol 3,216. The objection presumes 
that eighteenth century empires conducted themselves as the Roman Empire did.
91 "We have nothing in common with the people of the Russian Empire. Everything is different 
between us: the structure of body and disposition, temperament, degree of perseverance, rhythm of 
individual development, family, property relations, law, language, society, political traditions, the past
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were dependencies is also evident. Dependency was, in fact, almost a normal 
state for the Baltic lands. Since the sixteenth century and the disintegration of the 
Teutonic Order, there had not been an independent Baltic state. Livland and 
Estland had been the vassals or fiefs of greater powers. With the Russian 
capitulation, the overlord rather than the status changed and relations with Russia 
would be conducted from the position of a dependency. It is worth underlining 
the fact that neither of the Baltic provinces had much recent experience of existing 
as an independent state, nor no living memory of it. Accommodation to a foreign 
power was the norm and a mode of existence in which the provinces had 
experience.
This was not an exceptional case in the eighteenth century. The basic unit 
in the Holy Roman Empire was not so much a state as a Land, for which there is 
no exact modern equivalent. "A Land was, first of all, a territorial en tity ,... to be 
distinguished from cities, which were thought to belong to a different socio­
political realm, and from uncultivated terrain, which belonged to no realm at all. 
A Land was also a collection of institutions, laws, and customs peculiar to 
itself."92 Its authority was shared among several institutions, for example, guilds 
and landowners. Its identity rather than its sovereignty was important. It was 
often part of a larger system and "easily penetrated by outside elements."93 A 
Land was not necessarily a nation. The concept of nation was not developed in the 
early eighteenth century. Until the end of the century, countries thought in terms 
of Stoat, an entity perhaps more akin to eighteenth century empire than to what
and present." Carl Schirren, Livlandische Antwort, 95. An interesting omission in Schirren's list is 
religion.
92 James J. Sheehan, German History 1770-1866, 25.
93 Ibid.
we understand by the modem state, and the Staatsvolk, not necessarily all of the 
same nation, saw its unity represented in the Fiirst or prince.94 In this case, the 
Baltic provinces were part of the Staatsvolk united under the Russian state. They 
were not a Staat in themselves. Garlieb Merkel underlined this in 1798 when he 
pointed out that imperial confirmation of provincial privilege did not confer 
permission to build a "Staat im Staate."95
The Baltic provinces did not constitute a nation in any case. Livland and 
Estland were separate entities with separate administrations and different ethnic 
origins, languages and cultures. There was no one Baltic entity. More important 
for future developments in relations with Russia was the fact that the German 
Ritter, in both Livland and Estland, constituted a very small minority of the 
population, the majority of which were of a different nationality and language.96 
It was this third element which would play a large, if at first passive, role in the 
development of the relationship between the Baltic and Russia.
Russia had signed the capitulation agreement not with an independent state 
and not with a nation but with a Land. Within this Land, however, there was no 
unified representation of all estates, and the general non-German populace had 
no representation at all. The cities of Riga and Reval had their own capitulation 
agreements. The main negotiators of the central capitulation agreement were 
representatives of the landowning classes, mainly the Ritterschaft. It would be 
more accurate therefore to describe the relationship as that between the Russian
94 Lew Kopelew, "Neues Verstandnis und neue Mifiverstandnisse, neue Verbindungen und neue 
Widerspriiche," in M.Keller, ed., Russen und Rufiland, 17.
95 Garlieb Merkel, Die Letten vorziiglich in Liefland am Ende des philosophischen Tahrhunderts 
(Leipzig, 1800), Supplement, 111.
96 This is dealt with in detail in the second part of the chapter.
Empire and a Baltic Stand.97 This does not mean the relationship was one of 
Stand versus monarchy or absolute power. Limitation of medieval absolutism by 
according the nobility more rights is certainly a historical dynamic but the 
Baltic /Russian relationship went beyond that. It was not a case of the barons 
wresting power from their sovereign to gain more participation in the government 
of their own country, as in Poland or England. Theirs was more an attempt to 
guarantee a privileged political and economic position in their own country 
regardless of the norms and laws of the foreign power to which they had 
succumbed, thereby also effecting a special position in the Russian Empire. The 
viewpoint of Stand is important since the Russian state negotiated with the Stand 
and not with the Land or the provinces as such.98 The relationship over the next 
century and a half would be between representatives of the Russian Empire in the 
form of the tsar himself, his representatives or committees on the one side and the 
Baltic Ritterschaft on the other.
Although the concept and practice of estate was well developed in the 
West, would soon, in fact, become outmoded as a feudal leftover, Russia had no 
experience of estate in the Western sense. In its negotiations with the Baltic Ritter, 
Russia could not empathize with them as a Stand, as an estate.99 Its own social 
structure had not been broadly categorized or stratified in any ordered manner 
and would never develop into the four-estate model. In Muscovite Russia there
97 This would become more accurate when the Ritterschaft closed ranks in the middle of the 
century. See Chapter I, Part Two.
98 Schirren goes to some length to prove that the capitulation was meant for the whole province 
and all its inhabitants. Livlandische Antwort 131-134. As he points out, the word Land and not Stand 
was used in the capitulation agreements, but this does not mean that the Ritter's definition of Land 
included the majority of the classless (ohne Stand) population. It also does not preclude the Ritter, as 
the main negotiators, representing their own interests.
99 Which is not to imply that Russia did not have experience of privilege.
45
were nearly five hundred separate social categories to denote different ranks and 
statuses. Rank, or chin, was used as a categorization, but only for the privileged 
service classes (which lacked a collective name). Peter's Table of Ranks 
systematized privileged rank but did not create a social category. The Russian 
term soslovie, generally used to denote estate, originally described a gathering and 
gradually came to denote a constituted body, like the Senate. During Catherine's 
time, it developed a broader application but it was not until the mid-nineteenth 
century that it was defined as "a category of people with a specific occupation, 
distinguished from others by their special rights and obligations." The Baltic Ritter 
not only constituted a foreign element in the Russian Empire but as a Stand 
represented a concept alien to Russia.100 This is intensified if the Ritter are seen 
not only as a Stand but as members of that important feudal institution: a 
corporate body. The corporate state order, which predates the estates system, was 
an important check — in the form of regional or imperial diets and parliaments - 
- on the absolute power of the state, often empire. Russia had no experience of 
the feudal corporate order while the Ritter were a perfect example of it.101
Loyalty as a function of privilege
What bound a Land to the Staat, or a province to an empire was loyalty.
The concept of loyalty was inherent in that of empire /Staat. An eighteenth
century view clarifies the notion of loyalty:
What is the fatherland? It does not always only mean place of birth. But, 
when birth or my own free decision unite me with a Staat, to whose
100 The concept of estate in Russia is only touched upon here. For a detailed discussion, with 
comprehensive references, see Gregory L.Freeze, "The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social 
History," in The American Historical Review no.l (1986):ll-36.
101 See D.Gerhard, "Regionalism and Corporate Order," 155-182.
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salutary laws I am subjected, laws which take away from me no more of 
my freedom than is necessary for the welfare of the whole Staat, then I call 
this Staat my fatherland.102
Even in the next century, Timotheus von Bock, a Baltic noble imprisoned by
Alexander I, referred to the Russian Empire as his fatherland. "Although the
Ritterschaft of Livland is distinguished by special characteristics and would never
renounce the rights founded by its forbears, we regard Russia as our great and
holy fatherland..."103 At the time of capitulation, the Baltic barons took an oath
of allegiance to their new overlord. They did not do it without being assured that
their privileges would be upheld and they did not do it as speedily as Russia
might have wished. They first claimed that they could not take a new oath while
still under oath to Sweden,104 but Russia left them little choice, Peter reportedly
threatening confiscation of land for those who did not take the oath of loyalty to
Russia.105 Yet if there is consistency in any historical feature of the Baltic
nobility, it is in their loyalty. Sweden had tried to limit their privileges, had
reduced their landholdings, had threatened their very existence but the majority
of the Baltic nobles fought with Sweden against Russia.106 Their loyalty to
Russia was also firm even in adversity. Later in the century, when Russian
intervention in the independence of the Baltic provinces threatened the privileges
102 Cited by L.Kopelew, "Neues Verstandnis," in Keller, edv Russen und Rutland, 17.
103 Georg von Rauch, "Der russische Reichsgedanke," 195. Bock used the term Vaterhaus for 
Livland.
104 Schirren, Livlandische Antwort, 130-131.
105 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 107. Ungern-Sternberg Geschichte der baltischen Ritterschaften,
29.
106 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 103-104. Even seventeen members of the Patkul family fought 
with Sweden. As noted above (p.28), loyalty to Sweden may have been dictated by a desire to avoid 
the alternative i.e. being subjected to a more unlimited absolutism.
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of the barons, the barons still remained loyal to Russia.107 Gustav III of Sweden 
tried to take advantage of this discontent among the Baltic nobles to further his 
plans of aggression against Russia. He instructed the Swedish minister in St 
Petersburg to monitor the situation closely and sent an envoy to Livland and 
Estland in 1787 to stir up revolt among the German nobles against Russia. 
Although both Swedish representatives reported much evidence of discontent, 
they put no faith in support for such a revolt.108 The Baltic provinces remained 
loyal to Russia through its wars, from the Napoleonic Wars through to the First 
World War, when the Baltic Germans fought with Russia against the Germans. 
Loyalty overrode national boundaries, in allegiance to the Staat.
The ties of loyalty were not traditional in historical terms, for they changed 
as the ruling power changed. They were traditional as part of the feudal order, 
however, in that the oath of loyalty was a sacred one. It is this aspect which 
allows the relationship of the Ritter to the Russian tsar to be described as one of 
reverence.109 Loyalty, however, had very practical aspects. Inherent in 
allegiance to a greater power was the protection of that power against would-be 
contenders, in the case of the Baltic provinces, against the Schicksalsland fate. Such 
protection carried a price, however. In 1630, for example, Estland and Livland 
paid one-third of the cost of Sweden's participation in the Thirty Years' War.110 
A change in overlord could bring with it heavy costs. During the campaigns 
against Sweden, Russian troops had systematically destroyed the country as they
107 Under Catherine's Statthalterschaft 1786-1796.
108 H. Arnold Barton, Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 1760-1815 , 155.
109 Alexander Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung Livlands im 19.Tahrhundert vol I (Riga, 1889), 203.
The German word used is "Pietat."
110 Otto Greiffenhagen, "Begriindung und Ausbau der schwedischen Herrschaft in Estland und 
Livland durch Gustaf Adolf," Baltische Monatsschrift, 60, 1929; 335.
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retreated, leaving "places (to) exist only on the map."111 As well as ensuring 
external protection, the Staat was important in the regulation of internal affairs. 
The reasons the Swedish envoys gave to explain why the barons would not 
support a revolt against the Russian government are an indication of this. The 
nobles, they reported, were too dependent on Russian state service and too afraid 
of their serfs, who would rise up against them at the first sign of Swedish 
troops.112 The third area in which loyalty was of practical importance is also 
indicated in these reasons, namely to serve class interest. In return for allegiance, 
the barons' privileges had been reaffirmed; loyalty would ensure that they were 
maintained. The corollary is also valid: in return for their privileges, Russia 
demanded loyalty which brought with it very practical proofs, mainly fiscal, 
which benefited the Empire.113 Just as Russia's guarantee of the barons' 
privileges had not been unconditional, the barons' loyalty was dependent on the 
maintenance of their privileges. By the nineteenth century, the polemics of the 
Baltic/Russian confrontation would make this implicit understanding more 
explicit: the barons could only pledge loyalty as long as the tsar kept his word. 
"Loyal compliance has a limit."114
The crucial question was how far Peter's successors would abide by his 
terms. When the Polish King laid the foundation of privileged status in the Baltic,
111 General Sheremetiev's reports to the tsar describe the effects of this tactic:
Everything is devastated. ... Nothing is left standing except for Pemau and Reval and here 
and there a farm by the sea; otherwise everything from Reval to Riga is eradicated root and 
branch; places exist only on the map. Cited in Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 105.
112 See note 108 above.
113 The practical details of loyalty, paying taxes, serving in the army, supplying recruits, etc. will 
be described in the second part of the chapter.
114 Schirren, Livlandische Antwort. 185.
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privilege was at the centre of medieval law. Closely allied to privilege was the 
concept of corporatism and estates, with which the absolute authority of the state 
was held in check by regional diets and parliaments. In addition to privilege were 
the concepts of honour, status and above all libertas.115 "...in the Middle Ages, 
when servitude and arbitrariness were the general rule, liberty could scarcely see 
the light of day but by way of privilege..." 116 As political values changed and 
new concepts developed, privilege was no longer a historical necessity. Before the 
century was over, the concept of equality before the law was firmly established 
by the French Revolution. Russian critics of Baltic privilege underlined the 
anachronism of the situation. "Alone in the entire world the Baltic Provinces have 
not followed the general movement."117 Neither did Russia. The privileges of 
the Baltic barons would be reaffirmed by Peter's successors down to Alexander 
II. The general reservation, however, would not only remain118 but receive 
clearer and stronger formulation from Alexander I, when the privileges of the 
Baltic lands, both Livland and Estland, would be confirmed only in as far as they
115 Dietrich Gerhard, "Regionalism and Corporate Order," 164.
116 Iuri Samarin in 1864 in a letter to Baroness Rahden (of Kurland) in The Correspondence of Iu. 
Samarin and Baroness Rahden, 42.
117 Ibid.
118 Schirren claims the privileges were confirmed nine times after the death of Peter the Great: 
twice with both reservations, three times with one, three times with none and once with no 
confirmation. He gives phases rather than exact dates. (Livlandische Antwort, 156). Another source 
lists the confirmations as:
Catherine I 1 June 1725 
Peter II 12 September 1728 
Anna 23 August 1730 
Elizabeth 25 June 1742 
Catherine II 27 August 1763 
Alexander I 15 September 1801 
Nicholas I 9 February 1827 
Catherine I used the same condition as Peter I; her four successors confirmed the privileges "in the 
same way as Peter I and Catherine I had done" and Alexander and Nicholas used the stronger 
condition already mentioned. Geschichtliche Ubersicht III, 102-104.
were in agreement with the general decrees and laws of the Russian state.119 
The maintenance of provincial privilege within the Empire on the one hand and 
the imperial management of provincial privilege on the other, against a 
background of changing political concepts and realities, is a main pivot of the 
Baltic/Russian relationship.
PART TWO: THE REALITY OF PRIVILEGE
An important factor in the maintenance of privilege was that the Baltic 
lands, although subjected to foreign powers, kept their own systems of law. 
These laws, however, were not codified. Until the Privilegium Sigismundi 
Augusti in 1561, when the most important privileges and immunities were 
documented, the Ritter law granted by Bishop Albert in 1228120 was the core of 
the law system in the Baltic area.121 In the sixteenth century, the Ritter 
themselves recognized the need to codify the mass of accumulated customs, 
privileges, rights, and immunities by which their countries were governed. This 
would not only clarify the confusion, but would give the Land a Landesrecht, its 
own system of laws, which would be a guarantee against the imposing of a 
foreign law. Although over the centuries the Ritter would emphasize the German
119 The important difference between Peter's condition and Alexander's and one which perhaps 
indicated the direction of Russian policy towards its provinces is not just that the latter was more 
definite (laws rather than interests) but also that it applied in general to both Livland and Estland 
while the former had applied only to Livland.
120 First printed in 1537.
121 Baron R.Stael von Holstein, "Die Kodifizierung des baltischen Provinzialrechts," (in three parts) 
in Baltische Monatschrift 52 (1901): 186. There are claims that the version printed in 1537 stemmed 
more from Danish feudal law granted to Estland and documented there in 1315. Ibid.
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essence of their laws in their attempts to secure their own provincial law, German 
law as such was unacceptable. In answer to the request for their own Landesrecht 
in Article IV of the Privilegium, Sigismund of Poland recommended that the Baltic 
barons adopt one of the German law systems, a recommendation they refused to 
consider.122 The attempt to codify the laws in the Baltic provinces would last 
over two hundred and fifty years and would then be only partially successful. 
During this time, Livland was governed by laws which were, as described by the 
Ritter themselves in a letter to Peter II in 1728, "incomplete, deficient and 
unknown by most. ... there was no complete code of laws for judges and the old 
rights were obscure and in need of explanation ... cases were decided partly on 
the privileges of the Land and old customs and partly on German law, which was 
not known to everyone and often caused doubt."123 Over the next century under 
Russian rule, the request for a Landesrecht would be reiterated by the Ritter of 
Livland,124 not always with the same frankness about shortcomings — which, 
after all, could easily be replaced by Russian law, also under process of 
codification. Russian rulers did accede to requests for a codification of the laws 
in Livland and various committees were appointed to accomplish the task. The 
problems in securing a jus provincialis from the Empire would be an integral part 
of the provincial/imperial relationship. At this point, it is important to note that 
there was confusion in the laws which the barons so zealously guarded against 
foreign encroachment. The laws of the Baltic provinces were not written down 
for easy reference and as such could be easily defended by those who knew their
122 Ibid., 186-187.
123 Ibid., 190-191.
124 Estland was granted permission to work on its own law system in 1728. Ibid., 191.
way about the archives. They were not easily attacked, either internally or 
externally. The Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti had assured the basis of Ritter 
power from which the confusion could be defended. The bastions of German 
privilege, culture, language, administration and church were guaranteed. These 
were strengthened by the self-governing institutions founded under Sweden.
Self-government
While their political power was not completely autonomous, always 
dependent on a foreign power, the Baltic barons had rights of representation far 
beyond those of the Russian nobility. The institutions of local self-government in 
the Baltic were established under Sweden, in part based on older forms. Sweden 
had rejected the request of the Baltic Ritter to be incorporated into the Swedish 
nobility, which would bring them rights of political representation in Sweden,125 
but did accord them the right of local representative assembly. Estland, under 
Sweden since 1561, had a well-established Landtag126, which met, mostly in 
Reval, once every three years and obliged all land-owning Ritter under penalty 
of a heavy fine to attend. Matters concerning the Land were discussed and 
decisions initially did not require Swedish ratification.127 In 1643, Livland was 
also granted a Landtag. Its functions were similar to those of the Landtag in 
Estland but it was forbidden to discuss any matters of law, unlike the Landtag in 
Estland, and important decisions were subject to Swedish ratification.
125 F.Bunge, Geschichtliche Ubersicht der Grundlagen und der Fntwicklung des Provinzialrechts 
in den Ostseegouvemements, Besonderer Theil (St. Petersburg, 1845), 112-113. N ew ly ennobled 
German landowners were granted a place in the Swedish nobility but the Ritter only if they possessed 
an estate in Sweden. Ibid.
126 Provincial representative assembly, or Diet. The word will not be italicized from now on.
127 Ibid., 167.
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Membership was extended to all landowners without specific mention of noble 
status.128 The question of membership is an important one since it identifies the 
nature of the representation on the Landtag.129 
Economic M onopoly
The possession of a Rittergut, a noble estate, not the status of nobility in 
itself determined a seat and vote on the Landtag130 and this was why the Ritter 
were determined to maintain the monopoly on land ownership. Of all their 
privileges, the exclusive right of the Ritter to own land was the most important 
for it guaranteed not only their economic existence but also their political power, 
without which they could not uphold all their other privileges. Under Poland, the 
nobility had enjoyed the exclusive right to own noble estates until 1581 when 
Stephan Bathory accorded the right, dependent on imperial ratification, to the 
citizens of Riga. This was made clearer by the Polish parliament the following 
year when it stated that nobles could buy city property as long as they also 
fulfilled the duties of a burgher, and burghers could buy noble estates as long as 
they fulfilled obligations incumbent upon the nobility. In addition, jurisdiction 
was determined not by the Stand of the individual but by the Stand of the landed 
estates owned by the individual.131 Sweden supported this policy, confirming 
the right of the citizens of Riga, as well as of the Swedish nobility, to buy landed 
estates as long as they fulfilled the duties incumbent on owners of such
128 Ibid., 113.
129 In Kurland the Landtag was structured differently and carried much less political weight. The 
Ritter did not meet as a body but rather sent representatives from the church districts, which 
numbered 33 in 1819. See R.Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 137.
130 Ibid., 113. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 24.
131 Geschichtliche Ubersicht. 111.
estates.132 This meant that since non-noble landowners could own an estate, 
they could be members of the Landtag. With Charles XTs attempts in 1694 to take 
over the Landtag and its functions in reaction to Baltic opposition to the land 
reduction policy, the rules of membership changed but this was short-lived. 
Russia became the ruling power.
Russia returned to the Ritter the basis of their political power by restoring 
to them most of the lands which had been confiscated by Sweden, but even before 
this was done,133 the Ritter had already requested that their exclusive right to 
own noble estates be recognized by Russia, a request that was granted.134 At the 
same time, however, the rights of the citizens of Riga were confirmed in their 
entirety by the Russians and they included the right of the burghers of Riga to 
buy landed estates.135 Thus, the nobles had been accorded the sole right to own 
estates but the citizens of Riga had been reaffirmed in their right to buy estates. 
The ensuing disagreement between the Ritter and the burghers was settled by a 
statement from Baron Lowenwolde, Peter's appointed representative, on 28 
September 1711. The Ritter, he proclaimed, had the sole right to own landed 
estates, and burghers who owned such estates were obliged to sell them back to 
the Ritter.136 Not content with this, the Ritter soon after petitioned for the right
132 Ibid., 121.
133 The confiscated lands were formally returned by a series of commissions between 1721 and 
1728. Ibid., 136-137.
134 The request had been one of the capitulation terms agreed on between the Ritter and General 
Sheremetiev in 1710 and later ratified by the tsar. Ibid., 137. See also Geschichtliche Ubersicht, 
Allgemeiner Theil, 89.
135 This right had been accorded the citizens of Riga in Polish times. The capitulation agreement 
between the city and the Russians (see Ibid., 91-93) reaffirmed all previous rights. Geschichtliche 
Ubersicht, Besonderer Theil, 137.
136 Ibid., 137-138.
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to own crown estates,137 which Peter had declared should remain in possession 
of those who had bought or rented them.138 They were initially given 
precedence over non-nobles in the purchase of crown lands but by 1763, the 
corporations of the Ritterschaft in all the Baltic provinces had acquired the 
exclusive right to crown lands. This would remain the case until 1840 when the 
purchase of crown estates was accorded to the highest bidder regardless of 
rank.139 The conflict between the Ritter and the burghers over the question of 
landownership in the private domain was exacerbated by the claims of the non­
matriculated nobility, who were excluded from the right to own land by the 
closing of the Ritter ranks in 1747.140 From 1765 to 1779, when the non-nobles 
could elect their own marshal, the conflict was particularly severe but the right 
to own land remained with the Ritter and would remain a significant source of 
tension in the internal affairs of the Baltic for the next hundred years. T h e  
exclusive right of the Ritter to own land meant effectively that the land was 
divided between the Crown and the Ritter. In 1738 about seventy-five per cent 
of measured cultivated land was owned in 524 estates by private families, the rest 
in 167 estates by the Crown and 73 by the church. Two decades later, the 
proportion of measured cultivated land owned by private families increased by 
over five percent to 602 estates while land owned by the Crown decreased. 
Church land remained about the same.141 By the end of the century, there were
137 Ibid., 138-139.
138 Geschichtliche Ubersicht. Allgemeiner Theil, 90.
139 Geschichtliche Ubersicht Besonderer Theil, 139.
140 See below under Matriculation.
141 Interpreted from figures given in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 67.
944 landed estates in Livland, of which 705 belonged to private Ritter families.142 
M atriculation
Having secured the exclusive right to own landed estates, the Ritter then 
turned their attention once more to the question of who was entitled to belong to 
the Ritter. Dilution of the ranks would mean a reduction in landholdings. 
Establishing a matriculation roll would effectively control ownership of the land. 
Under Sweden, they had already tried to close their ranks against the influx of 
new nobles created by ruling powers or foreign nobles as well as the citizens of 
their own towns. In 1650, the nobility of Livland had secured the agreement of 
the Swedish Queen Christina to set up their own matriculation although nothing 
was actually done.143 Under Russia, these attempts were renewed beginning in 
1728 with the request that the Russian government allow a Ritter commission to 
compile their own matriculation list.144 Russia complied and in 1747 the list was 
complete. It consisted of 172 families divided into four classes: 52 from the 
crusader era, 16 from the Polish period, 45 from the time of Sweden and 59 since 
union with Russia.145 The Ritter ranks were effectively closed. New members 
could apply and receive the rank of noble if more than three-quarters of the
142 Five belonged to the Ritterschaft as a corporation and fifteen to the cities of Riga, Pemau, 
Wenden and Fellin. Crown estates had dropped to 100 while church lands surpassed crown lands at 
103. Ibid., 23.
143 Geschichtliche Ubersicht, Besonderer Theil, 116-117.
144 The pretext was so that all coats of arms could be properly displayed.
145 Ibid., 123-126. Slightly different figures are given in L.C.D.Bray, Essai Critique sur Fhistoire de 
la Livonie, vol.3 (Dorpat, 1817), 91. Bray gives as his source an article in Nordische Miscallaneen. His 
figures for the four classes are respectively: 52, 14, 33, 20.
The development of closed matriculation in Estland was similar. Ranks were confirmed closed in 1761, 
when 127 families were listed, alphabetically and not according to class as in Livland. Geschichtliche 
Ubersicht Besonderer Theil, 178.
Landtag votes were secured.146 The Ritter were thenceforth referred to as the 
Ritterschaft and the term Landschaft limited to non-matriculated landowners.147 
In 1796, after the hiatus of Catherine H's centralized administration 
(Statthalterschaft), the forms of self-government were resumed and membership to 
the Landtag more clearly defined. All landowners, whether the estate was owned 
or held in lien, could attend the Landtag but only members of the Ritter 
corporation were under obligation to do so and only matriculated Ritter had the 
right to vote in all matters. All others could vote only on taxes. There was also 
a clause allowing matriculated Ritter without land to vote on all matters except 
taxes.148 (This clause had not appeared before and would seem to be in 
contradiction to the condition of membership on the Landtag, that is, the 
possession of land.) Riga was represented by two delegates with one vote.149 
Thus, self-administration which had included all landowners for most of the 
Polish and Swedish periods was limited to the Ritter under Russia. The system 
of class representation on the Landtag would remain in force, with little 
modification, until 1866 when the Ritter lost the exclusive right to land 
ownership.150
146 Ibid., 126-127. A list of matriculated Ritter compiled by the Ritter Secretary in 1816 testifies that 
many new members were accepted into the ranks. The list numbers 343 families in all, 275 since 
union with Russia. See Bray, Essai critique, vol.3, pp 379-397 for the complete list.
147 Geschichtliche Ubersicht, Besonderer Theil, 127. The division has been viewed as historically 
inaccurate in that both terms were used indiscriminately in the past. H ow real they became is 
indicated by the fact that the Landschaft, now excluded from the Landtag, were accorded the right 
to elect their own deputy to Catherine's Law Commission in 1765. The Landschaft retained the post 
of "marshal" until 1779.
148 Ibid., 134-135.
149 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 28; Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 136.
150 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 28. In 1845 nobles in Livland had the right to own land while 
in Estland and Kurland the right remained with matriculated nobles. Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 
134.
In Estland, the nobility had almost always retained the right to own landed 
estates. The ranks of the Ritter had remained unofficially closed against Swedish 
influence, not one Swedish name appearing in the decisions of the Ritter.151 This 
was mainly because the councillors were more powerful than in Livland. They 
constituted the court of first instance152 (the Landtag in Livland was not allowed 
to discuss matters of law) and were elected from their own midst and held all 
important offices. Burghers were not allowed to buy noble estates (1662) although 
cities were (1690) and nobles were not allowed to buy property in the city. 
Membership to the Landtag was open only to the land-owning matriculated 
nobility. In effect, the political assemblies in both Livland and Estland were 
institutions of the Ritterschaft, of the matriculated land-owning nobility, who 
constituted a tiny minority of the population. Towards the end of the period 
under study, there were 7902 matriculated nobility in all three provinces out of 
a total population of 1,538,998.153 These members were concentrated in fewer 
than 350 families. Those Ritter who actually attended the Landtag, even on 
important issues, were much fewer. Voting members present at the Livland 
Landtag of February 1803, which discussed the reforms of 1804, numbered 184, 
considered a good attendance.154 Apart from the city of Riga with its one vote, 
no other sectors of society were represented on the Landtag.155 Whether the
151 Geschichtliche Ubersicht. Besonderer Theil, 171.
152 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 135.
153 Interpreted from figures given in Hueck, Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 2-4. 
Hueek's source is mainly Das Inland, 1837-140. Hueck also points out (p.5) that the total population 
had increased by 203,577 in the previous two decades which does not significantly change the 
prop-ortion of the matriculated nobility to the rest of the population.
154 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 171.
155 The cities, with a total population in all three provinces in the first half of the nineteenth 
century of 204,103, did have their own institutions. Hueck, Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen 
Verh altnisse, 3.
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self-governing body could properly be called a Landtag when it represented only 
a tiny percentage of the Land depends on the definition of Land, which was 
discussed in the first part of the chapter. The Land did not necessarily embrace 
all members of its geographical location. A definition such as "Everything which 
went beyond private existence and social relations but did not yet reach the 
broad, cool region of state duties and activity, that sort of in between sphere, 
where, thanks to partial autonomy, historically developed institutions and norms 
...functioned, that was the Land"156 did not take into account the vast politically 
and economically powerless majority of the population.
Local Administration
Not only did the Ritter control the Landtag through monopoly of land and 
restricted matriculation, but they also controlled all other institutions of self­
administration. The executive organ of the Landtag was the Landratskollegium, a 
council founded in 1643 under Sweden, consisting of twelve members voted for 
life from the ranks of the Landtag.157 Its duties were mainly to assist the 
Governor in matters concerning the Land. The capitulation agreements with 
Russia expressly confirmed the Landratskollegium as an institution.158 It was 
important to the Ritter because it embodied the all important right to be 
heard,159 a right that would be used to gain direct access to the Russian ruler.
156 Cited in Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 139.
157 Initially, six. There were two from each district, one Livonian and one Swede. When the 
number was raised to twelve in 1648, four from each district, the proportionate representation 
remained the same. Geschichtliche Ubersicht, Besonderer Theil, 115.
158 Ibid., 132.
159 Emphasized by Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung. 30; and by K.I.Lander, "Pribaltiiskii krai b 
pervoi polovine XIX veka," 332.
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The functions of the Landratskollegium remained the same over a hundred years: 
"to keep a watchful eye on the privileges, rights, customs and constitutions of the 
country."160 Since its members constituted an even number, each Landrat 
(councillor) served on a rotating basis as head for one month,161 and it was in 
this individual function that the Landrat would be most effective in negotiations 
with the Russian govern ment. In 1845, the Landrat was given a place in the 
government in local matters.162 In Estland, under Sweden for a century longer 
than Livland, the Landratskollegium had more power. It formed the court of first 
instance and also functioned as a type of political upper house.163
The next level of administration was formed by twelve district deputies or 
Kreisdeputierten, elected by the Landtag, who could be summoned by the Landrat 
whenever decisions were necessary between Landtag sessions, which took place 
every three years. In 1759, two bodies were created from this but they consisted 
of the same members. The more important of these was the Adelskonvent, a type 
of executive committee,164 which was composed of the twelve councillors from 
the Landratskollegium, the twelve district deputies, two treasury deputies and the 
marshal. The district deputies, not the councillors, were the official representatives 
of the Landtag and they alone were responsible to the Landtag for the decisions 
of the Konvent, although the councillors did exercise great influence on this
160 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 31.
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 135.
164 Known in Estland as the Ritter Aujichu (committee).
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committee because of their position and their seniority.165 
Land Marshal
The Ritter also realized how important it was to have their own leader, one 
person rather than an institution. In 1634, the Ritter of Livland, most probably 
under the influence of Estland's example, where a Ritterschaftshauptmann had been 
a political function since early times,166 requested the right to elect a Ritterschaft 
leader or marshal (Landmarschall)167 as well as a Secretary. The Landmarschall was 
elected for three years,168 and his duties were to lead the Landtag discussions, 
to oversee the execution of its decisions169 and to generally represent the 
Ritter.170 In relationship to the other important individual function, that of the 
resident Landrat, the Landmarschall exercised no specific powers except the right 
to have his opinion considered. The advantages of this office were to give the 
Ritter and the Land an official leader, which would lessen the role of the 
Governor, as well as their own representative, an office which would prove of 
historical importance in representing the Ritter in St Petersburg, one of the official 
functions of the Landmarschall. The office of Landmarschall has been viewed as the 
single most important position in provincial government.171 The office of
165 For the structures of administration at this level, see Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 33; and 
R.Wittram, Baltische Geschichte. 136.
166 Geschichtliche Ubersicht Besonderer Theil, 170.
167 In Livland the office was also first known as Ritterschaftshauptmann. In Kurland, it had the title 
of Landesbevollmachtiger, that is, someone fully empowered to represent the Land.
168 Until 1648 he was elected for one year. Ibid., 114.
169 In his function as chairman of the Adelskonvent. See Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 136.
170 Geschichtliche Ubersicht. Besonderer Theil, 114.
171 Thaden, Russification in the Baltic Provinces, 114.
Secretary was of importance in recording the official history of the Ritter, as it was 
and as it happened. From the point of view of the maintenance of privilege, 
based on historical proofs, this was an important function. From 1657 to 1677, for 
example, the Secretary was a lawyer from Thuringen, Caspar von Ceumem, who 
published a handbook of the privileges of the Ritter entitled "Theatridium 
Livonicum."172 This work became an important historical source to support the 
Ritter's claims to privilege.173
The Church
Besides the power they enjoyed as local overlords, the Ritter also had 
control of administration at a local level. This they achieved not through their 
own institutions but through the institutions of the church. The Lutheran 
Protestant faith, guarded and maintained by the Ritter, was predom inant and 
constituted the official church of each of the Baltic provinces.174 The institutional 
organization of the Lutheran Church in the Baltic provinces had been effected 
most thoroughly under Sweden. It was a comprehensive system of 
administration175 and in the absence of lower secular administrative levels, the 
church institutions provided the means of self-government at the local level.176
172 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 90.
173 It is, for example, listed as the second earliest source in the bibliography of the Privilegium  
Sigismundi Augusti, the cornerstone of Ritter privilege. See E.Winkelmann, Bibliotheca Livoniae 
Historica. 158. See also note 12 above.
174 There were small numbers representing other religions in the cities and in Kurland there were 
many Jews (22,000, which was a quarter of the town population) and several pockets of Catholics. 
Hueck, Darstellung der landwirschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 3.
175 See Wilhelm Lenz, "Zur Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte der baltischen evangelischen Kirche 
1710-1914," in R.Wittram, ed., Baltische Kirchengeschichte (Gottingen, 1956), 110-129.
176 See Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 36.
63
In common with German Lutheran practice of the time, the church as an 
institution was headed by secular authorities. In the Baltic area, most of the 
higher church offices were held by the Ritter. The highest office in each of the 
three provinces was held by a LandratF7 The vice-president in each case was 
a member of the clergy, elected or appointed by the Ritter, in Livland the General 
Superintendent, in Kurland the Superintendent and in Estland the Oberpastor. 
Other high offices were shared between Ritter and clergy178 and were appointed 
by the Governor General on the recommendation of the Ritter.179
At the parish level, the influence of the Ritter was considerable. The 
church with its vicarage and lands was in general part of a Rittergut and 
dependent on its patronage and support. The landed nobility elected two 
representatives to help administer the church and they, along with the pastor, 
formed a church court which was responsible for the peasants not only in matters 
of church discipline but in secular matters too. The noble administrators or the 
pastor had the right to convene a church assembly twice a year, or more often if 
necessary, for church and communal matters. The peasants also had 
representatives but they were chosen by the landlord and had no vote on the 
assembly. The pastor was not allowed to vote on the assembly either. Control 
was facilitated by compulsory church attendance: every adult was obliged to 
attend every fourth Sunday service but each farm had to be represented at every 
service.180
177 In the cities the highest office was held by the mayor, except in Narva where it was held by the 
most senior pastor.
178 In Kurland more clergy held these higher offices.
179 W.Lenz, "Zur Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte," in Wittram, Baltische Kirchengeschichte, 110-
111.
180 Ibid., 111-114.
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The Lutheran Church as a function of secular administration is a significant 
perspective in the organization of privilege and one which is often overlooked in 
the emphasis placed on the church's contributions to the development of non- 
German native culture and literature.181 The church was controlled at every 
level by the Ritter, which rendered the pastor totally dependent on their interests. 
The pastor's interests were in any case closely bound to those of the landowner. 
His social position was similar to that of the nobility. Under Sweden, pastors 
were accorded their own rank or Stand, with many of the personal rights enjoyed 
by the nobility, like tax exemption and judicial protection, but they had no rights 
of representation.182 Under Russia, these rights remained intact and were 
reaffirmed in the church reform of 1832.183 The economic position of the pastor 
was also similar to that of the landowner. Like his secular counterpart, the pastor 
was a landowner with jurisdiction over the serfs on his land. The peasants were 
obliged to supply him with all his needs, from food to fuel to gloves. In the 
eighteenth century, he was much better off than his counterpart in Germany. 
That the clergy were satisfied with their position is indicated by the fact that a 
proposal from the Ritter of Estland in 1724 to establish a fixed salary for the 
clergy was rejected by the pastors.184 While the claim that a pastor was only 
appointed after "emphatically making sure that he would be a reliable and sure 
representative of the privileges of the nobility" may be exaggerated,185 the Ritter
181 These aspects will be examined later in the paper.
182 W.Lenz in "Zur Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte," in Wittram, Baltische Kirchengeschichte,
114.
183 Ibid., 120.
184 Ibid., 115.
185 L.Adamovics, Die Letten. Aufsatze tiber Geschichte, Sprache und Kultur der alten Letten (Riga, 
1930), 271.
control of the church did cause the pastor's dependence while his social and 
economic standing placed him in the same interest group as the Ritter.186
The administration of the church, developed and reformed into the 
nineteenth century, although in the hands of the Ritter, has been seen as a positive 
example, a lesson in self-administration for the peasants.187 At the end of the 
nineteenth century, the Russian Governor Zinoviev, a supporter of Russification, 
attributed the flourishing life in the region to the church administration.188 The 
church in the Baltic, however, has also been viewed as an instrument of the Ritter, 
alienated from the peasants, and neglectful in encouraging the self-administration 
it should have.189 The role of the church in a wider sense will be discussed later 
in the paper but in its structure and administration, the church in the Baltic 
provinces was part of the system designed to guarantee privilege.
Throughout the first century of Russian rule, the church in the Baltic 
remained autonomous. Orthodox Russia did not have the religious institutions 
to supervise a Protestant church190 but began creating them as the nineteenth 
century began. In 1810, a new body was formed for the general supervision of 
foreign faiths and in 1819, Alexander I created a Protestant bishopry in St 
Petersburg and a General Imperial Consistory to supervise Protestant churches
186 An observer in Livland remarked in 1817, "A Protestant pastor is no more than a citizen dressed 
as a respectable minister; his existence is no more than philosophical, not at all religious .. and it 
would be a very good thing .. to imprint on the ministry of the pastor a more holy character which  
would distinguish him from other men." Bray, Essai Critique, 165.
187 R.Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 137.
188 Ibid.
189 L.Adamovics, Die Letten. 272-273.
190 The church in the Baltic formally came under the Justice Committee for the Affairs of Livland 
and Estland in St Petersburg. W.Lenz in "Zur Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte," in Wittram, 
Baltische Kirchengeschichte, 117.
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and clergy.191 Russia's supervisory capacity was confirmed, almost unwittingly, 
in the church reform of 1832, which had been prepared with the participation of 
representatives of the Baltic Ritter and clergy, and upheld the system which had 
been in force since the time of the Swedes.192
Judiciary
The structure of the judiciary system had been organized under Sweden. 
Before that, under Poland, the terms of the Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti had 
placed the judiciary system in the hands of the Ritter, especially since they were 
given the right to elect the judges for the court in Riga.193 The motive for 
insisting on control was to avoid the imposing of Polish law rather than the desire 
in itself to control the judiciary system. Sweden undermined much of this control. 
The court system was reorganized and initially the Ritter had no right to nominate 
or elect judges and magistrates. Not until 1675 did they gain the right to two 
nominations to the High Court. The President and vice-President of the High 
Court were appointed by the king and the members consisted of six nobles and 
six non-nobles, versed in law.194 The High Court was seated in Dorpat and 
dealt with matters of noble inheritance and any peasant complaints against the 
landlords. (Estland did not come under its jurisdiction since its Landratskollegium 
formed the court of first instance.) The rights of the peasant class to state
191 The complaints of the Baltic church consistories succeeded in limiting the area of supervision. 
Ibid., 117-118.
192 For a description of the reforms, see W.Lenz, "Zur Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte," in 
Wittram, Baltische Kirchengeschichte, 118-121.
193 Articles IV, V, VI guaranteed the old laws, the German language and German magistrates in 
court and the Ritter control of the court in Riga. C.Schirren, Die Capitulationen, 6-9.
194 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 47.
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jurisdiction was recognized in 1632 by the removal of the landowner's right of 
jurisdiction over his peasants. Four, later five, district courts were set up to deal 
with non-noble criminal cases and all civil cases. The cities of Riga and Reval 
came directly under the jurisdiction of the High Court in Stockholm.195
In the capitulation terms negotiated between the Ritter and General 
Sheremetiev, the Ritter did not neglect to restore their judicial control and most 
of the Swedish reforms were cancelled. The old system of law as guaranteed by 
the Privilegium in 1561 was ratified. The district courts, established under 
Sweden, were to be kept but the offices were to be occupied by the nobility of the 
land or other suitable German-born persons.196 In criminal matters, the nobility 
would come under the direct jurisdiction of the crown, not the district courts. 
Punishment for any crime by a member of the nobility against the government or 
its institutions should not be accorded to others and certainly not on the whole 
corporation. While the Russian tsar agreed to the compilation of a Landesrecht,197 
the old ways were ratified until a new code was ready. The courts would be 
governed by the privileges of Livland, old customs and the Ritterrecht. Where 
these were deficient, general German law should be followed.198 Although Peter 
I confirmed the near-autonomy of local law in the Baltic provinces, he did 
establish a control mechanism. A court of repeal and revision was set up in 1718 
in the form of the Justice Committee for the Affairs of Livland and Estland, which
195 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 46-47. O.Greiffenhagen, "Begriindung und Ausbau der 
schwedischen Herrschaft," 331.
196 Geschichtliche Ubersicht. Allgemeine Theil, 88. Tobien offers this as proof that the judicial 
system was not controlled by the Ritter alone. Die Agrargesetzgebung, 48.
197 Geschichtliche Ubersicht Allgemeine Theil, 90.
198 Ibid., 88.
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was subordinated to the Russian senate in 1737.199
Governor General
While self-government in the Baltic provinces was subordinated in general 
to the Russian Empire, there were few specific local governmental institutions 
above self-administration. The oldest and most important was that of Governor 
General, the representative of the Russian government in the provinces. In 1775, 
Estland came under the General Governor of Livland and after Kurland became 
part of the Russian Empire in 1795, all three provinces formed one Gouvernement 
in 1801, which would last until 1876.200 The Gouvernements were not merely 
territorial divisions of the Russian Empire but reflected the increasing interest of 
the central power to administer its provinces uniformly. The basis of Russia's 
organized provincial administration lay in the provincial reforms of Catherine II. 
In 1764, she gave wide powers to the Governors General of the fifteen 
Gouvernements.201 Not only were they to supervise the general administration of 
the provinces, but they were also to manage the finances, collect taxes, recruit 
soldiers, oversee schools, run prisons and orphanages, build and repair roads and 
bridges, fight fires, collect horses for the army, take an accurate census and have 
an accurate map of the province draw n up.202 Catherine's successors, while 
admitting the lack of a better model, were reluctant to support her version of the 
institution of Governor General. The very large area covered by one Governor
199 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 47.
200 Estland had its own Governor General from 1808 to 1819. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 303.
201 The Empire was divided into fifteen Gouvernements, previously ten, which were subdivided into 
forty-four provinces and 178 districts. Robert E.Jones, "Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775:
A question of motivation," in Canadian Slavic Studies. IV, 3 1970; 501.
202 Ibid., 500-501.
and the apparatus he would need to administer it would develop a power 
outwith the central power, a power that was often, according to Speransky, 
"arbitrary and uncontrolled." This was especially true in view of the fact that the 
Governor General was not designed as part of the central machine. The problem 
of how to design an efficient apparatus for local government with limited powers 
continued into the mid-nineteenth century. The Baltic provinces belonged to the 
category of exceptions recognized by Russia.203 They could be governed with 
special rather than general powers.204 The self-governing institutions of the Baltic 
provinces not only facilitated Russian administration but paradoxically acted as 
a brake on the development of too much power in the hands of the Governor 
General. His governing apparatus was not his own. In the Baltic provinces, 
however, the Governor General was a very important function. His 
administrative powers were described as limitless and he had the right to suspend 
sentence in a criminal cases, or refer them to the Senate.205 The Ritter and the 
Landtag communicated their decisions through him. Normal access to the central 
government was through the Governor but since the Baltic Ritter had the right to 
be heard directly by the tsar, they could circumvent the Governor. The Governor 
could be used to exert influence in St Petersburg on behalf of the province,206 
but was also used by the tsar to exert influence on the Landtag. Whereas in the 
eighteenth century the emphasis was on able and loyal administrators and several
20)3 Exceptions were recognized as those which could be governed by special powers, those which 
lay geographically far from St Petersburg and border provinces.
20)4 For details of the institution of the Governor General within the Russian Empire, see Bernhard 
Schalllhorn, Lokalverwaltung und Standerecht in Rutland zu Beginn der Herrschaft Nikolaus I in 
Forschungen zur Osteuropaischen Geschichte, vol 26, Berlin 1979; pp.15-26 and 109-125.
2015 He had no jurisdiction in civil cases. Bray, Essai Critique, 18.
20,6 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 49.
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foreigners served as Governors in the Baltic, most notably, Peter Lacy from 
Scotland (1730-1751) and George Browne from Ireland (1762-1792), the nineteenth 
century increasingly saw a more careful choice of Governor according to desired 
policy. Fearing instability in the eventful year of 1848, Nicholas I replaced 
Governor General Golovin with the more pro-German Prince Suvorov in an effort 
to support the stability offered by Baltic German administration.207
The Towns
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the total population of towns 
in the Baltic provinces was 204,103 (of a total 1,538,998). This sector, except for 
Riga with its one vote, was not represented on the Landtag. The towns were not 
large, Riga by far the biggest at 56,377 inhabitants. Of some 27 towns, only five 
had over 10,000 inhabitants and more than half had less than 5,000 
inhabitants.208
Baltic towns in the eighteenth century, especially Riga, were praised by 
contemporaries like Johann Georg Hamann or Johann Gottfried Herder for their 
political vitality, republican freedoms, self-government and civic pride, Herder 
describing Riga as "almost Geneva."209 Compared to Russian or Prussian cities, 
there was a great deal more freedom but only for citizens, and not all inhabitants 
were citizens. Citizenship, which brought with it the rights and freedom so
207 M. Haltzel, "Baltic Particularism and the Beginnings of Russification," in Thaden, Russification 
in the Baltic Provinces, 118.
208 Interpreted from figures in Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 2-3.
209 F.M.Barnard, Herders Social and Political Thought (Oxford, 1965), p.xii; M. K eller," 'Politische 
Seetraiime': Herder und Rutland," in Keller, Russen und Rutland, 362-363; 403-404.
admired by even German visitors, was reserved in Riga for German 
Lutherans,210 legitimately bom  of free parents, and in Reval, for Lutherans 
only.211 Without citizenship, one did not have the right to conduct trade or 
business in the city.212 Citizenship was also a condition of membership in the 
guilds, important representative bodies, which co-operated with the town council 
in the administration of the city.213 In the fifteenth century, when citizenship 
had not been exclusive to one group, many native Ests and Letts had been 
citizens, some estimates placing the proportion as high as one third of the town 
population. The guilds, however, were not open to non-Germans. Gradually, the 
native element lost their rights. In the course of the fifteenth century (the 
sixteenth in Reval where the non-Germans were often Swedes) non-Germans lost 
their right to own property in the city. They also lost trading rights, and 
marriages with non-Germans were forbidden.214 By the eighteenth century, they 
were not only not eligible for citizenship or membership in the guilds, no matter
210 Until 1661, one had to be Christian to be a citizen. The Swedish government then denied 
Catholics citizenship and in 1670 non-Lutheran Protestants were excluded. Geschichtliche Ubersicht, 
Besonderer Theil, 152.
211 Sweden had stipulated in 1648 that any person of any nationality could become a citizen as long 
as he was a Lutheran of legitimate birth. Other Christians were eligible if they converted to 
Lutheranism and brought their children up in that faith. Ibid.,187.
212 In Riga, only citizens had the right to trade and business and in Reval non-citizens had only 
limited trade rights.
213 The exact laws governing city administration were not codified until 1674, at Sweden's demand. 
The draft was never ratified but the city of Riga was governed according to this draft, which was then 
validated by the general ratifications of Peter I in 1710. (The first draft which was sent to Stockholm 
was reportedly lost while the second was never heard of again probably due to focus on other issues 
like confrontation with the landowners and hostilities with Russia.) Geschichtliche Ubersicht, 
Allgemeine Theil, 133-135. Russia had concluded separate capitulation treaties with the cities of Riga 
(4th July 1710 in 65 articles); with Pemau (12th August 1720 in 41 articles); and with Reval (20th 
September 1710 in 31 articles). Many of the articles paralleled those concluded with the Ritter 
especially those dealing with the Lutheran religion and with the German language, and some dealt 
with military matters of capitulation, like the quartering of troops. In general, however, all lands, 
incomes, privileges, advantages, courts, customs, freedoms on water and on land from the time of the 
Order through Polish and Swedish times were guaranteed to the cities. Ibid., 84-85; 91-93.
214 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 47.
what their background otherwise, but were forced as free m en to wear peasant 
dress, forbidden to engage in any commercial activity and obliged to clean the 
city's drains and refuse "so that they should not forget their origins, nor seek the 
privileges assured to citizens, and should remember eternally that they are 
slaves."215 One such Latvian family, the Steinhauers, resident in the city since 
the seventeenth century, had been honoured by Peter I conferring the title and 
office of official inspector of masts on one of its members. The family were 
successful in timber trading and became wealthy, owning land and commercial 
enterprises.216 When their application for membership in the guild was rejected 
on the grounds of nationality, the Steinhauers took their case to the Senate but 
lost. Nearly fifteen years later, in 1767, the Senate decided in favour of a similar 
case, brought by a relative of the Steinhauers, and declared the right to confer 
citizenship a monarchical prerogative to be granted according to general Russian 
law.217
This ruling was not prompted solely by an interest in the native non- 
German subjects in the Baltic cities. It was not only the native element that was 
discriminated against but also the many Russians resident in Baltic cities, 
especially Riga,218 also not eligible for citizenship before the 1767 ruling. The 
ruling did not bring equality of treatment. Orthodox Russians were now obliged 
to pay taxes but were excluded from the guilds, which meant they could not vote
215 Roger Bartlett, Human Capital. The settlement of foreigners in Russia 1762-1804 (Cambridge, 
1979), 89.
216 This could only be achieved under another's name since such activities were permitted only to 
guild members.
217 Ibid., 88-89; Geschichtliche Ubersicht. Besonderer Theil, 155.
218 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Russian population of towns in Livland was 
estimated at 15,000; 4000 in Reval; and 5000 in Kurland. In Kurland a quarter of the town population, 
some 22,000, were Jews. Hueck, Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse. 3.
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for or occupy any official positions or even attend the meetings where the taxes 
they paid were decided upon. They were allowed to work in the city but only 
under a German master. This situation lasted until 1841 when German monopoly 
on citizenship with full rights was broken by imperial command.219
The Peasants
The majority of the population of the Baltic provinces, some 1,314,992 of 
1,538,998 in the first half of the nineteenth century, were autochthonous 
peasants.220 At the end of the eighteenth century, 100 percent of the peasants 
in Livland were serfs, which meant that just over 93 percent of the total male 
population were serfs. In Estland the proportion was slightly less. By 1811, on 
the eve of emancipation, when the total population had increased, some 80 
percent of the peasantry were serfs in Livland while in Estland, the percentage at 
93 percent had remained roughly the same.221 This vast majority of the Baltic 
population were not only excluded from the realm of privilege but had been 
deprived of their rights in order to support it.
The early period
Under the onslaught of the crusaders, the tribes of the Baltic lands had 
been forced to become not only Christian but also subjects of their conquerors. 
Any uprisings, as in Estland in 1221 and 1343, were mercilessly crushed.222 As
219 Ibid., 160-161.
220 Interpreted from figures given by Hueck, Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 2-3.
221 From figures given by Isabel de Madariaga, "Catherine II and the Serfs: A Reconsideration of 
Some Problems," Slavonic and East European Review no. 126 (Jan. 1974): 37.
222 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 60.
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an organized Stoat and a member of the Hanseatic League,223 the area soon 
flourished and was ruled successfully for three hundred years by "a strange 
mixture of the boldness of the Ritter, the shrewdness of the clergy and the 
briskness of the merchants."224 It was not, however, a harmonious co-operation. 
The Ritterschaft, theoretically subject to the power of the Church, was determined 
to gain total control for its own corporation. In the ensuing two century long 
power struggle, the Church bequeathed land and privileges to those who would 
support them against the Ritter. The Ritter, already a military power, had less 
need of such a policy but temporary crusaders from Europe were encouraged to 
settle in the area by gifts of lands and privileges. Thus, there grew a third 
element of landowning power in the area, the "vassals." Eventually, there was no 
land which was not owned. All this land had to be worked to have any value. 
Since there were no farmers among the many immigrants from Germany,225 
landowners were dependent on local labour, not abundant in a thinly populated 
area. Although forced into subjugation, the peasant still possessed the right to 
personal freedom and the right to own land and property and although his lord 
had jurisdiction over him, he had had representation in the process. Corvee was 
imposed only in special circumstances, when a castle had to be built or a war 
fought. By the fifteenth century, however, landowners began to exert more 
control over their most valuable commodity. In an effort to keep the peasant 
labour they had, they made agreements with one another about runaway
223 Riga and Reval became members as early as 1284. Heinrich von Hagemeister, Materialen zu 
einer Geschichte der Landgiiter Livlands (Riga, 1836), 10.
224 "ein sonderbares Gemisch von kiihner Ritterkraft, schlauem Priestergeiste und regem 
Handelseifer" Ibid. 11.
225 This is usually explained by the fact that the land route through Lithuania was blocked but 
conditions in the Baltic area were not particularly attractive for peasants.
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peasants, thus tying the peasant to the land he worked, the first step to 
enserfment.226
With the Reformation, the Ritter were at last able to take control from the 
Church, and its lands and functions fell for the most part to the administration of 
the Ritter. Landowners increased as the Ritter gave land to others, and along with 
the land, the right of full jurisdiction over the peasants who lived and worked it. 
The peasant became glebae adscriptus — he belonged to the land where he lived. 
Enforcement of this principle was ensured by harsh punishment for runaway 
peasants. The peasant retained only the right to inheritable property.227 By the 
end of the sixteenth century this was also in danger. An observer at that time 
wrote: "The general peasant folk here are almost all serfs and treated harshly by 
their overlords ... They are so merciless ... that if a poor peasant has a good horse 
or ox or cow, they try to find cause to deny him it."228 Chronicles of the time 
depict the German landowners as devoted to drinking and enjoyment,229 a style 
of life which contributed nothing to the development of their estates and 
necessitated the forced labour of peasants to support it. It was also a style of life 
which could be maintained only in times of peace, never long after the first three 
hundred years. Times of war demanded more from the land and its people and 
further entrenched the peasants in serfdom.
Under Poland
Almost as soon as the Ritter had gained power from the Church, 'lo st it
226 H ueck Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 60-66. Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 
28-44.
227 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 66.
228 Cited in Ibid., 68.
229 Ibid., 67-68. The word Wollust is used, which would denote debauchery.
to foreign rule. Foreign dominion put more onus on the unplanned agriculture 
of the area since tributes had to be paid. The customs governing the life of the 
peasant, now serf, were formulated in the Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti, which 
legitimized the control of the landowner over his serfs, recognizing his full civil 
and criminal jurisdiction over them. (Article XXVI) This had been requested by 
the Ritter230 as necessary protection "since it often happened in Livland that 
nobles were killed by their own peasants." The Privilegium also accorded the 
right of the landowner to peasant labour and dues and agreed that the serf should 
not be burdened with any labour other than that for his master (Article XXIII). 
The abode of the serf was determined to be on the estate to which he rightfully 
belonged (Article XXII).231
The privileges of the Ritter had remained unharm ed by the transfer of 
power to external rule but with this transfer began a pattern of foreign 
intervention in the affairs of the Ritter, particularly in the area of their relations 
with their peasants, which would continue under different powers. Under 
Poland, the peasant's lot was not significantly ameliorated but the Ritter were 
restrained form worsening it, at least by legal methods. In 1586, Stephan Barthory 
had his emissary describe to the nobles of Livland the position of their serfs. 
They were "so miserably oppressed and burdened with such serfdom and 
punishment as could be found nowhere in the world, even among heathens and 
barbarians."232 The Polish ruler requested that the peasants in Livland not be
230 Following the example of Estland, where Denmark had granted the Ritter the same right.
231 C.Schirren, Die Capitulationen, 20-22. See also Reinhold Samson von Himmelstiern, Historischer 
Versuch tiber die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft in den Ostseeprovinzen, Beilage zur Wochenschrift 
Das Inland, 1838; 19. Samson summarizes these articles, describing the serf as the property 
(Eigenthum) of the owner. Although Article XXII lays down rules by which the peasant is treated as 
property, the word itself is not used in the text of the agreement.
232 Cited in Ibid., 21.
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burdened more than those in Lithuania and Poland. The Ritter denied the 
accusations but were forced in 1598, by the example of Poland on its crown 
estates in Livland, to allow their serfs to sell any excess produce or wares of their 
own in the towns. About the same time, the first attempt at codifying the laws by 
which the Ritter ruled was completed in three volumes by David Hilchen and 
contained a clear description of the Ritter's wishes regarding their serfs.233 As 
well as coming under the landlord's sole and full jurisdiction, the peasant and his 
children, as well as all his goods and property, could not be sold without the 
landlord's consent.234 In 1600, the Polish parliament refused to ratify this 
draft.235
Under Sweden
Sweden, Poland's successor as the dominium maris Baltici, continued the 
pattern of intervention more emphatically. In 1601, even before it had taken over 
the Baltic lands, the future Charles IX of Sweden recommended to the Ritter of 
Livland, amongst other reforms, the emancipation of their peasants.236 The 
Ritter refused this on behalf of the peasants, claiming the serfs preferred the old 
ways. As proof, the choice they had made under Stephan Bathory was cited. He 
had recommended that corporal punishment be replaced by a fine, an offer the
233 It has been claimed that the sources for this codification were not based on local practice but 
on Polish statutes and the jus terrestre nobilitatis Prussiae. Stael von Holstein, "Die Kodifizirung des 
baltischen Provinzialrechts," Baltische Monatsschrift, 52, 1901; 187.
234 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 22-24.
235 Stael von Holstein, "Die Kodifizirung des baltischen Provinzialrechts," 187.
236 In Swedish terms, the request was not a radical one since serfdom was not known in Sweden.
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peasants refused, not surprising in their moneyless state.237 The Ritter also 
pointed out that it had had to crush peasant uprisings and obedience had only 
been restored by fire and sword. A free peasantry could not be held in check. 
They did concede that deserving individuals could be freed by their lords.238
External intervention came more dramatically under Gustav Adolf. In 1632, 
the jurisdiction of the lord over his serfs was removed, and the serfs were given 
the right to complain against their masters at court.239 The right of domestic 
discipline or Hauszucht, however, remained in the hands of the master. The 
general frame of its application — "any infringement against God's commandments 
or against worthy laws" — gave the landowner wide powers of punishment over 
the serf.240 Hauszucht would last well into the nineteenth century and would be 
one of the last rights to be relinquished by the landowners. The Ritter viewed it 
along with their right of property over the serfs as indispensable for any noble to 
remain in the land.241
One of the reforms proposed by Gustav Adolf, which would eventually 
further reduced the arbitrary rule of the landowner over his serfs, was a survey 
of the land to regulate the amount of peasant labour due to the landowner. This 
policy would be supported by his successors, particularly Charles XI, but before 
it or any other proposed measures could be fully implemented, Gustav Adolf died
237 Barthory's reply, oft quoted by the Ritter, is said to have been "Phryges non nisi plagis 
emendantur" -  The Phrygians can only be ruled by physical force. In the documents of the time, a 
loose translation is given as "Let them remain woodcutters and water carriers." Samson, Historischer 
Versuch. 30.
238 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 22-26.
239 Only at the high court, not in local courts.
240 Ibid., 28.
241 Ibid., 30.
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in 1632. The next fifty years witnessed little initiative from the side of Sweden in 
regulating the state of serfdom in the Baltic. In 1681, however, Charles XI of 
Sweden demanded that the peasant in Livland be freed since slavery was against 
Christian practice. The Ritter once more assured the Swedish crown that the serfs 
did not want freedom, adding paradoxically that if they had it they would fill the 
land with blood in their efforts to eradicate their former owners. There had been 
many examples of attacks on and massacres of Germans, nobles and others, to 
prove this prognostication.242 As well as conducting an improved survey of the 
land to determine peasant dues, Charles XI introduced reforms on his crown 
estates, with the intention of recommending them to private landowners.243 The 
use of the rod in corporal punishment was forbidden; and under punishment of 
heavy fines, the holders of crown estates were forbidden to demand more of the 
peasants than was legally prescribed.244 Other measures protected peasant 
property from arbitrary appropriation by the lord, forbade unjust expulsion from 
his farm and put the peasant under legal jurisdiction with peasant 
representation.245 These measures benefited only peasants on crown lands, not 
those privately owned, but since only one-sixth of land remained in the hands of 
the nobles, the majority of peasants were crown peasants.
In contrst, the measures passed by the Landtag in the latter part of the 
seventeenth century indicate the concern of the Ritter to control peasant labour. 
There was obviously a problem with runaway serfs, understandable in view of
242 Ibid., 29-31.
243 Ibid., 37.
244 What each landowner could demand of his peasants was written down in a special book — the 
Wackenbuch. See Part Three below.
245 Ibid., 36-37.
the better treatment to be had on crown estates. In 1696, the Governor General 
had complained to the Ritter about their cruel treatment of their serfs, which 
deprived them of "health, livelihood, use of limbs or even life."246 As the 
number of crown estates steadily increased, more private peasants could be 
absorbed. The Landtag measures were designed to keep as many serfs under 
control as possible, enserf new ones, and retrieve runaway ones. Every 
contingency was covered; there were rules for illegitimate children, for widows 
and widowers, for strangers and foreigners, for day workers and visitors.247 All 
aspects of the peasant's life were controlled. The duration of a wedding feast as 
well as the number of guests, the amount of alcohol and the type of gifts were 
determined by the Landtag.
Under Russia
The change from Sweden to Russia meant belonging to an empire where 
serfdom was an unquestioned institution and the power of the landowner 
absolute. Whereas Sweden had issued a series of decrees in favour of the peasant, 
the Russian legislature could be expected to issue decrees in favour of the 
landowner, which it did. First, Russia restored all land, and with it all peasants, 
to the Ritter and upheld all their previously acquired privileges and rights,
246 Ibid., 37.
247 The rules of ownership were carefully worked out by defining exactly who was a serf and who 
could be enserfed. Basically, one was bom  a serf and it was a state that was passed on from parents 
to children. Illegitimate children belonged to the lord of the estate on which they were bom. A serf 
could give his son to another to bring up but he remained the property of the lord, w ho could reclaim 
him, his children and anything he had acquired. If a serf had no son and his daughter married outside 
the estate, she could inherit clothes and money but grain, cattle, horses and household equipment 
belonged to the lord. Landowners had three months to reclaim any of their m naway serfs, otherwise 
they remained the property of the new lord. There were many ways to increase the number of serfs 
on an estate without having to purchase them. Even if a serf took on a worker as help or apprentice, 
he became automatically the property of the serf s lord. Ibid., 38-42.
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specifically the Privilegium which more or less put the serf back where he was 
one hundred and fifty years ago. The Swedish reforms were effectively cancelled. 
In 1713, complete jurisdiction over the peasant was restored to the landlord when 
the latter was declared the only legal judge over the former. Corporal punishment 
continued unhindered and in 1760 impudent behaviour was deemed punishable 
by exile to Siberia. In 1762, a landlord was declared free from punishment for a 
peasant's death. The peasants lost any right of appeal or complaint and could be 
sent to Siberia without trial. These laws were of general application in Russia and 
not passed specifically for the Baltic area. Some orders were issued in the 
peasant's favour. In 1716 all landowners were forbidden to hinder the marriage 
of a female serf to a male from another area, and in 1722 crown estate holders 
were forbidden under forfeit of their holdings to use crown serfs for their private 
use or to hire them out to others.248
The exact status of the Baltic serf at the beginning of Russian rule is 
described in an official paper prepared in 1739 by Baron Rosen, the Landrat, in 
answer to the the request of the Imperial Justice Committee for a description of 
the legal relations between the landowner and his serf in Livland. The serf was 
described as the property of the landowner, as was anything he acquired on the 
estate of his lord. His corvee and duties were determined solely by his owner 
and he had no right of complaint against harsh treatment. Except in criminal 
matters, he was under the jurisdiction of the lord and could be punished 
corporally.249 The situation of the serfs in the Baltic was considered too extreme
248 These measures obviously had little impact since they were repeated in 1728 and 1733 with 
stiffer punishments. In 1756, the landowners were once more ordered not to hinder a peasant from 
marrying. Ibid., 43.
249 The text of the report is given in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 44-47.
250
251
49-57.
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even for Russia, also built on serfdom, and the pattern of external intervention 
continued. In January 1765, Catherine II issued stern warnings to the Landtag in 
Livland through Governor Browne, deploring, as the Polish and Swedish rulers 
before her, the miserable oppression of the serf under the "tyrannical severity and 
dissolute despotism" of the landowners.250 Browne outlined three main areas 
of concern: 1) the peasant was not allowed to own anything of his own, even if 
acquired by his "own sweat and blood"; 2) the peasant's labour and dues were not 
regulated and often beyond his physical capacity; 3) punishments -- such as the 
use of the rod until "skin and flesh fell off" or incarceration for months in chains 
on a diet of bread and water in the ice cold — were beyond Christian or 
humanitarian considerations. Other major problems were raised: the exploitation 
of peasant labour in the distilling of alcohol, a Ritter monopoly; the sale of serfs 
separately or together with their families; the absence of the serfs right to 
complain; the lack of schools for peasant children. Browne, in Catherine's name, 
did not limit himself to complaints but offered detailed solutions to the problems 
he raised.251 Although the Ritter's basic right to own their serfs had not been 
attacked, but rather the abuse of that right, the Ritter viewed this Russian 
commentary on their affairs as an attack on their complete and undisputable 
control over their serfs. Serfdom, their historical argument ran, had been 
necessary to subdue the peasants of the area and must be upheld to continue to 
subdue them. Its roots were not only in the "natural condition" of the peasants 
but in the privileges of the Ritter. The serf was regarded by the Ritter as an 
essential part of their landed property and as such would not be mistreated since
Catherine had visited Livland the previous year.
Much of the text of Browne's speech to the Landtag is given in Samson, Historischer Versuch,
his ruin would mean the ruin of his lord. Even if religious and humanitarian 
considerations did not ensure fair treatment, therefore, economic sense would.
Although the Landtag rebutted the Russian accusations,252 it agreed in 
April of the same year to pass measures which would in part meet the 
expectations of the Russian government.253 The Landtag agreed to the serf's 
indisputable right to own what he himself had acquired and the right to dispose 
of such property as he pleased; the regulation of serf labour and services, both 
regular and extraordinary; a maximum limit on corporal punishment and 
incarceration; and the peasant right to complain about any infringements of these 
measures. This last right was, on the surface, a major concession on the part of 
the Ritter but it was so qualified that it could not be exercised as a control on the 
arbitrariness of the landowner. Before the serf complained, he had to complete 
the disputed task. He then had the right to complain only orally, not in writing 
and not with legal representation. Only individual peasants could complain. 
When more than one complained, it would be considered revolt and suitably 
punished. If the complaint proved unjustified, the peasant was subjected to 
severe corporal punishment in the first two instances and forced labour for one 
year in a third. These conditions seemed to have the desired effect since in 1777 
Governor General Browne was compelled to address the Landtag on the subject 
of unrest among the peasants, caused, he claimed, by landlords not adhering to
252 The peasant, the Ritter daimed, was allowed to own and dispose of things he himself had 
acquired, so much so that there were peasants with large capitals. Peasant labour and dues were 
regulated except for the extraordinary services involved in running an estate — harvest, fertilizing, 
building, cleaning, carting, felling wood, etc -  which fluctuated from estate to estate. Such services 
benefited the peasants too since he was helped in times of hardship, even through his own fault, by  
the landlord. Corporal punishment was only used in more serious cases like runaways, theft etc. The 
text o f the Ritter's answer to Browne is given in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 57-71.
253 Browne had intimated that if the Ritter were not willing to take the necessary measures, 
Catherine was prepared to issue the law herself.
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the rules laid down in 1765. Landowners were demanding twice, three times and 
more the peasant labour allowed. The other reforms were also qualified in the 
landlord's favour. The peasant was given the right to own his own property but 
could only dispose of it if the landlord did not object. Peasant labour was 
regulated by the landlord. Each landowner had four months to submit the 
amount of labour the peasants had till now fulfilled and this would become the 
norm.
The laws of 1765, even if they had been adhered to, fell far short of what 
the serf had enjoyed under Sweden. The Baltic serf had gained very little in 
almost a century of Russian rule. Legislation designed to increase the power of 
the nobility in Russia worsened the position of the Baltic serf; legislation proposed 
specifically for the Baltic was successfully resisted or modified by the Landtag in 
favour of the Ritter. It was not until 1796 that legislation concerning peasants 
became more significant and ushered in the period of reform which led to 
emancipation.
One perspective attributes the oppression of the Baltic serfs under Russian 
rule to the demands of the Russian state on an economy devastated by war. The 
more the state demanded, the more the Ritter had to demand from the serfs.254 
The final part of this chapter will look at the duties of privilege and the price of 
loyalty.
PART THREE: THE DUTIES OF PRIVILEGE
The maintenance of privilege was built upon a system of duties and
254 See, for example, Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 95.
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obligations. On one side, privilege was supported by the duties demanded from 
the peasants and on the other guaranteed by the powers to whom the Ritter 
pledged homage and allegiance. Allegiance demanded a price, paid in military 
service, tribute and taxes, and to pay this price, the Ritter exacted dues from the 
peasants. The burden of all dues, whether manorial or state, fell on the land, at 
least until the nineteenth century when sources of revenue other than agriculture 
became economically significant. Taxation was based on a division of the land into 
units which were more than simple land measurements.
The Haken
Since the time of the Knights of the Sword, Livland255 had been divided 
into haken, a word which originally denoted a farming implement, namely a light 
plough.256 This type of plough was not found in the German lands, where the 
heavier wheel plough was used, but was probably brought by the Ritter from 
other conquered areas. Due to the tax system used by the Germans in the Baltic, 
the word came to describe a unit of tax as well as a farm implement. The usual 
German method of taxation, the tithe, could not be used in the conquered Baltic 
lands due to a lack of administration. The Ritter and bishops adopted the tribute 
or Zins method istead of the tithe.257
How much the land yielded was more important to the Ritter's economic 
welfare than the total area of land owned. Untilled land was not an economic 
prospect in feudal Livland. The yield was dependent not only on peasant labour 
but on the necessary implements and yoke animals. The more ploughs and yoke
255 The development was much the same for Estland and Kurland. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung,
60.
256 There is not full consensus on the etymology. Ibid., 50.
257 Bishop Albert I had substituted the tribute for the tithe, reserving the latter for those who 
rebelled against his authority. Ibid., 53.
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animals in use, the more the yield and the larger the share for the landowner and 
for the state. The amount of tax payable was based, therefore, on the number of 
implements available to till the land. Thus the plough or haken became the unit 
of tax. In Livland, the haken as an agricultural unit consisted of one horse, a 
plough and a harrow.258 As early as the thirteen century the haken came to be 
used as a topographical measurement, describing an area of cultivated land, but 
there was no standard size. At least five different area measures were described 
under the term haken.259 When the Ritter lost their autonomy, the definition of 
the haken was removed from the hands of the local landowners and transferred 
to the fiscal domain of foreign powers. Poland made the first attempt to 
standardize the size in 1561. Article XIII of the Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti 
specified the size of a haken arithmetically which worked out to about the same 
as the largest of the five measures in use.260 This method, however, was not 
adhered to.
Under Sweden, several measures were taken to regulate the haken in the 
interest of state fiscal standardization. Sweden's efforts concentrated not so much 
on the area of the haken but on the work needed to cultivate it. The variability in 
the size of the haken was partly caused by variability in the soil which in turn 
caused variability in the amount of peasant labour needed to cultivate it. In 1602, 
Charles IX of Sweden declared that taxation should be based not on the size of the 
haken but on the work done on it. A haken was defined as a farm where a peasant
258 There is disagreement over this, some researchers claiming the definition included two horses. 
Ibid., 54.
259 Hagemeister, Materialen zu einer Geschichte der Landguter Livlands, 3.
260 Schirren, Die Capitulationen, 15. Hagemeister, Geschichte der Land gu ter Livlands, 3.
could work enough to pay his dues with two horses six days a week.261 The 
total number of haken now became the focus of fiscal interest. The number of 
haken is an important perspective on the fiscal policies of the ruling power. The 
ruling power not only had the right to raise taxes but to decide on the method of 
taxation, and under foreign dominion the haken became a fiscal instrument. It was 
defined not by the Ritter but by the foreign state to which they were subjected. 
In an attempt to regulate the tax base, Gustav Adolf ordered a haken survey. 
Completed in 1637, it resulted in a count of 2871 haken.262 A few years later, 
another survey raised the number of haken, still based on peasant labour, to 
434S.263 By 1688, the total number had risen to 6236. The motivation in 
increasing the total number of haken was certainly fiscal, but the direct aim was 
not so much to increase income by increasing the number of taxable units as to 
regulate the Swedish crown's lands in Livland. Only 1021 of the 6236 haken were 
privately owned; the rest belonged to the Crown.264
The 1688 survey covered crown lands, both the land which was given to 
the peasant for his use in return for his labour (Bauerland) and the land which was 
for the landowner's economic use (Hofsland). The Hofsland on private estates was 
not taxable. The Bauerland carried the burden of all taxes, manorial and state.
261 Ibid., 6.
262 Ibid. Estland did not undergo the haken surveys that Livland did. They were planned by both 
the Swedes and Russians but never carried out. A haken was based on the number of male peasant 
farmers, five to a haken, ten at the coast where the soil was harder to till. Kurland also evaded haken 
surveys. The 1561 formula remained in force until 1714 when severe economic circumstances, 
including the effects of the plague, reckoned the haken at sixty male peasants. In 1763, the size of a 
haken was calculated according to its value. Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 75.
263 The discrepancy is perhaps explained by the very poor economic situation in the mid­
seventeenth century. Years of war and plague had left whole areas deserted. In 1627, one area 
counted 622 inhabited haken and 1605 deserted ones. Hagemeister, Geschichte der Landguter Livlands,
9.
264 Ibid., 16.
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There were so few private estates that it was deemed sufficient to register the 
peasant duties and dues in what was called the Wackenbuch, the official book for 
this purpose.265
The Swedish definition of a haken was based not only on peasant labour but 
also took the variability of the soil into account. The soil was divided into two 
categories, each with four grades. Dues owed by the peasants in labour or in 
produce were carefully defined. The reforms, therefore, although fiscally 
motivated, did benefit the peasants who had previously been ruled by the 
arbitrary systems of their landowners.
Under Russian rule, the haken as the basis of taxation remained. Most of 
the Swedish crown lands were restored to the Ritter and a new survey rendered 
the number of haken at 4788, considerably less than the Swedish survey.266 As 
the welfare of the land recovered from the years of war, however, Russia soon 
introduced new definitions and surveys in order to broaden its tax base. By 1761 
the total number of haken had reached 6362, of which the large majority were in 
private hands.267
A significant change was made in the method of calculation used. The 
Swedes had measured and appraised the land before taxing it but the Russian 
system was much less methodical. It simply counted sixteen adult persons to a 
haken regardless of the quality of the soil. Any Hofsland used by peasants was 
also taxable. Under complaints from the Ritter, Catherine ordered an 
investigation, but in 1783 the land tax was replaced by the poll tax. Haken were
265 The etymology of Wack is uncertain but in the thirteenth century it denoted an area of an estate; 
later it was used to describe the dues owed by the peasant to the lord of the estate. See Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzgebung, 57.
266 Hagemeister, Geschichte der Landguter Livlands, 18.
267 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 67.
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still counted but only as a means to register what the peasant owed his lord. 
Norms were to be set but since the landlord set them, the peasants were once 
more dependent on the arbitrary will of their owners. The poll tax remained in 
force until the reforms of 1804 reverted to the Swedish system of haken calculation 
and regulated norms.268
Dues and duties
State
Although the service of the Ritter to the state could only be supported by 
peasant labour, the peasant as such was not the taxable entity. As a serf, he had 
no status in the body politic. The landowner was responsible before the state and 
paid his taxes from his revenues, which were supplied by his serfs. The amount 
payable depended on the number of haken owned.
The oldest public duty was military service or Rofidienst. Although the 
Ritter no longer had to ride off to war personally, they had to maintain cavalry, 
the number depending on the number of haken owned. Other taxes payable by 
the Ritter to the state also stemmed from military needs. The Station, first raised 
by the Swedes in time of war with Poland and originally consisting of grain, was 
unsuccessfully contested by the Ritter in times of peace. There was also a forced 
contribution of wood and other materials useful in defence works. A fourth 
compulsory contribution was abolished by Peter I at the Ritter's request. The taxes 
could be paid in money, the amount determined by the num ber of haken owned. 
They were, therefore, attached to the Bauerland,269 payable by the user and
268 Ibid., 66-69.
269 The Hofsland remained tax exempt.
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deducted from the landowner's revenues, and constituted about twenty-five 
percent of the peasant's total dues. For much of the eighteenth century, the taxes 
as such were not increased, although the increase in the number of haken did 
cause an indirect increase. A significant change came with the introduction of the 
poll tax, levied on every male from 1783 to 1804. The landowner was responsible 
for paying his serfs' tax if they could not and he could raise the poll tax at will. 
This he did to cover the cost of the compulsory state contributions. The state also 
put a high tax on the sale of landed estates (Krepostposdilin or Besitzwechselsteuer). 
The Ritter were also required to supply three military recruits for every 500 m en270 
and quartering regulations were severe. For every five haken, quartering had to 
be provided for fifteen cavalry and their horses. An increasing scale meant that 
ten haken had to cope with up to fifty horses.271
Provincial
Taxes were also levied at a local level. The Ritter were bound to supply 
the material and cost of building and maintaining bridges and roads, the labour 
supplied by their serfs. The amount of the contribution depended on the size of 
the estate, in haken. To this tax is attributed not only the existence of roads in 
Livland but also their high quality.272 Under Russia, the Ritter also had to build 
post houses and supply the horses, carriages and other equipment necessary. The 
salaries of officials were the responsibility of the Ritter, and one which they 
resentfully viewed as the responsibility of the government for its own officials.273
270 Revoked by Catherine and reinstated by Paul.
271 Tobien, P ie Agrargesetzgebung, 73-87.
272 Ibid., 88. Bray, Essai critique, 39.
273 During the period of Catherine's Statthalterschaft, the Ritter were relieved of this responsibility.
There was also a modest contribution to the Landtag, based on the number of 
haken owned. The Landtag, however, was forced to borrow and taxes rose to 
cover the interests on the debt. The Ritter as individuals were also deeply in debt, 
in part due to the loss of income from their serfs when the poll tax replaced the 
land tax, in part due to the tax demands of the Russian state and in part due to 
the lack of systematic agricultural methods. At the end of the eighteenth century, 
the debts of the Ritter were in the amount of eleven million rubles.
CHAPTER II 
ENLIGHTENMENT AND REFORM
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PART ONE: CULTURAL AFFINITY AND POLITICAL LOYALTY
One of the most important aspects of Baltic provincial privilege was the 
guarantee of those very elements which marked the provinces as a foreign part 
of the Russian Empire. The continuance of the German language, German 
administration and German culture was assured. The actual extent of German­
ness in the provinces, however, was, as has already been indicated, limited to the 
small minority of the Ritter and the larger town element and accounted for 
approximately only one-ninth of the total population.1 The guardians of German 
culture themselves, the Ritter, were not all German in origin. Their ranks, 
especially in Livland, had been diluted over the centuries by the addition of Poles, 
Swedes, and other foreigners. The addition of non-German elements is especially 
noticeable under Russian rule.2 The matriculation list includes Russian names 
like Scheremetkv, Golovkin, Dolgoruky, Vorontsov.3 While these non-German 
additions represent honorary titles and deeds of land rather than significant 
foreign influences within the ranks of the Ritter, they do indicate that the
1 Hueck's figures for the first part of the nineteenth century count 175,253 Germans in a total 
population of 1,538,998. As already noted, only 7902 of these belonged to the matriculated nobility. 
Hueck notes that Kohl puts the figure much lower, erroneously, at 100,000. Darstellung der 
landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 2-4. Wittram, pointing out the unreliability of these early statistics, 
uses various sources to set the total Baltic non-German population at about 1,130,000 at the end of the 
eighteenth century. In Kurland, in 1797 there were 35,374 Germans of a total population of 394,626; 
in Livland, 42,783 of a total of 505,419 in 1782. According to Wittram, the number of Germans reached 
its highest point at the end of the eighteenth century, when it was three times as high as at the end 
of the nineteenth century. Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 143-144.
2 A full list of the Ritter of Livland as compiled by Georg von Harwifi, the Secretary of the Ritter, 
in 1816 is given in Bray, Essai critique, vol.3, 379-397.
3 Nos. 114, 115, 179, 181 respectively on the matriculation list.
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Ritterschaft, even although it considered itself German, was not purely German, 
that Baltic German was a special variety of German.4
Five centuries of development separated the Germans in the Baltic from 
mainstream Germany. It had required, as Baroness Rahden pointed out to 
Samarin, "extraordinary efforts of concentration" to keep their "national character" 
as they were "cast from one foreign suzerainty to another."5 Political realities 
were seldom in concordance with cultural affinity. As early as the sixteenth 
century, the German Baltic was considered a far outpost, long estranged from the 
German Empire (of which it was still a member). Repeated pleas for German 
help against the Russian threat went unheeded. The German states remained 
non-interventionist and the Baltic lands were forced to seek help elsewhere and 
submit to their fate of Schicksalsland.6 Cultural affinity also survived such 
anomalies as having to face Prussia as an enemy allied with Russia against 
Sweden. Although union with Russia demanded political loyalty to a foreign 
power, it did not hinder cultural affinity with Germany. In the earlier practice of 
Empire, which did not demand uniformity in its elements,7 the double role of 
cultural affinity and political loyalty was possible, but it would become 
increasingly difficult for the German Ritter to belong simultaneously to the West 
culturally and to the Russian Empire politically. The tension inherent in this
4 Non-Germans who did settle in the provinces, however, were speedily assimilated into the 
German way of life. Wilhelm Lenz, Per baltische Literatenstand, Wissenschaftliche Beitrage zur 
Geschichte und Landeskunde Ost-Mitteleuropas, Nr.7 (Marburg, 1953), 34.
5 The Correspondence of Iu. Samarin and Baroness Rahden, 54.
6 Walter Platzhoff, "Das erste Auftauchen Rufilands und der russischen Gefahr in der europaischen 
Politik," in Historische Zeitschrift 115 3.Folge (1916), 87-91.
A uniform foreign policy or concerted German action was difficult in any case since Germany was 
composed of many different political entities.
7 See Chapter I, Part One.
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double affiliation would increase as the Russian Empire developed politically. An 
independent political development in the Baltic was not possible due to its 
dependent political status. "The three provinces in themselves do not constitute 
a country, they are only a possession..."8 "The political future of the Germans in 
the Baltic provinces is really just a myth."9 The cultural affinity in the Baltic 
provinces, their German-ness, however, was a reality.
When the Baltic provinces became part of the Russian Empire, Western 
thought was being transformed by the ideas of the Enlightenment, ideas which 
would gradually be translated into reality. By the end of the seventeenth century, 
England's parliamentary monarchy had provided a model for reform which 
inspired the great French thinkers. By the middle of the eighteenth century, 
Voltaire, Montesquieu and Rousseau had written their most influential works,10 
and by the end of the century the American and French Revolutions had put 
many of the Enlightenment's ideas into political practice. The cultural affinity of 
the Baltic Ritter with Germany identified them with this changing West, but their 
political loyalty tied them to an absolutist state, behind the West in almost every 
aspect of development. The contradiction inherent in these roles, however, would 
only be a conflict in reality if the Baltic Ritter were indeed true representatives of 
an enlightened West and as such unable to support an autocratic, unenlightened 
Russia. The dichotomy could also have a positive function if the Baltic Germans, 
as representatives of the West, played a significant role in the Westernization and 
enlightenment of Russia. The historical reality shows that the dichotomy of
8 Samarin in a letter from Brussels, October 17, 1864. The Correspondence of Iu. Samarin and 
Baroness Rahden, 57.
9 Baroness Rahden in a letter from Lausanne, October 10 1864. Ibid., 54. The italics are original.
10 Voltaire, Letters from England 1729; Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws 1748; Rousseau, Social 
Contract 1762.
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cultural affinity and political loyalty did not function in either of these ways in 
the period of Enlightenment.
Baltic Germans and Germans in Russia
The Baltic provinces may have provided Russia with its window on the 
West but Russia already had firm, if limited, contacts with the West before 
becoming dominium maris Baltici. Throughout the centuries, there are scattered 
historical instances of Russia's increasing contact with Europe, or Europe's 
discovery of Russia.11 As early as 1576, a Lutheran church existed in Moscow.12 
By the mid-seventeenth century, when the Baltic provinces were still under 
Swedish rule, the German Quarter of Moscow, a settlement of foreigners, was 
firmly established.13 The Russian court and the German states were connected 
by marriage ties.14 Fearful of the Latin heresy which might threaten the Russian 
Church,15 Russia was not prepared, however, until Peter the Great to open up 
to the West. The acquisition of the Baltic lands was a necessary strategic part of
11 Ivan III married the Byzantine princess Zoe (later Sophia), who brought contact with Italy; Ivan 
the Terrible had granted trading privileges to the English in 1555 and Queen M aiy had an ambassador 
in Moscow; in 1631, a Scot had levied Swedish troops for the tsar and the military was generally 
trained by foreigners; in 1634, copper experts had been brought from Saxony; state ordinance factories 
were founded by Dutch and Germans in the 1640s. Walter Platzhoff, "Das erste Auftauchen Rufllands," 
77-93. Although it is not the direct intention of his article, Platzhoff gives examples of Russia's 
contacts with the West in the Middle Ages.
12 St.Michaelis. P.N.Berkov, "Deutsch-russische kulturelle Beziehungen im 18.Jahrhundert," in 
E.Winter, ed., Die deutsch-russische Begegnung und Leonhard Euler, Quellen und Studien zur 
Geschichte Osteuropas Band I, (Berlin, 1958), 67.
13 The nemetskaya sloboda, situated three miles from the Kremlin, was one of thirty-six slobody. All 
foreigners except diplomats lived there. In 1700 it had a population of about seventeen hundred. See 
Samuel H.Baron, "The Origins of 17th century Moscow's Nemeckaya Sloboda," California Slavic 
Studies, vol 5 (1970).
14 It is tempting to postulate that the German presence already in Russian circles made it easier 
for the Russians to understand their new subjects in the Baltic provinces rather than that the new  
"German" subjects made it easier for their overlords to understand German culture.
15 Hans Hecker, "Rufiland und Europa," in Russen und Rutland I, 52-53.
this policy but the means to westernize Russia lay elsewhere. Peter visited 
Germany, Denmark, Holland, England, France and Austria and imported experts 
of every kind from Europe. Russians were sent abroad to study, especially to 
Holland, England and Venice to learn the skills of shipbuilding, navigation and 
medicine,16 skills which were not so available in the less economically and 
technically developed Germany.
The number of Germans living in Russia increased over the eighteenth 
century as economic prosperity was perceived to be linked to the size of a 
country's population."... (T)he richness of any country does not proceed from the 
greatness of its extent, but from the number of its inhabitants ..." was an economic 
view generally accepted by the middle of the century.17 In 1761, Lomonosov 
recommended the recruitment of foreigners to settle the Russian Empire18 and 
the influence of "populationism" was evident in Catherine H's active 
encouragement of colonization, which brought many thousands of foreigners to 
Russia, estimated conservatively at 75,000.19 The great majority of these were
16 The degree of success can be questioned. Prince Mikhail Golitsyn, one of these involuntary 
Russian students, complained in a letter written from Amsterdam in 1711:"... the life that has fallen 
to me is the poorest and the hardest.... Even if I laboured every day of my life at it I would not take 
it in (much less master it), the reason being that if you do not know foreign languages you cannot 
learn science. Aside from my native tongue I am unable to learn any other, and my years have been 
spent away from any science ... I wish I might be taken back to Moscow, even as the lowest soldier 
in the ranks, but if that is not possible..., let me study infantry science and not navigation." Quoted 
in V.O.Kliuchevskii, "Western Influence in Russia after Peter the Great," trans. and ed. Marshall S. 
Hatz in Canadian-American Slavic Studies. 20, nos.3-4 (Fall-Winter 1986): 478-479.
[Kliuchevskii gave a series of lectures with this title at the Moscow Polytechnic Museum in 1890-1891, 
the complete texts of which were first published in 1983: V.O.Kliuchevskii, Neopublikovannye 
proizvedeniia. ed. M.V.Nechkina et alii (Moscow, 1983).]
17 Cited in Roger Bartlett, "Foreign Settlement in Russia under Catherine II," The N ew  Zealand 
Slavonic lournal no.l (1974): 2.
18 In a letter to I.I.Shuvalov "On the Preservation and Increase of the Russian People." Ibid.
19 Ibid., 16.
German.20 In the year 1766, 17,866 people were dispatched to Russia from 
Liibeck alone.21 The increase continued into the next century. From 1796 to 1858 
the number of Germans in Russia increased from 237 to 840 thousand, 
constituting 0,9% of the population.22 Subtracting Baltic Germans from the 
total23 still leaves a substantial amount of non-Baltic Germans, increasing from 
158,5 to 726 thousand. The majority of these German immigrants did not function 
at the same level as the Baltic Germans in Russia. Most of them were agricultural 
workers or artisans. In the city, there were German merchants, traders and 
craftsmen.24 That German immigrants came in such large numbers, however, is 
due less to the higher level of education and technical expertise they might have 
possessed, or to the deliberate choice of a German-born Russian Empress, than to 
the absence of stricter laws governing the recruitment of foreigners in several of 
the German states. Most countries were also pursuing populationist policies to 
ensure their own economic welfare and thus controlled emigration.25
20 Roger Bartlett, Human Capital: The settlement of foreigners in Russia 1762-1804, (Cambridge, 
1979), 58.
21 Ibid., 64. The incentives offered the promise of a better life than in the German states at that 
time. In addition to land and various initial help, the settlers were guaranteed religious freedom, their 
own jurisdiction within the colony, a thirty-year tax exemption and exemption from military service. 
[P.v.Koeppen, Uber Die Deutschen im St. Petersburgischen Gouvemement, (St Petersburg, 1850), 9.] 
They were also protected from enserfment. [Bartlett, Human Capital, 45.]
22 V.M. Kabuzan, "Nemetzkoye naselenie v  Rossii v  XVII - nachale XX veka," Voprosi Istorii, no.12 
(December 1989), 24.
23 An increase from 78,5 to 114 thousand.
24 Bartlett, Human Capital, 159.
25 Turkey, for example, would not allow the enserfment of Moslems; Austria saw competition for 
its own Hungarian settlements; France and Spain needed settlers for their own concerns abroad. 
Smaller states were unwilling to reduce their "human capital": Switzerland, Bavaria, Bayreuth, Hesse, 
and Saxony were examples of where Catherine's manifesto advertising for colonists was forbidden. 
Legal recruitment of colonists was limited to cities and free states, mainly in southern and western 
Germany. Denmark, Britain and Holland allowed the manifesto but their standards of living were 
high enough to keep their own human capital and they all had their own colonies for those who  
wanted to leave. Ibid., 57-58.
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The Baltic Germans served the Russian state in higher echelons than the 
average German immigrant. Peter required their service and many were glad of 
the opportunity to escape the poor conditions forced on the provinces by the 
ravages of war. Baltic Germans provided the Russian army with many officers26 
and served at court, where the German presence was strong in the middle of the 
eighteenth century. Baltic German, however, was not synonymous with German. 
The "German" phase in Russian rule, the bironovshchina of Anna, a phase which 
made future court circles wary of foreign, and especially German influence, is 
indicative of this. The Baltic non-noble Johann Ernst Biron from Kurland (at that 
time not under Russia's political dominion) gained influence with Anna, duchess 
of Kurland, who succeeded to the Russian throne in 1730. Biron's despotic 
methods at the Russian court made him extremely unpopular with the 
Russians.27 He was ousted by Munnich28 and Ostermann,29 non-Baltic 
Germans at the court, who feared that Biron would endanger the German 
presence in Russia. Baltic Germans and Germans were not necessarily one and 
the same thing.30
26 Baltic Germans served not only in the Russian army. There are instances of Baltic German 
officers in the armies of Sardinia, France, Sweden and Spain. Kurland, not part of the Russian Empire 
till 1795, supplied the Prussian army with officers. Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 145.
27 For opinions about Biron expressed in verse of the time, see Mechthild Keller, "Geschichte in 
Reimen: Rutland in Zeitgedichten und Kriegsliedem," in Russen und Rutland II, 311-314.
28 General Burkhard Christoph Munnich was a major political influence during the reign of Anna 
and an outstanding military leader. He led Russia in victory against Turkey (1736-1739). After sending 
Biron to Siberia, he himself suffered the same fate but was recalled and appointed director general of 
Baltic ports.
29 Heinrich Johann Ostermann came to Russia from Westphalia in 1704 and served as a diplomat 
under four Russian rulers. He too was eventually exiled to Siberia. For more on Ostermann, see Alois 
Mertes, Hans Dietrich Mittorp, Dieter Wellenkamp, Drei Deutschen in RuBland: Ostermann, Cancrin, 
Haass (Darmstadt, 1983).
30 Another perspective for the removal of Biron by the German elements at the Russian court may 
have been his plan, "a political game in rococo style," to commit treason by using Swedish help to 
create a Baltic state by adding the two other provinces to Kurland, under Swedish dominion. Georg 
von Rauch, "Politische Voraussetzungen fur westostliche Kulturbeziehungen im 18. Jahrhundert," in
Baltic Germans served not only in the army and at court but also in the 
civil and diplomatic services. By the middle of the nineteenth century, there was 
a high percentage of German names in all of these areas.31 Names, however, did 
not reveal identity or cultural affinity. It was not always possible to tell which 
were German or which were Baltic German or which were fully Russianized, 
especially since place of birth was not registered. Religion was registered and 
provides a better guide. In one statistical survey of Russian civil servants in the 
mid-nineteenth century, Lutherans accounted for only four percent of the total,32 
although their percentage increased at the higher ranks to fifteen percent.33 One 
cannot presume with certainty that these were only Baltic Germans but comments 
made to Haxthausen on his travels revealed a candidly expressed dislike for Baltic 
Germans, as opposed to Germans from Germany, because not only did they act 
insolently and arrogantly but they crowded Russians out of military and civil 
positions.34
As part of the army, the court and the civil service, Baltic Germans were 
less the bringers of Western Enlightenment than the suppliers of efficient 
administration. Another German presence in Russia, direct from Germany, could
Russen und Rutland, 45-46.
31 According to one source, twenty-six percent of those in the Russian diplomatic service had 
German names. W.v.Bock in Livlandische Beitrage Band I, (Leipzig, 1868) 87. Cited in Georg von  
Rauch, "Der russische Reichsgedanke im Spiegel des politischen Bewufitseins der baltischen 
Provinzen," in Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft Band I (Munich, 1954): 187.
32 Walter M.Pintner, "The Social Characteristics of the Early Nineteenth Century Russian 
Bureaucracy," in Slavic Review Vol 29 (March, 1970): 438. Three percent were Roman Catholic, 
presumably Polish, the rest Orthodox. "Individuals with German (or Polish) names but Orthodox 
religion are not included with the Lutheran and Catholic groups on the assumption that conversion 
implied a substantial degree of cultural Russianization."
33 Of ten top-level officials in the Economic Department of the Ministry of Interior, four were 
Lutheran. Ibid.
34 August Freiherr von Haxthausen, Studien uber die innem Zustande, das Volksleben und 
insbesondere die landlichen Einrichtungen Rufilands 3 vols. (Berlin, 1847-1852); vol 3, 19.
lay claims to the former role. The origin of this German presence had begun at 
the end of the seventeenth century (before the Baltic lands became part of the 
Empire), when Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, impressed by the success of the Jesuit 
missionaries in China, developed the idea of a European-Chinese synthesis, with 
Russia the all-important bridge between. Leibniz met with Peter the Great on 
several occasions and made practical suggestions for reform which almost read 
like a blueprint for the tsar's reforms: the foundation of educational institutions, 
libraries, an observatory (which would help navigation), printing and book shops; 
the employment of foreign expertise in all areas; the importing of useful things 
from abroad; travel permits; the education of people in Russia itself; a survey of 
the country from all aspects to determine its needs; the improvement of 
agriculture, productivity, communication.35 Leibniz's interest in Russia was 
communicated to his students. Christian Wolff, the recognized leader of German 
enlightened philosophy,36 served as science adviser to Peter the Great from 1716 
to 1725 and helped found the St Petersburg Academy of Sciences, which had close 
connections with the Berlin Academy of Sciences, which Leibniz had helped 
found. The Petersburg Academy attracted some of the most prestigious names 
in their fields, often directly and not through the Berlin Academy.37 The Leibniz- 
Wolff school dominated the Academy appointments, mostly through a network
35 Mechthild Keller, "Wegbereiter der Aufklarung; Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz' Wirken fur Peter den 
Grofien und sein Reich," in Russen und Rutland I, 391-413.
36 Rationalism and mathematical methodology formed the basis of his philosophy, based on 
Leibniz and Descartes, and he was a major force in the development of German philosophical thought.
See, for example, Keller, "Von Halle nach Petersburg," in Russen und Rutland, 173.
37 Daniel Bernoulli, the distinguished scientist, lectured in medicine, mechanics and physics at the 
Petersburg Academy from 1724 to 1732. Bernoulli was succeeded by Leonard Euler, the prominent 
mathematician, who stayed with the Academy from 1727 until 1735 when he joined the Berlin 
Academy. During his next 25 years in Berlin, he still contributed his publications to St Petersburg, 
which paid him a pension. Catherine II invited him to return to Russia in 1766, and he continued his 
research there until his death in 1783.
of personal acquaintanceships.38 Wolff, for example, secured an appointment for 
the philosopher, Georg Bernhard Bilfinger, who lectured there from 1725 until he 
took up an appointment at Tubingen in 1731. The network thus extended to other 
universities in Germany.39 Baltic Germans were not completely absent from the 
Academy. Three of the first four presidents were Baltic Germans,40 positions 
which needed efficient and loyal administrators rather than imported intellectuals.
Aufklarung
This intellectual German presence was a definite representative of Western 
thought in eighteenth century Russia, particularly in the first part of the century 
and has been viewed by some as the predominant Western influence. "Contrary 
to what is frequently believed, the major intellectual influence on Russia in the
38! The history of the cultural contacts between Germany and Russia in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries is often a chronology of personal acquaintanceships [see J.Tezner, "Bucher 
deutscher Autoren in Prokopovics Bibliothek," in E.Winter, ed., DiePeutsch-Russische Begegnung und 
Leonlhard Euler, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas, Band I, (Berlin 1958), 141-142] and 
attenmpts to systematize the personalities involved into a framework of social, economic and political 
contriibutions or significance have been few. P.N.Berkov, "Deutsch-russische kulturelle Beziehungen 
im lS.Jahrhundert," in Ibid., 64-65, suggests a more systematized approach to research in this area. 
It is ailso important to note that the German scholars w ho came to Russia did not come with a mission. 
They came simply because there were not enough academic positions to go around in the German 
states. Most left when they gained appointments elsewhere. One German observer wrote in 1775: 
"(The;) Academy ... has already attracted the greatest and worthiest men. But w hy is it that their stay 
is alwrays so short?" (Quoted in Inge Hellinghausen, "Russenlob und Russenfurcht: Schubart's Deutsche 
Chromik," in Russen und RuBland II, 448-449.)
39 August Ludwig Schlozer, described as "the most effective of all 18th centuiy German historians 
of Ruissia," was named professor of history at the Academy in 1765. He came from Gottingen and 
returned there in 1769. See Hans Hecker, "Rutland und die deutsche Historiographie des 
18.Jahirhunderts," in Russen und Rutland I, 197-213 for details of Schlozer's activity in Russia and 
Gottimgen. His reputation as a scholar in Russia is not undisputed. His grammar of the Russian 
language was prevented from publication by Michael Lomonosov (1711-1765) because of the many 
seriouis mistakes in it.
40 Von Brevem, von Kayserling and von Korff. Eduard Winter, Halle als Ausgangspunkt der 
deutschen RuBlandkunde im 18.Tahrhundert (Berlin, 1953), 289.
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eighteenth century was not that of France and the French Enlightenm ent.... The 
first influence -- in terms of both time and importance — was that of German 
thought, scholarship, and even literature."41 While much research has been 
devoted to the German influence on eighteenth century Russia,42 it is sufficient 
to note for the purposes of this paper that the Baltic Germans did not have a 
monopoly on the German presence within Russia and were not the sole 
representatives of the West. It is also important to note that the German 
intellectual presence in Russia, although Western, was not typical of Western 
mainstream enlightenment, but rather represented the German variety: the 
Aufklarung.43 The main characteristics of the Aufklarung are evident in the
41 Marc Raeff, Imperial Russia 1682-1825:The Coming of Age of Modern Russia (New York, 1971), 
140. Raeff is not alone in his conclusions. Some thirty years ago, in an article on British influences 
on eighteenth century Russia, M.S. Anderson named Germany as the chosen main source of intellectual 
stimulus in eighteenth century Russia. M.S.Anderson, "Some British Influences on Russian Intellectual 
Life and Society in the 18th Century," Slavonic and East European Review 39 (1960-61): 148. 
Elsewhere, Raeff considers another influence: "In addition to the Aufklarung, the Scottish variant of 
the Enlightenment played no mean role in the intellectual development of Russian elites in the late 
18th century....the Scottish orientation may prove to be even more important if we take into account 
the fact that it was the German philosophers .. who were among the first agents of its transmission 
to continental readers, including the Russians." Marc Raeff, "Heterogeneity of the 18th century in 
Russia" in R.Bartlett, A.Cross, K.Rasmussen, eds., Russia and the World of the 18th century: 
Proceedings of the Third International Conference 1984 on 18th Century Russia (Ohio, 1986), 669.
42 The establishment of the German Democratic Republic opened the w ay to cooperation between  
the Russians and Germans in historical research on German-Russian relations. The main force behind 
this line of research was the East German historian, Eduard Winter. "One of the most influential 
scholars in the GDR", Winter was once a catholic priest and between the wars was involved in the 
German nationalist movement in Czechoslovakia. He is a generally respected and prolific historian, 
acknowledged by historians in the Federal Republic of Germany (when the two Germanys still 
existed). [See, for example, Keller, Russen und Rutland (1987), Vorbemerkung,9. The bibliography, 
pp.631-661, contains many works of Winter and his team of researchers.] For bibliographies of Winter, 
see O.Feyl, "Veroffentlichungen von Eduard Winter 1926-1956," in Deutsch-slawische Wechselseitigkeit 
in sieben Tahrhunderten — Gesammelte Aufsatze, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 
Veroffentlichungen des Instituts fur Slawistik, Nr.9, (Berlin, 1956), 1-16; C.Grau and LFlentje, 
"Chronologische Bibliographic der Veroffentlichungen von Eduard Winter von 1924 bis 1965," in 
H.Mohr and C.Grau (eds.), Ost und West in der Geschichte des Denkens und der kulturellen 
Beziehungen — Festschrift fur Eduard Winter zum 7Q.Geburtstag, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte 
Osteuropas Band XV, (Berlin 1966), 5-27.
In 1967, Marc Raeff wrote a persuasive if debatable article based on Winter's work: "Les Slaves, les 
Allemands et les Lumieres," in Canadian Slavic Studies, I, no.4, (Winter, 1967), 521-551.
43 The Italian historian Franco Venturi was one of the first to emphasize that enlightenment had 
a national rather than a universal context. Enlightenment, Lumitres, Aufklitrung, Verlichting, ttluministno, 
Illustration are all terms which are not synonymous since they represent movements different in 
emphases, interests, and chronology. Beatrice Didier, Le Siecle des Lumieres (Paris, 1987), 248.
German intellectual activity in eighteenth century Russia. "The whole Academy 
[St Petersburg] is not organized so that Russia might profit in the least from it. 
For it is not languages, morals, international law and history, or the practical 
aspects of mathematics and the sciences which could be of real advantage to 
Russia ... but rather algebra, speculative geometry ... the languages of dead 
peoples, or the anatomical observations of men and animals, which is all seen by 
Russians as useless and fruitless capriciousness, which is why they do not like to 
send their children to the Academy."44 At the end of the century this conclusion 
is echoed by another observer: "The Petersburg Academy shone as far as Italy, 
and Russia remained in darkness."45
Russian scholars returning from study abroad found their German 
professors unlike their own experiences of Western intellectuals elsewhere. At 
Moscow University, Russia's first university founded by Tsaritea Elizabeth in 
1755,46 German professors were in the majority. Two Russian law students who 
had studied at Glasgow University from 1761 to 1767,47 under Adam Smith 
amongst others, secured appointments at Moscow University on their return from
44 Quoted in Keller, "Von Halle nach Petersburg," in Russen und Rutland II, 180-181. Johann 
Vockerodt, a German tutor and later diplomat in St. Petersburg, made his comments in 1737. He 
criticized the Academy for having achieved little more than a calendar and an alphabetization. There 
were some, if not many, practical contributions later in the century. For example, the naturalist Peter 
Simon Pallas, w ho had studied in England as well as Germany, was made professor of natural history 
at the Academy in 1768 and gathered much important data in his six year exploratory travels through 
Russia and Siberia. [Hans Hecker, "Rutland und die deutsche Historiographie des 18.Jahrhunderts," 
in Russen und Rutland 1 ,192.]
45 Quoted in Keller, "Von Halle nach Petersburg," in Ibid., 182.
46 It began with 100 students and thirty years later had only 82. Hubertus Neuschaffer, "Die 
baltischen Provinzen ohne Universitat von 1721 bis 1802," in Gert von Pistohlkors, Toivo Raun, Paul 
Kaegbein eds. Die Universitaten Dorpat/Tartu, Riga and W ilna/Vilnius 1579-1979. Beitrage zu ihrer 
Geschichte und ihrer Wirkung im Grenzbereich zwischen West und Ost. Vol. 9 in Quellen und Studien 
zur baltischen Geschichte (Koln, 1987), 27. Such statistics stand as a reminder not to read more into 
the term "university" than actually existed.
47 August von Haxthausen claimed that "all Russian jurists have been educated at German 
universities or at the very least by German jurists." Studien tiber die innere Zustande RuSlands vol 
3, 11.
Scotland and found their liberal ideas in conflict with the conservatism of the 
German professors.48 One of these students, Semon Efimovich Desnitskii, later 
appointed to the Chair of Russian Jurisprudence at the University, likened the 
German professors to "12th century monks who wished to swallow up all the 
sciences themselves and leave the laymen in darkness and ignorance.... the monks 
in England in those times acted in every way no differently from the way the 
present-day German scholars in Russia act, who try to prove that their own Gottingen 
University alone is the source of all wisdom."*9 German intellectuals may have 
claimed their own universities as the source of all wisdom, but it was a 
conservative and abstract wisdom, far different from the Anglo-French 
Enlightenment. Although the exported Aufklarung was criticized for not being 
practical enough to serve Russia's immediate needs, its conservative essence 
ensured that it posed no political threat. Later in the century, French culture 
would be embraced but quickly shunned as its ideas became too real.
Many of the Baltic Germans serving in Russia in the eighteenth century had 
been exposed to the German Aufklarung rather than to the Anglo-French 
Enlightenment. Political loyalty to Russia, as we have seen, did not at first 
adversely affect cultural affinity with another foreign power. The eighteenth 
century saw an increase in the cultural contacts between the Baltic provinces and
48 A.H.Brown, "Adam Smith's First Russian Followers," in A.Skinner and T.Wilson, eds., Essays 
on Adam Smith, (Oxford 1975), 249-250.
49 Italics original. Quoted in A.H.Brown, "The Father of Russian Jurisprudence: The Legal Thought 
Of S.E.Desnitskii," in W.E.Butler, ed., Russian Law: Historical and Political Perspectives (Leyden, 1977), 
126-127. While Desnitskii did reject the legal theory of the German Aufklarung, these dismissive 
comments reflect more his fight (and success) to teach in Russian and not in Latin as the German 
professors insisted. Wolff had led the change from lecturing in Latin to lecturing in German 
[L.Kopelew, "Neue Verstandnis und neue Mifiverstandnisse," in Russen und RuBland II, 24.] but not 
all German professors in Russia had enough mastery of Russian to lecture in Russian. Ludolf (see 
page 46 below) complained that most Germans in Russia did not speak Russian [E.Winter, Halle als 
Ausgangspunkt, 75.]
the German states. There were many immigrants from Germany to the Baltic area 
but they cannot be considered a homogeneous group. Not everyone who came 
from Germany would make a positive contribution. There were "all sorts of 
people, famous and unknown, educated and uneducated, believers and non­
believers, pietists and philosophes, geniuses and pedants, poets and explorers, 
philosophers and politicians, the ordinary and the special, the failures and the 
ambitious."50 The flow from the Baltic to Germany was mainly to the 
universities where young Baltic Germans were sent to study.51 Sweden had 
founded a university in Dorpat in 1632 but it was closed in 1656.52 Reopened in 
1690, it lasted only until 1710. For the whole of the eighteenth century it 
remained closed, forcing Baltic Germans to study abroad.53 From 1741 to 1750, 
there were at least 172 Baltic German students registered at the university in 
Konigsberg. In Jena, there were 165 Baltic German students from 1731 to 1740.54 
Leipzig, Rostock and Gottingen also had students from the Baltic.55 Initially, it
50 Cited in W.Lenz, Der baltische Literatenstand, 12.
51 R.Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 147. Irene Neander, "Die Aufklarung in den Ostseeprovinzen," 
in R.Wittram, ed., Baltische Kirchengeschichte, 149.
52 When the Russians took Dorpat.
53 See H.Neuschaffer, "Die baltischen Provinzen ohne Universitat von 1721 bis 1802," in 
G.Pistohlkors, T. Raun, P.Kaegbein, eds., Die Universitaten Dorpat/Tartu, Riga und W ilna/Vilnius, 
19-35.
54 One source claims that there was a total of one thousand Russian students at Jena in the 
eighteenth century, most of them from the Baltic. This would place Baltic Germans as the second 
largest foreign group, after students from the Hungarian lands, at Jena. O.Feyl, "Die Ruftland- 
Beziehungen der Universitat Jena im 18.Jahrhundert," in E.Winter, ed., Die deutsch-russische 
Begegnung und Leonhard Euler, 170.
Although there were not many Russian students at German universities, they should not be 
overlooked, especially since some of them acquired positions of power or influence later. For example, 
Michael Lomonosov studied at Freiberg and Marburg between 1736 and 1741; Alexander Radishchev 
was at Leipzig in 1771; Alexander Golitsyn was at Gottingen in 1786; Alexander Kurakin attended Kiel 
and Leyden between 1765 and 1768. See Georg von Rauch, "Streiflichter zum russischen 
Deutschlandbilde des 19.Jahrhunderts," in Tahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas Neue Folge 12 (1964), 
8-9.
55 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 147.
was mainly the sons of the nobility who studied abroad. In the absence of a 
larger urban population and a middle class, there were few who had the 
education or the money to study abroad. Towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, however, the Ritter did not have the monopoly on study abroad. An 
educated class, if not a middle class, had developed and the sons of pastors, 
lawyers, merchants and others were able to send their sons abroad.56 A cursory 
glance at the lists of students from the Russian Empire matriculated at Gottingen 
University from 1800 to 1825 reveals several names of the sons of merchants and 
pastors and other non-nobles from the Baltic provinces.57
In the eighteenth century, the century of enlightenment, however, it was 
the sons of the Ritter who experienced the Aufklarung first hand. The intellectual 
atmosphere was not much different from the variety exported to Russia. In its 
very essence, the Aufklarung was different from the Anglo-French Enlightenment, 
which was characterized by positivist, empirical and utilitarian aspects. The 
Aufklarung has been perceived as concerning itself more with natural law and 
rationalism,58 which confined it to the realms of abstract philosophy.
Doing justice to the Aufklarung would necessitate a philosophical 
enquiry59 and it is perhaps more useful to view the German Aufklarung in its
56 W.Lenz, Der baltische Literatenstand, 7-16.
57 Heinz Mohrmann, Studien iiber russisch-deutsche Begegnungen in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
(1750-18251, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas, Band V (Berlin, 1959), Appendix II 
pp.120-130.
This list is not the best indicator of the number of non-noble Baltic students at university since Dorpat 
University opened in 1802 and attracted non-noble students since it was much less costly than 
studying abroad. The list does, however, indicate that the Ritter did not have the complete monopoly 
on German education.
58 F.M.Barnard, Herder's Social and Political Thought: From Enlightenment to Nationalism (Oxford, 
1965), 7. See also Raeff, "Les Slaves, les Allemands ets les Lumieres," 545.
59 A few comments may serve as indicators. The label of natural law, for example, is an unclear 
one. Most philosophers throughout time have concerned themselves with the definition of natural 
law, the search for a body of generally recognized principles of right and natural conduct common
107
historical context. Frederick the Great attributed the lack of progress in the arts 
and sciences in Germany to the effects of wars. People and princes alike were too 
concerned with their livelihoods to spare much thought or time to 
enlightenment.60 The reason for the conservative and inactive nature of the 
German Aufklarung, however, is perhaps to be found more in the political 
system, or lack of it, under which it developed, or did not develop. England's 
parliamentary system provided a means for the political realization of ideas. In 
France, the lack of political outlet was effected forcibly against one central power. 
In the German states, the political situation was characterized by powerlessness, 
caused by the lack of political unity and the absolute power of the princes. There 
were some three hundred states in the German Empire, some fifty free cities and 
"the minuscule acres of a thousand sovereign imperial knights".61 The result of 
this political jigsaw was political powerlessness for all but those who ruled. Any
to all mankind. Aristotle reserved natural law for dtizens only, exduding slaves and barbarians. The 
Stoics believed natural law was applicable to all men and regulated by reason. Reason as the core of 
natural law was replaced by God in the medieval period and this theological definition dominated 
until the seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius, under the influence of the scientific revolution, 
once more returned natural law to the realm of reason. About the same time, Thomas Hobbes came 
down on the side of legislative law (or positive law) as a necessary control over man's naturally 
negative tendencies. John Locke allowed the necessity of an absolute authority but maintained that 
men had only surrendered certain of their natural rights to it. The French philosphers went further 
by declaring natural law superior to both church and state. Man surrendered his natural rights to 
society not to a monarch; law, therefore, was dependent on the general will of the people and not on 
monarchical sovereignty. German thinking on natural law had originally been led by Samuel 
Pufendorf (1632-1694), w ho had also believed in a natural law free from God and the Bible. All men 
on the basis of human dignity have a right to equality and freedom. Pufendorfs works were 
translated into Russian on Peter the Great's orders. (M.Keller "Von Halle nach Petersburg und 
Moskau," in Russen und Rutland aus deutscher Sicht, 173.) It was not Pufendorf s thinking, however, 
but that of Leibniz (who rejected Pufendorf s thinking as dangerous to faith), which would influence 
eighteenth century German thought. Leibniz believed that the origin of all things could be none other 
than God. This theological emphasis characterized German thought in the eighteenth century and is 
perhaps best represented by Christian Wolff, who believed God could be discovered by reason and 
not just revelation. Other notable thinkers of the period were Christian Thomasius, who also used 
reason to question, but not reject, religious truths; J.C.Gottsched; and the Berlin circle of later 
Aufklarer: Friedrich Nicolai,, Moses Mendelssohn, G.E.Lessing, Thomas Abbt and J.J.Spalding, who 
all belonged to the Wolffian school of thought.
60 Lew K opelew ," 'Unser naturlichster Verbiindeter.' Friedrich der Grofie iiber Rufiland," in Russen 
und Rufiland II, 279.
61 Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution. II, p.428.
debate about political change was theoretical. There was no "effective political 
breakwater against the powers of the nobility. Germany, throughout the major 
part of the eighteenth century, remained essentially a terra obedientiae ... where ... 
it was generally 'forbidden to talk politics'".62 "... (A)n enlightenment that was 
defined in political terms, as in the West, was alien to the German soul."63
Towards the end of the century, when the French were forcibly putting 
their ideas into political practice, German thinkers were involved in defining what 
exactly Aufklarung was. In 1789, the year of the French Revolution, K.F.Bahrdt 
complained, "The word enlightenment is now on so many people's lips, yet a 
precisely defined and properly limited concept is still nowhere to be found."64 
In 1790, one writer listed twenty-one separate meanings of the term Aufklarung. 
The attempt to find a definition had begun in 1783, just as the period of 
Aufklarung was coming to an end, when an exasperated contributor to the 
Berlinische M onatsschrift a periodical of the Aufklarung, asked the question: 
"Was ist Aufklarung?" Immanuel Kant was one of the first to reply in his now 
celebrated essay "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklarung?" Although Kant's 
definition65 is now accepted as the definitive one, at the time it was only the
62 F.M.Barnard, Herder's Social and Political Thought. 6.
63 Gordon A.Craig, "Dangerous Liaisons," The N ew  York Review of Books, 30 March 1989, p.15.
64 Quoted in German and English in H.B.Nisbet, " W as ist Aufklarung?': The concept of 
Enlightenment in 18th century Germany," in Tournal of European Studies 12 (1982): 82. The English 
translation used here is mine. Material and quotes in the rest of this paragraph are based on or taken 
from Nisbet's article.
65 The essence of Kant's definition: "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-incurred 
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of 
another. ... The motto of enlightenment is therefore: Sapere aude\ Have courage to use your own  
understanding.” This English translation is H.B. Nisbet's in Hans Reiss ed., Kant: Political Writings, 
54.
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beginning of a debate, which had "a highly theoretical and abstract quality, with 
little explicit reference to concrete situations." Kant himself recognized that he 
lived "not in an enlightened time but in a time of enlightenment."66 The 
incompatibility of academic theory and political practice was summed up by 
Goethe in 1797 "Wo das gelehrte beginnt, hort das politische auf."
Any political element was confined to observation rather than presription. 
"Discursive thought was the means whereby everything was to be comprehended 
and regulated".67 These discourses were centred on the universities, "places 
which transcended the narrow localism of the individual states."68 The 
atmosphere, however, remained largely academic and the influence of the 
universities brought this academic character to other spheres.69 Frederick the 
Great described German professors as learned but as pedantic and 
schoolmasterish.70 "The intellectual education in Germany is perfect," said Mme 
de Stael," but everything is done only theoretically;... public education, as good 
as it might be, can produce scholars but not citizens."71 This dichotomy between 
theory and political practice, "the dualism of intelligence and politics, of Geist and 
reality, of thought and action" has carried weight in German research until the 
present.72 "There was an eagerness to consider the state in the abstract, but no
66 G.S.A.Mellin, Encvclopadisches Worterbuch der Kritischen Philosophic l.Band.l Abteil (Leipzig, 
1797), 402.
67 Cited in Barnard, Herder's Social and Political Thought, 25, fn. 86.
68 Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution II, 428.
69 Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Vom Ancien Regime zum Wiener Kongrefi (Munich, 1981), 55.
70 L.Kopelew, "Friedrich der GroBe fiber Rufiland," in Russen und Rutland II, 279.
71 Cited in E.Fehrenbach, Vom Ancien Regime, 57.
72 Ibid., 152.
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chance to plan courses of action, assume responsibilities, weigh alternatives and 
probable consequences... Political thinking became idealistic; it fell not on the 
contending interests of conflicting groups, nor the actual dilemmas of justice...but 
on the pure essence of the state itself, or of liberty, right, law, human dignity, 
perpetual peace, or the general movement of history."73
This was the background of the Baltic German experience at German 
universities. What they brought back from their studies abroad was not so much 
the ideas of the Anglo-French Enlightenment, which were directed towards 
political and social change, but rather conservative, abstract concepts removed 
from political realities. They could talk about the ideals of freedom and justice but 
not the reality of reform to achieve them. The conservative aspects of the 
Aufklarung suited the Baltic nobility's wish to preserve the status quo, their 
feudal privileges. The lack of political depth in the ideas of the Aufklarung 
ensured that their political monopoly would not come under attack and their 
political powerlessness in the face of Russia was accepted rather than questioned, 
just as the absolutism of the German princes was accepted by their subjects. The 
French Enlightenment's call to equality for all or the English model of 
participation in government were not compatible with the practice of Stand, with 
the Ritter monopoly in political and economic spheres, or with the Baltic's 
dependent status.
On a simpler level, German education, despite cultural affinity, was a 
foreign education in a foreign country. It "alienated the youth from conditions in 
their fatherland, and through the impressions, customs and emotions they
73 Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution II, 428. Fehrenbach also quotes this as the 
clearest formulation of the theory/practice dichotomy. Fehrenbach, Vom Ancien Regime. 152.
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received made them less suitable to be useful [at home]."74 This "purely German 
education assumed too often the character of a sum of abstract knowledge and 
opinions, the realization of which into the practical life was awaited in vain."75 
Their lack of usefulness may also have stemmed from more m undane factors 
which inhibited the amount they actually learned or assimilated. "The too great 
liberty they enjoy, the almost total lack of discipline make them give themselves 
over to a ruinous prodigality and expensive vices..."76 They tended not to mix 
with the German students. The students from Kurland, for example, were 
reputedly known throughout Germany for their Corporationsgeist which was 
characterized 'by  a rough isolationism against the German students and by 
constant fights and duels with them..."77
The ideas of the Aufklarung may have been removed from reality but the 
German student was very practical in his choice of subject. "The nobility only 
studied public law, had no sense for good literature and brought home from the 
universities only the pedantry of their teachers."78 The Gottingen list cited above 
contains 216 names, some 150 of which list law as their subject. The tradition of 
law was a strong one in the Baltic lands, especially in the towns.79 Provincial 
administration necessitated qualified personnel. In the seventeenth century, it was 
not uncommon for lawyer families, even of non-Baltic origin, to be received into
74 Ernst von Rechenberg-Linten, Zustande Kurlands im vorigen und diesem Tahrhundert, (Mitau, 
1858), 149.
75 Julius Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen Rufllands. Politische und culturgeschichtliche Aufsatze, 
(Leipzig, 1868); 385.
76 Bray, Essai critique vol 3, 164.
77 E.von Rechenberg-Linten, Zustande Kurlands. 150.
78 Frederick the Great, cited in Russen und RuBland aus deutscher Sicht II, 279.
79 That is, it was not limited to the nobility.
the nobility,80 and at the end of the eighteenth century, after the Ritter had closed 
ranks, there were still instances of lawyers being accepted into the Ritterschaft.81 
Law as studied in Germany was not of much practical help in the Baltic 
provinces, however, where each province had its own law, the cities had their 
own particular set of laws, and there were elements from various German, Polish 
and Swedish codifications.82 German law studies did not equip the student to 
deal with this.83 Service in Russia broadened the career horizon for Baltic 
German students. In addition to law, diplomacy, mathematics and physics were 
seen as subjects which would secure them a future position.84 The pragmatic 
approach to university study was in keeping with the function of a university as 
perceived by a sovereign in need of competent personnel for the administration 
of the country. The main purpose of a university was to provide Staatsdiener, 
those who could serve the state.85 The Baltic Germans, suppliers of efficient 
administration of the Russian Empire, studied what ensured them a good 
position.
80 This was not the case in Kurland, where the nobility had closed their ranks against foreign 
elements in 1620.
81 Wilhelm Lenz, Der baltische Literatenstand, 5-6,11.
82 The subject of provindal law, its various sources and the process of codification was dealt with 
in Chapter I.
83 J.Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen Rufllands, 384.
84 Bray, Essai critique, vol.3, 161.
85 Klaus Meyer, "Die Universitat im russischen Reich in der ersten Halfte des 19.Jahrhunderts," in 
G.Pistohlkors et alii, eds., Die Universitaten Dorpat/Tartu, Riga und W ilna/Vilnius 1579-1979., 50.
It has also been argued that the Russian tradition in education was not utilatarian, even under Peter 
the Great. "(He) did not replace the 'liberal' education of the West by a narrow professionalism." 
Nicholas Hans, The Russian Tradition in Education. (London, 1963), 8.
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PART TWO: REFORM IDEAS IN THE BALTIC IN THE PERIOD OF
ENLIGHTENMENT
Schoultz von Ascheraden
Practical or not, suited to local circumstances or not, German education did 
not motivate the Ritter to initiate reform in the eighteenth century, the era of 
enlightenment. Until the last decade of the century, there were no Ritter-initiated 
reforms on the Landtag. There was, however, one individual reform, independent 
of the Landtag.86 It was influenced by contact with the Russian court rather than 
with Western enlightenment ideas per se. Its initiator, a member of the 
Ritterschaft, had studied in Russia not Germany. Bom in 1720, Karl Schoultz von 
Ascheraden was sent at the age of twelve to the Cadet Corps in St Petersburg 
since his parents could not afford to send him to Germany or hire him a tutor. 
He eventually served in the Russian army, then the Prussian and would have 
joined the French army had his father's death not necessitated his return. Elected 
Landrat in 1761, he was sent to St Petersburg to seek imperial confirmation of the
86 An earlier "law" is often mentioned as proof that the Ritter did consider reform, that what they 
practised was worse than what they intended and was negatively influenced by the laws and practices 
of Russia. This is, for example, Tobien's view of the Budberg-Schrader Law (named after two  
members of the commission that drafted it) 1730-1737, which he claims would have improved the state 
of the serfs if Russia had not impeded its promulgation. IDie Agrargesetzgebung 1 ,102-103.] The law  
would have granted the serfs very limited rights, customary rather than legal, over goods acquired 
by them as w ell as the right of complaint. [Ibid.; Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 152.], but this 
represented a deterioration in the status the serfs had enjoyed under Sweden. The right of complaint, 
for example, had been granted in 1632. (For the status of the serfs under Sweden, see Chapter 1,77-80.) 
The Budberg-Schrader Law was first and foremost a continuation of the attempts to secure an 
imperially ratified codification of provincial privilege as drafted by the Landtag in Livland rather than 
a reform proposal. [Stael von Holstein, "Die Kodifizierung des baltischen Provinzialrechts I," Baltische 
Monatschrift 52 (1901), 185-208.] The attitude of the Ritter to their serfs is best reflected in the official 
answer prepared about the same time (1739) by Baron Rosen, the Landrat, to the request of the 
Imperial Justice Committee for a description of the legal relations between the landowner and his serf 
in Livland. The serf, as well as anything he acquired, was the property of, and under the jurisdiction 
of, the landowner; his corvee and duties were determined solely by his owner and he had no right 
of complaint against harsh treatment.
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privileges of the Ritter, a task which kept him there for three years.87
It was perhaps through this political task that his attention was focused on 
serfdom in Livland, one of the bastions of Ritter power and privilege. Catherine's 
displeasure with the situation in the Baltic provinces was known. In 1762, her 
representative in the Baltic, Governor Browne ordered the courts to deal seriously 
with any complaints of peasants against their lords.88 During her visit to the 
provinces in 1764, Catherine visited Reval, Pemau, Riga, Mitau and Dorpat and 
obviously discussed the issue of agrarian reform with Browne. He felt justified 
in warning individual landowners against harsh treatment of their serfs in light 
of the forthcoming reforms.89 In the same year, Schoultz distributed a new 
law,90 translated into Lett, to his serfs.91 He granted his peasants the right to 
own moveable property,92 hereditary use, of the land,93 dues and duties 
regulated once more by the Wackenbiicher, protection from being sold or given
87 N.Wihksninsch, Die Aufklarung und die Agrarfrage in Livland. (Riga, 1933), 230-231.
88 Georg Sacke, "Livlandische Politik Katharinas II," in Ouellen und Forschungen zur baltischen 
Geschichte Heft 5 (Riga, 1944): 31.
89 Ibid., 32.
90 The text is given in Heinrich Johann von Jannau, Geschichte der Sklaverey, und Charakter der 
Bauem im Lief- und Ehstland. Ein Bevtrag zur Verbesserung der Leibegenschaft nebst der genauesten 
Berechnung eines lieflandischen Hakens (Riga,1786), Appendix I, 136-206. This was the first time 
Schoultz's law was printed in German. [Wihksninsch, Die Aufklarung, 232; Hubertus Neuschaffer, 
"Carl Friedrich Freiherr von Schoultz-Ascheraden: Ein Beitrag zum Forschungsproblem der 
Agrarreformen im Ostseeraum des 18.Jahrhunderts," Tournal of Baltic Studies, vol.12, no.4 (Winter, 
1981), note 3, p.328.] It can also be found in Reinhold Johann Ludwig Samson von Himmelstiem, 
"Historischer Versuch fiber die Aufhebung der Leibeigenschaft in den Ostseeprovinzen, in besonderer 
Beziehung auf das Herzogtum Livland," Beilage zur Wochenschrift Das Inland (1838), Appendix A.
91 On his estates Ascheraden and Romershoff, the names by which his reforms are often referred.
92 With certain conditions: the landlord had first choice if he wished to sell; the peasant could not 
take such property with him if he moved away because of marriage; in the absence of relatives, the 
property returned to the landowner upon the peasant's death; the property acted as security in case 
of peasant debt to the landlord.
93 This was conditional on the peasant fulfilling his duties. If not, the landlord could take his right 
away and put him in service to another peasant. In the absence of heirs, the land returned to the lord. 
The land could be divided among heirs if the divisions were not too small. The lord had the right 
to re-measure the peasant land.
away without their consent, and the right of complaint against their lord.94 
While these reforms represented a definite improvement in the serf's lot, they 
were no more than a partial return to what the peasants had enjoyed in Swedish 
times rather than the product of a new era. Still, they have earned Schoultz von 
Ascheraden a prominent place in the history of agrarian reform in the Baltic.95 
Schoultz, in keeping with enlightened thinking, did invoke "the light of reason" 
to show that it was "against man's nature for a hum an being to be, like an animal 
or an inanimate thing, the unlimited property of another man."96 He supported 
this with economic arguments which aimed, however, for a more efficient 
functioning of the system rather than an essential change in it. ’The lord's true 
advantage lies in the welfare of the peasant... As long as the peasants have no 
property and no measured duties,... it is impossible for their welfare to be general 
and lasting."
These arguments are in tune with economic thinking of the time. Although 
economics as a discipline cannot be said to have properly existed before Adam 
Smith towards the end of the century, enlightened ideas did affect changes in 
economic approaches. Physiocratic thinking began to replace mercantilist control 
and manipulation in the eighteenth century. Unlike the mercantilists who stressed 
production and trade, the physiocrats stressed agriculture as the basis of economic
94 A complaint found to be unjustified would be severely punished. The right of the lord to house 
discipline remained.
95 "... a man w ho in his beliefs and deeds surpassed the age in which he lived and achieved for 
himself in posterity the finest monument of honest philanthropy." Samson, Historischer Versuch, 73. 
Others are less definite about the enlightened aspects of Schoultz's reforms preferring to describe him 
as an agrarian reformer. (Wittram, Baltische Geschichte. 154.) For a discussion of the various 
interpretative perspectives on Schoultz, see H. Neuschaffer, "Carl Friedrich Freiherr von Schoultz- 
Ascheraden," 318-332. The origins of interpetative disagreements are to be found in Ludwig Karstens- 
Hamburg, "Zur Vorgeschichte der livlandischen Bauembefreiung," in Tomsburg I (1937), 215-222.
96 The text of Schoultz's speech to the Landtag in 1765 explaining his motives is given in Jannau, 
Geschichte der Sklaverev, 123-133 and in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 74-78.
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welfare (eminently suited to the economic situation in the Baltic provinces). In 
contrast to the mass of economic regulations of mercantilism, the physiocrats 
believed in natural economic laws — laissez-faire.97 The physiocratic elements 
of enlightened thinking are clear in Schoultz's insistence that "the improvement 
of the individual's welfare at the same time improves the general welfare." 
Specifically, a peasant with rights, especially the right to own, would be more 
motivated to work, would prosper and thereby increase the prosperity of his 
lord.98 The yield from Schoultz's own estate was doubled after his reforms.99 
If Schoultz was motivated by economic arguments, he might well have assimilated 
them in Russia. Interest in economic prosperity, using the experience of the West, 
had not halted at the end of Peter's reign. Between 1755 and 1764, an economic 
journal was published in St Petersburg, Ezhemes^frcK e, Sochineniyr/Monthly 
Essays), which printed translations of Western writers.100 Under Catherine, the 
interest in foreign works was at his height in the middle of the century. She 
established, for example, the "Association of those who are dedicated to the 
translation of foreign books into Russian." Its books and journals published 
writers representing the range of economic theories of the time: cameralism, 
mercantilism, physiocracy.101
97 The founder of the physiocratic school of thought is said to be Franqois Quesnay, court physician 
to Louis XV. His main work Tableau economique was published in 1758. The "economic disutility" 
of serfdom /slavery was also emphasized by David Hume and carried on in the latter part of the 
century by other Scottish utilitarians. (Peter Gay, The Enlightenment. An Interpretation (London, 
1973), 416-417.) These are discussed in Chapter IV.
98 Jannau, Geschichte der Sklaverev, 126. Samson, Historischer Versuch, 76.
99 Wihksninsch, Die Aufklarung, 232.
100 Its success led to the establishment of the Free Economic Society in 1765 which also published 
a journal. The Society will be discussed later in the paper.
101 For a survey of foreign economic works published in Russia during this period, see 
P.H.Clendenning, "Eighteenth Century Russian Translations of Western Economic Works," Tournal of 
European Economic History I, No.3 (1972), 745-753.
Schoultz added a third motive to those of humanity and economic sense, 
the most urgent reason of all: that the unlimited power of the landlord over his 
serf would be removed by imperial ukaz. "If we do not set ourselves limits ... 
nothing is more certain than that limits will be imposed on us." It is this third 
reason, the political one, which is of paramount importance. It highlights the 
em pire/province perspective and contains one of the dilemmas of reform in the 
Baltic: political acquiescence demanded reforms which the Ritter viewed as 
injurious to their rights, privileges and power. Non-compliance, however, could 
obliterate them as a Stand, as nearly happened under the Swedish regime. 
Schoultz was loyal to his Stand, to the Ritter.102 This loyalty to the political and 
economic interests of his class has been seen to detract from his enlightened 
reputation but, in fact, physiocratic thinking believed in the power of the 
landowner, in his right to the land.103 Schoultz believed in the aristocratic 
principle of government, as did Voltaire, but he was wary of an enlightened 
monarchy limiting the rights of the nobility, of the Ritter. "The law of a state 
[Staatsrecht]," he wrote, "defined the relations of all members of the state amongst 
themselves as well as against the highest authority."104 While a mixture of 
motives worked in Schoultz, it is quite probable that the political motive of 
preservation was very strong. His reforms, it must be remembered, however,
102This is especially obvious in his Versuch fiber die Geschichte von Liefland nebst einer 
kurzgefassten Abbildung des Liefflandischen Staatsrechtes which he finished in 1773. It was never 
published but there are several manuscript copies. [N.Wihkninsch, Die Aufklarung, 232). For a 
summary of this work see Ibid., 238-254.
103While the physiocratic influence must not be over-emphasized, it is worth noting that the 
political side of physiocratic thinking also suited the Ritter. The physiocrats coined the term "legal 
despotism" to show their opposition to arbitrary rule. They advocated minimal government over 
citizens, w ho would be subject to law, checked by an independent judiciary. Peter Gay, The 
Enlightenment. 494-496.
104Cited in N.Wihksninsch, Die Aufklarung. 252.
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were not presented first to the Landtag, the normal political way, but rather 
applied directly on his own estates.105 He may have been aware that opposition 
on the Landtag would have been too strong and thought it more effective to 
persuade his fellow Ritter by example. Some landowners in Estland and Kurland 
did follow his example but none in Livland.106 Schoultz, in defending himself 
against the criticims of the Landtag, said his reforms were never intended for 
general application.107
The Landtag at which Schoultz defended his reforms was the same one at 
which Governor Browne chided the Ritter for their deplorable treatment of their 
serfs and urged them, in Catherine's name, to reform.108 Schoultz, by virtue of 
his reforms, distanced himself from the criticism. What is of interest is that his 
reforms deal most aptly with the objections Browne raised, offering the Landtag 
and his fellow Ritter beforehand the solutions to the objections he knew would 
be raised in the government's name. "I fear hourly that our unlimited power over 
our peasants will be abolished by ukaz. This might have already happened if the 
Governor General had not endeavoured to deflect this forcible step with the idea 
that the Ritterschaft would limit itself."109 A certain amount of co-operation 
between Schoultz and Governor Browne, or the Russian court, is not
105 Tobien attributes the hostility of his fellow Ritter not to the reforms themselves but to Schoultz's 
failure to consult the Landtag. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung 1 .105.
106 From 1770 to 1816 there were eleven in Kurland and from 1789 to 1801 four in Estland. Wittram, 
Baltische Geschichte. 154. It is debatable whether these individual reforms were all motivated by  
Schoultz's example. In the case of the later ones, it is more probable that they were influenced by the 
atmosphere of a new reform era.
107Jannau, Geschichte der Sklaverev, 123. Samson, Historischer Versuch, 74.
108 See Chapter I, pp.82-84.
109 Jannau, Geschichte der Sklaverev, 130-131. Samson, Historischer Versuch, 77.
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inconceivable, and indeed his fellow Ritter accused him of supporting Russia.110 
At the very least he was influenced by the Russian plans.111
Im perially-supported reform ideas
There may be doubts about just how enlightened Schoultz was but his 
fellow Ritter had no doubts that his reforms were too extreme and totally 
unacceptable. The Landtag was forced to adopt reforms similar to Schoultz's not 
by his example or arguments but by Governor Browne's threats of Russian 
intervention. On 12 April 1765, Governor Browne promulgated the new 
regulations in Lett and Estonian: the peasant had a right to own moveable 
property; his work and dues were to be regulated; and he had the right of 
complaint against his lord. These reforms and Schoultz's ideas may not have 
been to the Ritter's liking but were concordant with the times in the Russian 
Empire, at least from the theoretical aspect.
In 1766, Catherine offered a prize for the best essay on a topic which went 
beyond the reforms forced on the Landtag or the reforms practised by Schoultz: 
"Is it more advantageous to the State for the peasant to possess land or only 
moveable goods and how far should this property extend for the advantage of the 
State?"112 The idea of peasant ownership of land was thus introduced by
110 Wihksninsch, Die Aufklarung, 236,
111 It is also interesting to note that while there is no evidence to indicate that Governor Browne 
and Schoultz did work together, Browne's proposals were probably drafted by A.J.Hofman, "one of 
the best experts in Swedish legislation in Livland." G.Sacke, "Livlandische Politik Katharinas II," 32. 
Sacke does not mention Schoultz in his article.
112 Catherine did not do so directly. The Free Economic Society, founded in October 1765, received 
anonymously in November of the same year the essay title plus 1,000 ducats. The Society members 
were naturally hesitant about the political wisdom of such a topic but were convinced by a second 
letter with more money that the initials IE actually stood for Imperatritsa Ekaterina. Erich Donnert, 
Politische Ideologic der russischen Gesellschaft zu Beginn der Regierungszeit Katharinas II, (Berlin, 
1976), 158-160.
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imperial authority (and would direct imperial policy until the Russian 
emancipation of 1861). The prize was awarded to the French economist and 
agronomist Beard6 l'Abbaye of Aachen.113 His essay combined liberal ideals 
with conservative practice. It recommended not only that the peasant should 
have a right to own moveable property and land but that he should be personally 
free, the prerequisites for the economic welfare of a country. Property ownership 
was inconceivable without personal freedom. "Property cannot exist without 
freedom, and the riches of a slave are like the silver bells round a dog7s neck; 
everything belongs to the master."114 Such reforms, however, could only be 
achieved in very gradual steps and only with the agreement of the landowners. 
The peasant must be prepared for freedom. "Do not make him master of a plot 
of land or master of himself until he is worthy of it."115 Industriousness would 
be evidence of worth. The granting of rights would then serve as reward and 
incentive. The peasant could be given "limited moveable property, then gradually 
some immovable property thus keeping him constantly in suspense. ... in this 
way, you will see a machine turn into a superb worker."116 Beard£'s ideas were 
obviously approved by the Empress. The Counts Panin as well as Prince Golitsyn 
had also supported the idea of peasant land security.117
Three other essays were singled out for special mention. One, from France,
113 By the deadline of 1 November 1767,45 essays had been submitted but none awarded the prize. 
The deadline was extended to 22 April 1768 when 162 answers were submitted: 129 in German, 21 in 
French, 7 in Russian, 3 in Latin and 1 in Dutch and 1 in Swedish. Ibid., 161. N.Wihksninsch, Die 
Aufklarung. 259.
114 Cited in E.Donnert, Politische Ideologic, 162-163.
115 Cited in Ibid., 166.
116 Cited in Ibid., 167.
117 Ibid., 162.
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offered a direct attack on the exclusive right of the nobility to land. "Modern 
philosophy claims that in the order of nature, the land belongs to no-one and its 
products to all." The only justified claim for ownership of land by individuals is 
by those who cultivate it. That such an essay was published in the Russian 
Empire, an essay which recognized the right of the peasant and not the lord to the 
land, is explained less by imperial policy which firmly supported the nobility than 
by the discrepancy once more between the idea and the proposed reform. In this 
case too, the writer pulls back when faced with reality, claiming that such a 
proposal is not practicable at this point. Another French writer, Voltaire, puts his 
ideas on a more practical level. Serfdom should be abolished on crown lands 
while landlords should be free to act as they wished. His recommendation would 
be to divide the land into parcels and lease these or force the peasants to buy 
them at a high price.118
One of the other two essays singled out for mention was written by a Baltic 
German.119 Erich Johann von Meek came from Livland and had studied at 
Konigsberg. In 1747 he had become Secretary of the Ritterschaft, an office he 
interrupted to serve under Ernst Biron in Kurland. He accompanied Livland's 
official representative to the 1765 Commission in Moscow. He had owned an 
estate but had lost it to creditors. Meek subscribed to the principles implicitly 
expressed in the essay title and agreed that property and freedom for the peasant 
were desirable, but his practical suggestions deviated sharply form these 
principles. Like the other essayists, Meek emphasized a gradual approach.
118 N.Wihkninsch, Die Aufklarung, 258-261.
119 The other was written by Johann Christoph Wollner, a known politician and writer, who had 
concerned himself with the problem of serfdom in Mecklenburg. His proposals essentially preserved 
the power of the landlord over his peasants. Ibid., 261-263. E.Donnert, Politische Ideologic, 169-174.
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Reform must not be undertaken until the peasants were educated, preferably by 
the clergy, in love for agriculture rather in knowledge as such.120 Those 
peasants who proved themselves industrious would gradually be allowed to own 
moveable property. (Those whose performance was not satisfactory would have 
their farm administered by the lord of the estate.) When almost all peasants had 
earned the right to own moveable property, the lord could begin to sell them 
plots of land. However, there would be no element of compulsion, even in the 
face of imperial example. The crown should lead the way on its own estates 
while private owners could choose to follow or not. Meek's definition of the land 
bought by the peasants reflect the concerns of the Ritter over the control they felt 
they must be able to exert over their labour force. Land bought by peasant would 
remain an integral part of the estate; the peasant would not be allowed to leave 
it; it would still bear corvSe to the lord, to be defined in perpetuity; a peasant 
could not move out of the class into which he was bom. Meek's proposals 
actually leave the peasant in Livland almost exactly as he was in the middle of the 
eighteenth century and still behind the Swedish reforms.121 
They accord the landowner full power over the peasant while paying lip-service 
to the idea of peasant ownership. Peasant ownership was a revolutionary idea 
in the mid-eighteenth century and more practical reactions could not have been 
expected at that point. Still, the confrontation between imperial policy and 
provincial resistance over the issue of peasant ownership was already detectable.
Apart from Schoultz, there were no other reform initiatives in the Baltic
520 Perhaps to make sure they were fully focused on this, they were forbidden to undertake any 
extra handicraft and if they did, the products thereof would belong to the lord.
121 Ibid., 263-267; E.Donnert, Politische Ideologic, 175-178.
provinces until the end of the century. The Landtag in Livland was strenuously 
opposed to reform, defending its historical rights to land and peasants against 
imperial reform suggestions. With the exception of Schoultz, the few voices raised 
against serfdom paid lip service to ideals and regressed on practice. There was, 
however, another force involved in improving the peasant's lot in the Baltic.
PART THREE: THE CLERGY, ENLIGHTENMENT AND REFORM
Johann Georg Eisen von Schwarzenberg
In the course of his speech defending his reforms, Schoultz had mentioned 
an anonymous letter, which had recently appeared in Muller's Sammlung der 
russischen Geschichte 122, describing unlimited serfdom "most maliciously" and 
exaggerating its abuses "most abominably." Schoultz viewed its publication as 
possibly the last warning the Ritter would receive.123 The letter did seem to 
have been published under Catherine's orders.
The author was an immigrant German pastor living and working in 
Livland. Johann Georg Eisen von Schwarzenberg, bom  in 1717 in Franken, the 
son of a minister of the church, became a Lutheran pastor after studying at Jena 
from 1737 until 1740. His decision to come to Livland in 1741 was based not on 
missionary or proselytizing zeal but on the desire to distance himself from the
122 Gerhard Friedrich Muller (1705-1783) was one of the few German intellectuals who stayed on 
in Russia. He was mainly a historian, but also gathered material on Russian geography and natural 
history. From 1732 to 1764 he edited the nine volume Sammlung russischer Geschichte, which 
included many of his own findings and commentaries about Russia.
123 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 77.
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Jesuits who were very active in his own area. He worked as a house tutor for 
four years before being appointed pastor near Dorpat. His energies were not 
completely devoted to theology or pastoral work. Much of his attention was 
focused on the development of an effective economic system. Eisen saw serfdom 
as the basis of all imperfection in a state, while private property was the basis of 
a state's prosperity. The Ritter may have agreed with the second part but, 
according to a contemporary and friend, Eisen "was amazed that this [first] truth 
was so new to those amongst whom he lived and that those to whom he 
communicated his teachings judged them negatively."124 The Russian court 
proved a more sympathetic audience. By 1760, Eisen's ideas had caught the 
attention of General Gustav Reinhold von Lowen, who in turn  presented them to 
the Grand Duke Peter, soon to become Peter III. Eisen was called to St Petersburg 
but before he could do the tsar's bidding,125 Catherine had taken over the 
Russian throne.126 In 1763, she summoned Eisen to set up an experiment based 
on peasant ownership of land on one of her estates. Eisen, however, "found that 
that [estate] was much too small for a trial which was intended as a model for the 
whole Empire." Later, after Catherine's visit to the Baltic, "Her Majesty gave the 
Count Orlov the estates of Ropsha ... Kipin [Kipen'], Skvoritz, Schungerhof 
[Shungorovo] and Liguva, near Petersburg, in order through me to get rid of 
serfdom and establish colonies."127 For reasons unknown, the imperially 
approved experiment was never completed and Eisen abandoned it with
124 Friedrich Konrad Gadebusch, from Pomerania, justice mayor in Dorpat. Cited in N.Wihkninsch,
Die Aufklarung. 208.
125 To settle a German regiment in Livland.
126 Bartlett explains Eisen's departure from the capital as due to an intrigue mounted by the 
"Livonian land-owning lobby." Human Capital, 23.
127 Cited in R.Bartlett, Human Capital, 92.
permission after eighteen months.128 Eisen was still nevertheless useful to 
Catherine. His next imperially ordered task was to publish an essay on the 
negative influences of serfdom, a topic he had already prepared. "Eines 
livlandischen Patrioten Beschreibung der Leibeigenschaft, wie solche in Livland 
uber die Bauern eingefuhrt ist" appeared in 1764 in volume IX of Muller's history 
and is the one Schoultz referred to.129 The essay first questions the validity of 
the Ritter's historical claims to ownership of their serfs, describes the miserable 
condition of serfs in the Baltic and comes up with detailed and practical 
suggestions for improvement. The physiocratic influence is evident in the 
argument that improvement in the peasant's lot would benefit the lord and the 
country in general. Conversely, the miserable situation of the peasants had a 
negative effect on the whole economy. Eisen did not propose the abolition of 
serfdom but its amelioration through the assurance of hereditary use of the land 
for the peasant. Corv6e should be abolished and replaced by cash payments. 
These reforms should first be tried out experimentally to convince landowners of 
their economic sense.
Eisen's essay was not limited to rational economic arguments. It also described 
in detail the power of the landowner over the serf, his family, his goods, his 
abilities and the way that such power was maintained. "And although the law 
prescribes moderation, the landowner still has enough freedom to cause 
someone's death when he uses the maximum penalty allowed. The wrongdoer 
is tied to a post and beaten, with two freshly cut switches, on the bare back until
128 This may have been the result in a change of direction in the Russian court in tackling the 
peasant question. The strength of the Ritter lobby at the Russian court cannot be ruled out.
129 According to Gadebusch, the essay was finished in 1767 and consisted of nine parts. The 
published essay is only part II. Part IX was a suggestion to award a prize on the best essay for the 
best agrarian system, a suggestion which Catherine did follow. Only parts of the work have survived. 
N.Wihksninsch, Die Aufklarung, 209-210.
the sticks break. This is called giving one pair of switches (tin Paar Rutheri).... ten 
pairs is the maximum allowed by law." Eisen pointed out that although the 
peasants could complain to the court if the maximum was exceeded, fear of 
further punishment prevented them. The rule of the landowner was arbitrary; the 
regulation of corv£e and dues according to the Wackenbiicher was only heeded on 
crown estates. Eisen's portrait of the landowning nobility in the Baltic was a 
damning one. Although later assessments of Eisen have claimed him as a "child 
of the Enlightenment,"130 "a real child of his time, an enlightened theologian, a 
loyal supporter of Reason,"131 "Eisen was widely regarded, both in his own time 
and later, as an eccentric, a projector of the worst sort."132 This was one way of 
detracting credence from his negative description of the Ritter. Another 
interpretative disclaimer is that Eisen was no more than a weapon wielded by 
Catherine in her fight against the Baltic Ritter.133 Muller's editorial role would 
seem to support this claim. Eisen himself felt compelled one year later to set the 
record straight by publishing what he had originally written and what Muller, 
supposedly under Catherine's orders, had added.134 The editorial changes 
underlined the negative traits of serfdom in the Baltic, claiming that conditions in 
Russia were much better. Why Catherine would want to paint the picture in the
130 R.Bartlett, Human Capital, 23.
131 Hubertus Neuschaffer, "Unterschlagene Machtpolitik. Aufklarung und Aufklarer im Baltikum 
zur Zeit Katharinas II,” in M. Keller, ed. Russen und Rutland aus deutscher Sicht, 413.
132 R.Bartlett, Human Capital, 93.
133 N.Wihkninsch, Die Aufklarung, 209. Others have assigned Eisen a role which goes beyond the 
Baltic [Erich Donnert, Tohann Georg Eisen. Ein Vorkampfer der Bauembefreiung in Rufiland, (Leipzig, 
1978). Donnert emphasizes Eisen's reforms in comparison to Schoultz's, which he sees as pure political 
calculation.] Eisen himself named his main influences as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, 
Juvenal, Newton, Thomasius, Bayle, Cartesius, Leibniz and Wolff. N.Wihkninsch, Die Aufklarung, 227.
134 According to Wihkninsch, the text is given, immediately after Eisen's biography, in Friedrich 
Konrad Gadebusch, Livlandische Bibliothek (Riga, 1777).
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Baltic as blacker than in Russia is open to historical surmise. She may have 
thought it would facilitate or justify introducing agrarian reform in the Baltic135 
for political or economic gain; a wider interpretation sees it as an attempt to 
"throw sand in the eyes of the West" by painting a picture of Russia which did 
not accord with reality.136 Whatever the motives were,137 there was definite 
Russian interest in Eisen's reform plans. It is noteworthy that his suggestions of 
hereditary tenure and the replacement of corv£e with cash payments would be the 
basic tenets of imperial agrarian reform demands in the Baltic provinces, 
especially in the early nineteenth century.
The two main voices raised in criticism of serfdom in the Baltic provinces 
in the mid-eighteenth century, Schoultz and Eisen, both differently motivated, 
were — if not Russian initiated — Russian supported. Their ideas obviously suited 
Russian policy of the time; they would not otherwise have been tolerated let alone 
published and practised. The perspective of the reform plans of Eisen and 
Schoultz as a reflection of Russian policy in the Baltic is a more valid one than 
that which sees them as proof of enlightened thinking in the Baltic. Neither Eisen 
nor Schoultz found support among the Ritter. Schoultz was forced to defend his 
"pure and irreproachable intentions" from the "malicious colouring" given them 
by his fellow Ritter.138 In 1766, Eisen complained, "I went back to [my parish 
of] Torma and the name of a dangerous project-maker and enemy of the nation 
was the pillow on which I ... had to lay my head."139 It was only Russian
135 N.Wihkninsch, Die Aufklarung. 216-217.
136 H,Neuschaffer, "Unterschlagene Machtpolitik," in Russen und Ruftland, 416-417.
137 The motives behind Catherine's policy towards the Baltic will be examined in the next chapter.
138 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 74.
139 Cited in R.Bartlett, Human Capital, 93-94.
intervention which had forced the Ritter to listen to, if not to accept, these reform 
ideas.140
German Pastors in the Baltic
Eisen had tried to give his ideas practical expression, even if his 
experiments had been mostly unsuccessful. His practicality was not limited to the 
level of economic reform. As a pastor, he involved himself in projects which 
would improve the daily life and health of his parishioners, most of them 
peasants. At university, in addition to theology and philosophy, he had studied 
medicine and the use of herbs and was able to supplement his income with the 
preparation of herbal medicines. He worked to spread inoculation against 
smallpox. He wrote a "garden book" in Estonian, having given up writing a book 
on theology,141 and discovered new ways of drying herbs and vegetables.142 
The nature of his work was more that of a farmer than of a pastor,143 and he 
was aware of the practical emphasis in his pastoral care. "Luther worked for the 
heart, Wolff for the spirit and I for the stomach. ... my Reformation will spread 
more swiftly and will be more general than theirs."144
This practical Christianity was practised by many pastors in the Baltic 
provinces at that time. Between fifty and sixty-six percent of pastors in the Baltic,
140 There may be a connection other than Russian support between Eisen and Schoultz. It is quite 
possible that they met in St Petersburg, perhaps even discussed their ideas. At the very least, Schoultz 
must have known of Catherine's support of Eisen. Perhaps his own reforms were an attempt to offer 
a model other than Eisen's, which planned to replace corvee with cash payments, an obvious 
disadvantage for the Baltic landowners. Perhaps Schoultz saw in Eisen's reforms the expression of the 
planned Russian policy he tried to warn the Landtag of.
141 N.Wihkninsch, Die Aufklarung, 207.
142 Of interest in the provisioning of armies. See H. Neuschaffer, "Unterschlagene Machtpolitik," 
in Russen und Rufiland, 414.
143 Irene Neander, "Die Aufklarung in den Ostseeprovinzen," in RWittram, ed., Baltische 
Kirchengeschichte (Gottingen, 1956), 133.
344 Cited in H.Neuschaffer, "Unterschlagene Machtpolitik," in Russen und Rutland, 414.
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like Eisen, came from Germany, and most of those who counted as native to the 
Baltic were the sons of immigrant pastors.145 Theology was a practical career 
alternative to law in Germany and was one of the more accessible academic paths 
due to the many institutions and seminaries available.146 Religion still held a 
strong place in the German states, where it had not been threatened by 
enlightenment. Elsewhere enlightened ideas had questioned religious beliefs 
which had held sway for centuries, in an attempt to remove religion's monopoly 
on explanation. In Scotland, England and France, the process of challenging 
religion's role had moved from theology through philosophy to political, social 
and economic elements, often with atheistic or deistic approaches. German 
secularization of knowledge had not gone much farther than the philosophical, 
and had remained strongly religious. Samuel Pufendorf,147 who had broken 
with the medieval theological approach by basing natural law on man's existence 
as a social being rather than on God or religion, was not acceptable to German 
thinkers. Leibniz rejected Pufendorf's approach and later German philosophers 
tried to reconcile reason, the basis of enlightenment thinking, with revelation, the 
basis of religion. Even by the end of the century, Kant declared the main focus 
of enlightenment to be religion.148 The logical outcome of the authority of reason 
would be the undermining of religion, of God, of faith.149 In 1797, the point of
145 W.Lenz, Per baltische Literatenstand, 8.
1461.Neander, "Die Aufklarung in den Ostseeprovinzen," 134. In Prussia in 1804, for example, there 
were 868 students of law, 625 of theology and 164 of medcine. E.Fehrenbach, Von Ancien Regime,
56.
147 See footnote 59 above.
148 Mellin, Encyclopadisches Worterbuch, 403. "Der Hauptpunkt der Aufklarung ist aber 
vorzuglich die Religion..."
149 The same dilemma, reason versus faith, had led Hume to choose scepticism some fifty years 
earlier.
morality was still seen to be to please God.150 The Aufklarung was firmly 
rooted in religion and therefore no threat to it. The pastors who came to the 
Baltic provinces from Germany, however, were educated Christians rather than 
representatives of the Aufklarung. Although elements of each were to be found 
in the other, practical Christianity and the Aufklarung were two separate 
movements with different roots, "...abstract Enlightenment notions were not 
necessarily infallible or superior to the largely compatible but sometimes 
competing insights offered by ... Christian thought."151
The normal procedure for a German pastor was to spend a few years as a 
house tutor before getting an appointment as pastor, just as Eisen had done. 
During this time, there was a chance to learn the language of the area,152 a 
prerequisite for teaching the word of God. Luther had translated the Bible into 
the vernacular to make faith more directly accessible. By 1689 there was a Lett 
version of the Bible, translated by Pastor Ernst Gliick,153 and by 1739, an 
Estonian translation of the Bible was published.154 Catechisms and hymn books 
were an important part of Lutheranism; they not only communicated evangelical 
teaching but ensured active laity participation. The activity of pastors in this area 
contributed to strengthening Lett and Estonian as written languages. Their
150 Mellin, Encyclopadisches Worterbuch, 399.
151 Charles Ingrao, "The Smaller German States," chapter in H.M.Scott, edv Enlightened Absolutism. 
Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe (London, 1990), 242.
152 W.Lenz, Der baltische Literatenstand, 8.
153 In 1727, however, a German pastor in Livland did not seem to be aware of the translation. 
[E.Winter, Halle als Ausgangspunkt, 286] Gluck also translated the Bible into Russian (but the 
translation was lost) as well as Luther's catechism; compiled a Russian prayer book and a Russian 
grammar. Christian Stieff, Relation von dem gegenwartigen Zustande des moscowitischen Reichs 
(Frankfurt, 1706); an extract, in Russen und Rutland aus deutscher Sicht, 97.
154 prepare£j by Pastor Eberhard Gutslaff, who had studied in Germany. E.Winter, Halle als 
Ausgangspunkt. 265.
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translation skills were not limited to religious material. Schoultz's reforms had 
been translated into Lett by a pastor,155 and those decrees promulgated in the 
local languages, as Browne's 1765 orders, would have needed the services of the 
clergy.
In the spirit of the age, the immigrant pastors collected information on the 
history, customs and culture of the local peoples. In an essay published in 1761, 
a German pastor praised Lett extempore poems and riddles.156 Pastor Gotthard 
Friedrich Stender (1714-1796), the son of a a clergyman in Kurland, dealt in detail 
with the Lett folk song in his Lett grammar in 1761.157 He also published a 
collection of songs, translated fables, and compiled a Lett-German dictionary.158 
Stender was testimony to the changes in the attitude of the clergy towards non- 
Christian practices. They had become a matter for historical record not religious 
outrage and were dealt with with reason and education. Calendars were 
published in Estonian (from 1731) and in Lett (from 1758) and contained not only 
lessons in religion for the peasants but also practical advice on farming. Stender's 
manual on geography and astronomy (1776) was an example of substituting 
knowledge for superstition.159 The title of a collection of sermons in 1770 
illustrates the endeavour to communicate practical knowledge with religion: 
"Grots Sermons on the Legality of Pox Inoculation, the first on general grounds, 
the second on special grounds and the third in consideration of one's obligations
155 Pastor Karl Johann Grass. N.Wihkninsch, Die Aufklarung, 232.
1561. Neander, "Die Aufklarung,” 142.
157 Ibid.
158 R. Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 151. His contributions earned him the epithet ”Latwis" (the 
Lett) on his gravestone.
1591. Neander, "Die Aufklarung," 141.
to God."160
Receiving the word of God and practical knowledge from the German 
pastors necessitated a certain degree of literacy. Education was an important 
aspect of Lutheranism. Luther himself had urged the German councillors to 
consider the need for schools in 1524, and in 1530 he published his sermon "Dafi 
man Kinder zur Schulen halten solle," (On Keeping Children at School). The 
Reformation had demanded an active laity, not passive recipients of the clergy's 
preachings. The Ritter recognized the religious argument for literacy:"... the first 
reason the peasant children learn to read ... is to commit [Luther's] Small 
Catechism to memory"161 but were slow to act. Sweden had been unsuccessful 
in persuading the Ritter to establish schools.162 Russia also exerted pressure on 
the Landtag to establish schools for peasant children in 1711 and hardly a 
subsequent Landtag went by without the subject of schools being discussed. 
There were some parish schools which offered rudimentary education, under the 
sexton's tutelage, but it was an ineffective system. If the sexton had no rooms for 
his catechetics, he had to cover long distances to the farms scattered often over 
more than one parish; if he did have the rooms, his pupils did not come due to 
the long distances or not being able to be spared from work. In 1739, an indirect 
attempt was made to introduce an element of compulsion: those who had not 
attended church school could not be confirmed. The clergy, whose work was 
being hindered by illiteracy, reproached the Ritter that nothing was being done,
160 Ibid., 134.
161 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 86.
162 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 39. In the first half of the seventeenth century, Sweden had 
pressed with some success for schools of higher learning "to bring war-like Livland to virtue and 
decorum." Most notable among these was Dorpat University, founded in 1632. Otto Greiffenhagen, 
"Begriindung und Ausbau der schwedischen Herrschaft in Estland und Livland durch Gustav Adolf," 
in Baltische Monatschrift 60 (1929), 332-334.
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while the Ritter expected the Church to take action. Neither side was willing or 
able to finance a school system, especially after the ravages of war and plague had 
left the country impoverished. Even if a landowner was willing to allow a school 
on his estate, he had to have enough spare land to support a school master.163 
It was Russian intervention rather than pressure from the clergy which in the end 
forced some action, when Governor Browne took up the subject of schools at the 
1765 Landtag. Unable to meet Russian demands to improve the legal and 
material status of the serfs, the Ritter felt able to offer some concessions in the 
field of education. The regulations agreed on were a compromise between the 
responsibilities of the clergy and the Ritter. Neither would have to bear the full 
brunt of setting up a school system. The Ritter pointed out the lack of 
schoolmasters and suggested they should eventually come from the peasant class 
(a less costly method than paying for imported teachers). Meanwhile, peasant 
children should be educated at home or at the church school, or where neither of 
these was possible, at a school provided by the landlord. Only estates of over five 
haken were obliged to set up a school for their peasants; smaller ones could do so 
"out of Christian zeal" but otherwise must have their children educated at the 
parish schools. So that schooling would not interfere with the work to be done 
on the estate, it would be limited to November through to Easter.164
These regulations, while implicitly acknowledging the need for secular 
support of education, did not provide a comprehensive, compulsory school 
system, but rather the opportunity of a rudimentary schooling which would 
achieve literacy. The school books, a matter of financial concern for the Ritter,
1631. Neander, "Die Aufklarung," 137.
164 The regulations covering the schooling of peasant children are given in Samson, Historischer 
Versuch, 85-89. See also Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 41-46.
reflected the need for peasant literacy for religious purposes: "hymn books, prayer 
books, catechisms, Bibles and ABC books."165 Frederick the Great's 
announcement to his Cabinet in 1779 was probably a more representative attitude: 
"In the countryside, it is enough if the people learn a little reading and writing; 
if they know too much, they will run off to the towns wanting to be secretaries 
and such like."166 Schooling did seem to work if reports on literacy are accurate. 
One pastor claimed a literacy rate of over seventy percent among children over 
seven years old and over sixty percent for adults.167
Pietism
Many of these practical pastors were pietists or influenced by pietism. 
Pietism had begun as a religious reform movement in German Lutheranism in the 
seventeenth century and was a contributing force to the development of the 
practical approach to religion within Protestantism. In the eighteenth century it 
was "a highly diversified movement of religious renewal,"168 strenuously 
opposed to the authority of reason over revelation and, therefore, to 
enlightenment.169 As a reform movement, however, it was an advocate of change
165 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 89.
166 Cited in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 46.
167 This may be a case of "oratio pro domo," but there are no other surveys to compare it with. 
A.W.Hupel was a particularly active pastor and his claims may be justified. Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzebung, 44. See also pages 153-154 below.
168 F.Emest Stouffer, German Pietism during the 18th century, (Leiden, 1973), 131.
169 In terms of the perspective of enlightenment, pietism has been described on the one side as an 
integral part of the Aufklarung [Marc Raeff, Imperial Russia 1682-1825: The Coming of Age of Modem  
Russia (New York, 1971), 142], its pacemaker, [Georg von Rauch, "Politische Voraussetzungen fur 
westostlche Kulturbeziehungen im 18.Jahrhundert," in Russen und Rutland aus deutscher Sicht, 50], 
and on the other as a movement utterly different from and hostile to Reason. [James L. White, The 
Origins of Modern Europe 1660-1789, (London, 1964), 269.] In spite of similarities and sympathies with 
enlightened movements, pietism remained resolutely opposed to an enlightenment which put reason 
above revelation. Even radical pietists like Friedrich Christoph Oetinger understood true
and many of its elements were in tune with enlightenment ideas. The importance 
of the individual was emphasized by the belief in the possibility of inner piety 
experienced individually rather than only congregationally through outward 
ritual. Equality among individuals was subscribed to by the belief that every 
Christian was a priest, a view which also challenged authority as represented by 
the priesthood. The pietist approach was not philosophical or dogmatic but 
biblical. The Bible was seen to be the source of Christian doctrine and should be 
accessible to all members directly and not only through the offices of the clergy. 
In the course of a century Halle, the centre of German pietism,170 published two 
million Bibles.171 The written word became an important medium and Halle's 
publishing houses disseminated prayer books, hymn books and educational 
materials, all of which necessitated the spread of literacy and an emphasis on 
education. The New Testament was the main focus of the Bible and its emphasis 
on the love of God through love of one's fellow men turned pietist attention from 
theological doctrines to human beings, from dogmatic pronouncements to "social 
sensitivity and ethical concern." The practice of Christianity was more important 
than the knowledge of faith.172
When pietism began to gain ground against orthodox Protestantism at the 
end of the seventeenth century, the Baltic provinces were still under Swedish 
dominion. Sweden followed a vigorous policy of one official religion and pietism
enlightenment to be a religious one: "See how greatly superior the enlightenment of the disciples of 
John and Christ was to ours....The new birth and enlightenment are the same (and) come through 
water and the spirit." Oetinger declared that book knowledge kills enlightenment. [F.C.Oetinger, "On 
Enlightenment," in ed. Peter C.Erb Pietists. Selected Writings, (London, 1983), 278-279.]
170 See page 137 below.
171 Stouffer, German Pietism during the 18th Century, 55.
172 Ibid., 237-242. Also Philiipp Jakob Spener, "Pia Desideria," (extract) in Peter Erb, ed., Pietists. 
Selected Writings, 31.
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was forbidden. Non-orthodoxy was punishable in some cases by the death 
penalty.173 This policy was also valid for the Baltic provinces. The General 
Superintendent of Livland Johann Fischer had corresponded with Philipp Jakob 
Spener, the recognized founder of pietism, and was sympathetic to the new 
movement. Sweden's policy and strong opposition, however, forced him to give 
up his position, which he had held for twenty-five years. Other pastors were 
indicted for pietist teaching.174 House tutors were brought under control of 
orthodoxy by means of examination, and study at pietist institutions abroad was 
forbidden. As pietism still continued to gain hold in the provinces, Swedish 
counter measures increased. In 1706 censorship rules forbade the distribution of 
heretical works, and travel was forbidden to those who had failed through 
examination to show religious reliability. Before the measures could become even 
more stringent, Russian dominion brought changes which benefited the 
development of pietism in the Baltic provinces. Not only did Russia free pietism 
from Swedish Protestant Orthodoxy but it actively encouraged it. Pietism, 
however, sought out Russia rather than vice versa.
The most important centre of pietism, its Ausgangspunkt, was the University 
at Halle, founded in 1694 by Frederick HI, Elector of Brandenburg, under the 
influence of Spener. Spener's unofficial successor, Auguste Francke, taught at the 
university from 1695 to 1727 and was its motivating force. Francke's pietism was 
eminently practical, rejecting a theology based on doctrine or "reine Lehre" for one 
based on "das Nutzliche" (the useful). This practical Christianity led to the 
founding of not just the university but also by 1698 of at least twenty-three
173 Otto Webermann, "Pietismus und Briidergemeinde," in R-Wittram, Baltische Kirchengeschichte,
149.
174 Ibid., 151.
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institutions offering different levels and types of education for the children (boys 
and girls) of nobles, burghers and foreigners, as well as shelter and care for 
orphans, the poor and the sick.175
Halle's activities were not limited to its immediate environment. 
Missionary work was a very important aspect. Francke meant the "whole world" 
to benefit from renewed Christianity and to this end set up seminaries to train 
missionaries as well as schools to educate students from countries where 
proselytization seemed possible and desirable.176 Russia, as a bridge between 
Europe and the Far East,177 was an important aim of pietist missionary work, an 
interest which coincided with Peter the Great's need for knowledge and expertise 
from the West. Like most of his policies, Peter's use of pietism was pragmatic.178 
He did not encourage it as a religious influence179 but rather as a means of 
spreading learning. Francke devoted much energy to the pietistic mission in 
Russia, sending some of his best students as tutors or preachers. He was able to 
use the German presence already in Russia as well as other foreign contacts, many
175 A list of these institutions in 1698 is given in Pietists. Selected Writings, 99. It is taken from 
Gustav Kramer, Francke: Ein Lebensbild vol I (Halle, 1880), 275-276.
176 This was not peculiar to pietism. The Catholic church was also active in missionary education, 
especially through the Jesuits in China, and at the end of the seventeenth century the Anglican church 
had a college for Greeks, Arabs, Turks, Persians and Armenians at Oxford. Motives were not always 
purely religious. In a mercantilist age, commercial advantages offered by new markets and trade areas 
were important as were the political considerations of the balance of power between France on the one 
hand and Prussia, Holland and England on the other. E.Winter, Halle als Ausgangspunkt, 32-33.
177 Leibniz had the same idea. See page 100 above.
178 It has been suggested that there was a political consideration in Peter's decision to allow pietist 
activity in Moscow. Since Sweden supported Lutheranism against pietism, Peter did the opposite. 
[Eduard Winter, Halle als Ausgangspunkt. 276]. This view belies the fact that Lutheranism flourished 
in Russia before, during and after the pietist phase.
179 Peter was careful with the religious aspects of pietism. He did not permit Francke to publish 
a protestant Russian Bible in Russia (although there was a Dutch-Russian one) nor an expose of 
Christian life written by Francke. Winter, Halle als Ausgangspunkt. 68. Those w ho used pietist house 
tutors were equally pragmatic. An example of one Russian's instructions to his son's pietist tutor 
includes the reminder that he should not talk so much of Christianity since the Russians are 
themselves Christians. Ibid., 80.
of which were effected through Heinrich Wilhelm Ludolf, the representative of 
both the English and Danish courts in Russia from 1692-1694.180
The tenuous footholds gained by pietism in the Baltic provinces under 
Swedish repression could now flourish unhindered and were supported by a new 
influx of pietist teachers and preachers from Germany. The route to Russia for 
Francke's pietist missionaries lay via the Baltic provinces. Until 1710, the overland 
and sea routes to Russia were via Narva, Riga and Reval. With the development 
of St Petersburg, ships were able to land directly and the Baltic ports became less 
necessary. Narva, however, remained important due to its geographical proximity 
to the new capital. The view that the provinces became a Durchsgangland in more 
than the geographical sense, that "pietism fertilized Russia via the Baltic 
provinces,"181 must not be overemphasized. Pietist teachers were sent directly 
from Halle and their direct mission was Moscow. Russians also had direct contact 
w th Halle: Russian representatives of the tsar visited Halle;182 the sons of Peter's 
closest advisors were sent to study there. This direct contact cannot be 
overstressed either since the numbers of Russians registered at Halle were 
admittedly small, consisting of fifteen in all until 1722.183
The benevolent attitude of Russia was not the only factor which allowed
180 Ludolf arranged for Francke to send pietist preachers to the Lutheran churches in Moscow. 
[Winter, Halle als Ausgangspunkt, 32-46.] He also facilitated contact with other foreigners in Moscow. 
Admiral Cruys, for example, a Norwegian who had been in service in the Netherlands until Peter I 
brought him to Russia to help build a Russian fleet, has been described as the most important link for 
Halle in Russia. [Ibid., 80.] Another important non-German link was the Scot James Bruce, Peter's 
master-general of the ordnance. Bruce's significant contributions to Russia are described in Ibid., 82-84. 
Miinnich was also an important link to Halle and a protector of pietism in Russia, replacing Bruce and 
Cruys in this role. Ibid., 87-89. Winter deals extensively with pietist contacts and presence in Russia, 
giving detailed examples.
181 O.Webermann, "Pietismus und Briidergemeinde" in Baltische Kirchengeschichte, 149.
182 Winter, Halle als Ausgangspunkt, 58.
183 By 1750, there were another fifteen. Ibid., 101. For the much larger numbers of students from 
the Baltic, see p 141 below.
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the pietist movement to gain ground in the Baltic area. Due to war and plague, 
there was a serious dearth of clergy and tutors, and the missionary pietists could 
fill some of the vacant positions without too much competition from orthodox 
Lutherans. They were still, however, far from widespread. Many of the pastors 
who came from Germany to replace those clergy killed by war or famine184 were 
not ideal candidates.185 An impoverished area did not have much to attract 
good candidates. Those who came did not speak the local languages and were 
unfamiliar with life and customs in the provinces. They had to cover up to five 
parishes due to the scarcity of available clergy.186 Some who came and secured 
positions lacked theological education, others proved to be "drunkards" or "slave- 
drivers."187 It was very difficult to remove an undesirable pastor once he was 
appointed. Even the General Superintendent complained at the 1747 Landtag 
about a pastor he would rather see gone but whom he would have to put up with 
until "the wretched man ate himself to death."188 The pietists and the other 
practical Christians among the clergy were not necessarily the rule, but by the 
third decade of the century, several important positions were held by pietists, 
including that of General Superintendent of Livland.189
The pietist influence was strongest in Estland. Narva, due to its proximity 
to the new Russian capital, became an important centre of pietism. Several of the
184 In Riga, twelve of fourteen pastors had died; in Reval, only three pastors remained; in Kurland 
fifty-four pastors, about half of the clergy, had died. W.Lenz, Der baltische Literatenstand, 7; 
R.Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 125-126.
185 LNeander, "Die Aufklarung," 136.
186 W.Lenz, Der baltische Literatenstand, 7.
187 Ibid., 8.
188 LNeander, "Die Aufklarung," 136.
189 Otto Webermann, "Pietismus und Brudergemeinde," 152.
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most active pietists had originally been prisoners of war in Russia during the war 
with Sweden and on their release went to study at Halle. Francke welcomed 
these Russian speakers as a means of furthering his mission in Russia. Although 
several of them, most notably C.M.Rodde, after serving Halle's purposes first in 
Russia, did eventually come back to active work in Narva, their focus was more 
on Halle's mission in Russia rather than Estland as such.190 Pietism in Estland 
owes much to the activities of one family, the Gutslaffs, especially in the Estonian 
language. In 1648 Johann Gutslaff demonstrated the strong Christian 
humanitarian ethic which preceded the Enlightenment. "All souls, whether noble 
or peasant, whether subjects, slaves or oppressed, belong to God." If anyone had 
the attitude "they are Estonian, we German, then I must answer: God sees not the 
person." He compiled a grammar of the Estonian language to help the 
"oppressed." This spirit of helping the oppressed peasant worked through 
succeeding generations. Several Gutslaffs studied at Halle and even sought 
financial support from Francke to publish a Bible in Estonian.191 Gutslaffs were 
active in Bible translation, in founding schools, in compiling Estonian hymn 
books, church handbooks, and catechisms, as well as Estonian language books.
Pietism was not as strongly represented in Livland. In 1728 there were 
twenty-nine pietists among the clergy and school rectors in Estland, in comparison 
to nine in Livland. Livland sent just as many students to Halle, however. In the 
first half of the eighteenth century, there were 168 students from Livland at Halle 
compared with 135 from Estland. Only eleven of these were from the nobility.
190 E.Winter, Halle als Ausgangspunkt, 260.
191 Francke was not able to help, his resources no doubt stretched by his focus on Russia, but 
offered to assist in seeking help from friends, especially in England. Ibid., 261.
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The Estonians studied mainly theology while the students from Livland, thirty-six 
of whom were from the nobility, concentrated more on law and went into Russian 
service.192
Despite its humanitarian principles, its awareness of the unjust situation of 
the peasants and its contributions to the development of the autocthonous 
languages, pietism never gained a strong hold amongst the peasants. There was 
an enormous gulf between the pietists' activities and the extreme needs of the 
peasants. This is highlighted in Hinrich Gutslaffs appeal for financial support for 
his Estonian Bible: "The Estonian peasant lives in windowless huts and is dressed 
in rough sacking. Famine is always present. In the last decade of the seventeenth 
century a hundred thousand people died and in 1710 more than a hundred 
thousand from hunger and plague. The poor peasants do not have a groschen let 
alone a taler for an Estonian Bible. Ten or twenty weeks before the harvest the 
peasant has to beg bread from his master. And during the harvest he has to work 
uninterrupted for the master. The children go barefoot, in only a shirt, summer 
and winter. Bread and chaff is their nourishment. It is, therefore, understandable 
that such people are not very receptive to the Christian truth. From the mouths 
of their preachers, who are completely dependent their landowners, they 
hear all about duty and honesty. The parishes are so big and the distances so 
great that it is a lot to ask of both preacher and peasants to have regular Sunday 
service. On top of that there is corvee which has to be done on a Sunday too. 
There is hardly any possibility of educating the children. The poor people learn 
the catechism by rote and the result is a terrible superstition. Because there are
192 Ibid., 286-287.
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no schools, the people grow up like animals in the field."193
The role of the peasants as ready recipients of all that an active pastor, 
pietist or orthodox, had to offer is questionable not only because of their 
oppression and poverty but also because of their attitude to the pastor in general. 
As described in Chapter I, the status, economic situation and background 
identified the immigrant German clergy with the landed gentry, whose social 
companions they often were, especially in hunting and playing cards.194 Their 
situation was very different from their counterparts in Germany. "A pastor in 
Livland would change places with a superintendent in Saxony or Prussia only if 
he wished for more peace, leaner meals and his comfortable carriage to stand 
unused."195 As General Superintendent K.G.Sonntag remarked towards the end 
of the century, "The interests of the preacher are too closely and too diversely tied 
to those of the noble."196 This was evident to the peasants who saw in the clergy 
another foreign authority like the landowner.197 Such a perception was not 
conducive to open receptiveness of pastors' efforts on their behalf. Even Stender 
complained that his catechism and hymn book, "which I wrote with all the effort 
of my m ind's strength in order to inspire," were rejected by the peasant 
communities in favour of a 1615 book.198 That this "tremendous tenacity" against 
innovation owed more to the nature of the clergy than to the passive resistance
193 Cited in Ibid., 261-262.
194 W.Lenz, Der baltische Literatenstand, 11. See also L. Adamovich, Die Letten. Aufsatze fiber 
Geschichte, Sprache und Kultur der alten Letten, (Riga, 1930), 270-272.
195 A.W.Hupel, cited in Ibid.
196 Cited in Guntram Philipp, Die Wirksamkeit der Hermhuter Briidergemeine unter den Esten und 
Letten zur Zeit der Bauembefreiung, (Cologne, 1974), 185.
197 Ibid., 183. 183.
1981. Neander, "Die Aufklarung," 145.
of peasants to change is borne out by the fact that another form of pietism was 
accepted by the peasants.
Hermhut
In June 1722 a new religious revival movement began on the landed estate 
of Count Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf in Berthelsdorf. Zinzendorf had 
strong pietist ties. His maternal grandmother had been a close friend of Spener 
and Zinzendorf had studied at Halle. The new community was begun by a group 
of Moravian brothers whose roots lay in the Bohemian movement led by Jan Hus 
almost three centuries before. Members of other movements joined in large 
numbers: Lutherans, Reformed Lutherans, pietists, separatists. Such diversity 
made for religious disagreement but Zinzendorf, a man of outstanding 
personality, was able to unify them in one cohesive brotherhood whose central 
belief was Christ as Redeemer of man's sins. Like the pietists, the "Hermhuter 
Gemeine"199 rejected all authority over dogma other than Holy Scripture. Like 
the pietists, they stressed the importance of missionary work and by 1742 they 
had 480 registered communities in over twenty lands, including America, 
Denmark, England, France, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and most of 
the German states. Livland had one of the highest numbers of communities 
listed.200
Livland received Herrnhuter missionaries in 1729 but it was Zinzendorf s 
visit in 1736 which established his movement in the Baltic. Just two years before,
199 The Hermhuter stressed the use of the word "Gemeine" instead of the more usual "Gemeinde." 
Where the latter connotes parish or church community, the former term implies the idea of commons 
or commonality. This demonstrates the importance of the religious and civil (or secular) constitutions 
combined in one. G.Philipp, Die Wirksamkeit der Hermhuter Brudergemeine, 3, fn .ll .
200 29. The highest was Switzerland with 66. Ibid., 41.
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Zinzendorf had been ordained a Lutheran minister, partly to show that he was 
not sectarian and still supported Lutheranism. This plus his Halle associations 
help to explain the ready support he received from both nobles and pastors in the 
provinces.201 In the next few years fifty Hermhuter brothers were invited by 
landowners and clergy to work as tutors, assistants to pastors, craftsmen, etc. By 
1742, there were between thirteen and fourteen thousand organized Herm huter 
members in the Baltic provinces.202
The Hermhuter held that dogma could not be valid for everyone at all 
times. "The way of God varies according to times, countries, climate and 
generations ... and the nature of the rulers in the world and teachers in 
religion."203 This emphasis on local factors as a determinative of faith led to the 
belief that missionary work could only be carried out effectively by local 
inhabitants. ".. the nationals (die Nationalen) should take complete care of the 
work and the Brothers should only have overall supervision."204 This was of 
particular importance in the Baltic provinces. Elsewhere "a free man faces a free 
man, and talk flows freely as well as the exchange of experiences of the heart, 
while here the national, like all peoples still under the yoke of corvee, always 
tends towards caution bordering on mistrust." A second factor inhibiting the 
effectiveness of German Brothers was the gulf between an Estonian (or Lett) and 
a German. "[It] is too large for the former to turn to the German with 
unconditional trust; and it is often impossible for the latter to understand fully the 
local ways of thinking ..." The Hermhuter were open and pragmatic about the
201 Ibid., 153-154.
202 Otto A.Weberman, "Pietismus und Brudergemeinde," 158-159.
203 Cited in G.Philipp, P ie Wirksamkeit der Hermhuter Brudergemeine. 46.
204 Ibid., 154.
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solution: "We will therefore direct our main attention to the national helpers 
(’NaHonalgehiilfen)... and our effectiveness on the larger numbers will always only 
be indirect through these helpers."205 Although the H erm huter opened 
schools to train local teachers and sextons, a formal theological background was 
not necessary to hold office in the Hermhut brotherhood. Like the pietists, the 
Herm huter believed in a universal priesthood but they put it into practice, to the 
advantage of both the local population and their own movement. Office did not 
confer rank or authority; office implied service, voluntary and often in addition 
to a secular occupation to the community and those who held it were third in 
importance after God and the Gemeine. Formal education was not a requirement 
for lay preachers and helpers. An inner conviction communicated outwardly was 
much more important.
This perception of local participation opened the way for the peasants to 
play an active role in the new communities. While one Landrat's claim that "the 
most stupid peasants, men and women" were appointed as lay helpers may be 
exaggerated, it was true that many peasants held office.206 This was in stark 
contrast to the passive, powerless, subordinate role they played in the Lutheran 
churches. The peasants were not only given the experience of organization, trust, 
responsibility and dignity but also provided a distinct advantage over the 
Lutheran churches. Unlike the traditional pastor, they gained the trust of the 
peasants, as Zinzendorf had predicted, and were instrumental in the spread of the 
movement. In addition, the quantity of H erm hut offices ensured a plentiful 
supply of helpers to care for the members, in contrast to the pastor with his large
205 Ibid., 174.
206 Ibid., 182.
146
area to cover alone.207
An important characteristic which distinguished the H erm huter movement 
from the pietists and contributed to its acceptance by the peasants was its appeal 
to the senses and emotions. In order to communicate the redemption of man 
through Christ, a matter for rejoicing, Zinzendorf used strong imagery. The aim 
of his teaching was to reach the "heart," the centre point of will.208 Through 
music, poetry, drama and celebrations, faith was received through the 
emotions.209 This emotional religiosity seemed to suit the autocthonous 
character. The Hermhuter placed great emphasis on singing and by 1742, their 
hymn book contained 1,300 songs.210 The musicality of both the Estonians and 
the Letts was a trait observed and acknowledged and they took part most 
willingly and ably in the Hermhuter "song hours."211 The Hermhuter 
gatherings, however, induced tears in their peasant members, to such a consistent 
extent that the movement almost became a "cult of sighing and weeping" which 
the German Brothers viewed with scepticism. The release afforded by tears may 
have been a "deeply rooted, unconscious reaction to centuries of serfdom" but it 
did become standardized behaviour characterizing the Herm huter.212
The peasant could feel the message of Christ much more tangibly with the 
Hermhuter than in the Lutheran churches, which were more like "prisons" with
207 For more on the role of the local laity, see Ibid., 241-249.
208 Ibid., 225.
209 This period of "reckless ecstasy" was in the 1740/s and although Zinzendorf eventually reacted 
aganst it, the stamp of emotionalty remained with the movement. Ibid., 6, fn.20.
210 Ibid., 231.
211 Ibid., 227-231.
212 Ibid., 226-227.
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the pastor representing law and order.213 Even the pietists could not compete. 
They were characterized by less joy and more penitence. Zinzendorf summed up 
the difference, "We are the court poets of the Saviour, the pietists are the prosaics 
and the grammaticians." He had no quarrel with the validity of pietism since 
both adhered, albeit loosely in his own case, to the Augsburg Confession of 
Lutheranism. "Pietism is not a fallacy, only another method; we ride and the 
pietists go on foot."214 Pietism, however, had paved the way for the Hermhut. 
The first Herm huter in the Baltic area came by invitation of pietist nobles and 
clergy,215 and Herm huter communities were most numerous where pietists had 
been active.216 This was especially the case in Estland, where pietist activity had 
been particularly successful. Of the thirteen to fourteen thousand Herm huter 
members in the Baltic area, eight to nine thousand were in Estland.217
The practice of equality and the attraction of an emotional approach explain 
why the Herm huter were accepted by the peasants where the Lutherans and 
pietists were not. It also helped that the interests and status of the Herm huter 
Brothers were, unlike those of the pastors, not identifiable with those of the 
landowner. The Herm huter enjoyed no special status or privilege and did not 
own land. Many of the Brothers came from simple backgrounds, not too different 
from their Lett and Estonian members. The Herm huter were not dependent on 
the landowners to the same extent as the pastors. They were, for example,
213 Mark Nerling, "Die Hermhuterfrage in Livland im 19.Jahrhundert/" in R.Wittram, ed., Baltische 
Kirchengeschichte. 171.
214 G.Philipp, Die Wirksamkeit der Hermhuter Briidergemeine, 46, fn. 22.
215 Ibid., 151-152.
216 Otto Webermann, "Pietismus und Briidergemeinde," 157.
217 Ibid., 159.
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appointed from Germany and although dependent on the good will of 
landowners, such landowners were not of the extreme feudal type, who would 
not have supported Herm huter in their midst. The H erm huter remained outside 
the church and its close links with the political structure of the provinces.
Despite some initial support, the Ritter slowly became more sceptical about 
the Hermhuter. This was influenced in part by the increasing hostility of the 
other religious communities to the Hermhuter. The orthodox Protestants could 
not accept a movement which allowed lay people to hold office, nor one that 
undermined the clerical hierarchy.218 The Halle pietists grew more distant as the 
movement grew more emotional and the leading clergy in the Baltic area 
withdrew their support.219 The Ritter, guardians of orthodox Lutheranism, were 
alarmed at the possible attack on the church (and no doubt visualized subsequent 
attacks on secular power): "... the only intention of these people and their
followers is ... to wrest the power from the hierarchy in the church."220 In 1742 
the clergy and Ritter together organized a commission to investigate the 
Hermhuter and in the following year Tsarina Elizabeth forbade the Herm huter 
movement, probably under the influence of a strong Ritter lobby in the 
capital.221 The ban was lifted by Catherine twenty years later but not before the 
brotherhood had suffered persecution and martyrdom.222 That the movement 
survived the ban is in no small measure due to the local lay helpers who kept the
218 Ibid., 161.
219 General Superintendent Fischer of Livland withdrew his support as did Oberpastor Mcwitz in 
Reval. Both their successors were opponents of the Hermhuter. G.Philipp, Die Wirksamkeit der 
Hermhuter Brudergemeine, 160,
220 Cited in Ibid., 177.
221 Ibid., 161-162.
222 Ibid., 164.
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movement in quiet motion.223 It also gave the Estonians and Letts valuable 
experience in responsibility and leadership.224
The fears of the Ritter were unfounded as far as the actual policies of the 
Herrnhuter were concerned. The movement was essentially conservative. 
Zinzendorf, in Lutheran tradition, upheld the order of Stand. Each individual 
should stay in the Stand to which he belonged. Once the lessons of Holy 
Scripture had been properly assimilated, "only then can we become useful 
creatures in the world, a peasant is then a real peasant, a nobleman a real 
nobleman, a pastor a real pastor a servant a real servant, and a lord a real 
lord."225 It was not the intention of the Herrnhuter to change the social order. 
Obedience to those who had power was their rule.226 The miseries of the 
peasant were sympathized with. Jesus too had had humble origins. Equality and 
emancipation were preached and practised only in a religious context. The 
Herrnhuter did not follow their policies through to the social and economic 
contexts. Although they followed developments with interest, they took no active 
part in the reform process227 and had no direct influence on the Landtag or in 
St Petersburg.228 This did not save them from suspicion of such activities, 
however. General Governor Paulucci as well as General Superintendent Sonntag
223 In 1756, the secret leader of the movement in the Baltic reported that 8000 Estonians were in 
contact with the movement, of which one hundred were German, half of them nobility. In Livland, 
there were 2600, fifty of which were German, half of whom were nobility. Otto Webermann, 
"Pietismus und Briidergemeinde," 163.
224 G. Philipp, Die Wirksamkeit der Hermhuter Brudergemeine. 167.
225 Ibid., 326.
226 In cases of revolution, for example, the Hermhut were not to take sides but to obey those who  
held power. Ibid., 330.
227 Ibid., 325.
228 Ibid., 145.
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both feared political unrest in 1818-1819 instigated by the Herrnhuter.229
In the age of enlightenment, the Herrnhuter remained essentially a religious 
movement, removed from the realm of reason and reform. Their religious 
enlightenment, however, was carried over into other spheres indirectly. Where 
they were active, the peasants gave up their superstitious ways and their abuse 
of alcohol. "They were industrious and obedient to their lords, went diligently to 
church and prayed quietly and peacefully. In the years 1740-1745 not one 
criminal matter was brought before the court."230 The movement had also 
awakened the peasants to the possiblity of a different social order, had taught 
them organization and responsiblity, had made them aware of their own language 
and culture and had contributed to the beginnings of a national consciousness.231 
The movement has been criticized for focusing only on the more well-off peasants, 
while the poor remained very poor, thus creating and supporting a peasant 
aristocracy. This may have been the case but in the last resort the movement 
helped create a peasant leadership, on which "the decisions of the people are 
largely dependent." 232 While the German Brothers did not orchestrate peasant 
uprisings, the peasant leaders they had created were often active.233 It would 
take several more decades, however, before their impact was felt on legislation.
The movement also had some effect on the legislators, on the Ritter.
229 Ibid., 254.
230 Otto Webermann, "Pietismus und Briidergemeinde," 160-161.
231 Although the Herrnhuter effectively but undeliberately started the nationalist movement by  
providing identity, Zinzendorf was against any element of nationalism in religion. G.Philipp, Die 
Wirksamkeit der Herrnhuter Briidergemeine, 268.
232 Ibid., 334, 333.
233 The role of the Herrnhuter in peasant uprisings is not clear. See Ibid., 254-257.
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Although the Herrnhuter had lost much noble support by the 1780s,234 their 
teachings did have some immediate influence on some nobles.235 They did not 
initiate thoughts of emancipation but rather a Christian patriarchalism. Rather 
than exercise power over their serfs, landowners influenced by the Herm hut 
would strive to care for them responsibly.236 While this would not change the 
legal status of the serfs, it may have eased conditions on some estates. On the 
legislative level, the physiocratic argument that serfdom was not economic would 
carry more weight. The patriarchal approach, however, could also be effective. 
Karl A.Bruiningk fought for hereditary use of the land and was instrumental in 
setting up a school system.237 The movement owed much to such nobles, not 
many in number, for securing continued tolerance of their movement on the 
Landtag.238 More importantly, these nobles also exerted influence on the 
movement's behalf at the Russian court. After Catherine had lifted the ban on the 
movement in 1764, Russian support continued, reaching its highpoint when 
Alexander issued a manifesto in 1817 which allowed the Herrnhut freedom to 
continue their work in the Baltic. Opposition factions among the nobility and the 
clergy sought to change this imperial benevolence and were helped by the 
Decembrist uprising, which had motivated a ban on secret societies. Russian 
support began to decrease during Nicholas's reign but by then the century of
234 Ibid., 287. Even in the period of the ban, there had been at least seventy-five noble families in 
sympathy with the movement. See note 223 above.
235 The Hermhut had a special school for the nobility from 1786-1802, [G.Philipp, 278] where the 
events and ideas of the French Revolution were discussed. [Ibid., 329.] In general, the ideas of the 
French Revolution infiltrated the Herrnhuter closed communites slowly.[Ibid., 17.]
236 Ibid., 285, 328.
237 Ibid., 286.
238 Ibid., 285-290.
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Herrnhut work in the Baltic was bearing fruit in the emergence of national 
movements.239
The efforts of the clergy in general were not directed towards legislation 
but rather to the lives of the peasants. Their practical work, which led to literacy, 
agricultural improvements, better health and hygiene and the development of the 
local languages, was not, however, enlightenment of the peasants in the accepted 
sense. It was rather practical education, perhaps a prerequiste of enlightenment. 
It was not their intention to create national consciousness but their recording of 
the local cultures and languages gave validity and open awareness to heritages 
other than the German one. Similarly, literacy was only the first step. One of the 
alleged ringleaders of the peasant uprising in 1802 claimed that he read the 
newspaper regularly and knew how matters stood in France.240
Pastors as publicists
For most of the eighteenth century, the direct involvement of the clergy in 
the process of agrarian reform had been limited. Pastors were aware of the plight 
of the serf but unwilling to tackle real changes in his legal status. "Is there no 
way to improve the situation of the peasants without making him free or 
decreasing the lord's income?"241 was the dichotomy they faced. The Pugachev 
uprising (1773-1775) ushered in a more conservative tone and Catherine's 
Statthalterschaft (1786-1796) displayed the power of the Empire over the province. 
This power was supported by a new generation of pastors, pastors who did try
239 For more detals on the Russian aspect, see Ibid., 290-304.
240 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 161.
241 Jakob Benjamin Fischer in Riga, 1778. Cited in Neuschaffer, "Unterschlagene Machtpolitik," in 
Russen und Rutland, 409.
to influence public opinion and legislation.
The clergy's awareness of the deplorable agrarian situation was often 
expressed along with loyalty and praise for Russia. August Wilhelm Hupei, the 
pastor242 with the high literacy rates, was an open publicist for the Russian 
Empire. From 1781 to 1791 he published Nordische Miscellaneen,243 which was 
designed, he said, to correct the false and superficial reporting of European 
travellers which had resulted in Russia being viewed with contempt as the worst 
nation in Europe.244 It was Hupei's intention to use facts and objectivity to 
create a more accurate picture.245 Like Eisen, he compared the situation of 
Russian serfs as much more favourable than that of the serfs in the Baltic.246 
While Eisen denied that he had written such a statement, Hupei took his 
comparisons further. "I bet that very few Russian peasants would change places 
with French peasants...The French populace is free (so they think), but poor; the 
Russian is enserfed but for the most part well-off."247 That the situation of the 
serfs in the Baltic had improved at all was due to measures introduced by the 
Russian monarch, which freed them somewhat from the power of "their petty
242 Of Oberpahlen near Dorpat from 1763 to 1804. Hupei was typical in that he was a German 
immigrant, had worked as a house tutor and recorded much of local customs and culture, but he was 
more involved in writing than in practical pastoral work. His Topographische Nachrichten (1774-1782) 
decribes in detail the land and its inhabitants, especially the life of the peasants.
243 In 28 volumes. From 1792-1798 it was published as Neue Nordische Miscellaneen in 18 
volumes. It covered "the history, geography, constitution, laws, traditions, customs, housekeeping, 
production, commerce and such in Russia but especially in Livland, Estland and Kurland." It has been 
described as the central organ of the enlightenment movement in Livland. N.Wihkninsch, Die 
Aufklarung, 301; H.Neuschaffer, "Unterschlagene Machtpolitik," in Russen und Rufiland, 413.
244 Captain John Dundas Cochrane, however, found the Russian peasants better off than the Irish 
ones. Narrative of a Pedestrian Tourney through Russia and Siberian Tartary 1780-1825, (London, 
1825), 68. Also cited by Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime. (New York, 1974), 148.
245 Hupei's intentions are cited at length in H. Neuschaffer, "Unterschlagene Machtpolitik," in 
Russen und Ru land. 410-413.
246 Ibid., 409.
247 Ibid., 412.
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despots.” The crown peasants in the Baltic were treated properly while the 
nobility still had too much power over their serfs.248 Although he ably 
described the misery of the serf's life, Hupei offered no reform plans, admitting 
that the matter was complicated and unresolved.249 Such had been, in effect, the 
conclusion of Catherine's essay competition.
This later generation of pastors devoted less of their time to practical 
pastoral care and more to publishing. Several were openly critical of the Ritter 
and openly loyal to Russia. Heinrich Johann von Jannau was a native of Livland 
but had studied in Gottingen. Although a pastor, he owned an estate and was a 
noble but not a matriculated member of the Ritterschaft. Jannau, who also 
described the evils of the system most vividly, did not consider freedom the issue. 
"Freedom, in the sense that we free-born possess it, would be the most harmful 
present we could give [the peasants]." His reform proposals were very similar to 
Schoultz's,250 but with strong emphasis on educating and informing the peasant. 
All laws pertaining to the peasants should be published in the local languages and 
made available to the peasants, as should the Wackenbucher.251 Jannau's loyalty 
to the Russian monarch is implicit in his support of Schoultz and explicit in his 
praise of Catherine's agrarian policies.252 Jannau could afford to criticize the 
Ritter since he was not one of them. He could also support Russian policy in the 
Baltic (this was the time of the Statthalterschaft) since a curtailment of matriculated
248 Mechthild Keller, "Nachrichtenborse Berlin: Friedrich Nicolai und seine Allgemeine deutsche 
Bibliothek," in Russen und Rufiland, 431.
249 N.Wihkninsch, Die Aufklarung, 300-304.
250 The text of Schoultz's speech to the Landtag and his reforms are an important part of Jannau's 
Geschichte der Sklaverey.
251 Ibid., 137.
252 Ibid., 136.
privilege could mean a gain for the non-matriculated nobility of which he was a 
member. Jannau also represents the native-born pastors who had a closer grasp 
of the situation than the earlier immigrant pastors.
The most famous publicist of this pre-reform area, Garlieb Merkel, was 
himself not a member of the clergy but the educated son of a pastor. As such, he 
is probably best described as one of the Literaten.253 Since his first publication 
did have a direct effect on the Landtag, his role in the agrarian process belongs 
properly in the next chapter, but it is pertinent to note here the dynamic of 
Russian loyalty which he also evidenced. Opponents and critics of the Ritter, like 
Hupei and Jannau, supported Russian imperial absolutism, albeit enlightened, and 
criticized provincial privilege. The dynamic would not have functioned if the 
critics had not been aware of Russia's growing intolerance of Ritter privilege. 
Their criticism could be loud and clear if they were sure of Russian support. This 
scenario benefited the serfs since any criticism of Ritter privilege obviously, 
especially with the background of the French Revolution which taught the 
dangers of ignoring feudal practices, had to begin with the basis of their power, 
their serfs. Merkel even saw the very act of belonging to the Russian Empire of 
crucial importance for the peasants. The internal affairs of Livland were handled 
in the open, were even published and reached the ears of the public.254 That the 
support was mutual is evidenced by the fact that Merkel received a pension from 
Catherine and from Alexander I.255
253 "What was a Literat? Everyone w ho had attended a university or institute of similar standing 
... and did not belong to the Ritterschaft. Literaten were pastors, lawyers, doctors, teachers ... 
apothecaries, architects and engineers." W.Lenz, P er baltische Literatenstand, 1.
254 Garlieb Merkel, P ie freien Letten und Esthen (Riga, 1820), 151.
255 H.Neuschaffer, "Unterschlagene Machtpolitik," in Russen und Rutland, 402,422; Tobien, P ie  
Agrargesetzgebung, 167.
As the century came to an end, the agrarian question was an integral part 
of the Empire/province relationship. It had not been solved by forces in the Baltic, 
despite imperial prodding, mainly because there were none committed to 
changing the legal and economic status of the serfs, although there had been 
impulses to improve the serf's lot. Pressure for change grew as publicists became 
a factor in the dissemination of information and expression of criticism, as the 
ideas of the French Revolution spread and as Russia continued to play its imperial 
role in the Baltic. Change and the forces behind it will be the subject of the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER III 
IMPERIAL AND PROVINCIAL ATTITUDES 
IN THE PERIOD OF AGRARIAN REFORM IN THE BALTIC
PART ONE: IMPERIAL INTENTION: CATHERINE II
The Statthalterschaft
Russia's pressure on the Ritter to reform in the middle of the eighteenth 
century was consistent with historical precedent. Poland had demanded 
improvement for the Baltic serfs, and Sweden had granted them important rights 
to the detriment of baronial power.1 Over the centuries, the Ritter had learned 
to cope with imperial pressure, resisting it with varying degrees of success. The 
1765 Landtag had conceded only as much as was necessary to prevent a more 
vigorous imperial intervention. The success of this policy of minimum 
accommodation to the wishes of the Empire was affected by a combination of new 
emphases in imperial policy in general and changes within the provinces 
themselves.
As the eighteenth century progressed, Russia's position as dominium maris 
Baltici was secured. The front with Turkey had also been fairly secure since 1739 
and the end to the Seven Years War in 1763 brought some respite from military 
concerns on other fronts. Imperial attention turned to the effective management 
of a vast Empire.
Russian administrative policy was based on the assumptions that all its 
conquered territories belonged unquestionably to the Empire and that the Empire
1 Polish and Swedish intervention in the affairs of the Ritter has been dealt with in detail in 
Chapter I.
was ruled by one absolute ruler. Catherine II added a new perspective. Not only 
was she a self-confessed absolutist but also a self-professed enlightened ruler. The 
theories of Voltaire and Montesquieu, however, ingested before she became 
Empress, were not of much practical help in quelling the peasant unrest which 
broke out at the beginning of her reign. In October, 1762 the Senate noted, "... 
many peasants, misled and blinded by false and untruthful rumours ... have 
renounced the obedience they owe to their estate owners and lords and have 
become involved in many arbitrary deeds and audacities."2 Such unrest was 
quelled by force of arms.3 The enlightened Empress did acknowledge the 
"intolerable and cruel yoke" of serfdom and the need to alleviate it, an attitude 
dictated not only by enlightenment-inspired humanitarian ideals but also by the 
pragmatics of statecraft. If nothing was done to improve the situation for the 
serfs, Catherine claimed, "they themselves will force it sooner or later against our 
will."4 This was also her attitude to the Baltic Ritter in 1765. If their behaviour 
towards their serfs was not improved, peasant unrest was bound to be the result, 
and this was a threat to the Empire. Catherine's humanitarian and liberal 
impulses, in general, if not directly motivated by pragmatic considerations were 
certainly influenced by them. She was aware, as an English contemporary noted, 
that "immoderate efforts are the symptoms of insufficiency, and have always more 
fury than force; that the security of the prince decreases in proportion to the
2 Cited in Nikolai Michailovich Druzhinin, "Der Aufgeklarte Absolutismus in Ruftland," in Per 
Aufgeklarte Absolutismus, ed. Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin (Koln, 1974), 320. This article is a 
German translation of the Russian original in Absoliutizm v Rossi (XVII-XVIItv.) (Moscow, 1964).
3 According to one source, there were forty peasant uprisings between 1762 and 1772. IJgnatovich, 
"Krest'yanskie volneniya pervoy chetverti XIX veka," Voprosiylstorii no.9 (1950): 68.
4 Cited in Druzhinin, "Der Aufgeklarte Absolutismus," 321.
exorbitance of his despotism."5
The Baltic Ritter, however, did not perceive Catherine's early pressure on 
them as part of a general attitude. Any reform for the peasants effectively meant 
a decrease in Ritter power and could only be interpreted as a direct threat to 
provincial privilege. Protecting privilege, therefore, meant resisting change for the 
peasants, a policy which would dominate the Landtag for the next fifty years. 
The effect of Catherine's imperial intervention on behalf of the serfs, the lessening 
of landlord power, has often been subsequently identified as the motive. "In order 
to limit the privileges of the nobility [in Livland], she turned her attention first to 
the peasant question."6 As Catherine herself admitted about the confirmation of 
provincial privileges in Livland in December 1762, however, "...in all honour 
neither I nor anyone knows what I will sign, if it is useful to the country or if it 
involves ways, customs or laws."7 Catherine would find out more about 
provincial privileges in the Empire's interaction with the provinces. The hostile 
reaction to her attempt in 1764, for example, to add fifteen Swedish and German 
non-nobles to the Ritter matriculation on the basis of their placing on the Russian 
Table of Ranks focused her attention on the closed matriculation practised by the 
Ritter. Interaction with the provinces brought the Empire more knowledge. From 
this perspective and from the perspective of national security, so important to the 
Empress, it is difficult to subscribe to the view that Catherine "was determined to
5 Cited in William Butler, "Foreign Impressions of Russian Law to 1800: Some Reflections," in 
William Butler ed., Russian Law: Historical and Political Perspectives (Leyden, 1977), 90. Catherine's 
initial attempts to alleviate "immoderate efforts" in Russia proper included the formal abolition of the 
death penalty and of the use of torture, although instances of both persisted.
6 Georg Sacke, "Livlandische Politik Katharinas II," Quellen und Forschungen zur baltischen 
Geschichte Heft 5 (1944): 28.
7 Cited in the original French in Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great 
(London, 1981), 61-62.
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undermine the autonomy of the non-Russian provinces [Estonia and Livonia]."8
Just as importantly, the rights of the nobility to both land and serfs were 
never in doubt, and Catherine never considered a change in the legal status of the 
serfs. Her reign was governed by the principle expressed in July 1762, 'W e intend 
to protect inviolably the landowners in their properties and estates and to keep 
the peasants in obedience to them."9 Economic privilege could be enjoyed as long 
as it did not threaten the security of the Empire. Provincial political privilege was 
tied to another sphere of imperial policy.
Catherine's interests as Empress of Russia, even as an enlightened one, 
were not centred on the peasant question. Her main interest lay in the effective 
government of her territories. The reason she gave for confirming the Baltic 
privileges even although she did not know exactly what they consisted of reveals 
what was more important for her. "... I thought that the peace of one whole 
province was preferable to all the rest."10 In the sphere of effective government, 
her enlightened studies did offer some practical help. She borrowed much from 
Montesquieu in the effort to organize and establish the authority of law. 
"Freedom is the right to do what the law allows."11 The law, however, in 
contrast to her mentor's view of it, stemmed from her autocratic power. Rather 
than establish any intermediary powers which would limit autocracy, Catherine 
set up a bureaucracy to channel her own powers throughout her Empire.12 
Without an effective administration, laws could not be enforced nor could her
8 As expressed, for example, by Madariaga. Ibid., 62.
9 Cited in Druzhinin, "Der Aufgeklarte Absolutismus," 321.
10 See note 7 above.
” Druzhinin, "Der Aufgeklarte Absolutismus," 322.
12 Ibid., 322-323.
own sovereignty be felt over such a vast area.
Shortly after assuming power, Catherine redivided the Empire into fifteen 
gubernii and clearly defined the hitherto rather vague duties of the Governors.13 
She began replacing the military organization of provincial administration with 
her bureaucracy, a body of civil servants. Aware of the lack of such personnel, 
Catherine had tried to prepare for the changeover by reforming the civil service. 
Her Staff Regulations of 1763 nearly doubled the number of civil servants but 
there were still far too few for effective administration.14 By 1781, Catherine 
herself admitted, 'Because of the great extent of several provinces there is both an 
insufficency of administration and a shortage of people needed for 
administering."15 This shortage of personnel could have been mitigated by 
allowing local nobles an elected share in local government, a measure considered 
by Catherine but initially rejected. Since compulsory state service for the nobility 
was abolished by Peter HI in 1762, volunteers from the local nobility were hard 
to find. As one Governor General complained to Catherine in 1767, "From the 
time that the nobility was freed from all obligatory service the government of the 
province has had great difficulty finding people for the interminable number of
13 "In addition to the basic duties of managing the finances, collecting the taxes, recruiting soldiers, 
and supervising the overall administration of the province, each governor-general was to oversee 
whatever schools existed in his province, run the prisons and orphanages, build and repair the roads 
and bridges, fight fires and collect horses for the army. He was also required to take an accurate 
census, to have an accurate map of the province drawn up, to inform himself about the people, 
customs, commerce and agriculture, etc of the province, and to write reports on these subjects and 
submit them to the Senate or directly to the Empress herself." Robert E.Jones, "Catherine II and the 
Provincial Reform of 1775: A question of motivation," Canadian Slavic Studies IV,3 (Fall 1970): 500- 
501. Jones' source is the Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossiiskov Imperii No. 12 137. See also John P. 
LeDonne, "Catherine's Governors and Govemors-General 1763-1796," in Cahiers du Monde russe et 
sovietique 20 (1979): 15-42. Chapter I pp. 60-70 above deals with the general function of the Governor- 
General in the Baltic provinces.
14 The number of civil servants in both central and provincial administration in Russia in 1763 was
16,500. Prussia, with one percent of the land area of Russia, employed 14,000. R.E.Jones, "Catherine 
II and the Provincial Reform of 1775," 502-503.
15 Ibid., note 16, 503.
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commissions that must constantly be filled."16 The problem of administrative 
personnel would concern imperial government for almost a century to come. In 
the 1830s, Nicholas I felt thwarted in attempts at local government reform. "... 
(T)here was hardly any means," he claimed, "to find more than 500 reliable civil 
servants for these posts [district administrators]."17
This problem did not exist in the Baltic provinces, where administration 
was functioning efficiently, and Catherine's early attempts to organize her Empire 
did not affect provincial government in Livland and Estland. These early 
attempts, however, had not received the Empress's undivided attention. The 
question of provincial administration had never been dropped18 but had ceded 
priority to war with Turkey which had resumed in 1768 and would last till 1774.
The necessity for efficient administration of the Empire was underlined 
emphatically in 1774 when Catherine's fears of the peasants taking matters into 
their own hands were realized. The Pugachev Revolt took more than a year to 
quell due, Catherine's generals claimed, to the weakness of the local civil 
authorities. Catherine herself also believed the rebellion could have been stopped 
by the presence of a strong local government. "I consider the weak conduct of 
civilian and military government in the various localities to be as injurious to 
public welfare as Pugachev and his motley rabble ... everywhere that the 
scoundrels encountered firmness and defense, there they obtained no success."19 
The question of effective administration as vital to the security of her Empire now
16 Governor Johann Jakob Sievers of Novgorod, cited in Ibid., 504.
17 B.Schallhorn, Lokalverwaltung und Standesrecht, 136-137.
18 In the period before 1775, at least seventeen projects had been drafted, by individuals, 
government agencies and the Senate. R.E.Jones, The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility 1762-1785 
(Princeton, 1973), 212.
19 Cited in R.E.Jones. "Catherine II and the Provincial Reform of 1775," 506-507.
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received Catherine's undivided attention. On November 2, 1775, less than nine 
months after the execution of Pugachev, Catherine presented the 491 articles of 
the Fundamental Law on the Administration of the Provinces. The law redivided 
the Empire into more gubernii and smaller units20 and increased central control 
by increasing the powers of the Governors. On the other hand, it separated the 
judicial from the administrative, and introduced an element of representation, for 
nobles, citizens and crown peasants, into the former. Of some 15,000 officials 
added to local government from 1775 to 1796, 10,608 were elected locally.21 All 
elected officals received a salary from the state.
Catherine's original intention had been to try the law on an experimental 
basis first in the province of Tver22 but was persuaded by the Senate to apply it 
to the whole Empire. Since its organization needed time, it could not be applied 
simultaneously throughout the Empire.23 This gave the Baltic provinces, and 
other parts of the Empire, time to react. Similarly, the central power had time to 
develop a consistent policy to the various reactions to the new law. Significant 
for the Baltic provinces were the reactions of Moscow and the Ukraine. Both 
preferred to keep their old institutions but were overruled, which did not bode 
well for any future exceptions. In 1782, the Ritterschaft of both Livland and 
Estland officially communicated their wish to reject the 1775 law, before it was 
applied. The reason they gave was that their own institutions had served as a
20 The five districts of Livland (plus Insel Oesel) became nine and in Estland four were increased 
to five.
21 2,704 peasants, 3,851 burghers, 4,053 noblemen. Jones, Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 
233.
22 Along with Novgorod, under the governorship of Johann Jakob Sievers.
23 It was put into practice in Novgorod, Tver and Smolensk immediately.
model for the new law and, therefore, need not be changed.24
Ironically, administration in the Baltic provinces had indeed been one of the 
main influences of the new law.25 As far as Catherine was concerned, "the 
institutions of the Baltic provinces, where the German barons elected their own 
courts, komissars, and 'landraty/ ... had brought happiness to the people of that 
region for hundreds of years."26 The mastermind behind the whole reform was 
perhaps Jakob Johann Sievers, a noble from Estland.27 Sievers had been 
appointed Governor of Novgorod in 1764 and shortly after had described in a 
report to Catherine the anarchy resulting from the lack of any local administration 
in his province.28 Sievers drafted a reform proposing the use of elected nobles 
in local administration but Catherine was not ready to assent to elected 
participaton in government and rejected Sievers' reforms in 1769. Five years later, 
in the middle of the Pugachev Revolt, she allowed the Governor of Kazan, which 
had suffered under Pugachev's uprising, to use elected nobles in local 
administration. In the period between Pugachev's execution and the
24 J.Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen, 218. According to Eckardt, Vorontsov did not allow this 
petition to reach Catherine.
25 Other sources included: the materials from the special committee appointed by the Legislative 
Commission and which worked on provincial reform from 1768-1771; the British legal and judicial 
systems as represented directly in Professor Desnitskii's proposals and indirectly in Catherine's 
reading of Blackstone (she supposedly began in 1774; Desnitskii's translation of the Commentaries did 
not appear until 1780.) See R.E.Jones, The Emancipation of the Russian Noblity, 213-220.
26 Ibid., 217-218.
27 J.J.Sievers cannot be viewed, however, as a direct representative of the Ritterschaft or, as his 
biographer Karl Blum [Ein russischer Staatsmann. Des Grafen Takob Tohann Sievers Denkwurdigkeiten 
zur Geschichte Rufllands 4 vols. (Leipzig and Heidelberg, 1857)] would have it, as a German 
KulturtrUger in the court of unenlightened Russia. Sievers left the Baltic for St Petersburg at the age 
of thirteen and, thanks to the great influence of his uncle at the court, enjoyed a successful career in 
Russian state service and in the diplomatic corps which took him to London for eight years. Robert 
E.Jones, Provincial Development in Russia. Catherine II and Takob Sievers (New Brunswick, 1984), 45. 
See also Roger Bartlett, "J.J.Sievers and the Russian Peasantry under Catherine II," in Tahrbucher fur 
Geschichte Osteuropas N.F. 32 (1984): 16-33.
28 Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen. 206-207.
promulgation of the provincial law, Catherine summoned Sievers to her side to 
work with her on her new law. She also consulted with the Landrat of Estland 
and with Governor Browne of Livland.29 Although Catherine's provincial law 
was influenced by Baltic institutions, it contained elements alien and undesirable 
to the Ritter.
Despite their petitions to the contrary, Livland and Estland were changed 
by decree into the Statthalterschaften of Riga and Reval in December 1782.30 A 
flurry of activity followed in an effort to keep the old institutions intact. Jakob 
Sievers, the architect of the reform, wrote to Catherine from his voluntary 
retirement31 in Livland: "I implore your Majesty, with tears in my eyes, to allow 
these provinces to enjoy their freedoms and privileges. Your Majesty confirmed 
these herself and, in my opinion, even more emphatically by using them to create 
the principles of the new law."32 The subordination of local authority to central 
power representatives was obviously a real fear, but the elements which were 
really alien to the old system were the very elective procedures which the Ritter 
so exemplified. Implicit in the election of officials to the lower courts and other 
institution^33 was the possibility of representation from other sectors of society.
29 Jones, Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 218.
30 It was implemented on 3 July, 1783.
31 Sievers submitted his resignation in May 1781, on the grounds of ill health but there is some 
evidence to suggest that he was disappointed that the office of governor-general, and therefore he 
personally, was still subject to the authority and control of the Senate despite his recommendations 
to the contrary. Sievers never won ascendancy over his opponents at court, particularly Prince 
Vyazemskii. Potemkin was also successfully turning Catherine's attention to the acquisition of more 
territory in the south, rather than provincial reform in the north, as a means to develop the Empire 
and Sievers felt his influence with the Empress decrease. RE.Jones, Provincial Development in Russia, 
157-168.
32 Cited in Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen, 270.
33 For example, the Institute of District Marshals composed of one elected representative from each 
district or Kreis.
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Ritter monopoly was threatened. The threat was all the more grave since there 
was a "class" anxious to relieve the Ritter of some of their power.
Catherine's Legislative Council, called in December 1766, had rekindled the 
resentments between the non-matriculated nobles and the Ritter. The former 
insisted on their right to elect deputies to the Commission since Catherine had 
summoned deputies from all nobles and landowners; the latter insisted that they 
were the sole representatives of the province. Imperial intervention resolved the 
matter in favour of the Landsassen, the non-matriculated nobles, a great blow to 
Ritter privilege, especially since it was now evident that imperial support of the 
Ritter could not be taken for granted. The Landsassen organized their own 
Corporation and sent deputies to join the Ritter delegates at the Commission. 
Ritter monopoly on political representation was now broken, with imperial 
support. Although the Landsassen were seen by their critics to conduct themselves 
"with embittered passion and without skill or any true political sense,"34 they 
scored significant victories in their claims to estate ownership, the economic 
monopoly of the Ritter, and to representation on the Landtag, the political 
monopoly of the Ritter. In 1774 Governor Browne declared that non-matriculated 
nobles were allowed to keep any noble estates in their possession35 and although 
their request to have their deputies matriculated (in order to receive full rights) 
was denied, they were given the right to representation on the Landtag in matters 
of tax.
The emergence of the Landsassen as a political force coincided with the 
promulgation of Catherine's Provincial Law. Perceiving the opportunity to
34 Ibid., 216.
35 It will be remembered that the Landsassen had enjoyed the right to own noble estates under 
Sweden.
influence imperial policy in their favour to the detriment of the Ritter, the 
Landsassen sent delegates to lobby in St Petersburg during discussions on the 
implementation of the new law. The town population had also been given the 
right to elect their own deputies and they too sent lobbyists to the capital. The 
Ritter naturally had their own representatives there. The impact of these 
conflicting parties in the capital must have raised doubts in the Empress's mind 
as to whether the situation in the Baltic provinces was quite so secure after all and 
must have dispelled any idea there might have been of excepting the provinces 
from the general law.36 Catherine's primary interest, after all, was security in her 
realm.
Despite the advantages gained by the Landsassen, the Ritter were initially 
not too alarmed by the Statthalterschaft. Its changes did not bring about "a change 
in the [Livland] constitution, since they in no way affected the system of Stand; 
the main difference from before was a change in the mechanism by which the 
local authorities co-operated. ...the transformation of the provincial authorities 
was completely compatible with the maintenance of the old institutions."37 The 
Ritter had also been reassured by the reaffirmation of those economic rights on 
which their power rested. Shortly before the implementation of the 
Statthalterschaft, on 3 May 1783, Catherine decreed the allodification of feudal 
estates,38 a move welcomed by the Ritter.39 The policy was not designed
36 It is implied that Catherine did not think of applying the law to the provinces. It was rather 
Prince Vyazemskii's (Catherine's procurator general since 1764) initiative. Eckardt, Die baltischen 
Provinzen, 217. The Ritter of Estland also referred to Catherine's promise to exclude their province 
from a general reform. Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, 319.
37 Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen, 223.
38 The change in the title to lands from feudal tenure to complete ownership.
specifically for the Baltic provinces, however. It was part of the Charter to the 
Nobility, promulgated on Catherine's fifty-sixth birthday the month before, which 
was the next step in the rational organization of the Empire.40 Rather than 
landed estates being perceived as part of national property on loan to the nobility 
in exchange for service, they now became the exclusive and inviolable property 
of the nobility.41 The measure was a logical addendum  to the Provincial Law. 
Local gentry would be encouraged to look after their property if they owned it 
and especially the serfs on it. Land ownership and its concomitant responsibilities 
would replace state service as the noble's obligation to the state.42
The Charter to the Nobility was not immediately applied to the Baltic 
provinces. Much as they greeted the reaffirmation of their right to landed 
property, the Ritter rejected the Charter in general. Catherine's classifications of 
nobles, burghers and state peasants did not match circumstances, or attitudes, in 
the Baltic. "The essential trichotomy in our countiy is: 1) matriculated nobles, 2) 
peasants, 3) all who do not belong to either of these two Stdnde.ll43 In 
contradiction to the Ritter practice of closed matriculation, the Charter reaffirmed
39 There is the suggestion that the allodification of the estates was directly connected to the 
application of the provincial reform. "... the nature of the bargain Catherine was going to drive home 
became clear: she would view the request to merge feudal and allodil land favourably if the Livonians 
proved accommodating over the statute of 1775." Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great, 
318. Madariaga bases her presentation of the Statthalterschaft on Friedrich Bienemann, Die 
Statthalterschaft in Liv- und Estland 1783-1796 (Leipzig, 1886).
40 For an interpretation of Catherine's Charters as a conscious attempt to organize society by 
defining and limiting social categories based on economic activity, see David Griffiths, "Catherine's 
Charters: A Question of Motivation," Canadian-American Slavic Studies 23 N o .l (Spring, 1989): 58-82.
41 For a description of the main points of the Charter, see R.E.Jones, The Emancipation of the 
Russian Nobility, Chapter VIII.
42 In actual fact, as Jones points out, "total avoidance of service, though legal, was discouraged.... 
service to the state was the source of all the nobility's rights and privileges." A noble who had not 
served could not vote or be an official on the assemblies of the nobility (p.280). At the same time, 
landless nobility could not even be enrolled in the assemblies (p.284).
43 "Pro ordine civico," Baltische Monatsschrift Band 9 (1864): 268.
169
ennoblement in reward for service to the state and the legal equality of nobility 
regardless of origin.44 Naturally, the Charter was exactly what the Landsassen 
wanted. Once again, the lobbyists were busy in St Petersburg. The impression 
of discord was underlined by increasing unrest in the provinces themselves. 
Despite initial hopes to the contrary, there was friction between local and 
government institutions, particularly in the towns, which led to disorder in 
administrative and judicial functions.45 Strife between the Ritter and the 
Landsassen continued especially since the latter made full use of their new rights. 
In the assembly called in September 1783 to elect and appoint the necessary 
officials, they were present in large numbers and made use of their vote in the 
election of the district representatives.46
Economic Pressure
Discord on the political level was intensified by problems in the agrarian 
sector. Years of serfdom, compounded by the effects of wars and imperial fiscal 
demands, had taken their toll on the economy. Possessing nothing, not even their 
own labour, the serfs followed a course of minimal activity, since fulfilling more 
than their norms would benefit only the landlords. Nor were they motivated to 
achieve much more than self-sufficiency on their own farms since surplus could 
be appropriated by the lord. In times of need, they could rely on the lord who 
was required to support them. A disinterested labour force did not benefit the 
economy. The attitude of minimal fulfilment was exacerbated by the absence of
44 The Charter's six categories of nobles did recognize the existence of social differentiation among 
the nobility.
45 Eckardt Die baltischen Provinzen. 229.
46 Ibid., 225.
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any agricultural plan on the part of the landowners. Their energies went into the 
supervision of their unwilling labour force rather than into the rational 
management of their estates. Landlords were unwillng to invest in better, labour- 
saving equipment, and there was a tremendous waste of labour due to outdated 
implements and the lack of any rational method.47 Such inefficency turned once 
fertile soil into useless fields. In the absence of any credit institute, many 
landowners were in debt and saw themselves forced to demand more labour from 
their serfs in an effort to increase their yields. The norms agreed to in 1765 were 
increasingly arbitrarily exceeded. By 1798, the labour norm had doubled that of 
1760.48
One relatively simple and speedy way to profit was the distilling of spirits, 
and concentration on it brought some economic relief. Distilling had always been 
a popular side enterprise on Baltic estates especially since the Ritter enjoyed a 
monopoly on the sale of spirits but it gained momentum at the end of the 
eighteenth century with new chemical and technological advances and with 
imperial permission, granted 1766, to sell to other countries. St Petersburg was 
an important market within easy reach. 1,080,000 "pails"49 of spirits were 
produced in Estland in 1777. "Most of it," reported A.W.Hupel, "is sold in St 
Petersburg and other Russian towns. Thirty years ago in none of the Estonian 
manors was such large-scale spirit-distilling practiced."50 Much was consumed 
by the dispirited peasants. By 1794 the price of a barrel of spirits was double the
47 A wooden harrow with one horse, for example, achieved much less than an iron one with two 
horses. For more details see Hueck, Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 106-107.
48 Ibid., 112.
49 A "pail" was equal to a Russian ved.ro which was equivalent to fifteen litres.
50 Cited in Yuhan Kahk, Peasant and Lord in the Process of Transition from Feudalism to 
Capitalism in the Baltic. (Tallinn, 1982), 31.
price of the grain needed to produce it.51 The land was exploited to the full to 
fulfil the demands of the estate distilleries and the value of estates was dependent 
on the price of spirits. In the 1820s this dependency, although less by then due 
to some agricultural diversification, would be an important factor in the economic 
plight of the nobles.
The Statthalterschaft did not improve the economic situaton in the Baltic 
provinces. In fact, although due to no deliberate imperial policy, matters were 
exacerbated.52 The younger generation, with more contact to St Petersburg, 
wanted more than the minimum their elders had been willing to put up with. 
Clothes, horses, carriages, etc cost money which was not there, or if it was, could 
be better spent. The tendency of the younger generation is evident in the "Clothes 
Regulation" which the Landtag passed in 1780 so that "money would stay in the 
country". Silk, for example, was allowed only if it was monochrome.53 Foreign 
laces, shoes, saddles, English horses and porcelain were among the articles 
completely forbidden.54 Another expense was the increase in education abroad. 
The Statthalterschaft had replaced honorary appointments with paid positions 
which encouraged the younger generation to secure positions as civil servants 
through education, usually abroad since Dorpat University was still closed. To 
meet additional expenses, landowners increased their labour demands from an
51 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 112.
52 Eckardt (in Die baltischen Provinzen, 230-231) is one of the few to claim that the economy of the 
Baltic provinces improved under the Statthalterschaft. He attributes this to good harvests and 
favourable trading conditions rather than to any particular imperial policy. It is important to note that 
Catherine did have definite economic policies. She broke with the traditions of mercantilism and 
passed several decrees encouraging free industry, especially that of 17 March 1775 which dispensed 
with the fees owed by industry to the state and declared the freedom to set up workshops or 
handicraft ventures without special permission.
53 Girls were not allowed to wear silk until they were twelve; boys were not allowed to wear silk 
underwear until they were fifteen.
54 Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen, 227.
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already overburdened and weakened peasantry in the hope of better yields from 
ever-deteriorating arable land. Serfs increased in value and were sold to less 
populated areas. Landowner debt increased and expanded, with many estates 
mortgaged. Bankruptcy and public auction of property were often the result. In 
Livland in the years 1765-1770 eight estates were sold. In the period 1796-1800 
the number was eighty-four.55
By the end of the century, paradoxically the larger and more populated an 
estate was the less it was worth.56 Along with the allodification of estates, 
Catherine had introduced a poll tax. Every male, with exemption for nobles, had 
to pay seventy kopeks a year.57 Taxation had previously been based on the work 
a peasant did on his lord's land.58 Now he was directly responsible to the state. 
The Ritter were allowed to raise it as they saw fit, which they did in order to pay 
other state demands. The peasants were burdened two-thirds more by the new 
tax.59 If a peasant could not pay, his master was responsible for his payment, 
which increased the burden of the landlord. In 1784, landowners were given 
permission to demand work in lieu of payment. Serfs increased the burden of 
poll tax without necessarily the yield of the estate, especially since poor farming 
methods had rendered much of the land unusable, bringing about the situation 
of too much dependent labour for too little land.
The poll tax created extra tensions in the agrarian situation. Both landlords
55 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 112.
56 Ibid., 114.
57 By 1797, it had increased to one rouble twenty-six kopeks.
58 The subject of taxation is dealt with in Chapter I, Part Three.
59 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung Livlands, 79.
and peasants were more burdened. The peasants thought the poll tax replaced 
their dues and there were several uprisings which had to be quelled by military 
force. Imperial concern was expressed by a delegation of Russian senators sent to 
examine the situation. Peasant discontent was another source of pressure on the 
Ritter. The French Revolution had not only put ideas of equality into practice, it 
had also shown the efficacy of insurgence.
The sector of society that was most affected by the deteriorating economic 
situation at the close of the eighteenth century was, apart from the serfs, the 
matriculated nobles since it was they who owned most of the estates. This was 
especially true in Estland where the exclusive right of the matriculated nobility 
to own estates had never been infringed upon.60 Since most of the Ritter in 
Estland owned only one estate, they tended to manage their lands themselves 
rather than lease them out.61 In Kurland the crown owned about one-third of 
all estates but most of the rest were in the hands of the Ritter. With the exception 
of some very large properties with thousands of serfs, most estates were of 
moderate size and managed by their owners.62 The situation was different in 
Livland where more sectors of society were involved in landownership.63 Estates 
there were generally much larger and more individuals owned several estates, 
which meant there was more leasing. About fifty estates belonged to non­
60 See p.58 above.
61 It was perhaps no coincidence that the few Ritter with several estates were often elected officials 
of the Ritterschaft. Landrat von Bellingshausen owned fifteen estates, Baron Ungern-Stemberg eight, 
Kammerherr Buxhoevden eight, Count Peter Mantteuffel ten; the Kreismarschall Baron Jakob Uexkiill 
fourteen. The situation in Livland was similar if more extreme. Landrat von Wulff owned twenty 
estates, the Landmarschall von Liphart nine, Staatsrat Mantyeuffell nine. These figures are for the first 
half of the nineteenth century. Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 129-130.
62 Ibid., 131-132.
63 The Ritter's exclusive right to landownership had been infringed upon at various times, for 
example by the Landsassen during Swedish times, confirmed by Governor Browne in 1774.
matriculated nobility, and about 106 to burghers. While there were only seven 
crown estates in Estland, there were over a hundred in Livland, half of which 
were leased to burghers. Thus, there were others with economic interests in 
Livland. In Estland and Kurland, where landowners formed more homogeneous 
groups, the reform process would go more smoothly. It would be in Livland that 
a wider range of voices would be heard.
Although the Statthalterschaft was immediately abolished by Catherine's 
successor in 1796, it was more than a historical episode. It was primarily a 
dynamic of change. This aspect is somewhat overshadowed by the 
Russian/German dichotomy in historical interpretation. It is less fruitful to 
ponder whether Sievers had made an ill-judged decision to apply a Baltic law to 
a backward Russia or whether it was really a case of applying a backward 
Russian law to an advanced country;64 whether it was the beginning of the 
Empire's attack on the province65 or a deliberate attempt to subdue the German 
provinces to a greater Russian whole, thereby sowing the seeds for a more sinister 
Russification later.66 The motive behind Catherine's policy was the rational 
organization of her Empire as vital to its security. Had the Baltic provinces 
proved efficient in local administration, it is fair to surmise that Catherine would 
not have seen the necessity to impose her new law there. The efficiency was 
disturbed by the economic factor of rural unrest and by the emergence of the
64 Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen, 205-214. R.Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 130.
65 Ibid.
66 "Catherine II, as is well known, viewed borderland privileges with particular suspicion and 
favored from the very beginning of her reign a basic 'Russification' of their administration and 
political institutions." Edward Thaden, Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914, 
(Princeton, 1981), 16. This perspective is not limited to Baltic historiography. David Griffiths claims, 
"Thus the empress set about eroding the special status preserved by several parts of the Empire ..." 
D.Griffiths, "Catherine II: The Republican Empress," Tahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas XXI (1973):
330.
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Landsassen as a political voice through the support of imperial decrees in their 
favour. These decrees, however, were designed for all the nobility in Catherine's 
Empire, again as a way to secure her Empire. The terms of the Statthalterschaft 
provided the non-matriculated nobles and the citizens of the towns with scope for 
development by allowing them to break into the economic and political 
monopolies of the Ritter. The provinces acquired public voices other than those 
of the Ritter. With knowledge of the Empire's support, the Landsassen and the 
Literaten became more vocal. It is not purely coincidental that the publicists 
described at the end of the last chapter expressed themselves openly during the 
Statthalterschaft. Even Garlieb Merkel wrote under its influence and supported it. 
In this respect, the Statthalterschaft opened up the way for agrarian reform. Voices 
of criticism were raised, either from humanitarian motives or from a wish to 
deprive the Ritter of power.
The Statthalterschaft had disturbed the traditional rule of the Ritter. When 
it was abolished and the old ways re-established, "numerous roots of former 
shortcomings had withered and could no longer thrive as fully as before."67 
Within the ranks of the Ritter themselves, there was support for agrarian reform 
which would satisfy the various political and economic pressures and at the same 
time retain the power of the Ritter. It is no coincidence that the reform process 
really started in 1795, under the Statthalterschaft, conceivably under Catherine's 
direct influence but certainly with imperial approval.
It is also worth noting that there were various sectors of society in both 
provinces who wanted the Statthalterschaft restored. Towards the end of 1802, for 
example, the guilds in Riga wanted its restoration and in February 1803, the
67 Garlieb Merkel, cited in J.Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen. 177.
matter was put to the vote. 658, mostly the smaller guilds, voted for the 
provincial constitution while a substantial 342 voted for the Statthalterschaft.68 
The Germans in the towns, excluded from political power by Ritter monopoly, 
would always tend to support Russian policy which would decrease the power 
of the Ritter.
PART TWO: PROVINCIAL RESPONSE: 1795-1796
Livland: 1795-1796
Against this background of political and economic pressures, the subject of 
reform was raised once more in the Landtag. The 1795 Landtag broke with recent 
precedent in that it was not the Governor General who introduced the subject of 
reform but one of its own members, "on his own initative or under the orders of 
Catherine."69 Friedrich Wilhelm von Sivers was elected district marshal in 1789 
after a distinguished military career fighting for Russia, particularly on the 
Turkish front, and three years later he was voted Land Marshal.70 Before the 
1795 Landtag met, its members had been preached to by the General 
Superintendent, Pastor Sonntag, supposedly on the invitation of Sivers.71 The 
concern of the clergy for the plight of the serfs had been evident in their pastoral
68 Tobien, Agrargesetzgebung, 186-189.
69 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 93-94. Another source is more definite about Russia's role, 
claiming that Sivers presented his reforms "in fulfilment of the Empress's secret orders." A.Richter, 
"Istoriya krest'yanskago sosloviya v  prisoedinennykh k Rossii pribaltiiskykh gubemiyakh," (Riga, 
1860), 19.
70 Under the Statthalterschaft this office was officially known as Gouvernementsmarschall but is often 
referred to as Adelsmarschall.
71 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 116.
activities over the past decades72 but Sonntag was the first to bring it directly to 
a political level.73 His sermon, which he himself described as "really not very 
complimentary,"74 did not attack the basic economic and political rights of the 
Ritter but did focus attention on the welfare of the peasantry. "As long as the 
human and civic existence of the peasants is not more secure, everything which 
should be morally effective remains nothing more than good will."75 As material 
for his sermon, Sonntag had apparently used the writings of a young house tutor, 
Garlieb Merkel, whom he had met in Riga through a group of Literaten76 
Merkel was the son of a pastor, mostly self-educated through the French books 
of his father's library.77 As noted in the previous chapter, he was one of those 
voices encouraged into the open by knowledge of Russian support. Merkel's 
loyalty to Russia would eventually bring him a Russian pension rather than the 
fate of radicals, like Radishchev, who criticized the government itself as the source 
of society's ills. Merkel's target was not imperial authority but rather local 
government: the political and economic monopoly of the Ritter at the expense of 
the peasants, whose cruel plight at the hands of ruthless landowners he vividly
72 This was dealt with in Chapter II.
73 Others had spoken out, but in less direct terms. A few years before Sonntag's Landtag sermon, 
Pastor Stender had tried to remind the Ritter in Kurland of their moral duties to their neglected 
peasantry in his introduction to the "Lettisches Lexikon, den Liebhabern der lettischen Litteratur 
gewidmet," published in 1789 at the expense of the Ritter. Irene Neander, "Die Aufklarung in den 
Ostseeprovinzen," in Baltische Kirchengeschichte, 133.
74 In his letter (9 January 1796) to Merkel reporting on his Landtag sermon, reproduced in Eckardt,
Die baltischen Provinzen. 186.
75 Cited in I.Neander, "Die Aufklarung in den Ostseeprovinzen," 133.
76 Merkel had sent Sonntag the manuscript of his book. It would be misleading, however, to see 
Sonntag merely as the mouthpiece of Merkel. Sonntag, not much older than Merkel, was an 
immigrant German pastor to whom the Ritter system of privilege was alien. He regretted the many 
ways in which the interests of the clergy were tied to those of the nobility [as expressed in a letter to 
Merkel, reproduced in Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen, 188.] and tried to free the church from such 
secular power. I.Neander, "Die Aufklarung in den Ostseeprovinzen," 148.
77 Julius Eckardt refers to Merkel as "this Baltic Voltaire." Die baltischen Provinzen, 169.
described in Die Letten. vorziiglich in Livland, am Ende des philosophischen 
Tahrhundert in 1797.78 Many of Merkel's contemporaries, especially those in 
possession of land, rejected his criticisms as exaggeration. Even a supposedly 
objective observer remarked,"... the work would have had more effect if it had not 
sinned by obvious exaggeration. This book is less a plaidoyer for the peasants 
than a factum against the nobility."79 It is true that Merkel's use of dramatic 
imagery detracts from serious consideration of his ideas. He compares most 
graphically, for example, the vain fight of the "free Lett" in the past to that of 
Laocoon against the serpents. The twin "hydras" of clericalism and nobility, 
however, with which the free Lett had to contend, were much worse than the 
monsters in the orginal myth.80 Whatever the weaknesses of Merkel's method, 
however, his book focused attention on the stark contrast between the ideas of the 
"philosophische Jahrhundert" and the reality of life in Livland, that huge dichotomy 
between fine words and practice, evidenced by the Landtag for the past few
78 Although the publication year postdates Sonntag's speech to the Landtag and the Landtag 
discussions, according to Merkel his work "appeared in Leipzig in the summer of 1796 under the 
publication year 1797." Garlieb Merkel, "Die Letten," in Thersites. Die Erinnerungen des deutsch- 
baltischen Tournalisten Garlieb Merkel 1796-1817 ed.Maximilian Miiller-Jabusch (Berlin, 1921); 16. It 
was this first edition which Merkel approved of. He criticized the second edition for the addition of 
"philosophical-political reasoning which could only harm the main purpose [of the work]." He blamed 
this on the pedantic effect the university had on him. Ibid., 15-16.
79 Bray, Essai Critique vol.3, 222-223. This attitude to Merkel is found in many of his 
contemporaries and in Baltic historiography. Tobien is particularly scathing in his assessment of 
Merkel, describing him at best as "an unscrupulous agitator, perhaps for a good cause, but never a 
historian." Tobien, Die livlandische Ritterschaft in ihrem Verhaltnis zum Zarismus und russischen 
Nationalismus (Riga, 1925), 33-36. Also Die Agrargesetzgebung, 167-168. There are many who would  
still agree that Merkel was more a polemicist than a historian. See remarks in H.Neuschaffer, 
"Unterschlagene Machtpolitik," in Russen und Rutland, 421-422.
80 The image is worth quoting in the original for the flavour of Merkel's dramatic "exaggeration." 
"Wie einen zweiten Laokoon stellt uns die altere Geschichte Lieflands dem freien Lettischen Mann dar, 
im Kampfe mit schrecklicheren Hydem, als selbst die Fabel gebar, dem gahamischten Pfaffenthum 
und dem legalen ritterlichen Raubersinn. Er ringt, er ringt, mit immer beklemmterer Brust, immer 
krampfhafterer Verzuckung und ersterbenderm Auge, mit immer verzweiflungsvollerer Anstrengung. 
Umsonst! Die Ungeheuer schniiren seinen Busen zusammen; er erliegt; und wer erkennt in dem  
Scheusal, das ihre giftigen Bisse zerfleischen, noch das edelste Geprage der Natur, den Ausdruck des 
mannhaften Freiheitsinnes und kunstloser Biederkeit!" Garlieb Merkel, Die Letten vorziiglich in 
Liefland am Ende des philosophischen Tahrhunderts (Leipzig, 1800), 119.
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decades. In the preface to his Historischer Versuch fiber die Aufhebung der 
Leibeigenschaft in den Ostseeprovinzen, written for Count Speransky81 and 
published in 1838, Samson von Himmelstiem,82 accorded Merkel a prominent 
place in the reform process in Livland. "The time of accusations and feuds is 
past... One has no need to fear censure, as far as I know, when one openly 
acknowledges the great contribution Dr. Merkel made to the happy 
transformation of matters relating to the peasants. He spoke passionately but 
truly. The passion was enthusiasm for what is good and is therefore not only 
forgivable but fully justifiable. ... Had Dr. Merkel not spoken with the passion 
which fired his speech just as much as it warmed his heart, he would have 
suffered the same fate as his predecessors. Like them, he would not have been 
heard or seen. Some of the younger generation owe their noble, beneficial plans 
for the future to his openness in 1796 when Die Letten appeared."83
Merkel advised the Ritter to initiate the necessary emancipation reforms 
before they were forced to.84 "The nation is no longer a slavish dog ... it is a 
tiger, gnashing its teeth in quiet rage, waiting longingly for the moment when it 
can break its chains and wash off its humiliation with blood."85 His reform plan, 
which he admitted contained nothing very new,86 would, he claimed, protect the 
right of the Ritter to their estates.87 The most important step would be to replace
81 See Jegor von Sivers, Zur Geschichte der Bauemfreiheit in Livland (Riga, 1878), Intro. XII.
82 A prominent Ritter reformer of the 1819-1846 period, to be dealt with in the next chapter.
83 Samson, Historischer Versuch, Preface.
84 Merkel, Die Letten, 264.
85 Ibid., 246.
86 Ibid., 343.
87 "The welfare of the Letts must be established in such a way that the nobility does not forfeit its 
pre-eminent use of its estates." Ibid., 331.
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the jurisdiction of the landowners over their peasants by peasant courts (which 
he points out were in place during the Statthalterschaft) to deal with both peasant 
disputes and complaints against their masters. Further, labour norms should be 
regulated88 and the expulsion and sale of peasants should be forbidden. The 
peasants should be prepared for freedom, which would be granted after a period 
of five years to all families who could pay 30-40 taler and who had no criminal 
record. The farms would be held by the peasants in hereditary tenure. Merkel's 
ideas were based on known Russian policy. Apart from the new idea of freedom, 
the same ideas had been expressed by Governor Browne at the 1765 Landtag and 
by Eisen as a representative of Catherine's ideas.89
Merkel's work would create "a sensation beyond (Merkel's) most eager 
hopes"90 but Sonntag's sermon caused no great controversy. In fact, the Landtag 
members were apparently impressed enough to order it published.91 Sonntag 
reported the attitude in the Landtag as positive. There was "a certain willingness 
among our noblity to take at last the welfare of the peasants to heart." Proposals, 
he said, which three years previously had been considered treasonable were now 
acceptable.92
There had been several such proposals, made publicly. Merkel and 
Sonntag were not the first to tackle the question of serfdom openly. All through 
the period of the Statthalterschaft, there had been public discussion of the agrarian 
question. The publicists Jannau and Hupei, discussed in Chapter D, took
88 Merkel underestimated this task, daiming it would take "maximum two winters." Ibid., 337.
89 Discussed in previous chapter.
90 Merkel, Die Letten, Supplement page 38.
91 And award him a golden bowl.
92 Sonntag's letter to Merkel in Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen. 187.
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advantage of the more open climate to publish articles on the subject. In 1788, 
Hupei published an article by Wilhelm Christian Friebe,93 at that time an 
immigrant German house tutor but soon (1801) to be Secretary of the Society for 
the Public and Economic Welfare of Livland,94 a position he would hold from 
1801 to 1810. Friebe argued that serfdom was an anachronism and that free 
peasants were more productive than serfs but was convinced that since the 
peasants had been deliberately kept in servile ignorance, they would have to be 
prepared for freedom. The peasant "does not think any more sensibly than the 
horse he mechanically guides; he certainly deserves all the sympathy of mankind. 
... Perhaps he should be given his freedom? By no means: this would be like the 
plague for him ... But to make him more active, more industrious, to teach him 
to protect himself from hunger: this would be a good deed of infinitely greater 
value than the noisy word freedom ..."95 Friebe's opinions on this point were in 
keeping with the times. A Scottish minister visiting Russia observed in 1784, 'To 
give liberty at once to twenty millions of slaves would be to let loose on mankind 
so many robbers and spoilers. Before slaves can receive freedom in full 
possess ion, they must be taught to know, relish and use its blessings."96
The problem, of course, was how to prepare for freedom without altering 
the system of rights and obligations, without disturbing the system of Ritter 
privilege. The Ritter, in general, however, were not prepared to contemplate any 
basic changes. They reiterated the terms of 1765 as solutions to the problems:
93 "Etwas iiber Leibeigenschaft und Freiheit, sonderlich in Hinsicht auf L ivland/ in Nordische 
Miscellaneen XV - XVII, ed. A.Hupel (1788), 744-768. For more on Friebe, see N.Wihksninsch, Die 
Aufklarung. 291-300.
94 See page 184 below.
95 Cited in Ibid., 293.
96 Cited in David Griffiths, "Catherine II: The Republican Empress," 329.
regulation of labour norms, the right of complaint against the lord and the right 
to own moveable property.97 The even more conservative view was aired in 
Hupei's Nordische Miscellaneen in 1782. A Livland noble, who wished to remain 
anonymous,98 argued that the peasant could never be practicably free of corvee, 
which was bound to the land, and which guaranteed him a certain amount of 
work. The labour norms must be properly regulated and obeyed for the welfare 
of the country. Foremost in the mind of the anonymous landowner was the 
guarantee of his labour force. For him, freedom for the serfs meant freedom for 
them to leave.99 Although there was certainly more open discussion of serfdom 
during the Statthalterschaft, preservation of the labour force kept most landowners 
conservative. At the same time that more liberal voices were being heard, the 
Landtag, for example, in 1791 forbade the marriage between serfs from different 
areas (although there had been an imperial decree in 1716 forbidding landowners 
to hinder the marriage of a female serf to a male from another area100).
By the time of the 1795 Landtag, most opinions on the subject had been 
aired. Conservative factions had perhaps gained in confidence and influence due 
to the experience of the French Revolution. Austria did provide an example of 
imperial decree overriding landowner interests but also proved what landlord 
opposition could do. Joseph II of Austria's attempt to introduce emancipation by
97 As expressed, for example, in the 1787 article, "Wiederum ein Wort zu seiner Zeit oder Versuch 
einer Beantwortung der unserem Vaterlande der so wichtigen Frage: wie wohl der Landplage des 
jahrlichen Bauemvorschusses am sichersten abzuhelfen ware.” See Wihksninsch, Die Aufklarung, 294- 
295.
98 Which may indicate the presence of more liberal elements, or at least that his views were very 
conservative.
99 Ibid., 295-296.
100 See Chapter I, p.81.
fiat had failed in the face of noble opposition.101
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Practical Reforms
An important new element, however, in the agrarian reform process is 
illustrated by Friebe. Friebe had stressed teaching the peasants how to farm better 
and this reflected agrarian thinking of the time. The establishment of the first 
veterinary schools — in France in 1762, Denmark 1773 and England 1791 — 
evidenced the new emphasis on livestock. New breeds were introduced, 
especially the Merino sheep originally introduced into Spain by the Moors.102 
Diversification, particularly with new crops like potatoes, was found to be 
productive. Friebe recommended the planting of potatoes and clover in 1789. 
The four-course field system, in use in most of Britain by 1800, was gradually 
being adopted in Europe. The enclosure it required replaced the thousand year 
old open-field system.103 New agricultural machines, like Jethro Tull's horse- 
draw n hoe and seed drill, increased efficiency. Changes had come as far as 
Russia at the turn of the century. An English mechanic in Moscow sold threshing 
machines, while another Englishman planted and sold new seeds of all sorts, 
including potatoes, beans and lentils. The planting of clover was especially strong
101 Joseph had worked out a measure of compensation for the landowners, but to no avail.
102 This was a much admired breed and despite a ban on its exportation, several countries were 
breeding Merino sheep by the end of the century.
103 The Norfolk, or four-course field, system eliminated the fallow field and emphasized fodder 
crops, which were used to feed livestock in winter, thus ensuring not only proper feed but also good 
and plentiful manure to fertilize the fields for future cereal crops. It also involved enclosure to protect 
the individual farmer's crop from general grazing.
in the Moscow area.104 Landowners began to take note of the possibility of 
higher productivity without losing any of their economic power over their serfs.
Friebe, a German immigrant, based his ideas for agricultural improvement 
mainly on the works of the German agronomist Albrecht Thaer (1752-1828), a 
pioneer of rational, scientific farming methods. He was also an advocate of 
peasant proprietorship.105 Friebe's works, and others, were distributed by the 
Livlandische gemeinnutzige und okonomische Societat (the Society for the Public 
and Economic Welfare of Livland). The Society had been founded in 1792106 
through the endowment of a Riga merchant, Peter Heinrich Blanckenhagen. 
Although not founded by Ritter initiative, its benefactor stipulated that it should 
be composed of members of the nobility, interpreted to mean matriculated 
Ritter.107 The Society was typical of its time. In fact, it was one of the last in a 
series of such societies in Europe, which testify to the scientific interest in and 
contribution to agricultural improvement. The first had been founded in Scotland 
in 1723 (Society of Improvers in the Knowledge of Agriculture), followed by the 
London Royal Society of Agriculture in 1753. Russia was not far behind with the
104 For a description of new advances in agricultural methods in Russia at the turn of the century 
see Chapter XVII in Heinrich Storch, RuCland unter Alexander dem Ersten vol.I (St.Petersburg and 
Leipzig, 1804), 363-380.
105 Friebe's work Grundsatze zur Verbesserung der Landwirthschaft in Livland, 2 vols. 1802,1803, 
for example, was based on Thaer's Einleitung zur Kenntnis der englischen Landwirthschaft 1801. 
Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 126-127.
106 The Society was formally founded on 18 October 1792 and ratified by the Ritter on 25 November 
1792. Imperial permission, stipulated by Blanckenhagen, was granted in 1794 although Catherine 
noted that such permission was not necessary. Hans Dieter von Engelhardt and Hubertus 
Neuschaffer, Die livlandische gemeinnutzige und okonomische Sozietat (1792-19391 (Koln, 1983), 20-21. 
The Society had its first meeting on 10 January 1796, which is often given as the date of its founding.
107 Blanckenhagen cannot be considered a typical merchant but, since he owned an estate, rather 
one of the Landsassen with aspirations to matriculation. After receiving ennoblement from Vienna, his 
family was received into the ranks of the Ritter in 1795, after his death, probably in gratitude for the 
endowment of the Society. Ibid., 20.
founding in St Petersburg of Die Freie Okonomische Gesellschaft in 1767,108 which 
also had Baltic representatives.109 The Russian society, in fact, provided the 
example for the new Livland society. Friebe had been a member of the Russian 
society for several years and had received fifteen prizes for works submitted to 
it. August Hupei was also a member of the Russian society before becoming an 
honorary member of the Livland society. The Society was committed to the 
physiocratic principle of the improvement of agriculture as the basis of a nation's 
wealth and since agriculture was dependent on the peasants, they were naturally 
a focal point of the Society's attention. As the first Secretary of the Society noted 
at the 1795 Landtag, "We must improve the situation of our peasants. Self-interest 
should motivate us if humanity has not already made it our duty."110
While the Society professed its commitment to practical agriculture,111 
there was a definite dichotomy between theory and practice. A rather naive 
optimism could not move the more traditional landowner. In its early years, the 
Society was perceived to lack ’’persistence in recognized truths, capital to establish 
anything real, knowledge of how to start or see anything through, time and 
energy of the oppressed populace and many other basic conditions."112 Practical
108 A list of the major societies founded in the eighteenth century is available in Ibid., 13. Michael 
Confino used the publications of the Russian Free Economic Society to examine agrarian relations in 
Russia between 1765 and 1820 in his well-known study, Domaines et Seigneurs en Russie vers la Fin 
du XVIIIe Siecle. Etude de Structures Agraires et de Mentalites Economiques, (Paris, 1963).
109 Engelhardt, Neuschaffer, Die livlandische gemeinnutzige und okonomische Sozietat, 24.
110 Cited in Ibid., 29.
111 At the 1795 Landtag Parrot, the first Secretary already quoted, gave a very detailed list of areas 
deserving of improvement. It included: orchards, spirits, forestry, potatoes, seeds, cellars, animal feed, 
implements, ploughs, cultivation methods, gardens, cattle breeding fertilizer, fire prevention, flax, silk. 
Ibid., 29.
112 This was the criticism of Parrot's brother-in-law, Johann Wilhelm Krause, who was a practical 
landowner and later the first professor of agriculture at Dorpat University. Ibid., 32.
ideas were indeed slow to be realized.113 A few attempts at innovation ended 
in failure. In 1798, the idea of the four course system was rejected. Attempts at 
sheep breeding failed as did the introduction of the threshing machine. A project 
which imported Angora goats from Bologna was unsuccessful as were isolated 
attempts to breed Merino sheep.114 In 1802, the St Petersburg Society described 
the problem of introducing even animal feed crops in Kurland: "... but these are 
still only wishes, which perhaps must wait till the next generation to be put into 
practice. Our contemporaries do not seem to be receptive to these improvements 
... preferring to farm as their fathers did."115
Farming methods in the Baltic area remained antiquated well into the 
nineteenth century.116 Livestock, for example, were left to fend for themselves 
and in winter were fed poor quality hay, owing to the inefficient methods of hay­
making.117 As a result, animals were underfed and weak and the underfertilized 
fields yielded little sustenance for them or for further crops. Farming implements 
were the same as had been in use for centuries. Despite changes in population 
and demand, the agricultural yield remained as low as it had been over a
113 According to Friebe, potatoes had already been harvested in 1787 but by 1841 they had not been 
introduced on all farms and were limited to gardens rather than to crops. Hueck, Darstellung der 
landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 124. Landowner interests often lay in more pleasurable rural 
pursuits like hunting. The last decade of the eighteenth century saw the development of large gardens 
and extensive parks rather than new farming methods. Ibid.,126. Bray describes his visits to some of 
these gardens which were like a "vast and beautiful English park." Bray, Essai Critique vol 3, 151.
114 For failed projects, see Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 125.
115 E.von Rechenberg-Linten, Zustande Kurlands, 85.
116 For a detailed description of methods and implements, see Hueck, Darstellung der 
landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse. 71-95.
117 Poorer farmers were sometimes forced to feed the animals the straw from the roofs. Ibid., 90.
hundred years earlier.118 Still, the Society did strive to keep landowners 
informed of new farming knowledge through the distribution of free leaflets and 
although the response was lukewarm,119 the Society was a consistent reminder 
of the need for agricultural improvement. It is even conceivable that Sonntag was 
more influenced in his sermon by the Society members with whom he was on 
close terms120 than by the writings of Merkel. It would, however, take two 
decades for Baltic landowners to realize that practical reforms failed because the 
labour force was unfree.121
Sivers' Proposals
Siver^' proposals to the 1795 Landtag contained nothing new. The 
background to his proposals may have been less the increasing discussion of 
serfdom than the conflict of functions between local and imperial authorities. 
Peasants had been given the right to complain against extreme labour demands 
or extreme landlord discipline but it was not clear exactly where they should 
direct their complaints, which had to be delivered in person. In 1786, the Landtag 
had decided that peasant complaints should be dealt with by the Adelsmarschall 
and two Kreismarsctialle, This decision was probably based on the fact that the 
terms of the Statthalterschaft had turned the Ordnungsgericht, where peasant
118 For comparative estimates, see Ibid., 82. Elsewhere, agricultural yields were increasing. From 
1788 to 1808 in Denmark, for example, yields and exports of grain approximately doubled. Between 
1770 and 1800, the number of cattle rose by a third due to the cultivation of clover and grass through 
crop rotation. H.Arnold Barton, Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 1760-1815, 368-369. It should 
be noted that the peasants in Denmark were emancipated in 1788, which would have affected 
productivity.
119 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 127.
120 Especially since Friedrich von Sivers himself was one such member. Engelhardt and 
Neuschaffer, Die Livlandische Gemeinnutzige und Okonomische Societat, 33.
121 See, for example, Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 123, 125.
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complaints had hitherto been directed, into the Niederlandgericht with peasant 
representation. The effect was that complaints were heard by both Ritter and 
government authorities. The subject was put on the 1795 Landtag agenda for 
clarification.122 The question of labour norms was closely tied to that of peasant 
complaints since without regulated norms a peasant had no standard against 
which to measure excessive labour demands nor could his complaints be assessed. 
The matter had been complicated by landlords demanding extra work to cover the 
non-payment of the poll tax. Sivers asked that labour norms be regulated where 
they had not been so, so that "the most unjust treatment would not be protected 
by an overstrict righteousness."123 This was a task given the landowners in 1765 
and of which they were once more reminded in 1777.
The new mood on the Landtag, described by Sonntag, did not bear 
practical fruit. The Landtag's reaction to Sivers' proposal was more 
procrastination than action. "... since this subject requires extensive debate, it shall 
be left to the Adelskonvent to determine the principles of the most exact regulation 
of the peasants' obedience and dues. These regulations will then be 
communicated to landowners through the district convents and their opinions in 
turn remitted to the Adelskonvent, so that the latter can prepare its proposal for the 
next Landtag."124 The Adelskonvent was instructed to consider as valid the 
surveys of peasant land done according to the Swedish method but in the 
measuring of new land, the crown peasants should be used as a reference point
122 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 115-116.
123 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 93-94.
124 Cited in Ibid., 94. Tobien rather misleadingly infers that the 1795 Landtag, by giving the matter 
over to the Adelskonvent, at least did not stall until the next Landtag, which would have been 1798. 
An extraordinary Landtag, however, was ordered by Catherine in 1796 to discuss another matter. 
Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 117.
in view of the higher dues demanded. This would necessitate more land being 
allocated or other just compensation.125 This point would cause some 
controversy later.
The discussion of agrarian reform now gained some impetus due to a series 
of extraordinary Landtag sessions. The matter was discussed one year later, 
instead of three, due to Catherine calling a special session in September 1796 to 
discuss the supplying of military troops.126 Twenty-three points were laid before 
the Landtag, none of them differing much from 1765. A final decision was 
postponed on the grounds that the Adelskonvent had not had enough preparation 
time and that not enough landowners were present. The Adelskonvent received 
further instructions for the final draft.127
Shortly afterwards, on 17 November 1796 Catherine died. Ten days later, 
her successor Paul cancelled the Statthalterschaft system.128 An extraordinary 
session of the Landtag met in January 1797. The 1796 points (now twenty-seven) 
were finalized and submitted to the tsar. Although 1796 is often seen as the 
turning point in agrarian reform in the Baltic, there was in fact little change from 
1765. Merkel, whose book the Governor ordered removed from public circulation, 
noted bitterly that the new regulations were nothing more than the usual 
hypocritical measures,129 claiming that they even cancelled out any
125 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 94.
126 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 117.
127 In his version of events, Samson implies that the 1796 Landtag merely asked the district 
representatives to reconsider a few minor points. Historischer Versuch, 94.
128 But expanded the tax system. He reinstated the burdensome recruitment, which Catherine had 
abolished in 1783, "to give back to them what was wrongfully taken away, the right to protect their 
country." Tobien, Die Agrargesetgebung, 83. A request to Paul to cancel recruitment was apparently 
refused on the grounds that it was a condition of the removal of Statthalterschaft. Ibid.
129 In his answer to Ritter von Brasch's criticism of Die Letten. published 1798 and included as a 
supplement in the 1800 edition of Die Letten already cited.
improvements gained in the last two centuries.130 Labour dues were to be 
regulated where they had not been and a new date for submission of the 
Wackenbucher was set for August of that year, some thirty years after the first 
ultimatum.131 The procedure for peasant complaints was as limited as in 
1765132 and the punishment for unjustified complaints the same.133 As in 1765, 
the task had to be fulfilled before the peasant could complain about it "because 
the lord, if he had overstepped the law, always had the means to compensate the 
peasant; the peasant, on the other hand, is seldom in the situation, when he had 
complained unjustifiably, to compensate for the damages incurred by his 
disobedience."134 The end of the Statthalterschaft had removed the duplication 
of court authorities and the appropriate judicial procedure for peasant complaints 
was once more firmly in the hands of the local authorities, with the Adelskonvent 
the court of highest instance.135 The peasant was to remain the property of his 
master, who would still have the right to sell him, but only to other nobles in 
Livland.136 Recalcitrant and runaway serfs could be sold to anyone with the
130 Ibid., 110.
131 Points 5,7,8. The text of the 1797 Landtag proposals is given in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 
Appendix B, 157-166.
132 The peasant had to complain in person and orally with no legal representation (Point 19). A 
maximum of four peasants (previously it had been one) could complain at the one time but only if 
the complaint involved the whole area; otherwise there could only be one complainant (Point 24). See 
Chapter I, p.83 for the 1765 terms.
133 Ten pairs of the rod in the first instance, twenty in the second (ten was the maximum allowed 
for normal punishment) and one year forced labour in the third. It was expressly stated that such 
punishment was to effect the peasant's own improvement and to serve as a warning to others (Point 
25). If the peasant complaint was justifed, the landowner was obliged to compensate him twice the 
value of what he had unjustifiably asked. Fines were imposed for further instances (Point 26).
134 Point 23.
135 Points 19-22.
136 Point 1.
right to own serfs.137 Discipline was to remain firmly in the hands of the lord. 
Minor misdemeanours were to be punishable by whip; more serious cases were 
to be subjected to the rod, as before, with the maximum punishment set at ten 
pairs of three strokes. This was also valid for the "children's rod."138 The 
peasant could be expelled from his farm, with compensation, if the lord proved 
it justifiable to incorporate the Bauerland into the Hofsland.139 As in 1765, the 
peasant was to be allowed to own what he had acquired or received but the lord 
would have first option on anything the peasant wished to sell or otherwise 
dispose of.140 How much the landlowner was allowed to demand in the event 
of non-payment of poll tax was determined and all other extraordinary duties 
were to be regulated.141 A glimmer of peasant rights was seen in the proposals 
to set up peasant courts for the settlement of peasant disputes and the compilation 
of a law book for these courts.142
This reform proposal, little more than a reiteration of the 1765 terms, was 
presented to Paul, who in turn gave it to a commission of Senators for 
consideration. The draft was returned to the Ritter for reconsideration of several
137 Point 2. Six peasant farmers were required to confirm the peasant's culpability.
138 Point 17.
139 Point 16.
140 Point 3. This was exactly the same as 1765. Tobien assesses the 1797 proposals as giving the 
peasants more property rights (Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 120) but, in fact, the terms were the 
same.
141 How much the landlord could demand of the peasant in distilling, spinning, threshing, 
transporting etc. was defined as well as public duties, like the building and upkeep of roads, and 
public fees, for such as pastors and teachers. Points 6 and 11.
142 The landowner, of course, retained full authority over the courts. Points 15 and 27.
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points.143 The following 1798 Landtag was characterized by divisions which 
would become typical of the whole reform process. It was such lack of unity 
which often left the way open or necessary for imperial intervention.
Out of the divisive atmosphere, a new role was implicitly assigned to 
imperial power. The tsar came to be regarded as someone to appeal to to settle 
a dispute. The delegates from the Estonian part of Livland objected to the 1798 
proposals as inapplicable to their situation. They also argued that there had not 
been enough of them present at the discussions. In the end they protested to the 
tsar against the decision of their fellow Ritter. Sivers had first threatened to use 
the strategy of summoning imperial power to settle disagreements in the internal 
affairs of the province144 and would use it often against the advice or without 
the knowledge of the Landtag. After much debate, the 1798 Landtag appointed 
a committee of eight to consider the final amendments.145
Imperial intervention, however, was not dependent on Ritter invitation. 
Peasant appeals also had some effect. In 1776, for example, the peasants of 
Wolmar submitted a complaint against the excessive demands of their landowner 
von Lowenstem to the future tsar Paul while he was travelling through the Baltic 
area. The complaint was found justified and Lowenstem forced to compensate 
his peasants (who were also punished for appealing directly to the tsar).146 Any 
threat to the security of the Empire warranted imperial intervention and peasant 
unrest brought swift attention. Even Paul, seldom motivated by the liberal
143 Tobien daims that the main objection was to limiting the sale of serfs to within Livland. Russia 
would lose potential labour from such a measure. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 122.
144 To prevent major Landtag revisions of the 1798 draft, Sivers threatened to protest to the tsar.
145 43 were in favour, 26 against. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung. 123. Samson suggests that the 
proposals were not ratified due to the objection of the Estland deputies. Historischer Versuch, 95.
146 G.Sacke, "Livlandische Politik Katharinas II," 33.
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principles of his mother Catherine, felt compelled to intervene in the affairs 
of the Baltic when the increase in the number of peasant complaints against 
landlords reached his attention. Paul ordered Governor General Nagel to 
communicate to the Ritter, in a rather complicated manner to ensure secrecy,147 
that any demands made of the peasants over and above the Wackenbuch 
regulations were strictly forbidden and punishable by confiscation of their 
properties. Sivers assumed that he, as Landrat, was responsible for the 
punishment of violations of Wackenbuch regulations and fined two landowners for 
such breaches. The landlords appealed to the tsar, again an instance of Baltic 
factions using imperial power to solve their disputes, and Sivers was suspended 
until it was decided who was legally entitled to punish landlords for 
infringements against the Wackenbuch regulations. The Landratskollegium was able 
to prove that it lay within the competence of the Landrat to do so.148 Despite 
the fact that Sivers, mainly due to his tactics, was losing popularity among the 
Ritter, it was more politic to ensure that enforcement rights lay formally within 
their own ranks than to yield them to imperial or state power because of internal 
differences.
The tsar communicated to the Ritter his expectation of "firm principles" to 
regulate the economic situation. The 1798 proposals were submitted to fulfil this 
imperial command but were not ratifed due to Paul's death in March 1801.
Estland: 1795
Events on the Landtag in Estland went more smoothly but the end result
147 See Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 130.
148 Ibid., 129
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was much the same. At approximately the same time as the Livland Landtag,149 
the Landtag in Estland began discussing the regulation of relations between 
peasant and landowner. Although the discussion was supposedly prompted by 
imperial concern over the peasants in Estland, there had been a few individual 
attempts to introduce agrarian reform which would influence the Landtag. In 
1789 Baron Berent Johann Uexkiill had introduced a detailed reform on his estate 
which regulated peasant obligations, recognized the right of the peasant to own 
moveable property, granted him a limited right of hereditary tenure and 
attempted to regulate relations between the peasant and lord in all spheres. This 
reform was introduced in 1791 by one other landowner, Baron Otto Friedrich 
Stackelberg. Due to information supplied by another Otto Stackelberg in St 
Petersburg,150 Catherine was moved to complain that "the peasant in Estland 
with all his goods is the unlimited property of his lord, who can sell him or 
exchange him for a horse or force him to settle on barren land."151 To correct 
this "false" impression, the 1795 Landtag submitted for legal recognition a list of 
measures the Ritterhauptmann Salza claimed were already in practice. Once more, 
imperial interest had motivated reform.
As in Livland, however, the proposals did not differ greatly from 1765 and 
should indeed have already been in force. The influence of Uexkull's reform is 
obvious. The Wackenbuch regulations were to be held to; extraordinary dues were 
to be regulated as well as the normal ones; the peasant was to possess all 
moveable property and could dispose of it as he wished, free from the lord's
149 Both sessions took place in December 1795.
150 Count Otto Magnus Stackelberg, former ambassador in Warsaw and Stockholm.
151 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 112. Also cited in Axel von Gemet, Geschichte und System des 
bauerlichen Agrarrechts in Estland, (Reval, 1901), 99.
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appropriation unless he was in his master's debt; moderation was called for in 
corporal punishment; the lord still had the right to sell serfs but only if they were 
recalcitrant; gifts of serfs could only be between relatives or ,rblood friends". 
Since there was often too little land for all peasants, serfs could be sold but only 
in families, and only to another farm and only in Estland.152 The basic rights of 
the lord over the peasant were not affected. Indeed, the Landtag reaffirmed the 
provincial law which recognized the peasant and all he owned as the property of 
his lord but promised not to make literal use of it as long as this promise was not 
published, a move which might incite the peasants to make demands.153 As 
disagreement characterized the Livland Landtag, the concern for secrecy was to 
characterize the Estland Landtag.
Catherine apparently reacted favourably to the proposals154 but did not 
respond officially. Early the next year, the Ritter, in Committee, continued with 
their deliberations but decided that until everything was finalized, their 
discussions should remain secret. "A certain unrestrained spirit of misunderstood 
freedom and insubordination, which has now spread over part of Europe and 
caused terrible catastrophes; the experience that through a misunderstood law a 
few years ago in the Riga Gouvemement dangerous unrest nearly broke out [poll 
tax 1783]; the fermentation in the feelings of the peasants here during the last 
Swedish war (1788-1790) — all this leads us to decide on secrecy."155 It was 
decided that in order to regulate peasant labour, landowners should submit by 
May 1796 specified information concerning the present obligations of their
152 The measures are listed in Ibid., 100-101.
153 Samson, Historischer Versuch. 113. Gemet does not report this decision.
154 Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 101.
155 Ibid.
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peasants, the size of their farms, and other relevant statistics. Six years later, 
when the Landtag was once more forced to take up reform, the data had not all 
been submitted.156
As in Livland, the reform process halted when imperial pressure relaxed 
or had been temporarily appeased by Landtag promises. In Estland, however, 
there was a continuing reform impulse in the private sector. Ludwig von Toll 
abolished serfdom on his estate, forbidding the sale of peasants or the 
appropriation of land farmed by the peasants. Although nominally free, however, 
the peasant was not allowed to leave the district. He had security of hereditary 
tenure and his rights, including that of complaint against his master, were 
protected by peasant courts.157 In 1801, Peter von Lowis introduced a similar 
reform. Peasants who worked hard could acquire freedom after a certain number 
of years. He also proposed that those bom  after January 1801 should be free.158 
On the official level, however, reform had come to a halt after the 1796 Landtag.
PART THREE: ALEXANDER I AND REFORM
When Alexander I, Paul's successor, came to the Russian throne in 1801, the 
reform process, despite the 1795 discussions, in both Livland and Estland had 
halted more or less at the 1765 level. In the absence of imperial pressure, the 
majority of the Ritter did not feel compelled to change the status quo. The first
156 Ibid., 101-102.
157 There is some disagreement about the exact date of this reform but it would seem to be between 
1796 and 1802. Ibid., 102-103.
158 Ibid., 103.
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two decades of Alexander's reign, however, would see definite changes in 
agrarian relations in the Baltic. The dynamics of these reforms are a complex 
interdependence of cause and effect factors in Russia, Livland and Estland.
The new tsar's enthusiasm for reform was obviously a major catalyst in the 
chain of events. Alexander I, had been raised by his grandmother Catherine the 
Great, in the spirit of enlightenment. Under his Swiss tutor Frederic-Cesar La 
Harpe, he had studied among others Condillac,159 Rousseau, Filangieri,160 
James Steuart and Adam Smith.161 Alexander, perhaps due to an education 
lacking in the practicalities of statecraft, however, was overwhelmed by the 
seemingly insurmountable task of transferring abstract ideas and ideals into the 
reality of reform.162 At the beginning of his reign, he did try to tackle the 
problem, choosing to work with a small circle of advisers, all with experience 
abroad, known collectively as the Secret Committee.163 According to Alexander
159 Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780) was the leading advocate in France of the ideas of John 
Locke.
160 Gaelano Filangieri (1752-1788), wrote La scienza della legislazione in 1786, an influential work 
on legislation advocating unlimited free trade and the abolition of the medieval institutions that 
impeded production and national well-being.
161 On his departure from Russia in April 1795, La Harpe left Alexander a detailed reading list, 
which is given in Jean Charles Biaudet and Framjoise Nicod eds., Correspondance de Frederic-Cesar 
de La Harpe et Alexandre Ier 1785-1824. 3 vols. (Neuchatel, 1978), Vol.l, No.43, 111-139. This work 
w ill be referred to throughout as Correspond ance.
162 Alexander even considered abdicating. Correspond ance, Vol.l, letters 41,48,49,59. His later 
involvement in the European arena would be a type of escape from these difficulties, offering him the 
chance to act decisively and effectively.
163 Neglasny Komitet. Alexander also called it "Comite de salut public". It is also referred to as 
the Unofficial Committee or the Private Committee. It was composed of Alexander and four friends 
he had relied on since 1797, since La Harpe7s departure: Count Paul Stroganov, educated in France, 
student of the French Jacobin Romme and a favourite of Catherine II; Count Victor Kochubey, 
educated in Geneva and a diplomat in London under Paul, appointed ambassador to Constantinople 
in 1792, Minister of Interior 1802-1807; Prince Adam Czartoryski, a prominent Polish aristocrat devoted 
to the restoration of Poland who had travelled extensively in Germany, France, Switzerland, England 
and Scotland and was appointed Alexander's Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1804; and Nikolai 
Novosiltsev, who had spent four years in England and admired the English constitution. In a letter 
proposing constitutional reform for Russia written to La Harpe in October 1797, Alexander names 
himself, Novosiltsev, Stroganov and Czartoryski as the group dedicated to enlightenment and reform. 
f Correspond ance, vol I, letter 59, p.216.]
himself, the Committee was the centre of power. "It is a council ... which rules 
everything; there is not a paper which has not been worked by them, not a man 
who has not been placed by them."164
One of the main topics165 of the Secret Committee was emancipation of 
the serfs. The Committee members were in agreement about the need for reform 
but were divided on exactly what kind of reform. Alexander himself had been 
influenced by La Harpe, who returned to Russia after Alexander became tsar.166 
Although not officially a member of the Committee and never present at any 
meetings, La Harpe was desribed by Czartoryski as its fifth member.167 His 
opinions were sought and discussed, if not always accepted.168
La Harpe's advice to Alexander was summed up in one phrase: make haste 
slowly.169 He tried to dissuade the tsar from any plans of total or immediate
The Committee met officially some 40 times between June 1801 and November 1803. 
[A.V.Predtechensky, Ocherki obshchestvenno-politicheskov istorii Rossii, 208].
164 Correspond ance, vol II,letter 160,p.46.
165 Other topics were the consideration of a constitution, the structure of the Senate and the 
organization of ministries. See Predtechensky, Ocherki, 109-110.
166 La Harpe returned to Russia apparently more conservative than he had left in 1796. His rather 
unsuccessful personal experience of political power in Switzerland had, as Alexander Vorontsov noted 
in a letter to Novosiltsev in September 1801, "put a lot of water in (La Harpe's) wine." 
Correspond ance. Intro., 26. Later observers would blame La Harpe for slowing down the liberal aims 
of Alexander. "It was the greatest misfortune that the man for whom Alexander felt the deepest 
respect, to whom he felt indebted for everything that was good in him, who had awakened in him 
aspirations of emancipation arrived in Russia at this time [August 1801] much changed under the 
influence of practical experience in his own country and produced on his protege the most 
conservative pressure." Semevskii, Krest'vanskii voprosv Rossii v  XVIII i pervoi polovine XIX veka 
(St.Petersburg, 1888), 245.
167 La Harpe was aware that the perceived influence of a foreigner on any reform would render 
that reform unacceptable. (Correspondance, Vol.l, letter 69, note c, p.329.) He did not wish his 
influence to be official, public or even noticed. This was the reason he gave for leaving Russia after 
less than a year. Thus, the opponents of reform could not use him as a pretext for rejecting any 
measures introduced by Alexander. (Correspondance, vol.l, letter 139, note a), p.605.)
168 For La Harpe's relationship with the Secret Committee, see Correspond ance, Intr., pp.26-29.
169 Hatez-vous lentement. Correspondance, vol I, letter 61, p.229. This Latin motto "festina lente" 
(originally a Greek maxim) which was often quoted by the emperor Augustus (Suetonius, Augustus, 
25,4; Polyaenos, Strategica, 8,24) was a very apt quotation for La Harpe's vision of Alexander.
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emancipation.170 While admitting that Russia would be unable to progress 
without the abolition of serfdom,171 he advised caution and detailed preparation. 
The very mention of emancipation would unleash chaos. "It is certainly dreadful 
that the Russian people have been kept in slavery, in contempt of principles. But, 
since the fact exists, the desire to put an end to a such an abuse of power must 
not make one blind to the means to do so. It is more than true, Sire, that to 
restore to your people the rights which belong to them, you must proceed with 
tireless patience, moderation and perseverance and courageously scorn reproaches 
of slowness directed against you by ignorance, or perhaps even ill-will."172 In 
fact, La Harpe stressed the need for caution to the extent that he warned 
Alexander not to expect the achievement of his aims during his own reign.173 
"But however long the career of Alexander I may be, he may not be able to put 
the finishing touch to his work. It will be enough for his glory and happiness to 
build on solid foundations the edifice of the true civilization of Russia, 
necessitating his successors to decorate the interior of the building, but posterity 
... will proclaim him the true founder."174 The solid foundations were education 
and legislation.175 The former should prepare the people for the latter. Reforms
Augustus moved cautiously step by step, working through institutions republican in outward form, 
to introduce reforms, mainly administrative, to bring stability and prosperity to an empire ruled by  
one man.
170 Alexander had sought La Harpe's advice on this topic: "Vous avez desire mon opinion sur les 
reformes que vous projetez depuis longtemps.” (Correspond ance, vol I, letter 69, p.316.) The nature 
of La Harpe's reply presupposes a more liberal approach on the part of Alexander.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid., p.323.
173 Ibid., pp.319, 322.
174 Correspondance, vol I, letter 106, pp.491-492.
175 Ibid., vol I, letter 69, p.320.
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should not come from laws, but rather should parallel the "formation of a new 
kind of man".176 Emancipation as such was "a subversive doctrine so contrary 
to [his] sentiments and opinions".177
La Harpe's cautionary approach was obviously not what Alexander had in 
mind when he had asked La Harpe some years earlier for "the quickest way to 
enlightenment"178 but it was the one that prevailed on the Secret Committee. 
Stroganov, who had much influence on the Committee, was not an advocate of 
peasant freedom. He saw the solution to agrarian tensions in the regulation of 
relations between the peasants and landowners. The peasants must be given 
rights and even some property but gradually and imperceptibly.179 The 
cautionary approach advocated by La Harpe and Stroganov was supported by the 
increasing incidence of peasant uprisings. From 1801-1810, there were 83 
uprisings, averaging eleven per year, an increase over the number of incidents 
under Catherine and Paul.180 The Committee's policy towards handling these 
uprisings was expressed by Kochubey, the most liberal of the Committee 
members: "... sending a special envoy to carry out a new investigation [to areas 
where there had been repeated peasant unrest] is a measure which, in my 
opinion, presents a series of difficulties. ... we are talking about criminals ... rather 
than weaken the local authorities with external investigations we should 
strengthen them with strict confirmation. First, we have to bring the recalcitrants 
to order and then some time later, when everything has calmed down, we can
176 Ibid., p.322.
177 Correspondance, vol II, letter 162, p.73.
178 "Eclairer les esprits en moins de temps." Correspond ance. vol I, letter 59, p.216.
179 Predtechensky, Ocherki, 105-106.
180 IJgnatovich, "Krest'yanskie volneniya," 49, 68.
take up the matter of their rights."181 The need for secure administration of the 
Empire, as under Catherine, was of paramount importance. Uprisings, 
unsuppressed, could lead to revolution on the French model.
Serious landowner opposition to land reform was discounted by Stroganov. 
"Our nobility," he argued, "consists of a great number of people who ... have 
received no education and whose thoughts are directed only to the will of the 
tsar. No right, no law, nothing can rouse in them the least resistance. This class 
is the most ignorant, the most insignificant, the most stupid." There were nobles, 
especially in state service, who would welcome reforms, while the majority saw 
the whole meaning of their existence in obedient fulfilment of the orders of the 
government. "What was not done during the past reign against the rights and 
personal security of the nobility! If there was ever a reason to save themselves, 
it was at that time. But the nobility did not open their mouths. On the contrary, 
they fulfilled with exactitude every measure which angered them ... How can a 
class completely deprived of social spirit undertake something which demands 
social spirit ... In a country with a despotic regime, changes are significantly 
easier and less dangerous since they depend on the will of one person, whom all 
the others follow like sheep."182
The real danger was seen to lie with the nine million serfs,183 whom 
Stroganov and others felt were on the brink of a general revolt. By November 
1803, Alexander commented to the Secret Committee, "It is necessary that the
181 Cited in Ibid., 51.
582 Cited in Predtechensky, Ocherki, 150-151.
183 This figure may seem somewhat low due to the method of categorization. As an indication, in 
1819, of 20 million male persons, 17 million were peasants. Of these 17 million, 57.5% were serfs, 
37.5% were crown peasants, 3.2% were apanage peasants, 1% were miscellaneous and 0.56 were free 
peasants. Roughly about half (48.8%) of the total male population were considered serfs. 
B.Schallhorn, Lokalverwaltung und Standerecht, 77.
masses are contented. If they start to cry out and feel their strength, it will be 
dangerous."184 The problem was how to content them. Stroganov had 
discounted serious noble opposition but any decrease in noble power over the 
serfs would allow the peasants to rise up unrestrained. The landed nobility were 
required to keep peace in the realm by keeping the peasants under strict control. 
From this perspective, reform was incompatible with state security. On the other 
hand, the peasant's load must be eased if discontent was not to turn into revolt. 
From this point of view, reform was essential to state security.
Despite Stroganov's arguments, noble opposition, working in more subtle 
ways than insurrection, made reform difficult. In May 1801, Alexander's proposal 
to forbid the sale of peasants without land was rejected by the Senate. They did 
not take the threat of peasant insurrection too seriously, claiming that "the simple 
folk are always wanting freedom."185 An economic argument against the 
measure was that it would hinder the settlement of insufficiently populated areas 
of Russia. Alexander tried a second time without success.186
The cautious approach to reform had become official government policy 
and Alexander's enthusiasm was soon tempered. In 1804, a censorship report 
noted that while serfdom was an issue that had to be dealt with and which the 
government had been examining for some time, "... a sudden change always 
destroys the machinery of government and aware of this [the monarch's advisers]
184 Predtechensky, Ocherki, 163.
185 Ibid.
186 The law was never passed in Alexander's reign. In 1804, serfs sold without land could not be 
recruited into the army for three years after their sale. A law in 1808 forbade the sale of serfs without 
land at public fairs and auctions. In 1820, Alexander wrote, "I am quite sure that the sale of serfs 
without land has been forbidden by law for a long time." Investigation proved that this was not the 
case and that an 1807 tax instruction had incidentally authorized the trade in serfs. See Jerome Blum, 
Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 1961), 427-428.
did not want to eradicate this evil suddenly .... If the author187 could find a 
quick but safe way to achieve the proposed aim, i.e. the abolition of slavery in 
Russia, he should present his plan to the government.'*188
During the first years of his reign, until January 1806, when reform was a 
major concern, Alexander issued almost 2200 decrees. Only about 300, however, 
were of any importance (proving perhaps that legislative activity is not always 
synonymous with political practice)189 and of these only two were of significance 
in agrarian reform. The first, passed 12 December 1801, allowed merchants and 
crown peasants to buy land. The effects were disappointing. By 1858, less than 
300,000 individuals had taken advantage of the privilege. Part of the problem was 
the inabilty of the peasant to pay. There had been a proposal to set up a Labour 
Bank to help state peasants without means to buy land but after it had been 
submitted to the Senate in 1803, it was never heard of again.190
The second reform measure was a compromise between upsetting the 
landowners and inciting the peasants to more demands. Introduced by Count 
S.P.Rumantsiev, the proposal originally sought to allow serfs to buy their freedom 
and land from their owners thus creating a new class of free farmers. The 
proposal became law, on 20 February 1803, but in Rumantsiev's name, rather than 
as a general law, and was to serve as an example which anyone was free to
187 The author was Ivan Petrovich Pnin and the work was his "Essay on Enlightenment with 
Reference to Russia." Pnin advocated freedom, property and education for the peasant class, quoting 
Catherine's Nakaz to support his ideas. An English translation of the essay can be found in Marc 
Raeff, Russian Intellectual History:an Anthology (New York, 1966), 126-158.
188 Cited in Semevsky, Kresbianskitvopros, 285.
189 Predtechensky, Ocherki. 209, 215.
190 Ibid., Ocherki, 164-165.
follow.191 Kochubey sent a circular out emphasizing that the decree would not 
change present relations. Peasants were to "remain in exactly that dependence and 
silent submission to their masters in which they were up till now."192 The 
liberals were sure it would achieve emancipation gradually and painlessly while 
the conservatives saw little threat since few landowners would wish to part with 
land and few peasants would have the means to buy it. The latter proved to be 
right. F.V.Rostopchin commented in 1803, "No-one is emancipating peasants 
because the peasants are not in a position to pay the money for themselves and 
the rich ones want to be merchants."193 Another reason was possibly that the 
reform was based on the principle of private individual property which 
contradicted the principle and practice of communal ownership.194 During 
Alexander's reign, the law was used not more than 160 times, freeing 
approximately 47,000 peasants.195 By 1858, the free farmers numbered only 
151,895 males, less than 1.5 percent of the total male serf population.196
191 The text of the ukaz as well as the conditions governing the mutual contracts can be found in 
Heinrich Storch, Rutland unter Alexander dem Ersten. Eine historische Zeitschrift 9 vols. 
(StPetersburg, Leipzig, 1804-1808), vol II, Chapter IX, 198-207.
192 Predtechensky, Ocherki, 172.
193 Ibid., 173.
194 This is suggested by Semevskii, Krest'vanskii vopros. Intro. p.XVI.
195 According to Tsagalov, most of the landowners w ho freed the 47,153 male peasants did so 
because they wanted to give up their estates to concentrate on non-agricultural investments. It is also 
noteworthy that most of these peasants were freed with land. N.A.Tsagalov, Ocherki russkoi 
ekonomicheskoi mysli perioda padeniya krepostnogo prava, (Moscow, 1956), 22.
196 Predtechensky. Ocherki, 172. J.Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia, 541.
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PART FOUR: REFORM IN THE BALTIC 1802-1817
Estland: 1802
The Baltic provinces were not a topic on Alexander's Secret Committee. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the Committee forbade formal discussion 
of emancipation in the Baltic provinces in order to avoid provoking unrest in 
Russia, a claim in keeping with the atmosphere on the Committee as described 
above.197 Reform towards eventual emancipation rather than emancipation itself 
was the direction being taken, a policy which was close to the Ritter conservative 
path.198 As already noted, however, the atmosphere of even limited reform was 
an important catalyst in the chain of events. The provinces had always reacted 
to imperial pressure but this time they anticipated it.
The first to react to Alexander's reform enthusiasm was Estland. Jakob 
Georg von Berg, elected Ritterhauptmann of Estland in 1800, spent many months 
in St Petersburg lobbying for the Estland nobility and was very aware of the
197 Predtechensky, Ocherki, 176. Tobien claims Livland's agrarian problems were mentioned only 
once by the Committee, at its meeting of 20 January 1802. He maintains the Landtag was then 
forbidden to discuss emancipation. [Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 154, 156.] Axel v. Gemet also 
mentions this meeting as proof that there was Russian opposition to reform in Estland and Livland 
for fear that such a movement would spread to other parts of the empire. fGeschichte des Agrarrechts, 
109.]
198 Apologetic Baltic historiography is perhaps guilty of some interpretative manipulation on the 
point of concurrence of the Secret Committee's cautionary approach and the Ritter conservative policy 
towards reform, the former stemming from reasons of security, the latter more from a self-preservation 
instinct. Quoting Semevskii, Tobien claims that La Harpe successfully persuaded Alexander that an 
improvement in the peasants' economic situation was more important than freedom, which is w hy the 
Russian tsar was so interested in reforms in the Baltic -  by regulating labour norms, they aimed for 
economic improvement before emancipation. [Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 281.] Tobien quotes 
(or translated) Semevskii inaccurately. Semevskii claims La Harpe advised Alexander to use the 
phrase "improvement in economic situation" rather than the word freedom. [Semevskii, Krest'vanskii 
Vopros. 245.] This is a more accurate representation of what La Harpe did advise on several 
occasions. In a letter devoted to the subject of emancipation in October 1801, fCorrespondance, vol I, 
letter 69, pp.316-326.] La Harpe recommends that limited reforms could be tried out on crown estates 
only, but without mentioning the word liberty. In a letter written in 1803, f Correspond ance, vol ii, 
letter 162, pp.61-78.], he reminds Alexander most clearly to avoid the use of the word freedom. 
["Evitez qu'on prononce le mot de liberte." Ibid.,p.73.]
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liberal tendencies of the tsar. His fears were perhaps well founded. La Harpe 
found reason to offer the tsar the following advice at the end of 1801, "I know, 
Sire, that you want to put an end to abuses; but meanwhile it would seem just, 
prudent and above all politic to allow the provinces until then to keep their 
customs and privileges, which they will renounce with much less difficulty when 
you have something better to offer."199 Berg also reported that, despite the 1795 
regulations, there was a definite hostility towards the Estland Ritter and the 
perceived arbitrary rule over their peasants.200 Such opinion was orchestrated 
in St Petersburg itself and directed to the tsar's attention, which in turn was 
directed towards reforming the ills he heard of. Some of the sources were Estland 
liberals. Peter von Lowis201 and another member of the Stackelberg family, 
Baron Carl von Stackelberg, were critical of the situation in their homeland of 
which they informed the tsar in writing at the end of 1801. Thus, liberal factions 
found it an effective strategy to influence the tsar against the conservative 
majority in the provinces, just as Otto Stackelberg had influenced Catherine. The 
conservatives did not have a monopoly on lobbying.
Berg was convinced that setting limits to arbitrariness was the only way to 
convince the monarch that such reports were inaccurate. In May 1802, he warned 
the Landtag that if they retreated from reform, there was the danger that the 
government would take matters into its own hands. This was credible in view of 
Alexander's attempts in 1801 to pass the law forbidding the sale of serfs without 
land, a measure which would have devalued the Ritter's strongest currency, their
199 Correspond ance vol 1, letter 81, 378.
200 La Harpe viewed the situation similarly. He wrote to Alexander, "These provinces seem to have 
enemies in your presence." Ibid.
201 It is not clear whether this was the same Peter von Lowis who had introduced liberal reforms 
on his own estates.
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serfs. The law of December 1801 allowing merchants and other free persons as 
well as crown peasants to buy land was a serious threat to the Ritter monopoly 
on land. Berg was also no doubt aware that the topic of reform was on the agenda 
of the Secret Committee even if he was not privy to the substance of the 
discussions. Imperial power seemed to be on the move and the pragmatic step 
for the Ritter would seem to be, in Berg's opinion, to move first.
While the prospect of imperial intervention in local autonomy was always 
a grave threat, there was also the more immediate matter of imperial permission 
and funds for a long-awaited Credit Bank. The Ritter may have felt these would 
not be granted to landowners perceived as arbitrary and inhumane. The matter 
of agrarian reform was actually raised at an extraordinary Landtag called for the 
discussion of a Credit Bank for the nobility.202 Opponents of the reform in St 
Petersburg, according to Berg, attributed this interest in a credit institute for the 
provincial nobility as the real motive of the reforms.203 In October 1802, one 
month after imperial approval of the reforms, the tsar granted permission to 
found a Credit Bank and loaned the appropriate funds —half a million roubles at 
a rate of three percent, and two million at a rate of five percent.204
The 1802 Landtag was persuaded by Berg's reasoning and came up with 
a set of reforms which were designed to rescue the peasant from the economic 
plight caused, in the opinion of the Ritter, by his own lack of interest. The 
peasant farmer was to be given the life-long right to use the land he farmed, a 
right which could be inherited by his children and widow. Productivity and
202 Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 105.
203 Gernet describes these opponents as Russian dignitaries and government officials. Ibid., 109.
204 Ibid., 110.
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industriousness were to be encouraged by allowing the peasant to keep possession 
of all moveable inventory he acquired, for example, grain, cattle, horses, with the 
right to dispose of such as he wished. Security of tenure, a significant concession, 
was to be formally guaranteed but in practice the peasant could be transferred, 
even to uncultivated land, as long as he was compensated. "Carelessness and 
negligence" could cause expulsion from the farm but only after investigation by 
the peasant court which would consist of members voted by the peasants. 
Families could be moved if it bettered their situation; individuals only after 
investigation by the peasant court. Complaints against oppression by the 
landowners were to be directed to the district courts (Kirchspielgericht).205 These 
proposals were submitted to the tsar on 4 July 1802.
The tsar took only one week to react. "... [T]he philanthropic intention of 
the Estland Ritter to establish and secure the political existence of their peasants 
has pleased me greatly. With delight I see the happy future of that land where 
two classes of citizens separated from one another until now will be united in the 
bond of mutual trust and goodwill, and where the definition of mutual rights and 
obligations of both classes will bring about the welfare of all."206 The tsar 
further recognized the proposals as the voluntary initiative of the Ritter, which 
Berg had expressly petitioned,207 and agreed to secrecy until the proposals could 
be executed.208 Alexander's view of the future was optimistic but his 
expectations were obvious. The political existence of the peasant, as well as his
205 Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 106-107.
206 The letter is reproduced in H.Storch, Rutland unter Alexander dem Ersten, Vol II, Chapter IV, 
125-126 and in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 114-115.
207 See Berg's letter to Alexander reproduced in Storch, Rufiland unter Alexander dem Ersten, vol 
D, Chapter IV, 121-124.
208 Ibid., 125-126.
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economic welfare, was important. At the final ratification in September 1802, the 
attitude dominant on the Secret Committee was evident in the tsar's expressed 
expectation that the Ritter would "gradually and imperceptibly," establish the 
rights of the peasants.209
The Regulations were published in Estonian in January 1803 under the title 
Igga Uks (Each of You), and addressed the peasants directly, asking them if they 
themselves were not responsible for their own "neediness" through their own 
negligence.210 The economic concerns of the Ritter are evident in their 
exhortations to the peasants to aim for industriousness, economy, and 
conscientiousness to achieve better harvests. The tone is feudal and the attitude 
paternalistic. Obedience is necessary and above all "the fulfilment without 
exception of all obligations to us, your lords; do not neglect any of them; have 
unlimited, child-like trust in us; convince yourselves of how well-intentioned we 
are towards you, how much we wish to turn you back from every mistake, and 
that your welfare now and in the future lies close to our hearts. This trust will 
bring you joy in the fulfilment of your obligations and you will reward us for the 
trouble and care we have shown you ..."
Although the Regulations guaranteed the peasant hereditary tenure, there 
were two significant omissions. They failed to consider the defining of labour and 
dues, a measure necessary to curb the arbitrary demands of landlords, and the 
limitation of corporal punishment, the method to enforce arbitrary demands. 
These deficiencies were obvious to imperial circles since Heinrich Storch211
209 Ibid., 140; Samson, Historischer Versuch, 115.
210 The Regulations are reproduced in Storch, Rutland unter Alexander dem Ersten, vol II, chapter 
IV, 128-139 and in Samson, Historischer Versuch, Appendix D, 179-184.
211 Storch is dealt with at the beginning of Chapter IV below.
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specifically mentioned them as two important points not yet dealt with.212 The 
peasants were given the right to complain but had no standard against which to 
measure what was extreme. The peasant courts were only competent to deal with 
discipline not covered by the lord's "house discipline." These omissions would 
be partially corrected the following year.
Livland: 1802-1804
Berg's initiative to restart the reform movement in Estland motivated 
Livland to take up its own 1798 proposals again. This causal relationship between 
the two was also the tsar's interpretation. "The plan which the Estland Ritter sent 
to me concerning the improvement of the situation of their peasants ... has moved 
the Livland Ritter to ask for confirmation of their 1796 Landtag decision to the 
same end."213 There was now the danger that the tsar would find favour with 
the Estland proposals and recommend them to Livland. The Estland proposals 
were not well received in Livland and had, according to Berg, been subjected to 
"the most spiteful interpretations."214 Sivers resubmitted the 1798 proposals to 
the tsar in August 1802, barely one month after the tsar's warm reception of the 
Estland proposals.
In his petition, Sivers mentions the tsar's approval of the Estland proposals 
but points out that Livland had submitted "similar and more detailed" measures 
as early as 1796. Seeming to anticipate imperial criticism, perhaps because of 
Alexander's attempts to forbid the sale of serfs without land, Sivers assures the
212 Heinrich Storch, Rutland unter Alexander dem Ersten. Eine historische Zeitschrift 9 vols. (St 
Petersburg-Leipzig, 1804-1808); vol II, Chapter IV, 120.
213 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 101.
214 Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts. 109.
tsar of two important concessions not included in 1796. He vouches for the Ritter 
renouncing their right to sell their serfs within the province or giving them away 
to relatives and promises to have the extraordinary corvee duties of the serfs, 
hitherto never assessed, measured according to the value of the land.215 Sivers 
acted on his own without consulting the Landtag, despite the stipulation of the 
Landtag in April 1802 that the Landrat could not make any important decisions 
without the general consensus.216 Sivers was probably motivated not so much 
by the anticipation of Landtag opposition to the new concessions as by the 
pressure of time if the tsar was to be distracted from accepting the Estland 
proposals for the whole Baltic area. This tactic, however, would cost the reform 
process much strife, especially since the promised concessions were major ones 
in the eyes of the Ritter.
The tsar did not respond to the Livland proposals as speedily as he had to 
the Estland proposals. It took him four months, during which time he had 
acquainted himself more with the situation in Livland, his interest prompted less 
perhaps by Sivers' petition than by the news of severe peasant uprisings on the 
estates of Kaukenhof and Kokenhof involving some 3000 peasants.217 He had 
a detailed report of the uprising from a comparatively new personality in Livland 
and at the Russian court. Georg Friedrich von Parrot,218 an immigrant tutor
215 The text of Sivers' petition is reproduced in Tobien, Agrargesetzgebung. 158.
216 Ibid., 159.
217 Ibid., 160-161.
218 Parrot was born in 1767 in Montbeliard in France [the family is said to have originally come 
from Scotland. Camilla von Stackelberg, Verwehte Blatter. Erinnerungen aus dem alten Baltikum 
(Berlin, 1992), 31-32.] After studying economics, mathematics and physics in Stuttgart [1781-1786], 
he took up a position as private tutor in Normandy [1786-1788]. In 1795, he came to Livland as a tutor 
in the family of Jakob Johann Sievers' brother. For bibliography on Parrot's biography, see Engelhardt 
und Neuschaffer, Die Livlandische Gemeinniitzige und Okonomische Sozietat, 27-28; Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzgebung. 161-162.
who first came to Livland in 1795, was instrumental in founding the Livland 
Economic Society and became its first Secretary (1796-1801).219 In 1802 he was 
appointed professor of physics and vice chancellor at the re-opened Dorpat 
University.220 Parrot provided Alexander with information on Livland.221 
According to Parrot, Alexander asked him in October 1802, after Sivers had 
submitted the Livland proposals, to draft a reform for the peasants in Livland. 
"The burden was too much for my shoulders alone. I told him that although I 
had done my best to acquire practical knowledge, I could not trust my own 
powers222 and requested his permission to join forces with some men of greater 
understanding." Permission was granted and Parrot was to form a committee 
with four others of his choice.223 Parrot's stay in the capital lasted until
219 He also became a member of the Leipzig Economic Society.
220 Baltic historiography accords Parrot an influential role in having Dorpat University reopened 
by means of his close relationship to Alexander. At the same time, he is viewed as having deliberately 
sought a Russian "nationalization" of the university in order to free it from Ritter control. See, for 
example, Heinrich Seesemann, "350 Jahre Universitat Dorpat" Vortrag bei den 33.Deutschbaltischen 
Kulturtagen am 26.September 1982 in G.von Pistohlkors, T.U.Raun, P.Kaegbein eds., Die Universitaten 
Dorpat/Tartu. Riga und W ilna/Vilnius 1579-1979 (Cologne/Vienna 1987) vol 9 in Quellen und Studien 
zur balfcchen Geschichte.
221 Whether the Ritter would have concurred with his opinions is questionable. Parrot is not held 
in regard in Baltic historiography. One opinion blames him for the loss of Ritter influence to the 
ministries. "Zur Geschichte der livlandischen Privilegien (II)," in Baltische Monatsschrift, 49 (1900), 
319. The nature of the relationship between Alexander and Parrot is partly illuminated in Friedrich 
Bienemann, "Aus dem Briefwechsel Georg Friedrich Parrots mit Kaiser Alexander I," in Deutsche 
Revue XIX (1894).
222 Parrot's own brother-in-law Johann Wilhelm Krause, professor of agriculture at Dorpat, would  
have agreed with him. He found Parrot's knowledge of agrarian matters superficial. Engelhardt and 
Neuschaffer, Die Livlandische Gemeinnutzige und Okonomische Sozietat, 30. Krause himself is said 
to have had "scant agricultural experience." He was actually appointed professor of economics, 
technology and architecture and spent the first three years of his tenure designing the university 
buildings. His agricultural programme began in 1806. Architecture was overemphasized while there 
were no courses in crop and livestock production or in soils and soil fertility. See Elmar Jaervesoo, 
"The Role of Tartu University and Riga Polytechnic Institute in Introducing Rational Agriculture into 
the Baltic Provinces and Russia," in Pistohlkors et alii, eds. Die Universitaten D orpat Riea und Wilna, 
197-215.
223 Parrot chose Friedrich von Sivers; Johann Danckwart (General Superintendent; died in 1803); 
Ernst Cornelius, a pastor; and Major Peter Ekesparre, soon to become the school inspector of Wenden. 
Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 162.
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December. At the farewell audience, Alexander reminded him about the 
committee and suggested that reforms could be carried out on crown estates first 
in order to provide an example for private estates. This was a course of action 
recommended to him by La Harpe. In February of that year, La Harpe had 
written, "The first measure [to increase the number of landowners] could be tried 
here and there on the estates of the crown, under the Emperor's eyes, and 
presented as a simple experiment at first to facilitate the acquittal of obligations 
and to relieve the inhabitants. If these attempts succeed (and they certainly will), 
it will not be long before they are imitated by private lords."224
The results of Parrot's committee, if it did meet, are not known. Parrot 
himself was probably busy with his work at Dorpat University and his relations 
with reform-minded landowners had been less intense after he had resigned office 
from the Livland Economic Society when he had failed to persuade its members 
to move headquarters to Dorpat. His main contact after that was correspondence 
complaining about the salary he was owed.225 Whatever the reason, the tsar7s 
recommended policy was not followed.
On 24 December 1802, some days after his audience with Parrot, Alexander 
responded to Sivers' petition. The policy of reform on crown estates was not 
mentioned, even although Sivers was to be one of the proposed Committee 
members. Alexander limited himself to criticism of the Livland proposals "which 
do not fully achieve the aim which one expects from the charitable intentions of 
the Livland nobility." In order to be more in keeping with the "Zeitgeist," wrote 
Alexander, the right to sell or give away peasants must be more limited, the
224 Correspond ance, vol.l, letter 106, p.491.
225 Neuschaffer and Engelhardt, Die Livlandische Gemeinnutzige und Okonomische Sozietat, 30.
extraordinary labour obligations must be specified, the peasant should be freed 
from having to transport the estate's products such long distances, and the 
peasant's right to marry should be limited only by the church and the family. The 
tsar's last point shows the influence of the Estland proposals: "The purpose 
regarding the administration of justice for the peasant cannot be achieved when 
the lord alone is recognized as his judge. This right could justifiably be 
transferred to judges elected by the peasants themselves, as, for example, the 
Ritter of Estland have done."226
Sivers responded quickly with a list of twelve points.227 As with his 
earlier petition, he had formulated and submitted them without the consensus of 
the Landtag. The pressure from Estland's example may have been a factor. The 
Igga Uks had been ratified by the tsar the previous September and was distributed 
to the peasants in Estland in the same month, January 1803, that Sivers submitted 
his twelve points. The points dealt directly with the tsar's criticisms. The sale of 
peasants was to be forbidden (1), extraordinary labour to be regulated (2), the 
peasant allowed to marry with permission of his family (6).228 The lord's 
monopoly on the administration of justice was to be removed by establishing 
peasant representation on the courts of first and second instance (8 and 9). The 
courts were to deal with disputes among the peasants but also against their 
masters.
Alexander praised this compliance with his will and on 30 January 1803
226 The text of Alexander's letter is reproduced in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 93-94; and in 
Tobien, P ie Agrargesetzgebung, 163.
227 There is the suggestion that these twelve points could have been the work of Parrot's Committee 
(Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 163) but the short time span makes this very unfeasible. Parrot did 
not leave the Russan capital until mid-December 1801 and Sivers submitted his points at the beginning 
of the new year.
228 The twelve points are listed in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 96-97.
asked Sivers to present it to the Landtag, whose members he felt sure would 
"with united strength found this memorial which would redound to their 
glory."229 The Landtag scheduled for June was brought forward to February. 
High attendance proved interest in the subject matter but instead of the unity 
hoped for by the tsar, there was great disagreement. In fact, as the tsar later 
wrote, the only thing which united them was disunity.230 Predictably, the two 
major concessions promised by Sivers and demanded by the tsar caused much 
contention, especially the regulation of extraordinary peasant obligations.231 
W hat made the differences of opinion more irreconcilable than before was the 
emergence of a vocal liberal faction on the Landtag. Early on, the faction made 
its presence felt in the proposal made by Sivers' brother to grant personal freedom 
at the age of twenty-one to all peasants born after Alexander came to the 
throne.232 The proposal was supported by twenty-one members.233 On 4th 
March 1803, after long and heated discussion, it was voted 105 to 40 (the liberals 
had gained some support) not to discuss emancipation. Sivers himself was not 
present at the vote, having rushed off to the capital a few days before to involve 
the tsar in the discussion which was going against the liberals. On 10 March, a 
few days after Sivers return, the Governor General issued a command from the 
tsar forbidding the discussion of emancipation on the Landtag. It should be
229 Alexander's short letter is reproduced in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 98 and in Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzgebung, 164.
230 In a letter 11 May 1803 to Kochubey, reproduced in full in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 101-
102.
231 This was very important to the Ritter since much work necessary on the estate was classed as 
extraordinary, for example harvesting. Of particular importance was the use of such unassessed 
labour in the distilling of alcohol.
232 This personal freedom was not unlimited. The freed peasants would be allowed to leave their 
estates only with the permission of the estate community.
233 There were 184 members present at the Landtag. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 171.
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remembered that Alexander had just issued the law allowing individuals to free 
their peasants according to private contracts. This had been as far as the Secret 
Committee or the Senate was prepared to go. Alexander obviously acted 
according to this policy when he seemed to support the conservative majority on 
the Landtag by forbidding a discussion of emancipation. Instead, he referred to 
the Rumantsiev decree and to the oft-repeated advice to regulate peasant 
obligations.234
The liberal faction might not have introduced the subject of emancipation 
had they known about the Rumantsiev decree from the beginning of the Landtag 
session but the decree was published three days after the session began and it 
would have taken some days for news of it to reach Riga.235 Meanwhile, the 
strife continued over the regulation of extraordinary peasant labour and the right 
to appropriate peasant-farmed land with compensation. There were protests 
against decisions made and protests against protests. There was even the 
suggestion to postpone matters until the next Landtag in June but this was 
rejected on the grounds that it would invalidate decisions already made.236 
After forty-one days of disagreement the Landtag closed session on 31 March 1803 
and sent the results to the tsar.
The reform draft was based on Sivers' twelve points, approved by the tsar, 
but disagreement on the Landtag had forced various amendments.237 The 
Landtag members were willing to accept the ban on the sale of peasants as long
234 Ibid., 172-176.
235 Tobien daims that news of the decree did not reach the Landtag until 30 March 1803. This 
would seem highly unlikely since Sivers left for the Russian capital 27 February, returning 7 March 
and must have heard of the decree while in Russia. Ibid., 175.
236 Ibid., 180.
237 The text of the reform is given in Samson, Historischer Versuch, Appendix C, 167-180.
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as the landowner could move his own peasants to his own estates. Reluctant to 
give up the power of force over the peasant, the landowner would retain his right 
to "house discipline" but without the use of the rod.238 Peasant representation 
on courts was accepted but peasant courts could deal only with peasant disputes 
and not with complaints against landlords as Sivers had proposed. Such 
complaints would be dealt with by the Ordnungsgericht, on which there would be 
two elected peasant members. The most important difference was the Landtag7s 
decision to allow landowner appropriation of peasant-farmed land.239 This was 
a major deviation from Sivers recommendation to forbid the expulsion of a 
peasant unless he had farmed negligently. The text of the reform actually states 
that appropriation is not allowed but goes on to list the exceptions which allow 
it. The peasant farmer could be evicted and the land incorporated into the 
Hofsland if he was negligent in his farming or in debt to twice the value of the 
farm but also if the Hofsland was not sufficient to support the labour force. (The 
landowner7s right to evict the peasant was in direct contrast to the hereditary 
tenure which the Estland Ritter had awarded their peasants in January of the 
same year.) The Landtag accepted the formal regulation of peasant obligations 
according to the Swedish method, something they had been promising since 1765, 
and proposed the assessment of estates not already surveyed for this purpose. 
Regulation of the extraordinary duties the peasant was required to render the 
landowner had been a major point of contention on the Landtag. Sivers had 
promised that these would be regulated and the tsar had shown his interest in the
238 The rod could be ordered by the courts. In case of an unjustified complaint against the lord, 
the punishment was still five pair of the rod for the first instance, ten for the second and one year's 
forced labour for the third.
239 This had been allowed by the 1796 reform. See p.191 above.
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matter by recommending limitations on the amount of carting the peasant was 
required to do. The extraordinary duties required of the peasant formed a large 
part of his obligation to his master and had to be performed over and above his 
other obligations. They included carting of all types from fertilizer to building 
materials, the time-consuming task of transporting products many miles to 
market, spinning, weaving, harvest work. Since they were not calculated, they 
were uncontrolled, nor could a peasant complain against them since they were not 
measured. It was a large grey area over which the landlord had full control. It 
was also an important source of free labour for any side enterprises on the estate, 
particularly the distilling of spirits. By regulating these services, the cost of labour 
on the estate would rise. The Landtag argued that in return for these services the 
peasant benefited from the free use of woods, hay fields, and gardens as well as 
the support of the landowner in times of need. Reducing all aspects of the 
relationship to strictly calculated duties and obligations would not benefit the 
peasant. In the end, the Landtag accepted the regulation of the extraordinary 
services against the survey of hay and garden lands (such lands were not included 
in the Swedish tax system) with the proviso that if such services exceeded the 
extra value of the hitherto unmeasured lands, the landowner could ask for 
payment in kind.
The Landtag made the political mistake of submitting not only these 
decisions for the tsar's approval but also the objections to them for his 
consideration. Several factions opposed to the draft also sent petitions to the tsar. 
All these conflicting reports conveyed the atmosphere on the Landtag as one of 
confusion and disagreement and Alexander, while professing to recognize the 
general intentions of the Ritter to grant the peasant a political existence, the right
to property and freedom from arbitrariness, felt these aims could not be achieved 
by the Landtag. "To achieve this," he wrote to Kochubey, "I deem it necessary to 
organize a committee under my own supervision."240 The affairs of the province 
were now to be regulated by an imperial institution, a blow to provincial 
autonomy caused not so much by the lack of unity on the Landtag as by 
involving the tsar in it. This was the logical outcome of the continued strategy 
of using the tsar to settle disputes, used by both liberals and conservatives since 
1795.241 The 1803 Landtag reform draft never became law.
The committee's brief was defined by the tsar himself. It would examine 
the opinions of the Landtag, compare them with the actual situation in Livland 
and then come up with new guidelines for reform.242 It was to consist of 
Kochubey as chairman, Senator Kosodavlev, Stroganov and two Livland 
representatives.243 Druzhinin would be responsible for the general leadership. 
Thus, two members of the Secret Committee were involved as well as a most 
influential advisor, Druzhinin. The affairs of the province were now well in the 
hands of the empire. The committee first met in August 1803 and submitted its 
proposed reform six months later and it was this proposal which became law on 
20 February 1804.
The reform was based firmly on the principle of protective rights for the
240 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 102.
241 Tobien lends the lack of unity a more positive function. It led to a refinement of the 1803 draft 
and ultimately a better law (implying that the objections were taken into consideration.) Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzgebung. 204.
242 In Alexander's letter to Kochubey, reprinted in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 101-102.
243 The tsar chose Gustav von Buddenbrock and Reinhold von Anrep from four nominated by the 
Landratskollegium. Sivers was nominated but not appointed. The other nominee was von Richter. Ibid., 
102; Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 205.
peasant and went further than the 1803 Landtag draft.244 The Swedish land tax 
system was maintained and all peasant obligations were to be calculated within 
the parameters set out in the reform. Since extraordinary services were to be 
included in the calculations, hay and garden land would be included in the 
taxable amount of land.245 Hereditary tenure of peasant land was established 
and the peasant farmer protected in his holdings. The reform attempted to 
regulate not only the rights of the peasant farmer but also of his labourers, fixed 
or mobile (Lostreiber). The most major change, however, and one which signalled 
a fundamental change in thinking, was the right granted to the peasant to acquire, 
buy, possess, sell and bequeath all kinds of property, including land. Not many 
peasants were in a position to do so but the principle of land ownership was 
established. While these reforms improved the legal status of the peasant, he was 
still firmly bound to the land he worked.
Perhaps the main feature of the reform, however, was exactly what the 
Committee members had aimed for. In presenting the reform, they expressed the 
hope that they had succeeded in "leaving nothing undefined in all the relations 
of the peasants to the landowners."246 This detailed definition protected the 
peasant but restricted the landowners, who would soon begin reacting against 
it.247 Landowner discontent with the reform, however, was inherent in its
244 The many clauses of the reform are summarized in Samson, Historischer Versuch. 103-108.
245 Where one haken was reckoned at 60 taler, 20 were now added to cover the extraordinary work. 
Guidelines were set for any necessary additional work. For example, only trained labourers could be 
used in the distilling of alcohol.
246 Cited in Yu. Kahk, "K voprosu ob agramoi politike tsarizma v  Liflyandii v  nachale XIX 
stoletiya,” in Istoriva SSSR 1962, No 2: 130.
247 The conflicting interests of peasant and landlord in the reform are reflected in the different 
historical perspectives of Baltic Soviet historians. Most of them, including Kahk and Zutis, view  the 
1804 reforms as contributing positively to social-economic development. Others, particularly 
L.A.Loone, thought the Wackenbuch element prevented any possibility of productive change. See Ibid.,
136. Also L.A.Loone, "Razvitie proizvoditernykh sil v  sel'skom khozyaistve Estonii v  pervoi polovine
221
origins. It had not been formulated or passed by the Landtag, whose members 
had not even been able to agree over the much less liberal 1803 draft. It was an 
imperial reform, and one whose principles Russia would support until its own 
reform in 1861.
Landowner discontent was exacerbated by the administration of the reform. 
For peasant obligations to their masters to be properly quantified, estates had to 
be measured. Those already measured had to have their obligations checked. 
These tasks were allocated by the Committee, now known as the St Petersburg 
Committee for the Affairs of Livland,248 to four Revision Commissions, one for 
each district of Livland.249 The chairman of each commission was appointed 
directly by the tsar and owned no land in Livland. Six landowners were chosen 
as members from twelve candidiates elected by the Ritter. The St Petersburg 
Committee would continue in existence to offer overall general supervision. Local 
supervision could be provided by the Oberkirchenvorsteher, an important office in 
the matter of peasant labour since the 1796 Landtag had decided that the 
Wackenbuch regulations were to be submitted, originally by August 1797, to his 
inspection.250 It was in the capacity of Oberkirchenvorsteher that Sivers was active 
on the Wenden Commission.
The task of measuring the estates was a difficult one since very few private 
estates and no crown estates had been surveyed as the reform required. The 
Commissions were to check the regulations worked out on measured estates and
XIX v.," in Istoricheskie zapiski, 60 (1957)^15-247.
248 It will be referred to as the St Petersburg Committee.
249 Insel Oesel already had such a commission. Samson, Historischer Versuch, 109.
250 In 1797, there were objections to this procedure on the grounds that the post of 
Oberkirchenvorsteher was normally filled by Sivers or his friends. See Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung,
121, 124.
in the case of unmeasured estates would take the number of haken used in the last 
revision (1784). If the landowner was not satisfied, he must start a new revision 
within a year and be finished within six. If the final result was lower than what 
he had estimated, he must compensate his peasants.251
The Revision project bore within it the seeds of Empire/province conflict. 
Not having been formulated or passed by the Landtag, it was an imperial rather 
than a Landtag reform and went beyond what many Ritter had found too liberal 
in the 1803 Landtag draft. The survey had barely commenced before objections 
were raised, reflecting the issues raised at the 1803 Landtag.252 The Landtag of 
February 1805 submitted 29 points to the tsar for his consideration but the tsar 
refused to consider them.253
By 25 May 1806, just before the next Landtag met, the tsar was moved by 
continuing complaints and petitions to write sternly to the Governor General, "I 
deem it necessary to inform you th a t ... there can be no trace of any more changes 
[in the reform] and that allowing any requests to this effect, which only lead to 
prolonging the end of the Revision and continuing the unrest ... will not be 
allowed by the authorities. Thus I charge you to communicate to the nobility that 
as I firmly insist on maintaining the reform for peasant obligations in its full force, 
no proposals for any kind of change may be made."254
The tsar's displeasure did not ensure an attempt at unity on the Landtag
251 Samson, Historischer Versuch. 110-111.
252 The landowners, for example, disagreed over the amount of taxation the hay and garden lands 
should be subjected to. The lower it was set, the fewer the extraordinary services the landowner could 
demand from his peasants.
253 He later allowed two of them concerning the preparation of instructions for the peasant courts. 
Tobien, Agrargesetzgebung. 216.
254 The text of Alexander's letter is reproduced in Tobien, Agrargesetzgebung, 220-221.
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the following month. Fifty years before the Landtag would have sought and 
found a compromise among themselves to present a united provincial front 
against imperial power but the economic stakes were now much higher and a 
liberal faction on the Landtag made compromise a more difficult option.
While the method of taxing hay fields to the perceived detriment of 
extraordinary peasant obligations remained an issue, the main objection was to 
Sivers and the Wenden Commission. Many considered that the Commission was 
setting labour norms so low that they would have to be raised in the final survey 
thus causing peasant unrest. Governor General Buxhoevden, on the other hand, 
complained that Sivers had set norms on church lands that benefited the pastors 
to the detriment of the peasants. The Landtag raised another complaint against 
Sivers which was connected to constitution reform rather than agrarian reform. 
The former is perhaps even more indicative of the divisions on the Landtag than 
the agrarian reform. There had been proposals for constitutional change on the 
1803 Landtag, two of which significantly recommended modified Statthalterschaft 
models, but the Landtag rejected all of them (even one proposed by Johann Jakob 
Sievers). Sivers sought to assign imperial power a greater role in the internal 
affairs of the province by attempting to have the office of Landrat ratified by the 
tsar and not by the Governor General.255 It was against this attempt that the 
1806 Landtag made a formal complaint. Obviously, Sivers felt that the only way 
to reform was to involve the Russian tsar while the majority of Landtag members 
felt that the way to stop radical reform, or prevent imperial intervention, was to 
have Sivers removed from office.
255 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 196-198.
224
The Landtag voted overwhelmingly against Sivers256 and asked the tsar 
to cancel the work of the Wenden Commission and remove Sivers from it. Sivers 
maintained he was responsible in this function only to the St Petersburg 
Committee and the tsar. Alexander replied swiftly through the Governor General 
on 22 July 1806, deploring the fact that the Ritter had not heeded his letter of the 
previous month. He declared all the decisions of the 1806 Landtag 
unconstitutional, reminding the Ritter that the W enden Commission was 
responsible only to the St Petersburg Committee. The matter of Sivers, however, 
as Oberkirchenvorsteher belonged within the jurisdiction of the province and 
Alexander permitted the removal of Sivers from his post. The tsar's decision 
displays diplomatic shrewdness. Firm in upholding imperial decisions and 
committees against provincial undermining, he still conceded to the provincial 
constitution where it was appropriate, namely in the dismissal of Sivers.257 
Alexander's letter also clearly expresses imperial policy. The state would not 
interfere in the jurisdiction of the province but the Landtag would not be allowed 
to concern itself it with imperial institutions. Of importance in this implicit 
statement of policy is the way in which the Commissions are regarded as imperial 
institutions. Until the creation of the St Petersburg Committee to rectify the 
shortcomings of the 1803 reform draft, which in turn created the Revision 
Commissions, there had been no imperial institutions,258 apart from the 
Governor General, within the provinces concerned with its internal affairs. The St 
Petersburg Committee itself gradually took on the character and function of an
256 59 against 17 voted to raise the status of the complaint against Sivers to that of acting contrary 
to the laws of the province (Landesbeschwerde). Ibid., 273.
257 This did not affect Sivers' influential position as a member of the Landratskollegium. In any case, 
he was reinstated as Oberkirchenvorsteher in August 1809. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 235.
258 Apart from the obvious exception of the period of the Statthaltertschaft.
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upper authority on agrarian matters and other related topics in Livland and (from 
1809) in Estland. It must be remembered that this imperial institution empowered 
to oversee the affairs of the provinces orginally came into existence because the 
Livland Ritter had called on the tsar to settle their disputes rather than because 
there was a direct deliberate imperial policy to intervene in provincial matters. 
Indirectly, the Empire had caused the disputes by exerting pressure for reform 
unpopular with the Ritter.
The tsar's letter did not stop the complaints. The following month, August 
1806, fifty landowners from Wenden submitted complaints to the tsar about the 
Wenden Commission. Si vers defended the decisions of the Commission and at 
the same time wrote a diatribe against his fellow landowners and Ritter, accusing 
them of lawless arbitrariness in the past and manipulation of the new laws in 
order to remain arbitrary rulers over the peasants. "Their [the landowners'] 
interpretations would render lawful what the reform had rendered unlawful and 
the reform would be three times more oppressive than arbitrariness has hitherto 
been."259 The denunciation was another wedge for imperial intervention.
Alexander's attention, however, was being draw n more and more into the 
European arena by Napoleon. Until 1807, Russia was involved militarily in the 
allied fight against Napoleon and 1806 was a particularly active year. Alexander's 
uneasy truce with Napoleon brought some respite from 1807 to 1812 but the tsar 
led campaigns against Finland, Sweden and Turkey. Since the northern front was 
once more involved, stability in the Baltic provinces was essential. Imperial 
permission was eventually given for supplementary clauses to be added to the 
law of 1804 but a revision of the hay field taxation, which the Ritter had fought
259 For an extract from Sivers' writing, see Tobien, A grargesetzgebun g, 230-231.
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for, was excluded. By 1809, 68 amendment paragraphs had been added.
Of interest are those paragraphs dealing with farm labourers. They prove 
just how undeveloped the economy was and the reforms must be seen in that 
context. The hereditary tenure of land granted to the peasant farmer had 
narrowed the farm labourer's prospects, virtually excluding him from farm 
ownership, the basis of positive motivation towards better productivity. The 
peasant farmer's obligations towards his labourer were fixed in more detail. A 
minimum wage could not be fixed since the economy had not developed enough 
for peasants to deal in money, If married, a labourer was to receive a certain 
amount of land. If single, he was paid in board and keep and clothes.260 Thus, 
the burden of labourers lay formally with the peasant farmer and not with the 
landowner. Those labourers without a fixed position were also assigned, although 
indirectly, to the peasant farmer. He was allowed to use them as workers even 
if by doing so he exceeded his labour quota per haken.261 The landowner, 
however, reserved the right to move the Lostreiber about as labour demands 
dictated. Categories of peasant were further fixed in that house servants could 
be sold as farm labourers but not vice versa.
The most important change in 1809 was, however, the establishment of a 
Messrevisionskommission (MRK), a survey revision commission, to replace all four 
local commissions. Under a President appointed by the tsar and five members 
nominated by the Ritter, all Bauerland, not Hofsland, would be re-assessed. The 
landowner would assess the value of his land and the amount of peasant
260 The number of shirts, trousers, underwear, shoes, socks was specified. For details, see Tobien, 
Die A grargesetzgebun g, 239.
261 Which the amendments set at not less than twenty persons per haken, ten males between the 
ages of 17 and 60 and ten females between the ages of 15 and 55.
obligations. If the peasants were in agreement, the norms would be entered in the 
Wackenbucher. If the peasants disagreed, a general measurement would be made 
(or a partial one generalized). After approval by the St Petersburg Committee, 
each Wackenbuch would be published in four copies, one in the language of the 
farmer for his reference. Sivers would soon be back in an influential role as 
chairman of the St Petersburg offshoot committee which was to check the 
Wackenbucher.2*2
Despite an imperial deadline of 1815, the survey was not finished when the 
1804 reform was replaced in 1819. It was held up by various practical factors 
such as the lack of surveyors, the time needed to send the Wackenbucher to St 
Petersburg and back, the demands of war, and the continuing complaints of the 
landlords, which increased as the costs of the survey, borne by the districts where 
the revisions were taking place, escalated.
While the imperial role in the reform process in Livland was an important 
one, it must be noted that it was not dictated by comparison with the serfs in 
Russia. They enjoyed none of the rights proposed by the St Petersburg 
Committee or recommended by the tsar. The Russian serf was completely in his 
master's power and discipline,263 his labour dues were not regulated264, he had 
no right of complaint against his master, no legal representation, no protection
262 Apparently under the tsar's recommendation in March 1810.
263 In 1833 the landlord could still inflict whatever corporal punishment he found fitting as long 
as it did not endanger the serf s life.
264 Except in the western provinces, particularly White Russia and Lithuania, where land allocation 
and labour dues were regulated by the inventory system under Poland. The Russian Senate voted for 
the abolition of this regulation but it remained in force, almost by default, until 1840 when it was 
formally abolished. Soon after, however, it was reinstated. See J.Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia. 
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against eviction, transfer or sale,265 no property rights. Extraordinary services 
were also demanded of him, especially the onerous carting obligation which often 
involved winter trips of up to 600 versts in the remoter provinces,266 although 
such duties were sometimes counted as part of the barshchina. There were, 
however, two important areas of difference with the Baltic serf. Labour dues 
were not assessed according to the amount of land a peasant had been allocated. 
The landlord generally stipulated an overall sum which the peasant commune 
divided up. Even if the landlord did calculate per dwelling or unit, the peasant 
land was still allocated by the commune. Thus, the commune played a significant 
role in labour allocation. The land was seen to belong to the commune, to the 
peasants, rather than to the landowner who was acknowleged as the owner of the 
peasants. Secondly, the situation of serfs in Russia varied greatly from area to 
area267 as well as from landowner to landowner. As the economy developed, 
obrok peasants could work elsewhere and instances of such serfs accumulating 
large fortunes were not uncommon.268 While the Secret Committee had 
pondered almost fruitlessly the seemingly impossible task of emancipation for the 
Russian serf, the St Petersburg Committee had a starting point in the Baltic 
provinces in the existence of a system for the measurement of land and the 
regulation of peasant labour. In Russia, there was no such starting point. There
265 In 1771 there had been a decree forbidding the sale of serfs by public auction but serfs 
continued to be sold up until emancipation. In 1857, nobles with populated estates were still allowed  
to buy and sell serfs. I.I.Ignatovich, Pomeshchich'i i krest'vane nakanune osvobozhdeniva (Moscow, 
1910), 22-25.
266 A verst was equivalent to about 3,500 feet. One economist in the 1840s estimated that in summer 
800,000 serfs and in winter 3,000,000 (almost one-third of the male serf population) were involved in 
carting. Ibid., 453.
267 Serfs in the non-fertile provinces paid obrok. Barshchina was the preferred method in good 
farming areas. The former tended to be better off. See I.Ignatovich, Pomeshchich'i i kresfvane, 45-76.
268 J.Blum, Lord and Peasant 471-474.
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was no standardized allocation of peasant commune land. More was sometimes 
demanded of families with smaller plots since other productivity factors were 
probably taken into consideration.269 It was a system that defied measurement 
and generalization. In that it had a mathematical basis, the system in the Baltic 
provinces was controllable. Had it not been, imperial intervention in the disputes 
amongst the Ritter may not have found a practicable course of action. As it was, 
the solution presented itself in the form of a complete survey of everything that 
the past had deemed measurable, land and labour, a solution which would prove 
to be the catalyst for further reform. This would happen first in Estland.
Estland: 1804-1817
The 1804 reform for Livland went much further than the Estland Igga UJcs, 
which had not even regulated peasant obligations. In the course of 1803, 
however, Estland worked out guidelines for the regulation of peasant labour, not 
without disagreement between liberals and conservatives, but the new 
Ritterhauptmann, von Rosenthal,270 was able to guide the Landtag to a decision 
in March 1804. He was no doubt helped by the fact that the St Petersburg 
Committee had issued its reform plan for Livland just one month before. The 
Ritter were anxious to come up with a plan more suitable to their needs than the 
Livland reform.
The Estland 1804 reform, more an amendment to the 1802 Igga Uks than a 
new reform, differed from the Livland reform. The principle of regulating peasant 
obligations based on the quantity and quality of the land as well as the size of the
269 Ibid., 444.
270 Rosenthal had served in the American mlitaiy as John Rose and had supposedly been on 
friendly terms with Washington. Tobien, P ie Agrargesetzgebung, 296.
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labour force was recognized, but in practice, labour dues were to be measured 
according to the quantity of land and labour force only. The quality of the land 
was to be taken into account only when there were disputes between lord and 
peasant.271 The Estland Ritter thus hoped to avoid the difficulties and costs of 
a general survey. Permission was given for landowner and peasant to make 
private contractual agreements, imitating the Rumantsiev decree.272
Alexander ratified the new regulations on 27 August 1804 but, perhaps 
influenced by the St Petersburg Committee's reform for Livland, expressed his 
discontent over several points. The Estland reform still allowed the transfer of 
peasants under certain rather undefined circumstances273 and the tsar now 
forbade the transfer of families from an allegedly overpopulated estate without 
investigation by the peasant court and ratification of the district court and the 
Adelsmarschall that the estate was indeed overpopulated. The second criticism 
concerned part of the extraordinary services. Where the peasant did not have 
wood for his own heating at hand, his labour dues should be lessened to 
compensate for the burdensome work of getting it. Sending the peasant more 
than 40 versts274 was forbidden.
By September 1805, most of the estates in Estland had been assessed, 
resulting for the most part, it was claimed, in the reduction of peasant dues. The 
reforms were suitably amended and published in German, Russian and Estonian. 
Despite this alleged reduction, the peasant in Estland still owed his master more
271 The regulations are summarized in Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 114-118.
272 Gernet claims that many made use of this right. Ibid., 124.
273 See page 208 above.
274 A verst was equivalent to 3,500 feet. It would seem to have been not uncommon to send 
peasants distances of over twenty miles for firewood.
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than his counterpart in Livland.
Whereas in 1803 Livland had feared the Estland reform would be applied 
throughout, the Estland Landtag was now aware that the Livland reform of 1804 
could be applied to their province especially since it had been drafted by an 
imperial commission. Ritterhauptmann von Rosenthal was more and more 
convinced, as he wrote in July 1804 before imperial ratification of the Estland 
proposals, that the Livland reform plan, which was being studied in St Petersburg 
"usque ad minutissima", might be applied to Estland. "... [A]t each paragraph of 
our peasant reform, comparisons are made with the Livland reform which are of 
course not in favour of the former."275
Rosenthal was right. The comparisons started in earnest after the decree 
was imperially ratified. Carl von Stackelberg was once more active in lobbying 
for the liberals. He submitted his opinion on the new Estland reform to the tsar 
concluding that "the new reform has not improved the situation of the Esten but 
rather left them in misery." In December, Alexander let it be known that the 
Estland reform "was not considered final and should be perfected in the course 
of time." By the beginning of January 1806, von Rosenthal informed the Landtag 
Committee that he had news privately from St Petersburg "that revision 
commissions for the examination and introduction of the Wackenbucher similar to 
those in Livland were being considered for Estland."276
Russian opinion was supported by peasant unrest in the province. There 
were uprisings on several estates late in 1805, some of which had to be quelled 
by force. The peasants had expected more from the new reform, perhaps in the
275 Cited in Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 125-126.
276 Quotes in this paragraph cited in Ibid., 125-126.
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knowledge of the Livland reform and its regulation of the extraordinary labour 
services. One specific protest of the uprisings was against the threshing which the 
peasants had to do at night. The extraordinary duties were not regulated and 
were, as they had been in Livland, a source of exploitation. The Landtag of 
February 1806 passed some measures to limit the amount of threshing demanded 
of the peasants in an attempt to quieten the situation but did not tackle the 
question of the regulation of extraordinary dues in general.
Russia was keeping a watchful eye on events in its province and sent a 
mission headed by Senator Sacharov to Reval in April 1806 to investigate the 
peasant unrest and take any measures necessary to improve the situation. The 
Senator, however, left after short discussions with the Landtag Committee.
The Estland reform was also subjected to public criticism. The playwright 
August von Kotzebue277 wrote a very sharp criticism, most of which he 
apparently later retracted.278 Towards the end of 1806, Livland entered the 
discussion in the form of an article, dedicated to Kochubey and Novosiltsev, 
written by a Dorpat professor. Professor Ewers compared the "provisonal" 
Estland reform most unfavourably with the Livland reform.279 Nothing was 
undertaken on the official government front, however, until the Peace of Tilsit 
freed Alexander from military concerns. In September 1808 he instructed his new 
Minister of the Interior, Prince Kurakin280 to review the Estland reform. The fate
277 Kotzebue had been in government service in Estland and owned an estate in Livland (a gift 
from Tsar Paul after he was recalled from Siberian exile). He was pro-Russian, often critical of 
Germany. He was assassinated by a radical German student in 1819.
278 Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts. 127.
379 Ibid.
280 Gernet in his account of the reform process attributes the more aggressive attitude of the 
government towards Estland to Kurakin. Ibid., 127.
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of the Estland reform was tied more securely to the Livland model by Kurakin's 
method of investigation. Together with Druzhinin, who had worked on the 
Livland reform, Kurakin conducted a comparison of both provincial reforms. The 
results found the Estland reform insufficient and deficient and the peasant worse 
off than his counterpart in Livland. Kurakin concluded that the peasant could not 
prosper under the labour norms worked out by the Estland Landtag.281
Not only was the Estland reform now inextricably linked with the Livland 
reform, it was placed in the domain of imperial institutions by Alexander in July 
1809.282 The Committee for the Improvement of the Situation of Estland 
Peasants consisted of Kurakin, the Estland Ritterhauptmann (Otto Stackelberg), the 
Landrat von Klugen (replaced by Count Stenbock) and three members, Druzhinin, 
Ekesparre and Kaisarov, from the Livland Commission. Stackelberg and Stenbock 
were asked to react to the conclusions reached by Kurakin and Druzhinin. The 
Estland representatives maintained that the bad situation was due not to the 
reform, which had not had time to take effect, but to a combination of factors 
including bad harvests, the quartering of troops, a 400 percent increase in the 
price of salt, the ease with which the peasant was allowed to contract debts, and 
the obligation of the landowner to give the peasant advances of all sorts.
The Committee was not convinced and recommended to the tsar that the 
reform could not be allowed and a special Landtag must work out a new reform 
before 1 July 1810. The tsar ratified this decision on 20 January 1810. The new 
reform was to be based on the principles used in the Livland reform, a great blow 
to the Estland Ritter who were not prepared to grant any more than they already
281 Arithmetical calculations are summarized in Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 131-134.
282 Alexander had apparently seen for himself how imperfect the reform was during a journey 
through Estland the previous year. Ibid., 129.
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had, arguing that their economic position did not allow it. They also argued that 
more change would unsettle the peasants and lead to insubordination. By March, 
they had decided to reject any further changes. Baron Ungem Sternberg reflected 
the majority feeling: "This reform may carry the stamp of hum an imperfection and 
not stand up in every detail to the criticism of theory but the Ritter have in the 
essential points with the best intention and to the best of their ability cared for the 
improvement of the situation of the peasants, and are convinced that the future 
welfare of this class is dependent on its own industriousness."283
The Landtag closed session until June. Meanwhile, the Committee in St 
Petersburg began a statistical survey of peasants and dues in Estland. The 
conclusions pointed to the need to decrease peasant obligations and the Ritter 
decided to petition the tsar (during Kurakin's opportune absence in Paris.) The 
tsar, according to Kosodavlev, the new Minister of the Interior, refused to consider 
the petition and reiterated the deadline of 1 July 1810. The June Landtag was 
reminded by the Governor of the tsar's wish for the 1804 reform to be revised but 
by July the Ritter were once more petitioning the tsar for permission to retain the 
1804 reform. The points they were unwilling to accept were the essentials of the 
Livland reform, the very points which they knew caused their own reform to be 
compared unfavourably with the Livland reform: the right of the peasant to own 
immovable property; the measurement of peasant land; and the regulation of 
extraordinary duties. The tsar rejected the petition.
There seemed little doubt that future petitions would be futile and that it 
would only be a matter of time before the Livland reform was imposed on 
Estland. The Ritter saw their right to the land threatened and their economic ruin
283 Cited in Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 136.
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assured by the decrease in peasant labour norms and the expense of survey 
commissions. Livland's example, by this time, was proving the difficulties of such 
surveys. The solution to their dilemma was to appear, ironically, in the form of 
a seemingly much more radical measure than the Livland reform: personal 
emancipation of the serf. Having first sounded out the tsar's reaction to such a 
proposal, the Landtag of February 1811 proposed freeing the relationship of lord 
and peasant from the constraints imposed by the Livland reform. The 
Ritterhauptmann Otto Stackelberg set the tone. He regretted that the government 
had not recognized the factors which had paralysed the beneficial influence of the 
1804 reform, preferring to blame the reform itself, but at the same time recognized 
that no attempt to standardize duties and obligations could be perfect since it 
could not take into account the many varying local circumstances in order to do 
justice to each and every estate. Constant changes would bring unrest and the 
cost of the whole enterpise, as the Livland experience proved, was prohibitive. 
"All this proves that no Regulative can be found completely satisfactory and 
everyone would agree that it cannot be the only appropriate way to promote the 
welfare of the peasants, however necessary and wise the 1804 Regulative was, 
which accustomed both sides, landowner and peasant, to an exact, binding 
observation of mutual obligations, and prepared the way for legal independence. 
By its nature, every Regulative defines the dues on all estates according to the 
same scale without taking into consideration locality and other circumstances 
which cannot be taken into account and this injustice must affect both sides. 
Under these circumstances, concluding mutual voluntary contracts would seem 
to be the only just and immutable standard of setting obligations and, because it 
strengthens the bond between landowner and peasant on a legal basis and
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through mutual interest, the surest way to the welfare of both parties."284
By 24 February 1811, the Landtag had agreed that the landowner would 
renounce his right over the personal liberty of the peasant and that the peasant7s 
use of the land would be determined on a contractual basis with him. The land, 
however, would remain the unlimited property of the landowner. Although the 
tsar agreed to this new principle just one month later, it did not become law until 
1816. The delays were caused mainly by the 1812 invasion whch prevented the 
final drafting committee, imperially appointed but consisting mainly of Ritter 
meeting in Reval, from completing its work. The final draft was ratified by the 
tsar in May 1816, passed by the Landtag on 16 October 1816 and put into effect 
on 8 January 1817. The Ritter renounced their rights over their serfs, basing their 
future relationship with their peasants on mutual contracts. The land would 
remain the property of the landowners. Since 1811, a note of caution had entered 
and the transition from serf to citizen was to be accomplished gradually, over a 
period of fourteen years, "to avoid the misunderstandings and confusion which 
might arise from sudden transition" and to allow time for the establishment of 
those institutions necessitated by the change in the political and civic status of the 
peasants, especially in the police and judicial areas.285
The Estland emancipation reform, the details of which will be discussed in 
the following chapter, was the solution to a province/Empire deadlock. The 
Empire sought to apply new legislation or at least economic standards worked out 
for a neighbouring and, to a Russian way of thinking, similar German province. 
The 1804 Livland reform had not been drafted by the Landtag of Livland but by
384 Cited in Ibid., 146-147.
285 Ibid., 152.
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an imperial institution. The Ritter of Estland might have been able to accept the 
Livland 1803 draft more easily than the more liberal 1804 reform. Their reaction, 
therefore, was not so much against a supposedly more liberal Livland but against 
a more liberal imperial version of Baltic agrarian reform. The emanciption reform, 
however, should not be viewed only in the context of a desperate response to a 
severe economic threat but in the wider context of economic thinking of the time, 
which provided an alternative solution to that of the Russian government's policy. 
The context of the reform widens to include its repercussions on the other Baltic 
provinces. It defined the reform path the provinces would take, one which 
deviated from the main road of reform elsewhere. It would also affect Russian 
policy in agrarian reform.
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CHAPTER IV 
EMANCIPATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
PART ONE: ADAM SMITH AND HEINRICH STORCH
The Accumulation of Wealth
The proposal of the Estland Ritter to emancipate their captive labour force 
was very much in tune with economic thinking of the time. The relationship 
between unfree labour and productivity had occupied economic theory in Europe 
for some decades and by 1811, when Estland first proposed emancipation as an 
alternative to the Livland reform, had been clearly and widely expounded.
Until the end of the eighteenth century, unfree labour was an accepted 
economic fact of life. The century of enlightenment was also the century of 
slavery, and the economic strength of the British and French Empires owed much 
to this institution. About the same time that the members of the 1765 Livland 
Landtag were being imperially chastised for their treatment of their serfs, an 
English slave trader claimed, "Negroes are the Sinews of a Plantation, and it is as 
impossible for a Man to make Sugar without the assistance of Negroes, as to make 
Bricks without Straw."1 The French philosophes, Montesquieu as early as 1721 in 
his Lettres Persanes, had spoken out against slavery, but the abolition movement, 
led largely by Quakers in Britain, did not gain ground until the last decades of the 
century. Trading in slaves was banned in Britain in 1807 but abolition itself 
would take another few decades. In the new America, admired for its ideas of
1 Cited in Peter Gray, The Enlightenment, 420.
equality, slavery lasted longer than serfdom did in Russia.2
The moral reprehensibility of slavery argued by the philosophes and the 
Quakers was outweighed by its economic advantages. The slave trade was "the 
first principle and foundation of all the rest, the mainspring of the machine which 
sets every wheel in motion."3 In 1771, John Millar at Glasgow University 
introduced a completely new perspective.4 He argued that slavery was in fact 
unprofitable. Slaves were not trained to do anything but the most crude labour 
and constituted a most unwilling and inefficient labour force. Millar's teacher, 
Adam Smith, gave this utilitarian argument force by including it, albeit briefly, in 
his economic theory of the accumulation of wealth, published in 1776. Smith's 
perspective on slavery was purely economic, a departure from the humanitarian 
arguments of the eighteenth century. "The experience of all ages and nations ... 
demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their 
maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A person who can acquire no 
property can have no other interest but to eat as much and to labour as little as 
possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase his own 
maintenance, can be squeezed out of him by violence only, and not by any 
interest of his own."5 "...[T]he work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end
2 For an interesting comparison of the institutions of American slavery and Russian serfdom, see 
Peter Kolchin, Unfree Labour: American slavery and Russian serfdom (Cambridge, Mass., 1987).
3 Cited in Peter Gay, The Enlightenment, 420.
4 In what was published in a later edition (1779) as The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks. See 
Ibid. 416-418.
5 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London, 1874), 
Book 3, Chapter II, 298. It is clear that Smith viewed serfdom in Russia as a "species of slavery." Ibid., 
297.
than that performed by slaves."6 It is from the economic perspective rather than 
from the religious or moral one that Smith viewed the Quaker emancipation of 
their slaves. "The late resolution of the quakers [sic] in Pennsylvania to set at 
liberty all their negro slaves, may satisfy us that their num ber cannot be very 
great. Had they made any considerable part of their property, such a resolution 
could never have been agreed to."7
Wealth could not be accumulated with unfree labour, either in agriculture 
or in manufacturing. "In the manufactures carried on by slaves ... more labour 
must generally have been employed to execute the same quantity of work, than 
those carried on by freemen."8 Smith, however, who did not seem to presage the 
imminent industrial revolution, attached, in the physiocratic tradition, more 
importance to agriculture.9 Improving agricultural productivity was of 
paramount importance. "The capital employed in agriculture not only puts into 
motion a greater quantity of productive labour than any equal capital employed 
in manufactures, but in proportion to the quantity of productive labour which it 
employs, it adds a much greater value to the annual produce of the land and 
labour of the country, to the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. Of all the 
ways in which a capital can be employed, it is by far the most advantageous to
6 Ibid., Book 1, Chapter VIII, 63. Bowing to certain realities which may have seemed to contradict 
this claim, Smith acknowledged that certain economic activities could afford slavery. The colonial 
enterprises of tobacco and sugar especially could tolerate unfree labour. In those "English colonies," 
however, where the principal produce was com, the far greater part of the work was done by freemen.
7 Ibid., Book 3, Chapter II, 298. It is interesting to surmise how Smith would have commented on 
emancipation in Estland, where slaves did indeed form a considerable part of property.
8 Ibid., 537.
9 In Smith's theory of the stages of development of society, a theory shared by others of the time, 
the agricultural condition preceded the last, the commercial.
the society.”10 Smith attributed America's rapid progress to capital investment 
primarily in agriculture.11 Commerce and manufacturing were also considered 
cornerstones of the economy, but in relation to agriculture. "The greatest and most 
important branch of commerce of every nation, is that which is carried on 
between the inhabitants of the town and those of the country."12
The solution to the economic dilemma of serfdom was to be found in the 
essence of Smith's theory on the accumulation of wealth, namely the principle of 
natural liberty. This principle largely supported the principle of laissez-faire, of 
the advantages of natural economic laws over economic regulations, already 
expounded by the French Physiocrats.13 All systems of economic preference or 
privilege or of restraint hindered productivity. "Every man, as long as he does 
not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his 
own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those 
of any other man."14 The "propensity in human nature ... to truck, barter, and 
exchange one thing for another" would guarantee the necessary economic 
activity.15
10 Ibid., Book 2, Chapter V, 280.
11 Ibid., 282.
12 Ibid., Book 4, Chapter IX, 539.
13 Smith did, however, place more importance on the power of individual liberty than Quesnay 
did. In Smith's opinion, Quesnay "seems not to have considered that in the political body, the natural 
effort which every man is continually making to better his own condition, is a principle of 
preservation capable of preventing and correcting ...the bad effects of a political economy in some 
degree both partial and oppressive. Such a political economy ... is not always capable of stopping 
altogether the natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity. If a nation could not 
prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a nation 
which could ever have prospered." Ibid., Book 4, Chapter IX, 529. Smith's main objection, however, 
was to the "capital error" of the Physiocrats in "representing the class of artificers, manufacturers and 
merchants, as altogether barren and unproductive" (in contrast to the productive class of farmers). Ibid.
14 Ibid., Book 4 Chapter IX, 540.
15 Ibid., Book 1, Chapter II, 10.
First published in 1776, Adam Smith's theory was well known in Russia by 
1811. Even before it was published, Smith's ideas had been brought to Russia by 
Desnitskii and Tret'yakov, who had studied under him and John Millar at 
Glasgow University.16 On their return to Russia, both Desnitskii and Tret'yakov 
published lectures based on Smith's teachings17 and several of Desnitskii's ideas 
based on Smith were reputedly incorporated into Catherine's Second Supplement 
to her Nakaz in April 1768.18
After publication, Smith's Wealth of Nations was easily accessible to non- 
English readers in Russia. The Ministry of Finances commissioned a Russian 
translation of the work in 1808 and extracts were published in the St Petersburg 
Journal, the official paper of the Ministry of the Interior.19 The first French 
translation had already appeared in 1779-1780, followed by others in 1781,1788, 
1790 and 1800.20 The first German translations were available even earlier, in 
1776 and 1778.21 The effect on the Ritter, as evidenced by the decisions of the 
1790's Landtag sessions and the reforms of 1802-1804, was negligible. In 1803,
16 See Chapter II, p. 13 above.
17 For details of their lectures and points of congruence with Smith and Millar, see A.H.Brown, 
"Adam Smith's First Russian Followers," in A.S.Skinner and T.Wilson, eds., Essays on Adam Smith 
(Oxford, 1975), especially pp. 260-273.
18 For a detailed discussion of Desnitskii's direct and Smith's indirect contributions to Catherine's 
Nakaz, see A.H.Brown, "S.E.Desnitsky, Adam Smith, and the Nakaz of Catherine II," in Oxford Slavonic 
Papers (Oxford, 1974): 42-59.
19 Nicolai Politkovskiy received 5000 roubles for the translation. It is worth noting that the Journal 
also published extracts from the works of Bentham, Bacon and Ferguson. Bentham in particular 
enjoyed a w ide readership in Russia. According to his French translator, as many copies of Bentham's 
works were sold in St Petersburg as in London. Victor Leontovitsch, Geschichte des Liberalismus in 
Russland (Frankfurt, 1957); 43-44.
20 Although the Charles Garnier translation of 1802 is considered the best of the early translations.
21 Christian Garve's 1794 translation was considered the first dependable German one. Information 
on the translations is from Roderick E.McGrew, "Dilemmas of Development: Baron Heinrich Friedrich 
Storch (1766-1835) on the Growth of Imperial Russia," in Tahrbucher fiir Geschichte Osteuropas Neue 
Folge, vol 24, Heft 1 (1976): 36-37.
Baron Ungern-Sternberg of Livland could still argue in a pamphlet published in 
St Petersburg that slavery was inherent in human nature.22 That it took longer 
for Smith's teachings to penetrate the Ritter ranks is due to the natural time span 
between a new idea and its enforcement but also in no small part to the attitude 
of the Russian government to the new economic thinking. While the Estland 
Ritter may have found the solution to their economic problems in the teachings 
of Adam Smith23, Russian approval was a prerequisite.
Heinrich Storch
That there was imperial interest in and implicit approval of Smith's 
economic theory is evidenced in the works of one of the Russian court's official 
chroniclers, Heinrich Storch. Originally from Riga, Storch had studied at Jena and 
Heidelberg before joining the Cadet Corps as a teacher in 1787. Soon after, 
Catherine appointed him her secretary of literature and from then until his death 
in 1835, Storch enjoyed imperial favour and appointments under four Russian 
rulers. Under Catherine, Storch began the first of his descriptive works of the 
Russian Empire, using many of the statistical findings of the systematic study of 
the Empire initiated by the Academy some decades before.24 Storch's 
methodology of using statistics in analysis was relatively new but it was the
22 The pamphlet was entitled, "Do proposals to emancipate the peasants conform to Russian law?"
("1st die von einigen des Adels projektirte Einfuhrung der Freiheit unter den Bauemstande in Livland 
dem Staatsrechte Russlands conform?") Ungern-Sternberg was part of the conservative contingent on 
the Landtag who were unwilling to grant any more than what 1765 had already granted since, in their 
view, the serfs were the hereditary property of the landlord. Baltic historiography prefers to view  
Ungern-Sternberg as "mentally ill" rather than accord his extreme conservative views historical 
consideration. See, for example, Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 282-283. Compare Semevskii's 
consideration. Krest'vanski Vopros, 287-289. Extracts from Ungern-Sternberg's work can be found in 
Storch, RuBland unter Alexander dem Ersten vol VII, p.394 ff.
23 See, for example, Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 145.
24 By 1790, much of the data collected had been published by Ivan German (Benedikt Franz Johann 
Hermann) and L.Kraft.
central role he attributed to economics in the development of a nation which 
reflected the thinking of Adam Smith. As early as 1798, in the reign of Paul, 
Storch cited Adam Smith in his comprehensive work Historisch-statistisches 
Gemalde des russischen Reiches.25 Shortly after, Storch's position as court 
"spokesman" was confirmed by his appointment as Alexander's chronicler. 
Rutland unter Kaiser Alexander dem Ersten is a description of Alexander's 
policies and legislation, from a mildly critical standpoint.26 More significant as 
a source of officially approved economic thinking was the course of lectures 
Storch designed for the Grand Dukes Nicholas and Michael. Although the Cours 
d'£conomie politique was not published until 181527, after the subject had first 
been raised by the Estland Landtag, Storch had already expressed the ideas 
elsewhere. In March 1806, for example, he expounded Smith's principle of natural 
liberty to the Academy. While the German-reading public in the Baltic provinces 
had ready access to Smith's work in translation and had no need to wait for 
Storch,28 Storch's work is important as a reflection of imperial tolerance of the 
new economic thinking.29
This did not mean that the government had an open policy towards all
25 Historisch-statistisches Gemalde des russischen Reiches am Ende des achtzehnten Tahrhunderts/ 
(Riga, Leipzig, 1797-1802). For examples of citations of Smith in this work, see RE.McGrew, 
"Dilemmas of Development," 17, note 19.
26 Storch belonged to the court circle of the Dowager Empress, which was at times "a center for 
intrigue and criticism of Alexander's policies." Ibid., 41.
27 Henri Storch, Cours d'economie politique ou exposition des principes qui determinent la 
prosperity des nations (St Petersburg, 1815). Towards the end of Alexander's reign, censorship forbade 
a Russian translation of the work and the importation of other translations was forbidden.
28 For those who did not read French, the German translation did not appear until 1819.
29 It is also possible that Storch helped shape imperial policy on agrarian matters but this should 
not be overemphasized. He was not pro-emancipation despite his support of the principle of natural 
liberty. The principles expounded in the Cours were not obvious in the policies of his pupil Nicholas 
once he became tsar.
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expressions of liberalism. Censorship was still in force. In 1806, for example, 
Andrei Kaisarov, a Russian student at Gottingen University, wrote his doctoral 
dissertation on the emancipation of serfs in Russia in which he stressed freedom 
as a prerequisite of productivity. The translation of Kaisarov's work into Russian 
(from Latin) was forbidden.30 Censorship was stringent enough that the 1809 
Moscow Censorship Committee forbade certain parts of Montesquieu's On the 
Existence of Laws dealing with the ills of serfdom, which Catherine had used for 
her Nakaz.31 Acceptance of, or at least interest in, new ideas was indicated more 
in officially approved channels. In 1812 the Free Economic Society organized an 
essay competition on the relative merits of free and serf labour. The tsar indicated 
his interest by raising the original prize money offered.32 There were fourteen 
entries submitted, eleven in Russian. The first prize was awarded to Ludwig 
Heinrich Jakob of the University of Kharkov, formerly professor at Halle, who 
argued that serf labour was much less profitable than free labour.33 Garlieb 
Merkel won second prize with similar arguments.34
While Storch acknowledged the Cours to be based on the theories of 
Smith,35 he also consciously deviated from them in his attempt to adapt Smith 
to Russia.36 On the non-productivity of unfree labour, however, he was in
30 Heinz Mohrmann, Studien fiber russisch-deutsche Begegnungen in der Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
(1750-18251 (Berlin, 1959), 49. It is worth noting that Kaisarov became a professor at Dorpat University 
in 1810. He was killed in battle against the French in 1813. See Ibid., Chapter IV, Part I for more on 
Kaisarov.
31 Semevsky, Krest ianski Vopros, 286.
32 From fifteen ducats to one hundred. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 285.
33 Storch refers to this "excellent work" in Cours, Book VIII, Chap. XI, p.307, note (2).
34 Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia, 563.
35 Storch, Cours, vol I, p.III.
36 Ibid., p.IV.
complete agreement. In the process of production, slaves were no better than 
machines, and poor ones at that. "... [I]n a country where there were no workers 
other than slaves, the accumulation of capital ... could be achieved only by the 
economy, intelligence and application of their masters."37 Storch, however, 
doubted the ability of the Russian landlord to compensate for the economic losses 
caused by slavery.38
Storch very consciously used the word slavery (Vesclavage) to describe the 
state of the peasants in Russia. Only those peasants belonging to the crown could 
be described as serfs.39 This categorizaton reflects the reality of the differences 
between private and crown peasants in Russia.40 As Storch pointed out, crown 
peasants (except for those in mines and factories) had the advantage of paying 
rent rather than working corvee. Storch described the rent as moderate and 
adjustable according to the quality of the land.41 The state peasant had the right 
to own what he acquired and to dispose of such as he wished. He was protected 
by law and had judicial recourse to a tribunal, two members of which were 
elected by the peasants. Issued on application with a passport, he was allowed 
to leave the village to work elsewhere for a limited period. He was even allowed 
to join the ranks of merchants or bourgeois with the permission of the tribunal
37 Ibid., vol IV, Book VIII, p.282.
38 Ibid., Book IX, 283-288. Storch points out that the Russian landlord is experienced only in state 
service and knows nothing of enterpise.
39 Ibid., vol. IV, Book VIII, Chap. X, P.296.
40 According to statistics used by Storch, the former numbered 6,678,000 males in 1782 and the 
latter 4,675,000. Ibid., Vol 6, note XX.
41 In 1798, an attempt had been made to determine the rate of the quitrent according to the quality 
of the land. This was far from the Baltic haken system, however. The provinces of the Empire were 
divided into four classes. Peasants living in the most prosperous areas paid five roubles per person, 
the scale going down to three and a half roubles in the poorest area. J.Blum, Lord and Peasant in 
Russia, 485-486.
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and commune. Under Catherine, crown villages had been given the right to buy 
property and under Alexander this right was extended to individuals.42 Apart 
from the uncertainty of his fate -- he could be allocated to a mine or factory or 
relegated to the status of slave by being sold to a private individual, a rent-paying 
serf was more like a free labourer than a slave.43 Reality, however, did not 
always coincide with Storch's categorization. Crown serfs, he admitted, were 
often worse off than privately-owned slaves, a paradox he attributed to the fact 
that private peasants were often well managed by the landlord himself whereas 
crown peasants were at the mercy of the crown representatives.44 Many private 
slaves were well off, testifying to the fact that Russian landlords were often less 
arbitrary than landlords elsewhere.45 Legally, however, the crown peasants in 
Russia enjoyed more rights than the serfs in the Baltic did before 1804. What the 
tsar urged on the private estates of the Baltic was often only what the Russian 
crown peasants already enjoyed.
Storch did not categorize the peasants in Livland as slaves, the reforms of 
1804 having raised them to the status of serfs.46 This categorization reflected 
Russian approval of the reforms in which Russia had had a large say. Storch was 
aware of their shortcomings, however. The serfs in Livland were inferior in status 
to the serfs47 of Russia because they were still tied to the land and had to render 
service in kind rather than rent. Storch agreed with Adam Smith that corvee
42 Decree of 12 December 1801. See Chapter III, page 203.
43 Cours, vol VI, note XIX, pp.266-270; vol IV, Book VIII, Chap.X, pp.292-300.
44 Ibid., 296-297.
45 Ibid., 295.
46 Storch, Cours, 271.
47 I.e., the crown peasants.
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labour was most unproductive. Rents taken in kind or service, Smith had stated, 
were "more hurtful to the tenant than beneficial to the landlord... In every country 
where they take place, the tenants are poor and beggarly, pretty much according
to the degree in which they take place."48 Since labour dues in Livland were
$■
regulated in detail, however, Storch felt the serfs there enjoyed certain advantages 
over their Russian counterparts.49
Imperial dissatisfaction with the Estland reforms is reflected in Storch's 
note that the Estland peasants, despite the reforms of 1805, remained slaves. He 
also noted, however, that the eventual success of their discussions to emancipate 
their serfs would bring about a praiseworthy example.50
PART TWO: THE PRACTICE OF EMANCIPATION ELSEWHERE 
Denmark
Along with the theory of Adam Smith, there were several practical 
examples of emancipation, some pre-dating the 1802-1805 reform period, to 
influence the Baltic Ritter. The nineteenth century seemed to begin on a wave of 
emancipation. Not all of these were practical examples of Smith's theories, 
however. In 1788, the Danish government, after repeated attempts to regulate
48 The Wealth of Nations, Book 5, Chapter II, 657. Storch expresses similar opinions in Cours, vol 
IV, Book VIII, Chap. VIII.
49 Storch's approval of the regulated nature of the Livland reforms is in contradiction to Smith's 
theory of natural liberty.
50 Cours, vol VI, note XIX, 271-272.
relations between peasant and lord,51 finally abolished bondage or stavnsband.52 
All peasants would be free by 1800.53 Although the ideas of Adam Smith had 
been voiced on the reform commission, they had been overruled by the "positive 
discriminatory state intervention" approach.54 The need to protect the peasants 
"from the free play of economic forces"55 was evident in the ordinance of 1790 
forbidding the incorporation of peasant land into estate land and one year later 
the stipulation that all labour services were to be determined by free contract 
between peasant and lord with crown arbitration if necessary.56 Although by 
1807 sixty percent of peasant farms had become freeholds, compared with three 
percent in the mid-eighteenth century,57 labour obligations still existed and 
although regulated were done so at a very high level.58 In general, though, 
peasant lands remained in peasant hands, either as freeholds or as tenancies.
Not all peasants were protected from landlords or economic forces, 
however, since not all were farm tenants or freeholders. Between 1787 and 1801,
51 There were similarities with the Baltic provinces. A small group, some 300 landowners, owned 
90% of the land. These landowners also filled many of the administrative and chancery positions.
52 Stavnsband was not serfdom per se. Early in the eighteenth century, economic depression led 
landlords to introduce strict measures to ensure a cheap labour force. In 1733, all males between 18 
and 36 years of age (in 1764, extended to between four and 40 years of age) were required to live in 
the villages where they were born. This requirement was attached to military service. Like serfs, the 
tenant peasants were required to work three days on the lord's lands and were under his private 
jurisdiction and punishment. 1788 removed compulsory residence, compulsory labour and landlord 
jurisdiction.
53 Serfs in the duchies were all liberated by 1805.
54 Thomas Munck, "The Danish Reformers," in H.M.Scott ed., Enlightened Absolutism (London, 
1990), 261.
55 H.Arnold Barton, Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 1760-1815 (Minneapolis, 1986), 371.
56 T.Munck, "The Danish Reformers," 258.
57 H.Arnold Barton, Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 371.
58 T.Munck, "The Danish Reformers," 260.
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the cotter class increased by nearly a quarter in Denmark- By 1801, it 
outnumbered the farmers. The census of 1801 counted 261,307 persons in the 
farming class and 322,587 in the cotter class.59 There was little protection for the 
cotter class, which supplied the labour for both farmer peasants and landowners. 
Nearly twenty years after emancipation, in 1807, landowners were given the right 
to impose unlimited labour services on cotters on their estates and to exercise 
corporal punishment.60 
Sweden
In Sweden, where serfdom had never really existed, all restrictions on 
peasant freehold rights were removed in 1789. From the end of the seventeenth 
century, a series of measures had protected peasant-farmed land from 
incorporation into estate land. Crown lands were once more sold on a large scale 
to peasant tenants and in 1789 and 1809, manorial lands were sold to commoners 
and to peasants. By 1809, about thirty percent of such lands had been bought by 
commoners, of which at least a third were peasants. By 1815, over half the 
matriculated land in Sweden was farmed by peasant freeholders and nearly 
another fifteen percent by crown tenants.61 In 1806 Sweden also placed under 
Swedish law Pomerania and Rugen, where appropriation of peasant lands had 
been widespread. This gave the serfs their freedom.
Finland/N orway
Restrictions on peasant freehold rights were also removed in Finland in
59 H.Arnold Barton, Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 372-373.
60 T.Munck, "The Danish Reformers," 260.
61 H.Arnold Barton, Scandinavia in the Revolutionary Era, 371.
1789 but there the nobles retained the monopoly on manorial estates. This had 
less effect than it would have had in Sweden or the Baltic provinces since nobles 
held a much smaller amount of land and their estates were small. In Norway, 
where there were very few manors62 land was sold to peasant tenants.
Germany
In July 1807, Napoleon decreed the serfs in Poland free and Prussia, the only 
central European state outside the Confederation of the Rhine, emancipated its 
serfs in October of the same year as part of a series of reforms to revitalize the 
country after its demoralizing defeat by Napoleon. Much had been destroyed 
especially in East Prussia and agrarian reform was an economic necessity since 
landlords were unable to support their impoverished peasants. The reform 
allowed every member of every class to acquire property of any other class. On 
the surface, this was in keeping with free economic principles but in practice 
benefited only the landowners and those able to purchase land, especially peasant 
land. In September 1811, landowners were granted free disposition of their 
property. They had the right to enlarge or decrease it by purchase or sale. At the 
same time, however, an edict was passed to protect the peasant from economic 
exploitation. Peasants on rented land were to become owners and compensation 
was to be paid to the landowners.63 The landowners, however, protested 
vigorously and in May 1816, the effects of 1811 were reversed when the 
landowners were granted the right to buy peasant land and incorporate it into
62 Barton names Jarlsberg, Larvik and Rosendal.
63 The compensation norm was set at one-third of the land for a hereditary plot and half for a non- 
hereditary plot. The compensation could be paid in cash or in kind. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung 
vol II, 7. Basically, this meant that by giving up half of the land he used, a peasant became owner of 
the other half.
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their own Hofsland. The peasants in Prussia, therefore, remained economically 
dependent on the landowners and did not attain the economic security necessary 
for an increase in productivity and the accumulation of national wealth. In the 
following decade, the agricultural situation worsened as landowners bought up 
peasant plots. Peasant property decreased, the number of landless peasants 
increased.
Theory/Practice
In the two decades immediately preceding the emancipation reform, 
Estland's neighbours had provided a variety of emancipation models, none of 
them, with the possible exception of Sweden, true to the principles expounded by 
Adam Smith. State economic regulation was found to be necessary, as in the case 
of Denmark, to protect the freed peasants from exploitation. Where there was 
inadequate economic protection, peasants suffered at the hands of their more 
powerful lords, as in Prussia. These deviations from Smith's theory are partly 
signs of transition but what made it impossible for Smith's ideas to be put into 
practice was the lack of peasant property. In Denmark, the farmer class, secure 
in its land holdings, flourished; it was the landless peasants who were subjected 
to exploitation and therefore had to be protected. In Prussia, land eventually 
remained firmly in the hands of the landowners and peasants were as dependent 
free as unfree. As long as the peasants did not possess the means to economic 
independence, i.e. land, economic regulation or, in its absence, exploitation would 
be an integral part of personal freedom. Without land, example proved that the 
practice of emancipation would linger behind the theory of emancipation. h 
most cases, political considerations allowed only a partial application of Smith's
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theory. Storch, as noted, had adapted Smith to Russian circumstances, seeing no 
contradiction in applying the principle of natural liberty in an absolutist society. 
Although Smith was not an anti-monarchist, he limited the duties of a sovereign 
to defence, justice and public works and institutions. Storch accorded the ruler 
of Russia a more active role in reform. This was also the case in Prussia, where 
the monarch was persuaded by the noble ranks, the mainstay of the monarchy, 
to reform in their favour. In Denmark too, political power rather than economic 
forces determined the nature of the reforms. The Estland reforms also bore the 
transitional signs of mercantilist mixed with laissez-faire elements and were also 
subjected to absolutist direction.
PART THREE: EMANCIPATION IN ESTLAND
The emancipation measures discussed by the Estland Landtag in 1811 
received imperial approval but the work of the imperially appointed committee 
to finalize the reforms was interrupted by the French invasion and could not be 
resumed until 1815. In the meantime, doubts had risen about the practical 
wisdom of the reforms. There was the fear expressed by the 
Ritterschaftshauptmann that the uneducated peasant would be taken advantage of 
by unscrupulous landowners and he recommended postponing emancipation until 
the next generation so that the peasants could be prepared for it.64 Berg's 
petition to this effect found no audience with Alexander and no support from the
64 Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 149.
Governor General, Prince Oldenburg.65 The Governor General though did 
recommend a gradual approach so that it would take fourteen years for complete 
emancipation. The final draft was approved by the tsar in June 1816 and was put 
into effect 8 January 1817.
There were two essential pillars to the reform, on which all clauses were 
based: the Ritter would renounce all claims on the person of the serf, thus 
liberating him into an independent Stand with appropriate legal rights, and his 
relations with him would be governed by free contract. This was in keeping with 
Smith's principle of natural liberty. The second principle of the reform, however, 
was in direct contradiction to Smith's teaching. The Ritter would keep their right 
to ownership of the land. The peasant was thus freed with no means of economic 
support other than renting his labour to his lord. Smith had emphasized the need 
for the labourer to acquire property,66 to work his own land. The right of the 
freed peasant to acquire land was indeed granted by the reform but was 
unrealistic as long as the peasant started with nothing. In addition, the leases 
contracted would be of short duration. Smith had pointed out that such leases 
restricted development, considering even the French leases of 27 years, "a period 
still too short to encourage the tenant to make the most important 
improvements."67 Leases should be granted for life. In addition, the tenant 
should be protected from eviction, should not be required to perform any services
65 Although there was one Governor General for the three Baltic provinces after 1795, Estland had 
the status of a General Gouvernement from 1808-1819. The first Governor General in this period was 
Prince Peter Georg von Holstein-Oldenburg. In 1811 Crown Prince Paul August von Holstein- 
Oldenburg became Governor General and remained in this post until he returned to Germany in 1816. 
From 1819-1876, the three provinces were once more governed as one General Gouvernement. See 
Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 303, note 1.
66 Wealth of Nations Book 2, Chapter III, 299. Also page 2 above.
67 Ibid., Book 3, Chapter II, 301.
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not stipulated in his lease agreement and should not be overburdened by public 
duties and taxes.68
Opponents of the reform had expressed their doubts about the economic 
wisdom of freed peasants without land security, and Prince Oldenburg included 
these objections in the final report of the drafting period to the tsar in November 
1816. Economic circumstances, Oldenburg argued, would ensure that the peasant 
would survive without land. "As philanthropic as such a fear69 may appear, it 
is considered groundless ... by those who are convinced of the immutable truth 
that estate owners can in no way manage without field workers, if they do not 
want to lose all income from agricultural production. That they need one another, 
the landowner the peasant and the peasant the landowner — that is the safest and 
strongest guarantee for the welfare of both classes. ... The lack of necessary 
people to work the land offers the peasant the security that he will not be left 
without employment; for one should know that Estland is not densely populated 
but rather belongs to those Gouvernements that do not have enough population in 
relation to their areas."70 Oldenburg also pointed out that although the reform 
granted the peasant no land, it did grant him the right to acquire land. The 
prospect of owning land would encourage his industry, which would be of 
advantage to his lord, "who until now has had free disposition of his peasants' 
labour but from now on can only exploit them with their own agreement and on 
the basis of a contract." The fear on the landlord side that laziness and indolence, 
the "outstanding characteristics of the Estland peasants," would prevent any
68 Ibid., 300.
69 "What will the peasants do, robbed by the new measures of the land, without property being 
granted them? Will not the situation of the peasants instead of being lightened and improved become 
worse than before?"
70 The report is summarized with extracts in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 305-306.
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agricultural productivity was assuaged by the utilitarian argument that these traits 
came from serfdom and with freedom would disappear. A third group of 
objections concerned saw the serf as ill-prepared for freedom. Oldenburg did 
include a proposal for school reform with his report, on the grounds that 
education must go hand in hand with liberation71 but for more immediate needs 
proposed a transitional period during which the necessary judicial and 
administrative steps could be taken to prepare the peasant for freedom. This 
transitional law, in place until all were emancipated, bound the peasant to the 
estate and was based mainly on 1804 regulations. In addition, since the land 
belonged to the lord, he had the right of police force over all communities and 
individuals on his estate. The complete transitional period was put under 
Alexander's supervision through a committee set up in May 1816.72
The Russian authorities raised no serious objections to the reform but the 
Senate did recommend a more restrained use of expressions like "emancipation 
from serfdom" which would cause in "Estland itself and in the whole Empire 
mistaken ideas and unfounded views which attribute to the government 
intentions and opinions which it did not have."73
PART FOUR: EMANCIPATION IN KURLAND
Alexander may have begun his reign with such intentions but strong 
opposition and the advice of his more moderate allies seemed to have persuaded
71 Ibid., 307.
72 Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 156.
73 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 308.
him of the wisdom of gradual reform. The 1804 Li viand reform had been under 
detailed Russian guidance and had followed principles of economic regulation 
rather than those of economic freedom. As late as August 1814, after he had 
already approved the Estland emancipation proposal in principle, the tsar wrote 
to Governor General Paulucci: "In view of the measures now in force regulating 
the rights and duties of the Livland peasants, I find it necessary to establish a 
reform for the good of the peasants in Kurland."74 Paulucci and the Ritter of 
Kurland understood this, understandably, to be a recommendation of the Livland 
reform. The reform they submitted, however, based on the Livland model, was 
found deficient by Alexander in December 1816, after the Estland emancipation 
reform had been officially ratified.75 The tsar offered the Ritter of Kurland the 
choice between their own reform, based on the Livland model, or the Estland one. 
The dynamics of the Kurland reform, however, are not simply based on imperial 
will being imposed on the province. It was not simply a matter of Alexander first 
recommending the Livland reform to the Ritter of Kurland and then changing his 
mind when a seemingly more progressive reform for the Baltic was offered by the 
Estland Ritter. As much as the Estland reform was an important catalyst, Kurland 
itself was part of the dynamics.
Until union with Russia in 1795, there had been no agrarian reform of any 
kind in Kurland.76 Of all the serfs in the Baltic, those in Kurland were the closest 
to slave status. From 1561 until 1795, Kurland had enjoyed virtual independence
74 The text of the short letter is given in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 121.
75 The reform was ratified in June 1816 and became law 8 January 1817.
76 There had been a few individual attempts immediately preceding union with Russia. In 1770, 
Georg Dietrich von Behr granted his peasants court hearings and the hereditary right to their farms.
His reforms were motivated by the desire that "God's honour" be respected in his area and several of 
them were restrictive, and punishment severe. In 1780 and 1793, two other estates introduced similar 
reforms. For details, see Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 313-315.
as a duchy under fealty to Poland. Political and economic power, however, lay 
in the hands of the aristocracy.77 Serfdom was unlimited, the only legal restraint 
on landlord power being a ban on the death penalty. The landlord was free to 
appropriate Bauerland, evict peasants, sell individuals without land, administer 
justice, in short his power over his serfs was completely unrestricted.78
Despite total subjection, however, there was almost no peasant unrest in 
Kurland. Centuries of comparative peace had allowed Kurland to escape the 
extra demands placed on an economy by war. It had also been free from the 
burden of state taxes so that the landowners produced mostly for their own 
needs. The Ritter of Kurland lived a rather simple life style and there were few 
extra demands made on the estates for luxury.79 Since increased income was not 
essential, there were few additional enterprises on estates to burden the peasants. 
The Ritter of Kurland were reportedly benevolently patriarchal in attitude to their 
serfs80 and could afford to be as long as economic circumstances allowed.
77 Tobien describes it as an aristocratic oligarchy, especially strengthened in the period 1698 to 1758 
when there was no reigning Duke. Die Agrargesetzgebung. 311. Rechnenberg-Linten describes it as 
an aristocratic republic rather than a duchy. Zustande Kurlands, 146.
78 For more details of unlimited serfdom in Kurland, see Rechenberg-Linten, Zustande Kurlands, 
5-8. Tobien considers Rechenberg's work, one of the very few on Kurland's agrarian history, "clear 
and objective." Rechenberg was Secretary of the Ritterschaft in Kurland from 1815 to 1851, and as 
such had ready access to archives. His stance, however, is unequivocally that of the Ritter and at 
times his work is a plaidoyer for the feudal order of Stand, which he sees threatened by developments 
in the West, whose "Zeitgeist is not ours" (p.168). He defends, for example, the Russian Table of 
Ranks, whereby the rank of hereditary nobility is attained only through state service, as "a strong dam 
against the destructive influence from abroad on the institutions of the hereditary nobility" (p.166).
79 The life style of the Kurland Ritter was based on the traditional activities of war, hunting and 
socializing (for which simple farming methods left much time, although it is possible to surmise that 
the methods were simple because the Ritter preferred socializing to farming). Rechenberg-Linten, 
Zustande Kurlands. 86. The ethics of Ritterschaft lay in honour and service rather than in amassing 
profit and material possessions. Ibid., 162.
80 Ibid., 14; Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung. 319, 325. Tobien attributes this to the proximity to 
Prussia, where many from Kurland studied or served in the military. They were then influenced by  
Frederick the Great's reforms for the crown peasants in 1777. Those in Livland and Estland, on the 
other hand, had closer contacts to Russia, where unlimited serfdom set a negative example. (Ibid.) 
This, however, does not explain the lack of reform initiative in Kurland (nor attempts at reform in
Much as the Ritter way of life, live and let live,81 might have fostered 
harmony, it could not support an economy endlessly. Agriculture was devoid of 
planning. "[It] was not a science; it was no more than mechanical activity, 
requiring hands and feet but no head."82 There was no investment in agriculture, 
no planning for the future. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the 
economy was not able to withstand the extra demands placed upon it by union 
with Russia. Like the other provinces, Kurland was expected to contribute to the 
Empire's revenues by the payment of taxes and customs and to its military power 
by supplying recruits and quartering. To meet these extra demands, the Kurland 
landlords were forced to try to increase income from their estates. The normal 
burden was increased when the Empire went to war. In November 1806, for 
example, Kurland was ordered to supply and armour 12,000 men for war against 
France. The continental blockade deprived Kurland of its market for surplus com 
and in 1812 Kurland was directly affected by the French invasion.83 In 1812, the 
Senate also saw fit to impose the sales tax on estates,84 which had been imposed 
on Livland in 1783 but from which Kurland was supposedly exempted in 1798.85
Livland and Estland). Rechenberg-Linten, while acknowledging the benevolent treatment of serfs, 
attributes the lack of reform to the fact that many served in the military of different countries - France, 
Prussia, Saxony, Poland - and returned with many different ideas. This made concerted action 
difficult especially in a political atmosphere which was conducive to factionalism. (Rechenberg-Linten, 
Zustande Kurlands. 145-146).
81 Tobien describes this — Leben und leben lassen -  as a traditional Kurland motto. Die 
Agrargesetzgebung, 319.
82 Rechenberg-Linten, Zustande Kurlands, 86. See Chapter VI for details of the deficiencies in 
Kurland's agriculture.
83 The sum of Kurland's contribution to the war effort in 1812 has been calculated at 15 million 
rubles, excluding the cost of destroyed buildings and ruined harvests and the losses incurred by the 
recruitment of peasants. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 322, note 6.
84 Besitzzvechselsteuer; Krepostposchlin. See Chapter 1, p.90.
85 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 321.
Although the Ritter managed to postpone it until Alexander could personally 
decide, they had no guarantee that they would not be subjected to its considerable 
financial demands.86
Landowners sought to meet the new demands by increasing their lands at 
the expense of peasant land or by increasing corvee. Reform was not considered 
by the majority. When Ulrich von Schlippenbach, Landrat in Pilten,87 suggested 
reform for the serfs, he was not taken seriously.88 Schlippenbach's proposal 
belongs to the eighteenth century, to the era of moral indignation rather than to 
the economic era of natural liberty. 'The will of the master alone is the serfs' law. 
... Who can say the peasant is a human being and yet maintain he does not feel 
the yoke of serfdom? As a moral being he is destined for freedom and carries this 
awareness within him. But when the value of his existence is reckoned in taler, 
his labour seen as a commodity and his very being as coinage which his master 
can circulate and change at will, even the most callous person must feel the 
misery of his situation." Schlippenbach did recognize the need for legislation. 
The goodwill of landlords was no substitute. "In general, the treatment of serfs 
in our country is humane and good, and the peasant in several places is better off 
than even free farmers in Prussia and Lithuania but that pays tribute to the 
honour of the landowners in Kurland rather than to our laws, which define only 
the rights of the masters over their serfs and too little their duties towards them
86 The Ritter had had previous success in gaining a priviliged position wthin the Empire. The 
Statthalterschaft imposed 27 November 1795 was removed 24 December 1796. Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzgebung, 318.
87 "An educated and enlightened man, also known as a poet and writer." Rechenberg-Linten,
Zustande Kurlands. 20.
88 Ibid., 21.
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... " Schlippenbach's proposals were comparable to the Livland 1804 reform.89 
"A law which gives [the serf] hereditary possession of property, money and goods 
which he himself acquires; a law which allows him the possibility of acquisition 
by defining his obligations and rewarding his industry with the right to acquire 
property, such a law does not exist, only that which makes the serf and all he has 
the property of his lord."90 These proposals, however, found little support from 
landowners who had enjoyed unquestioned sovereignty over their serfs until eight 
years before. In the same year as Schlippenbach suggested these reforms, Baron 
von Wolff suggested the limitation of serfdom to the Mitau Landtag and the 
ensuing uproar caused him to have to leave the session.91
The Ritter, however, did have one area they wished reformed but for this 
they needed the Empire. Under Russia, the Kurland Ritter had lost one of their 
most important rights: the monopoly on the lease of crown lands. This had been 
an important source of revenue especially since the crown owned at least two- 
fifths of the land in Kurland.92 While the loss of their monopoly would not have 
any real effect until current leases expired, the Ritter felt that state demands were 
placing an unfair burden on the serfs. In 1805, the situation arose whereby 
provincial Ritter demanded reform on imperial estates. Ritter representatives 
reported to the Finance Minister that the peasants on crown estates were 
oppressed by the extra work demanded to cover public duties, especially 
transporting building material to the harbour towns, wood from the estates to
89 Tobien exaggerates when he describes Schlippenbach's proposal as emancipation. Die 
A gargesetzgebun g. 321, note 3.
90 Extracts from Schlippenbach's "Uber die Einschrankung der Leibeigenheit in Curland" are given 
in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 119, note 102.
91 Rechenberg-Linten, Zustande Kurlands, 21.
92 Estimates are given as two-fifths or one-third. Compare Chapter III, p.173 above.
cities, and stones for street and bridge repair. The situation was exacerbated by 
the decreasing numbers of crown peasants which meant there were fewer to do 
the same work. Some 14,000 were said to have gone over to private lands.93 
The Ritter claimed the serfs did not have enough time to work the Hofsfelder and 
the leaseholders, still mostly Ritter, had to support the peasants with loans in 
order to make sure they could still work on the estate fields. The Ritter 
representatives proposed replacing the extraordinary duties with money 
payments.94 The petition reached the tsar and on 20 February 1809, he followed 
his normal procedure and appointed a committee to investigate the matter. In 
May of the following year the committee made its recommendations: some of the 
extraordinary duties would be rendered ordinary and the rest would be replaced 
by money payments. This solution would be allowed a trial period of one year.
The Russian government had reacted positively to interference in its own 
affairs but the problem was not solved. The development took another 
unprecedented turn when the crown peasants themselves appealed directly to the 
Russian government. In 1811, a petition was submitted by six representatives of 
the crown peasants in Kurland contradicting the claims of the Ritter. It was not 
the extraordinary but the ordinary labour services which were oppressive. "It is 
the defined corvee which consumes our best time and energy in the service of the 
managers, which takes us away from our fields and harvesting. That is the 
eternal living source of our misery."95 In this period of agrarian reform in the
93 Perhaps because treatment was indeed better on private estates but more likely because they had 
been sold to increase revenues or imperially granted for services rendered.
94 To solve the problem of decreasing numbers, they proposed excusing peasant farmers from
military service in the hope of encouraging runaways from military service from other provinces. 
Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 323.
95 Cited in Ibid., 324.
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Baltic, these are the first peasant voices officially heard on the subject of their own 
oppression. Other voices, although strong in uprising, had been less articulate. 
The complaint itself and the solution proposed propelled the matter into a broader 
context and more firmly into imperial hands. The peasants suggested the 
abolition of serfdom and the replacement of corvee by annual money payments 
based on the size and quality of the land. Such rents would first go to the 
leaseholders for the hire of farm labour for the duration of current leases, on the 
expiry of which no new leases would be granted. Instead, each crown estate 
should be divided among the peasant farmers who would then pay rent to the 
government. To take care of farmless labourers, uncultivated land should be at 
their disposal for six years after which they would be able to pay rent.96
It is indicative of Alexander's open attitude to agrarian reform proposals 
that he accorded this peasant petition due consideration, assigning it to the 
Committee for Livland Affairs in St Petersburg for an opinion. In 1813, hardly a 
suitable year to consider any measures which might adversely affect state 
finances, the Finance Minister97 rejected both the committee decision of May 1810 
and the peasant proposal. The peasants, he claimed, would be unable to pay rent 
especially after the cost of war.98 By December 1814, the crown peasant matter 
was relegated to the files, probably not so much from lack of imperial interest but 
because another course of action was being pursued. In August of that year, the 
tsar had written his letter asking the Kurland Landtag for reform, based on the
96 Tobien cites from the peasant petition but summarizes most of the points. That the peasants 
specifically mentioned emancipation is not evident from the parts quoted. Ibid.
97 Now Count Guriev; the original proposal had been submitted to Count Vasiliev.
98 And, according to Tobien citing a memo written by Gur'iev to Minister of the Interior 
Kosodavlev, because Alexander wished to sell the crown lands in Kurland. Die Agrargesetzgebung, 
324-325.
Livland idea." Thus, the Ritter request for the tsar to alleviate matters on crown 
estates in Kurland had brought imperial attention, and ultimately reform, to 
private estates.
The tsar, however, may seem to have been a little behind the reform 
impetus. While approving the emancipation proposals made by the Estland Ritter 
in 1811, he recommended in 1814 to the Kurland Ritter the Livland reform of 
1804, even although there had been talk of more far-reaching reform on crown 
estates in Kurland itself in 1809. Alexander was still very much caught up in 
foreign affairs. Napoleon had taken up much of his attention in the past decade. 
His attention partially returned to domestic affairs, he took up where he had left 
off, at the Livland reform. Paulucci was convinced enough of this to persuade the 
Kurland Ritter of the necessity of a Livland-style reform. It is also feasible that 
Paulucci advised the tsar to recommend the Livland reform, judging it, justifiably, 
more acceptable to the Kurland Ritter than the Estland reform.
Due to Paulucci's advice, the Ritter had not been invited as a whole, as a 
political body, to discuss the reform. The matter was to be taken care of by a 
committee, with Ritter representation, appointed by the tsar under the 
chairmanship of Governor General Paulucci.100 This was not a total deviation 
from imperial political practice. The Livland 1804 reform had been drafted by 
imperial commission and the Estland emancipation reform had been suggested 
because the proposals of the imperial commission were unacceptable. Each 
Landtag, however, had had the chance to discuss the matter first. Paulucci
99 See page 257 above.
100 Its members, named by the tsar on the recommendation of Paulucci, included von Schoeppingk, 
von Medem, von Schlippenbach (which proves that he was taken seriously in some circles), von 
Manteuffel and two district marshals, von Folckersahm and von Fircks. See text of tsar's letter to 
Paulucci in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 121.
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reportedly felt it advisable to obviate probable factionalism on the Kurland 
Landtag.101 Experience in the Baltic had perhaps taught that the matter would 
come to imperial commission in any case. While there was always a political 
undercurrent in any province/Empire interaction, it is not clear whether the 
Kurland Ritter viewed the tsar's reform procedure as a violation of their political 
rights or whether they used the political objection to voice their dissatisfaction 
with the committee's reform.
The committee was to "draft a plan concerning the duties of the peasants 
in Kurland which would be to their good as well as to that of the landlords" and 
submit it to the tsar "within two or latest three months."102 Almost on schedule, 
the committee submitted its plan in December 1814. Its report showed a cautious 
awareness of the Estland emancipation. "To suddenly free the enserfed peasants 
would be dangerous and disadvantageous to both sides, landowners and peasants 
..." Kurland felt itself able to compare serfs with free farmers. In certain areas of 
Kurland there were farmers who had never been serfs and who owned their land 
based on enfeoffments dating back to the fourteenth century. These free farmers, 
however, were reported to be generally worse off than serfs because they led a 
"lazy, disorderly life."103 The serfs, on the other hand, were well looked after.
"The legal situation of the Kurland serf is completely different from the actual 
situation ... (and) there are very few individual cases of needy peasants in 
Kurland. In spite of the difficult circumstances at the end of the recent war, their 
welfare was protected because their landowners, although themselves
101 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 326.
102 Ibid.
103 Cited in Ibid., 328. Thus, the principle of the productivity of free labour was completely 
reversed.
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impoverished, paid their state taxes for them, as well as the dues imposed on 
them by the enemy, and they replaced stolen horses and cattle, maintained them 
in times of need and tried in every way to protect and care for them." If anyone 
needed help, they implied, it was the crown peasants."... the peasants on private 
estates are in a better position than those on crown estates." Schlippenbach's 
opinions had obviously not found support on the committee, which maintained 
that legal measures were not necessary when other guarantees were in force. 
"Although the serfs had no legal protection against arbitrary and cruel treatment, 
humanity, a sense of honour and public opinion guaranteed them protection. The 
landlord who mistreated his serfs was always loudly and generally despised, in 
fact shunned, and the Ritter insisted on his being strictly punished ..." The 
committee, however, agreed to propose reforms which would, as the tsar wished, 
protect by force of law the mutual rights and duties of landowners and peasants 
from all abuses but would also, as the Ritter wished, "maintain the tender bond 
which tied the peasants to the landowners like children to parents." 104
Although the Kurland reform was supposedly based on the Livland model, 
there were important deviations. While, as in Livland, the peasant remained 
bound to the soil, he was not guaranteed hereditary tenure. The committee 
argued that such a concession would violate the Ritter's exclusive right to the 
land. In addition to the historical right argument, they brought two more points 
to their case. Granting hereditary right of tenure to peasant farmers would 
deprive the farmless labourers of any prospect of owning land and therefore of 
any productive effort. It would further encourage the development of a privileged 
peasant class, which would not encourage industrious efforts in the advantaged
50,4 Quotations in this paragraph from citations in Tobien, Die Agargesetzgebung, 327.
or the disadvantaged class, the former because they had no need to, the latter 
because they had no prospects. The landless labour class was indeed a problem 
in the Danish reform and was fast becoming one in Livland. Instead of hereditary 
tenure, the Kurland reform proposed life-long tenure and the right to buy any 
land that burghers could buy.
Another deviation from the 1804 Livland reform, and one which showed 
the ambivalent attitude of the time, was the proposal to regulate peasant labour 
dues by free agreement. This was a principle of economic freedom applied not 
only in an economically regulated situation but to a captive labour force. The free 
contracts would be on a twelve year basis to be confirmed by court, a step 
necessary to protect the serf from exploitation. In the absence of free agreements, 
a norm would be set for corvee. This norm could be established without 
surveying the land. This was a major deviation from the Livland model.
Despite these regressive deviations, the reform did not find favour with the 
Ritter.105 A representative was sent to the tsar at the Congress of Vienna to 
request that the Ritter be allowed to propose their own reform, "one which would 
not endanger the peaceful existence of anyone."106 The fact that the tsar had not 
first given the matter to the Landtag to discuss obviously lent a political 
dimension to the Ritter request107 but it is fair to surmise that had the committee 
report found favour with the Ritter, this would not have been a factor.
Opinion on the proposed reform was divided even on the committee.
105 Rechenberg-Linten, Zustande Kurlands, 22.
106 Ibid.
107 Tobien presents only the political motivation. He does not mention dissatisfaction with the draft 
but rather the objection to the Landtag being bypassed. The fact that these objections were raised after 
th« committee report was finished, which Tobien does not clearly indicate, would support the view  
th«t there was more than political discontent involved. See Die Agrargesetzgebung, 326.
Schoeppingk in particular raised objections and Paulucci himself could not agree 
with all of it. Faced with Ritter discontent and a divided committee, the tsar 
asked the Governor General for a report on the appropriateness of the committee 
draft. Paulucci did agree that the peasant should remain bound to the soil, on the 
economic grounds that it would ensure state taxes and a rural labour force, but 
wanted hereditary tenure of land, as in the Livland reform. Making hereditary 
tenure dependent on being bound to the land should alleviate the fears of the 
landowning class. Paulucci, however, was against a land survey as a means of 
setting labour norms. It would be a costly and perhaps not completely 
standardized work, as in Livland, and since agriculture was much simpler than 
in Livland, norms could be more easily set. These arguments and other 
clarifications of the reform and the opinions surrounding it were set out by 
Paulucci and submitted to the tsar in November 1815.
Paulucci had played an important intermediary and advisory role.108 He 
had apparently recommended the committee approach to Alexander as a way of 
obviating party factionalism and opposition to reform.109 The Ritter sent 
representatives directly to Alexander at the Congress of Vienna to plead their case 
and were told by Paulucci that the Ritter would be allowed to meet as a body if 
the reform draft was rejected, a seemingly sure indication that the tsar had either 
changed his mind or Paulucci had misread him originally. Paulucci seemed now
108 Marquis Paulucci enjoyed the confidence of Alexander and seemed to have worked closely with 
him. As an Italian and a Catholic, however, he was always viewed as a foreigner in the provinces 
during his seventeen years as Governor (1813-1829). More significantly, he was viewed, even by a 
non-Ritter, as one of those "who followed their philanthropic aims with military severity ... [and] 
strove for the elimination of all differences, limited the rights of the privileged classes for the good 
of the oppressed, without being very exact about the way they did it, hated everything which smacked 
of medieval superstition or feudalism ... Geographical and historical boundaries were crossed with 
cosmopolitan enthusiasm...” Paulucci was instrumental in pressurizing the Baltic Ritter into reform.
For a short contemporary portrayal of Paulucci, see Eckardt, P ie baltischen Provinzen, 244-249.
109 See Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 329.
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to have foreknowledge of Alexander's preference for the Estland reform.
It took Alexander one year to react. In that year, in June 1816, he gave his 
formal approval to the Estland reform. In December, shortly before it became 
law, Alexander wrote to Kurland: "Although I recognize the Livland 1804 plan as 
the basis of your plan submitted for the improvement of the peasants in Kurland 
... it seems to me that the proportion of dues to be allocated the peasants on the 
basis of the composition of the plots cannot be achieved without a survey and 
evaluation of the land."110 Alexander thus reminded the Ritter of Kurland that 
a survey was an integral part of the imperially approved Livland model. The 
Estland Ritter had also tried to use the Livland model without a survey. He then 
gave the Landtag the choice between the plan they had submitted, imperial 
approval of which, however, would seem to be conditional on a survey, and the 
Estland reform, which, perhaps mindful of Russian Senate advice, he did not refer 
to as emancipation.
Alexander's choice represented two different ages, eighteenth century 
economic regulation and nineteenth century economic freedom. It is unlikely that 
the tsar was trying to force the Estland reform model on Kurland. If he had so 
wanted, he could have ordered them to discuss a reform plan on the lines of the 
Estland model. The real disincentive to the Livland reform was not so much the 
supposed wish of the tsar for the Estland reform but the prohibitive costs of the 
surveys involved in the Livland model. Adam Smith had referred to the 
"laborious and expensive" expedient of surveying and valuing the land for tax 
purposes (the "simple and obvious" expedient being a register of leases) and 
warned that the survey and evaluation of all the lands in Bohemia was said to
110 Alexander's reply is in Samson, Historischer Versuch. 121-122.
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have been the work of a hundred years.111 Livland had not provided an 
encouraging example. In fact, it may have been problems there which made the 
tsar reconsider the Estland reform as a model for the Baltic area. Alexander's 
support of the Livland reform had been consistent, however. He had allowed no 
variations from it in Estland. In 1809, he reaffirmed its principles by establishing 
the overall survey commission in Livland itself. He gave Kurland a choice. The 
Livland reform would be acceptable as long as it was applied in toto, inclusive of 
survey. There is nothing to suggest that had the Kurland Ritter opted for the 
Livland model with the survey, the tsar would not have accepted it. At the same 
time, the tsar must have known from the Estland experience, the Kurland Ritter 
themselves and Paulucci's advice that the Ritter would not accept the survey. 
Alexander's choice perhaps showed political shrewdness. The disincentive of the 
survey must have been quite strong for the Kurland Ritter to even consider the 
emancipation implied by the Estland reform so soon after centuries of unlimited 
power over their serfs.
The tsar's reply to the Kurland Ritter letter had been written 5 December 
1815. Two weeks later Paulucci appeared before the Kurland Landtag and argued 
against all he had argued for in November 1815. Serfdom was not in keeping 
with the times, nor did its abolition require preparation. There was also the 
question of Baltic rivalry. Kurland should not be seen to lag behind Estland. 
Paulucci convinced the Kurland Ritter that the Estland reform was what the tsar 
really wanted. In April 1817, 236 against 9 voted to adopt the Estland proposal.
Behind this vote lay political considerations. Hum anitarian or enlightened
111 Wealth of Nations Book 5, Chapter II, Part II, 659.
ideas alone could not have affected such a swift change from unmitigated serfdom 
to emancipation in just two decades, and economic circumstances had not had 
enough time to become pressing. "Under the rule of the duchy anyone who even 
dared to propose limitations to the arbitrary power [of the Ritter] would have 
been branded a traitor to his fatherland."112 While it may be true to assert, as 
Rechenberg does, that there would have been no reform without Russia's 
intervention,113 it must not be overlooked that it was the Kurland Ritter 
themselves who invited imperial intervention when they demanded reform on 
crown estates in Kurland. This invitation was prompted by the new burden, 
mostly economic, of belonging to the Russian Empire. The Empire had changed 
matters in the province, and the province sought to redress this. As soon as the 
Empire was involved, a new dynamic of province/Empire interaction was set off, 
just as in Livland and Estland. Provincial request required imperial response 
which in turn implied provincial reaction or compliance. The alternative of non- 
compliance was not politically feasible. As a province, Kurland could not afford 
the enmity of the Empire. The politically feasible solution was to comply but 
simultaneously seek political concessions from the Empire which would ease the 
position of province within the Empire. The Kurland Ritter had three petitions 
which till this point had not found favour with the Empire and they determined 
to submit them opportunely with their agreement to emancipation. The Ritter 
wanted the sales tax on estates (Besitzwechselsteuer) abolished, the monopoly of 
leases on crown estates restored and state taxes reduced.114 What was new was
112 Rechenberg-Linten, Zustande Kurlands, 20.
113 Ibid., 21.
114 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung. 334.
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the expressed desire to set up an autonomous upper authority for justice and 
administration of the three Baltic provinces. There would be one judicial 
authority, under a President appointed by the tsar, and one administrative under 
the Governor General for administration, police, finance, commerce, industry, 
school and church. This proposal, however, did not get further than the Landtag 
in April 1817. Opinion was divided and lack of unity forced the matter to be 
dropped. It would not be taken up again until the Livland Landtag made a 
similar proposal in 1837.
The other three petitions were partially granted. The Besitzzvechselsteuer was 
abolished115 and state taxes would not exceed those imposed on other parts of 
the Empire. The Kurland reform was approved by the Senate and imperially 
ratified by 25 August 1817. One year later, on 30 August 1818, Alexander came 
to Mitau to celebrate its promulgation.
PART FIVE: EMANCIPATION IN LIVLAND
By 1817, two of the three Baltic provinces, with imperial approval, had 
emancipated their peasants. Livland was still under the economic regulation of 
the 1804 imperially approved reforms. In fact, the basis of the whole reform, the 
survey of land, was still in progress. The interests of standardization alone would 
indicate that emancipation in Livland was inevitable. Although imperial policy 
still seemed to support the 1804 reforms, as evidenced by the choice given to 
Kurland, it was clear that the tsar also approved of the new emancipation reforms.
115 It had supposedly been abolished for Kurland 22 August 1798 but this had been disputed.
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Even if there were no imperial intention to force Livland to adopt a similar 
reform, the pressure of example would be strong enough to undermine the system 
in Livland. It would be very difficult to maintain a completely different 
philosophy and practice alongside neighbours of the same nationality, language, 
religion, culture and history.116 Perhaps of graver concern would be the 
influence of neighbouring freedom on the peasants in Livland. T here  w as 
enough doubt about economic security to allow for the airing of new ideas. The 
1804 reform had not solved the economic problems, which increased — as in 
Kurland —in proportion to imperial demands. Livland was required to furnish 
20,000 men for war against France in 1806. The continental blockade in 1808 
deprived the Baltic of one of its most important export markets,117 causing grain 
prices to fall. The value of estates consequently decreased118 and landlords were 
forced to seek more credit. Although increased imperial demands contributed to 
the deterioration in the economic situation in Livland, landowner credit was 
substantially supported by imperial loans.119
By the time the Estland emancipation reform was ratified, "not one person 
[in Livland] spoke out in the press or on the Landtag against emancipation."120 
The "times when this word was detested in our fatherland, when for centuries 
only that which was inherited from our ancestors was considered salutary, when
116 See Samson, Historischer Versuch, 123.
117 In that year the value of exports from Riga fell to less than half the 1803 level. For export
figures for Riga from 1803 to 1820, see Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 276.
118 For detailed figures for the years 1761 to 1829, see Hagemeister, Geschichte der Landguter 
Livlands, 26.
119 For detailed figures of imperial loans, see Hueck, Darstellung der landwirtschaftlichen 
Verhaltnisse, 137.
120 Jegor von Sivers, Zur Geschichte der Bauemfreiheit in Livland. Wiederabdruck einer Reihe von  
Flugschriften und Zeitungsartikeln aus den Jahren 1817-1818 (Riga, 1878), XIX.
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he who dared to see what was venerable as obsolete could expect to be branded 
a dangerous innovator" had been in the course of a few years replaced by times 
"when every page of m odem  history warns us to to take the consequences of the 
causes, when a more benevolent sense of hum an happiness and hum an rights is 
more at home amongst us, when it can finally be permitted to discuss this 
topic."121 The Ritter were fully aware of the pressures upon them to deal with 
emancipation. "...[0]ur agriculture is threatened by a crisis which can only be 
solved by the freedom of the peasants; ...the spirit of our century cannot be 
resisted, it is our duty to take up problems which will otherwise fall on our 
children; ... this great step will not be against the will of our ruler, since our 
neighbouring province is involved in it with the highest permission; ... the 
inevitable cannot be avoided for long, sooner or later that must happen which will 
be salutary for all..."122
The inevitable, however, was not necessarily the Estland emancipation 
model and while there were few voices raised against emancipation as such, there 
was disagreement about the actual modality of emancipation. There were those 
who believed a different model was necessary for Livland, one that had yet to be 
worked out. "...[H]ow shall it [emancipation] happen, how shall it be organized 
so that everything which has guaranteed our existence up until now will not be 
lost in chaos? ... No one has yet attempted to answer this question."123 Heinrich 
von Hagemeister attempted an answer in August 1817 and the debate occasioned 
by his proposal continued vigorously in the press until the Landtag in June of the
121 Heinrich von Hagemeister, "Vorschlage, alien livlandischen Gutsbesitzem zur Beherzigung 
empfohlen" (13 August 1817) in Jegor von Sivers, 2.
122 Ibid., 3.
123 Ibid.
following year.124 At the core of the debate was the land question. As one 
landowner acknowledged openly, even at the end of the debate: "The right to 
serfdom is an inhuman one, which all landowners in Livland would renounce, if 
only there was no need to fear the loss of the all too hum an right to hard-earned 
property."125
Hagemeister and the majority of Livland landowners, like their 
counterparts in Estland, took for granted their unlimited right to the land, as 
reaffirmed in the Estland emancipation reform. Those few who openly questioned 
this right were not of the Ritter ranks. Merkel did suggest that where once the 
peasant had belonged to the land, the land should now belong to the peasant.126 
There was a suggestion published anonymously that the peasant should be 
allowed to purchase the land with the help of credit set up by the government, 
as in Denmark.127 A surveyor of crown lands purported to speak for the 
peasants when he also suggested peasant purchase of land,128 but these 
proposals were not taken up in the debate. The principle of landownership was 
never seriously threatened, especially since it was a privilege imperially upheld.
The landlord's exclusive right to the land, however, as noted earlier, was 
incompatible with the principle of laissez-faire, which the Estland reform
124 The debate took place in the press from August 1817 to June 1818. Twenty-seven articles, 
mostly from Neue Inlandische Blatter, were collected and reprinted by Jegor von Sivers in 1878. See 
note 121 above for full title.
125 Peter von Sivers, "Auflosung einiger Hauptknoten zur Auflosung der Leibeigenschaft in 
Livland" (1 June 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 167.
126 Garlieb Merkel, "Ansichten tiber die Art, wie die personliche Freiheit den Bauren [sic] des 
Livlandischen Gouvemements zu ertheilen ware" (4 December 1817) in Jegor von Sivers, 63. Merkel's 
ideas progressed with developments. In 1797, he had advocated a reform that would protect the right 
of the Ritter to the land. He had also supported hereditary tenure. See Chapter III, p.180 above.
127 A.B.C. "Eingesandt" (11 May 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 147.
128 CJM.Schroeder, "Ideen und Vorschlaege zur Realisirung eines Grundeigenthums fuer die 
Livlaendischen Bauem" (23 February 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 96.
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purported to represent. While the Estland reform process had concerned itself 
little with the fate of the peasants without land in a free market, the matter was 
a central point in the reform debate in Livland and the various proposals mooted 
in the press indicate attempts to reconcile incompatible elements, to mould laissez- 
faire into the strictures of landlord privilege or landlord privilege into the system 
of laissez-faire. One of the main reasons for concern in Livland about the 
economic plight of the freed peasant was the fact that the serfs there would be 
freed from a protected economic situation where they had secure hereditary 
tenure of the land. Although personally unfree, the Livland serf enjoyed a certain 
amount of economic security. The Estland reform would grant personal freedom 
and economic insecurity.
The Emancipation Debate in  the Press
In his attempt to answer the question of how emancipation should be dealt 
with in Livland, Hagemeister tried to combine economic protection with personal 
liberty. He was not an ardent supporter of 1804, pointing out that peasant 
discontent with it was a strong motive for a new reform,129 and he fully 
subscribed to the principle of landownership as expressed in the Estland reform. 
"To each his own"130 was the formula whereby he stressed that each should keep 
what was his, the landlord the land and the peasant his labour. He did, however, 
believe that without security of land there were economic dangers in 
emancipation and proposed to protect the peasant with hereditary tenure, which
129 Hagemeister cites the peasant opinion of the 1804 reform as "the same old horse with a new  
saddle." Hagemeister (13 August 1817) in Jegor von Sivers, 2.
no »je£jem das Seine." Ibid., 3. This would become a motto of the conservatives, of those who  
strove to exclude the peasants from any land ownership at the expense of the landowners.
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was an integral part of the 1804 reforms. Hagemeister viewed 1804 as a 
preparation for freedom, as a bridge to emancipation, and as such an integral part 
of emancipation. If the Estland emancipation was applied, it would cancel 1804 
completely and remove an economic right already granted to the peasant. "Free 
competition may be more applicable where hereditary use of the farm has not 
been granted to the peasant farmers by already existing laws."131 Hagemeister 
also argued that emancipation without land security was not economically 
advantageous to the country. Limited leases would encourage the peasant to farm 
from a short-term perspective without long-term plans for land improvement. 
Good land would be systematically exhausted.132 Other defenders of economic 
protection shared this view. ’The shorter a lease, the greater the concern about 
immediate profit and the less attention paid to long-term agricultural 
planning."133
The majority of Ritter were opposed to hereditary tenure. Their opposition 
was motivated by two main considerations, which varied in emphasis according 
to the standpoint. The Ritter in Kurland had used the same arguments when 
removing the hereditary tenure clause from their version of the Livland 1804 
reform.134 There were those who viewed it as a violation of the landowner's 
exclusive right to the land, as a subterfuge for forcibly taking the landlord's land 
from him to give to the peasant. "What is hereditary tenure (Erbpacht) really but 
a modifed hereditary ownership (Erbbesitz)?... Hereditary tenure is nothing more
131 H.von Hagemeister, "Bemerkungen zu dem in Nr.9 der inlandischen Blatter, unter der 
Unterschrift: 'Liickenbutzer/ enthaltenen Aufsatze" (23 March 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 113.
132 Ibid.
133 Karl von Bruiningk, "Einige Bemerkungen zu der in Nr.3 der Inlandischen Blatter erschienen 
Gegenerklarung des Herm Landrichters von Bock" (2 February 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 91.
134 See pp.266-267 above.
than a purchase, with the difference that the price will never be paid."135 Baron 
von Buexhoewden pointed out that possession of the land had been gained 
through the "most sacred contracts" and since the land was the incontrovertible 
property of the landowner, his free administration of it could not be limited by 
law.136 In May 1818, shortly before the Landtag discussed the issue, 
Buxhoewden spoke for many when he claimed that granting the peasants 
hereditary use of the land would cancel out the property rights of the lord. Like 
Rennenkampff, Buxhoewden believed that hereditary use of the land was 
synonymous with hereditary possession of the land. Hereditary tenure had been 
acceptable under serfdom, since serfdom was the condition governing it. When 
this condition was removed, the right to unlimited possession of the land should 
be restored to the landowner.137
It was hardly surprising that hereditary tenure was a policy with little 
support. It had never received the vote of the Landtag. The 1803 reform had 
implicitly allowed appropriation of peasant land (although the Estland 1802 
reform had supported hereditary tenure). It was the 1804 reform, drafted by 
imperial commission, which had established hereditary tenure of land for the 
peasants.138 A new reform would give the Ritter a chance to remove a policy 
they had never really supported.
The second consideration against hereditary tenure had less conservative
135 Gustav von Rennenkampff, Bemerkungen iiber die Leibeigenschaft und ihre Aufhebung 
(Copenhagen, 1818), 124-125. Jegor von Sivers indudes an extract (pp.2-56) which mainly reiterates 
the known arguments against serfdom rather than the specific economic suggestions to be found in 
the latter half of the book.
136 Peter von Buxhoewden, "Ein Wort iiber das Recht des Erbherren auf den Boden" (6 April 1818) 
in Jegor von Sivers, 123-124.
137 Peter von Buxhoewden, "Gegenerklarung" (18 May 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 150-151.
138 See Chapter III, p.220.
roots. It was stressed by the liberal group led by August von Bock who were 
motivated less by the perceived violation of landlord privilege than by economic 
considerations. For Bock, hereditary tenure was a privilege given to some 
peasants at the expense of the majority, whom it deprived of the prospect of land. 
This was what Denmark had experienced but Bock used the example of 1804. It 
meant that potentially good farmers were excluded from farming by often less 
able hereditary tenure holders.139 This argument was also used by the first, 
more conservative, group, who used the plight of the underprivileged to 
strengthen their defence of Ritter privilege. Buxhoewden, for example, who 
believed hereditary tenure was a violation of a sacred right, argued that "Freedom 
does not mean making the farm-hand a slave of the farmer and creating two 
classes from one."140
Unlike Hagemeister, Bock was not disturbed by removing a right already 
granted. For him, 1804 was not a bridge to freedom. "I also think the present 
situation is a transition to something better, not in the form of a bridge, however, 
but much more in the form of a crutch which can be confidently thrown away as 
soon as one can and wants to walk on healthy feet."141 Bock firmly believed in 
Smith's principle that free competition not laws must be the only economic 
regulator. "Free competition will help everywhere and where in force no-one who 
wants to work can end up in need ... privileges and monopolies suffocate
139 Heinrich August von Bock, "Gegenerklarung auf die in Nr.30 der Inlandischen Blatter v.J. 
erhaltene Erklarung der Herm K.von Bruiningk" (19 January 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 74.
140 P.von Buxhoewden (6 April 1818), Jegor von Sivers, 124.
141 H.A.von Bock, (19 January 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 76. Bock's choice of image was influenced, 
or enhanced, by the rhyme of KrUcke (crutch) and Brticke (bridge). In his reply, Bruiningk wrote: "... 
in no way could I consider the good and salutary that we have, just because of a rhyme, as a crutch 
which can be thrown away." Bruiningk, (2 February 1818), Jegor von Sivers, 92.
generally all industriousness and seldom bear good fruit."142 Bock supported 
the Estland model by which the economic fate of the peasant and lord should be 
regulated by free contracts on a free market, but however much Bock subscribed 
to liberal economic practice, he and other like-thinking Landtag members were 
firmly committed to Ritter privilege. "Prosperity founded on the destruction of 
another can never bring any good."143 Bock coined the phrase "Land mein Zeit 
dein" to summarize the fact that the land belonged irrevocably to the landowner, 
while the peasant was at liberty to hire out his time.144 No further laws than 
this were necessary.145 Other contributors stressed the economic wisdom of such 
an approach. It would work because the landowner and peasant were mutually 
dependent. "Whoever has cultivable land needs, seeks and finds hands; whoever 
has free hands needs, seeks and finds cultivable land."146
Not all opponents of hereditary tenure or other land security for the 
peasants147 were against 1804. One of the most prominent names in Baltic 
history, Reinhold Johann Ludwig Samson von Himmelstiem had much praise for
142 H.A.Bock, "Noch einige Worte auf Veranlassung der von Hagemeisterschen Vorschlage" (8 
December 1817) in Jegor von Sivers, 68.
143 Ibid., 66.
144 Ibid.
145 Bock may have changed his views. Tobien mentions his commentary on the 1812 essay 
competition of the Free Economic Society, wherein he supposedly stated that a free worker with no 
land or property, living from hand to mouth, would have a less secure existence than a peasant tied 
to the land. The solution would be a free peasant with the use of land paid in cash or kind. Tobien, 
Die Agrargesetzgebung, 286.
146 "Lfickenbfitzer zu einer viel besprochenen Materie, an Niemand besonders gerichtet" (2 March 
1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 104.
147 Hereditary tenure was not the only form of economic protection proposed. Peter von Sivers, 
for example, recommended life-long rather than hereditary tenure (1 June 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 
183. Kurland had also proposed life-long rather than hereditary tenure in their adaptation of 1804. 
See p^feibabove. Karl Budberg had suggested a compromise of 25 years of economic protection, based 
on the Wackenbuch regulations, before the introduction of free contracts. K.Budberg, "Ansichten fiber 
die Art, wie die personliche Freyheit den Bauem des Livlandischen Gouvemements zu ertheilen ware” 
(9 October 1817) in Jegor von Sivers, 23.
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1804.148 Samson had studied law at Leipzig at the same time as Merkel, for 
whom he had a high regard. Samson, in his own words, was "vividly moved by 
Die Letten. Amongst the academic friends and countrymen a fraternity came into 
existence whose aim was to do everything possible in the future for the 
improvement of the peasant class."149 As notary for the Ritterschaft from 1802 
to 1807 Samson was present at and recorded the discussions of the 1803 and 1806 
Landtag sessions, which had concerned themselves with the question of reform 
and the behaviour of Friedrich von Sivers, a man much admired by Samson. 
Samson believed that 1804 had already conferred freedom. "We can say out loud: 
the peasant is free, because he is."150 Due to regulated labour, hereditary tenure, 
protection of the law, the right to acquire and possess property, the serf was 
actually a "free glebae adscriptus", deprived only of mobility.151 If necessary, 
however, "let us free the bird, which prefers the blossoming spring at the top of 
its native tree to a delicate cage, the sparse nourishment of the open air to the 
ample food of an excellent dwelling, let us free him into God's wide sky to rejoice 
in the spring, in his existence!"152
The "delicate cage" was preferred by August von Sivers, who argued that
148 Samson would later judge 1804 much more harshly. In 1838, he wrote, "I recognize no merit 
whatsoever in the 1804 reform. I concede rather that it was the signpost to what must eventually 
come." Historischer Versuch, 149.
149 Jegor von Sivers, dedication to RJ.L.Samson von Himmelstiem, XII. The sixteen Baltic students 
at Leipzig with Samson and his brother, who might have formed the "fraternity," are listed p.XI.
150 R.J.L. von Samson, "Uber Herm v. Hagemeister's Vorschlage, alien Livlandischen Gutsbesitzem  
zur Beherzigung empfohlen" (3 November 1817) in Jegor von Sivers, 33.
151 Ibid., 34.
152 Ibid.
there was no need for a new reform.153 "... [We] have no reason to allow 
changes, which would throw out everything that has gone before, immediately 
after the introduction of a new reform, which our monarch most certainly does 
not want to snatch away from us. What is driving us? Are the arrangements of 
the neighbouring provinces really so beneficial to both sides? W hy not wait to 
find out what results the gradual introduction of these arrangements will have at 
the end of the set time period of fourteen years? ... W hy should we rashly give 
away the certain good for the uncertain?"154 As far as August von Sivers was 
concerned, there were only two valid reasons for giving up 1804. One was the 
fear of peasant unrest, but Sivers considered this fear unfounded due to the 
gradual nature of the reforms in the neighbouring provinces. He did not say 
what the second was. "I would rather not touch on the second reason."155 One 
can only surmise that he was referring to imperial pressure, a subject best not 
dealt with in the press.
August von Sivers was perhaps the only one in the debate whose argument 
had internal consistency. Those, like Hagemeister, in favour of hereditary tenure 
were trying to combine economic regulation with personal freedom. The 
conservatives refused to consider any land concession to the peasants and 
conveniently used the principle of free competition to support their arguments for 
continued privilege. Those more genuinely committed to liberal economic theory 
opposed hereditary tenure as conservative economic practice but upheld Ritter
153 It is difficult to view August von Siver's motivation as anti-peasant since he was one of those 
Landtag members w ho supported his brother Peter's proposal for emancipation in 1803. See previous 
chapter p.215. Also, Jegor von Sivers, XXIII. (August was the grandfather of Friedrich von Sivers. 
Ibid., XXII.)
154 August von Sivers "Ein Wort zu seiner Zeit" (26 January 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 81.
155 Ibid., 83.
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privilege in the form of landownership. The categorization of conservatives and 
liberals was unclear. Those who favoured a liberal economic policy often had 
conservative motives, while those who supported economic regulation did so out 
of a desire to help the peasants, which meant some sacrifice of land rights.156
As long as the land belonged exclusively to the landlord, any attempt to 
apply Smith's theory would be inherently inconsistent. The economic liberals were 
forced to allow elements of not only regulated economy but of feudalism in the 
practice of their theory. Immediately after his poetic imagery of the freed bird, 
Samson, for example, asked the sober question: "But should the freed peasant stop 
corvee altogether?" Samson himself found corvee "a leftover from slavery" and 
agreed with current economic theory that corvee was work badly and unwillingly 
performed, the most expensive form of labour and harmful to both peasant and 
lord.157 Still, he conceded that "personal freedom and corvee are not 
incompatible." Free contracts could be based on labour, produce or money.158 It 
was obvious to most that free contracts in the free market would probably have 
to be based on corvee or kind rather than money since the peasants did not have 
the wherewithal to transform their labour or products into cash, and more 
importantly, indebted landlords had no cash to pay for peasant labour. The 
sparsely populated province did not have enough markets. One contributor noted 
that he had offered money rent to his peasants but they had refused because they 
would not know how or where to convert their products into money. In addition, 
currency in the early nineteenth century was far from standardized and there
156 Tobien does not agree with Jegor von Sivers' categorization. Sivers names Bruiningk and 
Hagemeister the liberals, while Buxhoewden is labelled conservative. Jegor von Sivers, XXIII. Tobien 
sees the defenders of 1804 as the conservatives. Tobien, Die Agrargesetgebung, 339 and note 4.
157 Samson (3 November 1817) in Jegor von Sivers, 33.
158 Ibid., 34.
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were many types of coins with different values in circulation, which would 
confuse the peasant.159 Peter von Sivers, however, had successfully employed 
farm labourers on a cash basis since 1805 and had published an article on this 
venture in 1816.160
Another leftover from serfdom which many thought should be retained in 
the new economic sytem was the Wackenbuch. It would form a general guidance 
for drawing up free contracts and would be of particular help to the peasants. 
Bock rejected the Wackenbuch regulations as the basis for free contracts. There 
could be no general norm to cover the "infinite" number of local variations. Only 
free contracts could regulate these.161 The issue of Wackenbuch regulations 
forming the basis of free contracts would be an important part of the Landtag 
discussion. Rejecting the Wackenbuch would nullify the work of the 
Messrevisionskommission, a difficult move to support in view of the tremendous 
cost expended on it.
The one common element which united all these voices was the belief in 
the unlimited right of the lord to the land. In fact, there was the feeling that 
emancipation was the one sure way to imperial affirmation of their land rights, 
rights which they perceived as limited by 1804. "Should the landowners of 
Livland renounce their right to the serfdom of their peasants, his imperial majesty 
would restore to the landowners the unlimited exercise of their legally acquired 
rights to their properties."162 This is the most convincing of all the arguments 
used in favour of emancipation: freedom of the serfs in return for unconditional
159 A.B.C. "Eingesandt" (11 May 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 145-146.
160 Jegor von Sivers, XX.
161 H.von Bock, (19 January 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 75.
162 P.von Sivers, (1 June 1818) in Jegor von Sivers, 176.
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disposition of property. Samson would later sum up this attitude from the 
vantage point of two decades hindsight: "The 1804 reform took from the 
landowner what he legally and justly had and unconditionally owned and gave 
him what he should never legally and justly have and unconditionally own. It 
took from him the free disposition of his property and left the peasant in 
bondage."163 Emancipation would return to the landlord what was rightfully 
his.
Gustav von Rennenkampff
The paradoxical interdependence of privilege and freedom is well 
represented in the debate in the press but also in a book published in May 1818 
towards the end of the debate and just before the Landtag dicussions.164 The 
author, Gustav von Rennenkampff, had studied agrarian relations elsewhere, 
particularly in Denmark and Germany. Rennenkampff s proposals have been 
highly praised as "appropriate and attainable," "far ahead of their time," 
displaying "a deep understanding of agrarian-political organization, a far-sighted 
view of what is worth striving for and what is practicable..."165 His signficance, 
however, lies more in what he represented. Like many of his fellow Ritter, he 
was an ardent supporter of Ritter privilege who sought to effect a reform which 
would fit into feudal concepts of right as well as nineteenth century ideas of 
equality. Although Rennenkampff argued most persuasively against serfdom,
163 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 148.
164 Gustav von Rennenkampff, Bemerkungen ueber die Leibeigenschaft in Liefland und ihre 
Aufhebung (Copenhagen, 1818).
165 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 342, 344.
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using emotional arguments of moral indignation166 as well as the more rationally 
expounded economic ones, the society he envisaged was not based on equality 
but on Stand. 'The servant should serve, the higher ranks should rule ...."167 
Civil freedom should be enjoyed by all estates of the state but respect, power 
and influence should only be enjoyed by those who know how to use them in a 
salutary fashion. The appropriate regulation ... of the rights and duties of each 
Stand will protect against all restrictions and there will be no need for welfare 
measures to protect the supposedly weak against the strong. If there are clearly 
defined limits to the rights of each Stand, there can be no stronger or weaker, 
since only deficient laws make one Stand stronger than another, and not wealth, 
Stand, or property."168 Although the peasant should rise in status, "anything 
which encourages him to raise himself above his Stand ... or allows him to think 
that he is the most useful and significant in the state, or justifies him in setting 
himself as his better's equals must all be avoided."169 Treating a man higher 
than his station in life stems from "fanatic philanthropy, an evil which even the 
wisest governments have not always managed to avoid if it was part of the spirit 
of the times, like an epidemic disease in the air ...,,17°
Not only was the status of the peasant strictly defined in terms of Stand, 
but his contribution to society was also defined. Every effort should be made to 
keep him to his, admittedly difficult and monotonous, work in the fields.171
166 It is these arguments which are represented in the extract in Jegor von Sivers, 193-232.
167 Rennenkampff, Bemerkungen iiber die Leibeigenschaft, 206, footnote.
168 Ibid., 206.
169 Ibid., 208.
170 Ibid., 205-206.
171 Ibid.
Rennenkampff believed Livland's future economic well-being lay in agriculture. 
It could not compete with the established industries of England, France, Germany, 
Switzerland and the Netherlands since it had neither a surfeit of people or 
money.172 Agriculture was, as Adam Smith had said, the foundation of a 
nation's prosperity. Rennenkampff further believed in the theory of population 
expounded by Thomas Malthus in 1798, that a nation's population was 
determined by its food supply.173 This was an important consideration in an age 
when nations reckoned wealth on their "human capital." In 1817, David Ricardo 
solved the limitations imposed by the Malthusian principle174 with the idea of 
a global division of labour, with each country concentratng on what it was best 
at. Free trade would then ensure an effective division of goods. Britain, for 
example, would not concentrate on food supply but on industrial goods, which 
would be exported while food would be imported. Rennenkampff s proposal that 
Livland concentrate on agriculture and import what few luxury goods it 
needed175 was consistent with Ricardo's economic theory. While the theory may 
not have appealed to landowners in industrializing countries, it was consistent 
with the economic interests of the landowning class in rural economies. As long 
as land was of prime economic importance in Livland, the landowners would be 
the chief beneficiaries of economic progress.
172 Ibid., 167.
173 Rennenkampff actually quotes the statistician Oeder but it is a clear summary of the Malthusian 
principle. Ibid., 170-173.
174 Ricardo referred to the situation in Britain but his conclusions involved other countries. As the 
labour force increased, more food would be needed. This could only be produced by extending
cultivation or intensifying capital and labour on areas already under cultivation. The former was not 
always possible and the latter resulted in diminishing returns. Ricardo's solution was to import cheap 
wheat from abroad.
175 Ibid., 167.
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Rennenkampff was of the opinion that agriculture would not only increase 
the wealth of the nation and support population growth, it would also guarantee 
the moral standards of the lower classes. Unlike factory work which turned men 
into machines176 "agriculture ... has a beneficial influence on those involved in 
i t .... The success of the work of a farmer is dependent on the favour of heaven. 
He gets used to pleading for it. He lives in hope, which is often disappointed, 
and he accepts it; he is therefore devout and resigned. Due to this ... nations 
which are dependent on agriculture have a better ordered life and better morals 
than those which are not..."177. Rennenkampff considered it the political and 
moral duty of any reform to bind178 the peasants to agriculture.
Rennenkampff agreed with Samson that there was much to praise in the 
economic regulation of 1804. "Of the various transitions from serfdom to freedom 
which I know, I have never seen one that was more appropriate, a more perfect 
preparation for a peaceful, salutary changeover... we have only a very easy step 
to take to general freedom."179 This "very easy step," however, involved the very 
difficult land question: how to keep the freed peasant bound to the land without 
giving him any. Rennenkampff rejected hereditary tenure as synonymous with 
possession of the land180 and rejected emancipation with land security. 
Although he had experience of other emancipation models, he supported only 
those which upheld the principle of complete landlord disposition of land. The
176 Ibid., 177.
177 Ibid., 176.
178 He used the word fesseln which conveys the meaning of "chain." Ibid., 178.
179 Ibid., 53-54.
180 See his remarks p.278 above.
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mistakes of other countries were to be avoided.181 From the 1786 Danish 
Commission, he cited: "The peasant is a human being like others. He should be 
granted the rights which his class in other countries enjoys but one should not 
take from others to make him h ap p y .... He must have freedom but his farm will 
not become his property. When he is given freedom, he will be like the farmer 
in England, a free contractor. ... If the landowner is to lose his right over the 
people, then he should be allowed unlimited rights over land and property ...Ml82 
The emancipation model which he found most appropriate was that of Germany. 
He praised it for what it afforded the peasant,183 but ignored the reality of 
landlord free disposition of property.184 He was, however, aware that the 
German emancipation worked in the landlord's favour. "Without the example of 
Germany," Rennenkampff reportedly claimed, "such a uniform decision in Estland 
or in Kurland or here in Livland would not have come a b o u t... One knew from 
experience that abolishing serfdom and releasing the peasants from the land in no 
way meant, as orignally feared, that property, income from the land or credit 
were in any danger."185 Rennenkampff admitted the advantages of hereditary 
tenure were often obvious elsewhere186 but thought these advantages could be 
gained by methods other than those which infringed on landlord rights.187 
Hereditary tenure was in any case, he argued, economically harmful to the state
181 Ibid., 62.
182 Cited Ibid., footnote, 146-147.
183 Ibid., 162.
184 See page 251-252 above for German emancipation.
185 Jegor von Sivers, XX.
186 He even purported to be personally in favour of voluntary hereditary tenure. Rennenkampff, 
Bemerkungen. 137.
187 Ibid., 131.
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since it encouraged indolence rather than productivity amongst the peasants, who 
could not be expected to value land simply given to them.188 The peasants must 
be motivated by some sort of external force, and free competition would supply 
that force.189
Like many of those involved in the emancipation discussion, Rennenkampff 
admitted that free contracts would have to be based on corvee. Even although it 
was one of the major disadvantages of serfdom, it could not be abolished along 
with serfdom since the peasant would be able to assess his contract only on the 
basis of what he had experience of.190 He offered a compromise solution 
whereby the farmer would not have to do any more corvee than he could manage 
with the farm-hands he already had for his own needs. He should not have to 
hire more in order to complete his corvee.191
Rennenkampff was not unaware of the economic dangers of free 
competition coupled with landlord ownership of the land and quoted the poverty 
in England as an example.192 His solution was economically convincing but 
equally supportive of landlord privilege. A certain proportion — Rennenkampff 
originally proposed two-thirds193 -- of peasant land would be guaranteed for 
peasant use. The landlord would be entitled to sell, divide, give, or lease peasant 
land as he pleased, but would be prevented from adding more than one-third to
188 Ibid., 136.
189 Ibid., 126-127.
190 Ibid., 144-145.
191 Ibid., 185
192 Ibid., 158-160. Meat, for example, was not within the reach of the English worker. Every tenth
person had to live from porridge (the Scots, rich or poor, willingly). Ibid., 159, footnote.
193 Ibid., 164.
the Hofsland.194 Rennnenkampff's proposal may have offered an alternative 
economic protective measure to hereditary tenure but it was one which served 
landlord interest. Admittedly, it would protect the peasants from the fate of their 
German counterparts, where landlords had appropriated large tracts of peasant 
land. In Livland, however, it would be a regressive step since landlords were 
forbidden to appropriate any peasant land. Before this was permanently fixed by 
law, as in Denmark where emancipation had forbidden landlord appropriation of 
peasant land, with no chance for readjustment, Rennenkampff judged it wise to 
introduce some leeway for future adjustment. Expressed differently, his proposal 
allowed the landowner to appropriate up to one-third of peasant land. In 
addition, the landlord should be compensated for allowing two-thirds to remain 
in permanent peasant use by every peasant-farmer working three years for the 
landowner as a labourer.195
In addition to the appropriation restriction, Rennenkampff proposed setting 
a minimum and maximum farm size to protect the peasant. A farm should be 
large enough to support a family but not large enough to require the hiring of 
extra labour. In the latter case, the tenant farmer would become more a manager 
than a practical farmer. This restriction also worked in the landowner's favour. 
Smaller farms were more easily managed, more easily leased, more easily 
controlled, more easily sold than large farms. It was not in landlord interest to 
have large tracts of "their" land owned by one person, possibly even burghers.196
194 Ibid., 161, 164.
195 Ibid., 202.
196 "The larger a farm, the more work a tenant can free his own hands from, the more other people 
... w ill be attracted to leave the dties and take up the comfortable life of such a tenant farmer; the 
industrious farmer w ill be pushed out by lazy, inexpert townsmen, the land will be flooded by 
bankrupt-headed farmers, the cities will be emptied ..., the landowners will see their property 
devalued by lazy tenants and the state will be infinitely poorer..." Ibid., 183.
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Smaller plots would keep the farmer properly occupied in the landowner's 
interest.
Rennenkampff was very clear about the role the government should have 
in reform. The government should not interfere in economic relations. A general 
economic law could not be applied to widely varying local conditions, which were 
best regulated by independent economic laws. The government had a right to 
intervene in matters of human and political rights but not in economic 
matters.197 Rennenkampff felt this warning was justified. The government 
should not be viewed as the representative of the lower classes in confrontation 
with higher classes.198 "As well as the indubitably great interest the government 
has in the farmer, it should not deny its deep interest for equally important 
classes (Stcinde), nor favour the former at the expense, or even ruin, of the 
latter."199 Throughout Rennenkampffs book, there is an awareness of 
government pressure for emancipation and the fear that such pressure would 
result in reform detrimental to Ritter land privileges. While government pressure 
was certainly a factor to be reckoned with, it seemed unlikely in view of the terms 
of the Estland emancipation that the government would do anything but uphold 
the Ritter right to the land. It did, however, support the policy of hereditary 
peasant tenure of land, which was viewed by many Ritter as a violation of their 
own property rights.
197 Ibid., 144.
198 Ibid., 204.
199 Ibid., 117. See also p.142.
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The Landtag Debate
The public debate was brought to an official level on 1 June 1818 when 
Samson von Himmelstiem formally proposed that, pending imperial permission, 
the Landtag should declare the peasants in Livland free.200 At about the same 
time, the Ritterschaft of Oesel made the same proposal as did the guilds of Riga, 
Dorpat and Pemau concerning the serfs on the lands owned by the city 
corporations.201 The Landtag was opened on 18 June 1818 by Baron Schoultz 
who set a cautious tone by warning the members to "distinguish the truly good 
and useful from the apparently good and useful and not to be misled, even when 
fine-sounding verbiage and high-sounding phrases reverberate amongst us, 
behind which ....self-interest and fame-seeking often attempt to hide."202 On the 
next day, Marquis Paulucci unequivocally set the Landtag its aim by warmly 
recommending the example of Estland and Kurland.203
The Landtag began its discussions on 26 June 1818 with the consideration 
of Samson's proposal and Paulucci's directive. With regard to the former, the 
Konvent had recommended first seeking imperial permission to discuss 
emancipation in light of the fact that one reform was already in processs. As long 
as one reform was valid, a new one could not be discussed without imperial 
cancellation of the first. This was not really obstructionist since a new reform 
would nullify the costly survey and the validity of the Wackeribiicher, steps which
200 The text of his proposal is in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 123-124; and Tobien, Die 
A grargesetzgebun g, 348-349.
201 It is not dear when Oesel made its proposal. The Riga guilds discussed the decision between 
7 and 10 June. The fact that these various proposals were made simultaneously leads Tobien to 
describe the movement towards emancipation as "spontaneous." Die Agrargesetzgebung, 346.
202 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 349.
203 The text is available in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 124-126.
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could not be taken without safe guarantees. Paulucci's instructions, however, had 
made imperial wishes clear and the recommendaton redundant. The majority of 
the Konvent were in favour of emancipation but, like the Kurland Ritter, decided 
to use the opportunity to gain some concessions from the imperial 
government.204 Most of these concessions had been granted to the Kurland 
Ritter. The Livland Ritter wished exemption from paying state taxes for their 
peasants, exemption from state estate sale tax, and a gradual introduction of the 
new law so that emancipation would be complete, as in Kurland, in 1831. Two 
other points were of importance and would cause much debate. The first was 
that the survey commission should continue its work until all peasant land was 
surveyed. This was in keeping with Samson's proposal which stipulated that 
emancipation should take place "as soon as the survey commission had completed 
all Wackenbiicher for public and private lands."205 In addition, the government 
should replace the three million roubles spent on the survey which would be 
made obsolete by free contracts. This was all the more necessary since landowner 
debt to the Credit Society was 7.5 million roubles.
The matter of the survey reflects the ambivalence of the reform model 
contemplated. On the one side, it was argued that the survey should be halted 
at once since the free contracts of the new reform did not need it. On the other, 
it was argued that contracts needed norms and these could only be provided by 
a survey, especially since contracts would be mostly in labour or in kind. A 
survey would also help to estimate state taxes correctly and would enable the 
peasant to estimate his own abilities in drawing up a contract with his landowner.
204 See Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 350-351.
205 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 124.
295
It would also be a reason to keep the peasant where he was rather than going off 
into circumstances with which he was economically unfamiliar. The majority of 
land councillors and district deputies were in favour of the survey being 
continued. Free contracts could then be based on the results but there would be 
no compulsion to do so.206
A dissenting minority was led by August von Sivers on the Chamber of 
Deputies. He repeated the arguments he had already published against a new 
reform.207 He still advised waiting to see how the reforms worked in Estland 
and Kurland, where reform had been necessary since they had nothing 
comparable to 1804. Sivers' opinions are interesting from the political perspective 
of province/Empire. He was convinced the government would not force the new 
reforms on Livland. He was also convinced that the government would never 
violate the landlowner right to the land. He viewed fears of imperial intervention 
as the prime motivators of the reformers. He also felt that the reformers were 
using the opportunity of emancipation to secure from the tsar their right to the 
land.208
Sivers proposed to the Chamber the rejection of Samson's proposal and 
Paulucci's directive. The Livland Ritter, he argued, should not suggest reform to 
the government but rather wait to see if the government would force the Estland 
reform on Livland. This proposal was supported by five other deputies, thus 
making six votes against and six in favour. The vote of the Land Marshal, who 
chaired the Chamber, went to those in favour. The close vote allowed Sivers to
206 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 351.
207 See pp. 281-282 above.
208 This view had already been expressed publidy by his brother Peter. See pp.284 above.
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propose that the whole Landtag vote the following day, 27 June 1818, on whether 
to change the 1804 reform or not. The vote also proved that there was a distinct 
possibility that the Landtag would vote for retaining 1804. In this case, 
emancipation would be rejected before it was discussed. Paulucci certainly saw 
this as a possibility and appeared unexpectedly at the Landtag before the vote 
took place. He gave the members the choice of voluntarily asking the tsar for the 
Estland model of emancipation or accepting his resignation as Governor 
General.209 The Landtag subsequently voted not to carry out the vote proposed 
by August von Sivers for that day, i.e to discuss whether the 1804 reform should 
be changed or not. This vote caused confusion. It was interpreted by some as a 
vote in favour of emancipation while others thought emancipation had still to be 
discussed. Samson, who was present at the Landtag, is unequivocal: "On 27 June 
1818, the unanimous decision was made to declare the peasants free, pending 
imperial permission."210
That the "unanimous decision" was actually a vote in favour of 
emancipation is made questionable by a proposal made 1 July after much 
uncertainty and discussion. The Landtag would offer to emancipate their 
peasants if the tsar so wished if certain conditions were first211 met.212 Despite 
objections raised by those, like Samson, who thought emancipation should be 
declared voluntarily by the Ritter and those, like August von Sivers, who opposed 
a new reform, the proposal was accepted with minor modifications.
209 An extract of Paulucci's speech is in Tobien, P ie Agrargesetzgebung, 353.
230 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 126.
231 The "first" was later eliminated.
232 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung. 354-355.
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The concessions requested213 were mainly concerned with the tax 
exemptions already mentioned but there was a significant addition. The Ritter 
asked for the removal of the Committee for Livland Affairs,214 the upper 
authority for the survey, in both St Petersburg and in Riga. This was a political 
consideration. Since its creation in 1804, the Committee had gradually taken on 
the role of an imperial supervisory body for the affairs of the province and its 
absence would mean more political leeway for Livland. That this had more to do 
with political independence than economic activity is evidenced by the fact that 
the Landtag did not intend to propose halting the survey which the Committee 
was supposed to supervise. The committee in Walk should finish the survey of 
private estates and the Wackenbucher would be ratified by the Governor General 
alone. This implied that the landowners intended to use the Wackenbilcher as the 
basis for free contracts. They did not, as originally intended, ask the tsar to pay 
the three million roubles the survey had cost, no doubt because they had not 
recommended to discontinue it. They did ask for a ten-year extension on their 
credit. They also asked for reorganization and higher salaries for the provincial 
authorities, whose duties would be increased by emancipation.
Paulucci was satisfied enough to guarantee the tsar's acceptance of the 
proposal, which came 13 July 1818, just one week after its submission.215 The 
tsar gave his permission for a committee to discuss any adaptations of the Estland 
and Kurland reforms necessitated by local conditions. He stipulated that 
membership should not only represent the Ritter but also Oesel, the towns and
213 See Samson, Historischer Versuch, 126-127.
214 See Chapter III, pp. 221; 224-225.
215 The text of the tsar's letter to Paulucci is given in Samson, Historischer Versuch, 127-128.
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the crown estates.216
The committee, which began its work in October, had completed its draft 
by December 1818. In essence, it followed the Estland emancipation reform. The 
principle of free contract in a free market was upheld as the basis for reform. 
Rennenkampff, supported by Hagemeister, submitted his proposal that a 
proportion of peasant land be guaranteed to the peasants, but the committee 
considered this a violation of landowner rights and refused to discuss it. The 
Estland reform also provided the basis for a system of justice and law for the 
peasants as well as a school system. The Livland draft proposed a less 
complicated and shorter transitional period than in Estland and Kurland since 
1804 had prepared the peasants for freedom. The timing of emancipation was to 
be based on the completion of the Wackenbiicher, which could then be used as the 
basis of free contracts. The survey should be completed by 23 April 1823, when 
half the farmer serfs would be freed. The second half would follow in 1824 and 
by 1826 all domestic servants and labourers would be emancipated. They would 
not immediately have freedom of movement, however. Landlords were still 
afraid that freedom would encourage ther valuable labour force to abscond. For 
the first three years the freed peasants were to be bound to their parish districts, 
the area of mobility being extended in the next three years and by 1832, when 
Estland and Kurland serfs would be completely free, Livland peasants would be 
allowed to move anywhere in the province.
The second modification of the Estland /Kurland reform was a major area 
of contention. At the time of emancipation, Kurland had cancelled all the debts 
the peasants had incurred as serfs. In Livland, the serfs were also indebted to
216 There is a list of members in Samson, 128-129 and in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 357 note
2.
their landlords. In 1795, the landowner's duty to supply his serfs with grain in 
times of need was changed to supplying them with a store which they had to 
keep supplied. The onus was now on the serfs. In years of poor harvests, like 
1807, the serfs became more indebted to the landlord for grain supplies. The 
situation of peasant debt was complicated by the land survey. 1804 had 
stipulated that unmeasured estates could use the 1784 estimates but that if a 
landlord was dissatisfied, he could initiate a new survey. If the new survey 
showed peasant labour had been estimated too low, then the landlord had the 
right of compensation from his peasants. Cases of peasant compensation added 
to peasant debt. Landowners, however, were also indebted to their serfs. If the 
peasant quotas had been estimated too high, the landowner was bound to 
compensate the peasant and there were several cases of this. In 1818, many of 
these compensation cases had not been settled. The Commission, believing that 
a peasant burdened with debts could not cope in the free state, recommended that 
all mutual debts between landlord and peasant incurred before 1 January 1818 be 
cancelled.
The Landtag which met in December 1818 to ratify the Commission's draft 
objected to the abolition of peasant debts. Even Friedrich von Sivers spoke out 
strongly against it. His concern seemed to be the effect such a move would have 
on landlord credit but he was perhaps motivated by his general hostility to the 
new reform.217 He felt strongly enough about it to use his usual tactic of 
threatening to petition the tsar. Sivers was supported by Rennenkampff, who
217 He wrote shortly after in his complaint to the government about the peasant debt proposal, 
"Why ... should w e diverge from our original principles and without reason but with a false show of 
generosity trouble the order of society, destroy the fortunes of individuals and reverse a law given 
to us by his Majesty, based on supreme justice?" Cited in the original French in Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzgebung, 368, note 2.
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viewed peasant debt as a separate issue from compensation owed by peasants to 
their landlords. Those landowners who had managed their peasants well and had 
not given any loans had no peasant debts, but they would lose what their 
peasants owed them in labour which had been estimated too low.218 Peasants 
who had accumulated no debts but were owed compensation would also suffer. 
It was Rennenkampff s opinion the peasant could not expect the rights of freedom 
without facing up to its duties — and debts.
Once again provincial dispute was settled by imperial intervention, in the 
form of the Governor General. Paulucci said debts up to 1 January 1819 must be 
cancelled if the situation of the peasants was not to be worsened by freedom. The 
Landtag succumbed with the compromise date of 1 January 1813. Thus, the 
Livland serf escaped being emancipated landless and indebted.219
Imperial ratification was not immediately forthcoming. On 7 January 1819 
Friedrich von Sivers had apparently carried out his threat to complain to the tsar 
about the debt issue.220 The discussion continued among delegates in the capital 
until, under Paulucci's guidance,221 the original draft secured imperial approval 
on 26 March 1819.222
The reform had not had an auspicious start. Although the debate about 
emancipation in Livland had begun in the provincial press and not by imperial
218 There may be a correlation here. Peasants who worked low labour quotas for the landowner 
had more time to work their own fields and therefore more chance of self-sufficency.
219 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 349-357.
220 Ibid., 368.
221 Paulucci reportedly added modifications, albeit inessential, without consulting the Ritter. This 
apparently caused tension in future dealings, especially between the Land Marshal and the Governor 
General. Ibid., 369, note 1.
222 The emancipation decree was formally celebrated in Riga 6 January 1820.
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order (as might have been expected after the Estland and Kurland reforms), the 
Landtag had not been enthusiastic about the emancipation reform. Later 
historiography has attributed this reluctance to factors other than lack of 
motivation. "If the Landtag negotiations were carried out hesitatingly and with 
many difficult interruptions and unclear points, part of the blame lies with the 
less than skillful chairmanship of Baron Schoultz ...',223 Were it not for 
Paulucci's timely interventions, the Landtag may have followed the advice of 
August von Si vers and decided to keep the 1804 reform until imperial 
dissatisfaction became evident. Paulucci certainly thought so. If Paulucci was 
acting under the tsar's orders to cajole rather than force Livland to adopt the 
Estland model of reform, then the imperial role in the reform process was 
considerable. If the tsar really did view 1804 as an acceptable alternative to the 
Estland reform, then Paulucci's role was more one of adding to his own laurels 
by persuading the province into a more progressive move which would please the 
tsar. In either case, the matter was not resolved by the Landtag independent of 
imperial interference.
In his closing remarks to the Landtag, the Land Marshal Lowis of Menar 
voiced the general doubt and presaged the reform's future. "If the farmer 
peasants gain little more from this than the name of free people, at least the more 
numerous class of domestic servants and labourers will enter into a much better 
and happier situation. Perhaps the new road will at first seem rough to the 
peasants, humanity and cleverness will be needed to lead them with a fatherly 
hand along the unfamiliar path... Some of us may doubt that the people for whose 
future happiness we have sacrificed will recognize with thanks what we have
223 Jegor von Sivers, XXI.
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done for them! ... And if ingratitude should indeed be our reward, so let the 
knowledge that our intentions were genuine and good give us the courage never 
to regret what we have done."224 There would indeed be ingratitude and 
regrets, and these, along with a closer look at the content of the reform, will form 
the basis of the final chapter.
224 Cited in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 367.
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CHAPTER V 
THE FREEDOM OF EMANCIPATION
PART ONE: FREEDOM LIMITED IN THE BALTIC
Emancipation did not prove to be the economic cure it was hoped for. 
"Hardly three decades have gone by [since emancipation]," noted an official 
committee report in Estland, "and there is hardly anyone in the country who is 
not severely affected by the general unease caused by the ever-increasing 
confusion in the agrarian situation. No-one dares to hope that time alone will 
bring improvement and whoever has observed the depress: ing symptoms and 
thought about their cause seeks in the hopeful past and its admittedly well- 
intentioned legislative efforts the root of these ills which are already harming the 
present and if left to develop undisturbed will threaten the future even more."1 
Blaming the emancipation reforms was justified but not because Adam Smith's 
principle of natural liberty was not practicable in the Baltic provinces. The Baltic 
emancipation reforms retained elements which were essentially feudal and 
incompatible with economic laissez-faire policy.
Political Restraints
While the Ritter had formally recognized their serfs as free individuals, 
they ensured that they maintained firm control over them in practice. The 1804 
reforms had granted the peasants several important civil rights -- for example, the 
right to citizenship, the right to own property, the right to be protected by law -- 
as well as a certain amount of self-administration. These rights were diluted 
rather than strengthened by the emancipation reforms. Before emancipation, the
1 Cited in Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts in Estland, 164.
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landowner was the local authority, the essential link, as Catherine had seen it, in 
state security. There was no alternative form of local authority to supervise the 
serfs once freed. 1819 created the means for local organization of the peasants in 
the peasant commune, or Gemeinde. The Gemeinde, answerable for all peasants on 
the estate, had a wide area of responsibility including collecting taxes, supplying 
military recruits, administering the grain store and the Gemeinde finances, coping 
with the poor and the sick, arranging a school system and maintaining roads on 
the estate.
The peasant could only leave the Gemeinde if all his dues had been fulfilled 
and if the Gemeinde agreed. He was then obliged to register in a new one. The 
freed peasant, however, was restricted in his mobility. In Estland the peasant was 
not allowed to leave the province until the number of male reached
140,000.2 In Livland, mobility was more vaguely promised by a future decree.3 
The restrictions on mobility would continue into the 1860s when they came into 
conflict with Russian pressure for unrestricted mobility.4
The Gemeinde represented the peasant to such an extent that one observer 
commented that the peasant had few rights as an individual and had validity only 
as a member of the Gemeinde.5 While the Gemeinde filled an administrative gap, 
it also allowed the landowner control over the peasants. The landowner directed 
the general meetings of the Gemeinde and its decisions had to be ratified by him. 
He also had the right to veto any new member and choose peasant officials from
2 In 1845, the number was 122,000.
3 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 148; Gemet, Geschichte des 
Agrarrechts, 177.
4 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 245-258.
5 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 128.
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candidates offered. Peasant court decisions were also to be ratified by the 
landowner.6
Much of this supervision was deemed necessary since the peasants were 
perceived to lack the experience needed to run the Gemeinde themselves. A 
contemporary Ritter report noted that the peasants were not mature enough and 
that the national character did not lend itself to community spirit. Instead of 
fighting this, one had tried to get round it and as a result, peasant communities 
existed only formally, with no inner solidarity. "A Gemeinde had been created 
which was controlled by the government and the landowners. ... Because the 
Gemeinde officials were in no way equal to the demands made of them, the lords 
had to take control again to avoid complete confusion, which made the hoped for 
independence of the Gemeinde completely impossible and opened the way for 
arbitrary power..."7
More intrusive than the landlord's supervision of the political life of the 
peasants was his right to safeguard law and order on his estate. 1804 had 
lessened the judicial power of the landlord over his peasants by forbidding the 
use of the rod without a hearing and by the setting up of peasant courts.8 
Although the peasant courts were retained, 1819 restored full "house discipline" 
to the landowner in a different, but more encompassing, form. The task of 
keeping law and order was given to the estate police (Gutspolizei), who were 
armed with wide powers of arrest and the right to inflict a certain amount of 
corporal punishment without trial. While at work on manorial lands, the peasant
6 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 136-141; Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen 
Verhaltnisse, 148, 159.
7 Cited in Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 167-168.
8 See Chapter III, p.217 above.
farmer, whom 1804 had protected from corporal punishment, could be punished 
without investigation by the overseer with up to fifteen strokes of the rod. Many 
peasant farmers preferred to send their workers to the lord's fields rather than be 
subjected to such arbitrary power. In Estland especially this type of corporal 
punishment apparently led to suicides.9
Economic Restraints
What really ensured the freed peasant's dependence on the landowner, 
however, was his landless state. Hereditary tenure of the land granted by the 
1804 reforms had given the peasant farmer security and a reason to work the land 
well. As its critics had pointed out, it was in effect tantamount to owning the 
land. 1819 delivered a free peasant to the free play of economic forces, without 
land tenure or long-term leases. The peasant's landless situation was made more 
precarious by the right of the landowner to freely dispose of his lands, whether 
peasant or estate land, as he wished. 1804 had firmly forbidden the appropriation 
of peasant land or the expulsion of peasants without due cause but the 
emancipation reforms allowed the landowner to incorporate, appropriate, 
separate, sell or divide the land as he wished. The new freedom of disposition of 
land coincided with the change to rational agriculture.10 It was admittedly a 
slow change -- by 1839, only 180 of 616 estates in Estland had adopted new 
agricultural methods, with a similar number in Livland11 — but combined with
9 Samson, Historischer Versuch, 141-142; Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen 
Verhaltnisse, 175, note 1.
10 See Chapter III, pp.183-187 above.
11 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 147. Since Livland had more estates, 
it should have had a higher number on new methods. In Kurland about twenty estates had adopted 
new methods. As Hueck points out, rational agriculture was more successful in Estland, where most 
estates were owned and managed by local nobles, than in Livland where there were more absentee
landlord free disposition of land, it marked a detrimental tendency for the 
peasants. Since most new farming methods, especially animal breeding, clover 
and potatoes, required more land, landowners were able to make good use of the 
right to dispose of their lands as they wished. When the unused land available 
did not suffice for their needs, they incorporated neighbouring peasant land 
without having to compensate the peasants they displaced.12 In Estland, where 
estates were close to the villages, often villages of four to fourteen farms were 
broken up. In many cases, there was not even a good economic reason for 
appropriation of peasant land.13 Since land was not scarce, the peasants could 
normally be settled elsewhere, but the process added to the peasant's insecurity 
and his reluctance to farm with a long-term view to improvement of the land.14
The lack of land security was compounded by another feudal element, 
namely corvee. From the 1810-1820 Wackenbuch surveys of 726 estates in Livland, 
over 27,000 farms were on corvee and only 73 on cash rent.15 By 1838, the 
number of peasant farmers who paid money rents had risen to 3424 but the large 
majority in the Baltic provinces still worked labour dues.16 Corvee meant that
landlords and more leasing. (Ibid., 144.) In Livland, estates were also larger and more divided. The 
smaller estates in Estland lent themselves to more effective planning. (Ibid., 206)
12 The peasants were supposed to be compensated but the wording of the clause was so vague that 
it could easily be evaded.
13 Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 161.
14 Tobien claims that although there were individual cases of injustice against peasants, the 
peasants benefited overall from landlord economic manipulation of land. From 1819 to 1846,248 haken 
of peasant land were incorporated into Hofsland but in the same period, there was a total of 270 haken 
of new peasant plots on Hofsland. (Die Agrargesetzgebung. 417.) 248 haken of appropriated land 
constituted, according to Tobien, no more than 3.76% of Ritter haken. Ibid., vol II, 200.
15 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 432.
16 They farmed a total of 559 haken, about eight percent of the total peasant land. Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzgebung. 427.
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the peasant could not take advantage of his freedom. The guiding principle of the 
reform "Land mein, Zeit dein" had no practical meaning when the peasant's time 
was in the hands of the landowner. The peasant was unable to work for his own 
gain, for example by selling surplus produce for cash. Money could have 
alleviated the harshness of the peasant's landless state but without it, his right to 
buy non-noble land was purely theoretical.
In addition to tying the peasant to the landowner, corvee was ill-suited to 
the rational approach to agriculture. It was not flexible enough to meet the needs 
of rational planning and an effective division of labour, important elements in the 
Baltic area since most agricultural work had to be completed during the short 
summers. Corvee also demanded close supervision of the peasants especially 
since they were free to go at the end of their contracts, thus avoiding any 
consequences or penalties for work poorly done. In this respect, corvee was more 
suited to serfdom than to free labour.17
Contracts between peasant and landowner were based for the most part on 
Wackenbuch norms which had been worked out based on the old methods of 
farming, but new methods and crops, like potatoes, often demanded more labour 
than the old norms stipulated and landlords had to demand more from the 
peasants. Before emancipation, the amount of labour the landlord could demand 
had been regulated by law but the peasants lost this legal protection through 
emancipation. Corvee increased in both Estland and Livland at a time when 
peasant holdings decreased owing to the other concomitant of new agricultural 
methods, landlord appropriation of peasant land.18 As Hueck remarked in the
17 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 172-173.
18 Ibid., 153.
early 1840s,"... where rational economy flourishes best, there the situation of the 
peasants is the most wretched."19 It was not an easy economic step, 
however, to change to hired labour. Juhan Kahk has shown that without the 
means to make the necessary investments to change to hired labour, landlords 
were just as well off staying with corvee.20 Ungern-Sternberg, who studied 
agriculture at Dorpat University during this period, concluded, "In most cases the 
profits received when the landowner works with his own workers remain 
considerably below the value of the corvee work one gets from the peasant- 
tenants ..."21 His view was supported by others. Some thought hired labour 
could only be used when the necessary agricultural machines were available while 
others saw that it would necessitate a complete reorganization of land and the 
appropriation of peasant plots into estate land for general management of the 
estate. Even if it were feasible, there was just no money to pay wages.22 The 
change from corvee to hired labour would be a slow one.23 That landlords 
found corvee more profitable than hired labour did not mean that it was 
economically effective in the long-term, however. It allowed them to maintain an 
income from their lands but demanded no re-investment or land improvement.
19 Ibid., 182.
20 Juhan Kahk, Peasant and Lord in the Process of Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism in the 
Baltics, (Tallinn 1982), 70-74.
21 Cited in Ibid., 75.
22 Ibid., 75-76.
23 Kahk lists three possibilities for the landlord: "a) to abandon the corvee system at once and 
without compensation, resulting in the economic ruin of the feudal landlords (by losing 70% of their 
profits stemming from the unpaid work of the corvee peasants and by having to buy draught animals 
and agricultural implements for the sum equal to 50% of their yearly income); b) to change the corvee 
for money rent at once (in one year) landlords would lose 50% of their income, having to spend it on 
the purchase of draught animals and inventory; c) to change the corvee for money rent over a longer 
period, with landlords losing 3-4% of their yearly income (money needed for the gradual exchange 
of the peasant inventory for the personal inventory)." Ibid., 76-77.
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Economic Circumstances
The inefficiency of corvee was compounded by inefficient agricultural 
management. Landowners lacked the economic background to make rational 
agricultural decisions and forecasts.24 There was still the belief that no special 
training was needed to manage an estate and law or military servcie still provided 
the educational background of most landowners.25 Little money was re-invested 
in agriculture26 and when it was, often ineffectively.27 The introduction of new 
methods needed capital investment and capital was one thing the Baltic nobles 
did not have. The general economic climate did nothing to alleviate their 
problems. The continental blockade had caused a sudden drop in grain prices in 
1809, which meant a drop in the value of estates, especially for those who had 
bought during the period of high grain prices between 1805 and 1808. 1816 to 
1819 saw an increase in the value of grain due to poor harvests in Germany; 
Livland had a particularly good harvest in 1819. Emancipation started off on a 
good economic wave and belief in the higher productivity of free labour seemed 
to be justified. It was short-lived. Due to good harvests all over Europe from 
1821 to 1827, grain prices fell again.28 By the end of the 1820s, of the 547 estates
24 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 207.
25 C. Hehn, Die Intensitat der livlandischen Landwirthschaft (Dorpat, 1858), 71. Hehn pointed out 
that agriculture as a science rather than a collection of local observations had only just begun (Ibid.,
3) but felt strongly enough about the lack of agricultural background of landowners to list as the first 
of his theses for his doctoral dissertation: "The study of law for future landowners is not to be 
recommended." Ibid., 111.
26 J.Kahk, Peasant and Lord, 66.
27 Animal feed, for example, could freeze in front of the animals in the barns because proper
flooring had not been thought of. Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 206.
28 Ibid., 137.
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in Livland in noble hands, 477 were indebted to the Credit Society and had an 
annual interest payment of 492,000 silver rubles to keep up with.29 Estland's 
position was no better with 511 estates owing a yearly interest of 382,000 silver 
rubles.30 Kurland's estates were also severely indebted. Substantial imperial 
loans were necessary to keep the credit institutes in the Baltic provinces 
functioning31
Although a growing amount of estates were trying new methods to 
overcome the economic crisis, the majority persisted in the old ways. Estland 
Ritterhauptmann Griinewaldt noted, "We know no land improvement other than 
distilling ... We do not utilize the real treasures of our estates."32 Many 
landowners still relied on the distilling of alcohol as the quickest way to increase 
income.33 Of 736 estates in Livland, 600 were involved to some degree in 
distilling.34 Most of the alcohol was exported to Russia, where since 1827 each 
region was guaranteed a certain quota. In 1838, Livland undertook to deliver 
118,000 "pails"35 of alcohol to the province of St Petersburg.36 During the 
difficult mid-1820s, Estland was able to persuade the government to guarantee 
acceptance of a quota of 250,000 pails if a large number of estates were not to fall
29 For comparison, the imperial government collected 500,000 silver rubles from Livland's poll tax. 
Ibid., 143.
30 The lower interest payment is explained by the lower land value in Estland, which had not been 
subjected to the same amount of land speculation as in Livland and Kurland. Ibid., 140.
31 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 137.
32 Ibid., 206.
33 See Chapter III, pp. 170-171 above.
34 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 419, note 8.
35 One "pail," a Russian vedro, was about fifteen litres.
36 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 218. Also Tobien, Die 
Agrargestzgebung, 420, particularly note 5.
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into ruin.37 With a guaranteed market, there seemed little economic reason for 
landowners to give up distilling. The rest of the alcohol was sold domestically 
at prices fixed by the Landtag but trade was also permitted. The landowner was 
allowed to trade spirits for grain and flax, at specified amounts, with his own 
peasants.38 In 1836, however, the Livland Landtag voted to ban trading in 
alcohol, a move motivated not only by the recognition that high peasant alcohol 
consumption was a hindrance to economic activity but also by the appearance of 
competition on the market. When the imperial government granted the peasants 
the right to sell their produce on the open market (1810 1812), merchants were 
swift to take advantage. Alcohol played a significant part in this trade. Peasants 
would sell their grain at values set by the merchants often in exchange for spirits. 
The government did not support the Landtag in its proposed ban on the grounds 
that it did not conform to imperial law. Support, however, did come from the 
towns, which complained that agricultural supplies to their markets were being 
stopped by traders and that the number of merchants in the towns had also 
decreased sharply. The cities wanted trade limited to the cities. Imperial support 
was not forthcoming. By 1842, however, the ban on trading in alcohol was 
allowed.39
Legislative attempts to regulate alcohol consumption were supported by the 
increase in moderation unions organized by local clergy. The local nobility, 
especially those with vested interests in distilling, were not always in favour of 
such unions and there were cases of landlords persuading their peasants to leave
37 Gert von Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik zwischen Russifizierung und Revolution, 
(Gottingen, 1978), 53.
38 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung. 420.
39 Ibid., 420-423.
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the unions.40 The unions were forbidden, however, by the Russian government 
in 1839. Russia's economic interest in alcohol was evident from its market 
demands. The tax it imposed on the Ritter for the privilege of distilling added to 
its revenues, some 300,000 silver rubles in the case of Livland.41 By the 1850s, 
distilling was widespread in Russia42 and imperial dependence on provincial 
output was less.
The economic viability of distilling on a large scale depended on market 
prices. In the mid 1820s, prices began to sink and income from distilling dropped 
sharply.43 By the 1830s, the rye used to produce the spirits sold for more than the 
spirits it produced. Landlords in the Baltic, however, could produce the grain at 
little cost due to their unpaid corvee workers. Still, there was diminishing income 
from distilling and without diversification, its decline affected the general 
economy of the provinces. As long as the economy concentrated on distilling, the 
provinces were dependent on the vagaries of the European market, on the good 
will of the Russian government and on corvee as the most economic form of 
labour.44
Hampered by the decreased productivity of bonded labour, inefficient 
management, lack of capital for improvements, outdated methods and lack of 
diversification, landlords resorted to demanding more peasant labour as the only 
way left to increase yields. Without legal protection against unduly high labour
40 J.Eckardt, Die baltischen Provinzen, 408-409.
41 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 143.
42 J.Kahk, Peasant and Lord, 81.
43 The fluctuations in the price of spirit production and market prices from 1780 to 1850 are given 
in graph form in J.Kahk, Peasant and Lord , 79.
44 Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 53.
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demands, the peasants bore the brunt of the deteriorating economic situation. The 
peasant farmer became poorer, having little time left over from corvee duties to 
till his own land. The pressure came not only from the landowner but also from 
his own workers. 1804 had stipulated how much the peasant farmer had to pay 
his workers, or Knechte, and how much he had to feed, clothe and house them. 
After emancipation, the Knecht was free from regulations and could demand his 
own price on the open market. In order to keep his labourers, a peasant farmer 
had to give in to their demands. He was also obliged to furnish them with a plot 
of land.45 The Knechte often worked only annual contracts, neglected the farmer's 
property and animals, his only capital, and left him with corvee dues 
outstanding46 Contrary to the fears that emancipation would produce a poor 
landless proletariat, the Knecht class initially benefited economically from 
emancipation, able to demand good conditions for their labour. It was the 
peasant farmers who suffered.47
With the ever-imminent threat of expulsion, high labour demands and high 
labour costs, the peasant farmer was prepared to sign only short-term contracts, 
from one to three years. Later the landowner was unwilling to grant long-term 
contracts in case he lost control over the land. Short-term contracts were a major 
obstacle to economic growth, as Adam Smith had pointed out.48 The peasant 
farmer had no interest in improving land which neither belonged to him nor 
guaranteed him long-term security. He worked for short-term gain, often 
exhausting the soil in the process, and used his freedom to move on in the hope
45 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 178.
46 From an official report cited in Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 167.
47 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 419.
48 See Chapter IV, p.254 above.
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of a better contract elsewhere. In Livland especially, this behaviour was almost 
systematic and many farms were threatened with ruin. Short-term contracts were 
a major factor in the lack of agricultural growth.49
The feudal anomalies in the emancipation reforms were focused on by the 
peasants at the very beginning.50 Even before the emancipation decree was 
published, it was obvious that the peasants had a different understanding of 
freedom from that of their legislators. By November 1822, peasant farmers had 
to decide whether they would continue their leases under the Wackenbuch 
regulations or cancel them. In August many farmers resigned their leases but 
refused to move from the land,51 and in the years 1822-1823 more than 3,000 
peasant farmers (about fifteen per cent of all peasant farmers in Livland) refused 
to perform corvee duties and also refused to leave their holdings.52 They were 
convinced that the land had been given to them, to use not to own, by the tsar. 
In autumn 1822, a pastor tried to explain this attitude to the authorities. The 
peasants, he said, "interpret liberation as not only the abolition of their serf status, 
but also and even above all as the liberation from the hated manorial corvee; and 
the idea that their holdings belong to them has become rooted in their minds."53 
For the peasants, secure tenure of land and freedom from corvee were integral 
components of freedom. For their part, the landowners were equally convinced 
that the land and peasant labour on it were part of the natural order of things.
49 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 178-180; Gernet, Geschichte des 
Agrarrechts, 165-166; Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 417-419.
50 Which is not to suggest that the peasants actually viewed them as such.
51 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 409.
52 J.Kahk, Peasant and Lord, 84.
53 Cited in Ibid., 85.
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For many, custom took precedence over theory or principles and they saw no 
discrepancy between their feudal privileges and laissez-faire principles.54 
This complacent attitude on the part of the landowners continued even in the face 
of clear warning signs of economic difficulties. By the end of the 1830s poverty 
was an openly discussed topic. Merchants in Reval complained that there was 
almost no grain to be bought from the peasants.55 The weakness of farm 
labourers had led to the import of Russian workers on some estates in the 
summer months, for more wages than the native workers.56
Legislation
In the two decades following emancipation, there was little legislation 
undertaken to remedy any of the economic ills. The one major attempt to mitigate 
peasant poverty came from the Governor General. Paulucci thought credit would 
help and his proposal to set up a peasant credit bank received the tsar's approval 
in January 1830. The idea was based on the peasant bank model already in 
operation in Oesel, which consisted of a grain depot to help needy peasants, 
capital for communal buildings like hospitals and a land improvement fund for 
the cultivation of land. Paulucci's version meant that all Gemeinde monies would 
come under one administration. All three provinces were against the proposal57 
Peasant credit, they argued, was detrimental to peasant industriousness. Under 
imperial prodding, the Ritter later came up with a savings bank plan but this was
54 J.Eckardt, "Livlandisches Stillleben," in Die baltischen Provinzen, 413.
55 Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 180.
56 Ibid., 185.
57 A display of the lack of unity which had caused problems in the past and would again in the 
near future.
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lost in the government's more general approach to the agrarian problem.58
Those who had argued against 1819 still voiced their criticisms but found 
little support at home although they would eventually gain imperial support. In 
the meantime, the majority believed that any economic difficulties were temporary 
and that legislation to modify 1819 was unnecessary. There were a few who 
viewed the situation with less optimism. "There is nothing we can do for the 
future except await the complete ruin of the peasantry, and with it our own, or 
expect a forceful intervention from the side of the government."59 There was 
every reason to expect Russian intervention in the agrarian reform process.
PART TWO: RUSSIAN REFORM IMPULSES UNDER NICHOLAS I
While the Baltic Ritter were allowing the 1816-1819 reforms to take their 
course, Russia's attention was focused on finding its own reform model. 
Although Nicholas I's reign had begun with revolution and its repression, the 
reaction against the Decembrists did not entirely eliminate imperial reform 
impulses. Nicholas, convinced by the uprising of the need for reform under firm 
government control, was tenacious in his search for the appropriate formula even 
if he was reluctant to disturb the status quo by actually putting ideas into 
practice. The search would bring imperial attention to the economic ills of corvee, 
appropriation, peasant dismissal and in general the lack of protection for the 
peasant in the 1830s in the Baltic provinces.
58 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 423-424.
59 Cited in Hueck, Darstellung der landwirthschaftlichen Verhaltnisse, 186.
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State Peasants
The imperial reform impetus was first directed towards crown peasants, a 
focus dictated primarily by the interests of state revenue. The "class" of crown 
peasants owed its origins to the fiscal reforms carried out under Peter in the 
1720s. In the government's attempt to determine its tax base and facilitate 
collection in the absence of local authorities, the non-enserfed were brought under 
government control. Since the criterion was negatively expressed -- all peasants 
who did not belong to a private landowner — the group was not limited to those 
who lived on government lands but eventually encompassed all non-serfs, 
including free farmers.60 By 1838 there were officially thirty-three categories of 
state peasant61 (as by then they were more accurately called). Their historical 
background was evident in the greater freedom they were accorded and in the 
rights they enjoyed in comparison with serfs.62 Speransky referred to them in 
volume nine of his 1832 Code of Laws as free rural inhabitants.
In terms of numbers, imperial effort was worth it. By 1835, 34 percent of 
the peasant male population were state serfs, numbering about 7 million.63 This 
was obviously a source of revenue which could not be ignored. As well as 
increasing state revenues, reform for state peasants could be carried out without 
directly antagonizing the land-owning gentry. There was also the possibility that 
imperially directed changes on crown estates would set an example for the private
60 N.M. Druzhinin, Gosudarstvenniye krest'yane i reforma P.D.Kiseleva vol 1 (Moscow, Leningrad 
1946-1958), 24, 44. (This work will be referred to in this chapter as Druzhinin.)
61 J.Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia, 476.
62 See Chapter IV, pp. 246-247 above. Also Druzhinin, 78-83.
63 Druzhinin, 45.
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sector to follow. This was the policy urged on Alexander by La Harpe.64 These 
two perspectives -- the administrative fiscal and the general reform approach — 
would be emphasized differently by various reformers under Nicholas. They 
were also evident in the changes made in the administration of the state peasants 
over the decades. Under Catherine, when imperial focus was still mainly fiscal, 
state peasant affairs were handled by the Treasury Department. Paul set up a 
separate central organ, the Commission of State Agriculture, to deal with them 
and when ministries were set up under Alexander, the Ministry of the Interior 
took over. In 1811, fiscal interest dominated and a Department of State Domains 
was set up under the Ministry of Finance. By the 1840s the state peasants were 
managed by their own ministry.
Although imperial power recognized the need for special supervision of 
state peasants, it could effect such supervision only at the central level. On the 
local, real level, peasants were subjected to petty managers, gentry, chinovniks, or 
whoever happened to be the tenant of the estate or the local administrator. 
Unjust treatment at the hands of arbitrary managers sometimes led to 
uprisings.65 Inefficient local administration of crown estates also meant that 
productivity was not maximized and the state was losing potential revenues. 
Taxes, as a means of increasing revenues, could only be raised to a certain extent 
since the peasants' ability to pay did not increase correspondingly, only their 
indebtedness. Catherine, supposedly on the recommendation of Jakob Sievers, 
mooted the idea of turning state lands into gentry hands as a means of increasing 
productivity and Paul also thought this would be an efficient way of supervising
64 Correspondance de Frederic-Cesar de la Harpe at Alexandre Ier, vol I. letter 69, p.324; letter 106, 
p.491.
65 For examples of state peasant uprisings, see Druzhinin, 102-109.
the estates.66 The idea was in keeping with current economic thinking. Edmund 
Burke noted in 1780, "A landed estate is certainly the very worst, which the crown 
can possess ... more proper for private management, than public 
administration."67 Alexander, however, first rejected this policy as a 
strengthening of serfdom although he still admitted the need for effective local 
supervision of state serfs. "The class of crown peasants has long required better 
organization. Due to the lack of local administration and the worsening of the 
different demands of the lower district chinovniks, this class of people often suffers 
significant grave burdens. The necessary measures for their protection will be 
undertaken in the course of this year."68 Like many of Alexander's good 
intentions, this one also came to nothing. By May of the same year (1810), in line 
with Speransky's plans, Alexander returned to the policy of his predecessors and 
declared that crown property with peasants would be up for private sale to 
nobles, merchants and foreign capitalists. The Minister of Finance D.A. Gur'iev 
had guaranteed a gain of 100 million silver rubles from the sale of three million 
desyatin69 of land, two of forests and 332 thousand peasants in 37 provinces. The 
Senate had also agreed that the best solution for the economic viability of state 
domains was selling to the gentry, sure that any other reform would only result 
in more chinovniks. The nobility as local representatives of central power were 
obviously preferable to civil servants.
66 Druzhinin 147. The idea in an English or French context, where crown lands belonged to the 
royal family, would seem impossible but in Russia such lands belonged not to the imperial family but 
to the state treasury. Druzhinin, vol 2, 571.
67 Cited in Wilhelm Roscher, Geschichte der National-Oekonomik in Deutschland (Munich, 1874), 
754.
68 Cited in Druzhinin, 148.
69 One desyatin was 2.7 acres.
The policy failed due to practical difficulties. Since government estates had 
rot been surveyed, it was difficult to set a price. The imperial commissions, 
motivated by the need to decrease the national debt, valued the land rather high 
tu t the gentry offered very low prices at the auctions. By 1816, the government 
-  only 292,458 silver rubles richer — decided to keep its properties rather than sell 
cheaply.70 The idea was not completely dropped by the gentry71 but was 
overtaken by a different approach.
Russian Reform Plans
In 1824 the first warnings of a changed imperial policy which might affect 
the Baltic provinces came in the form of another proposal made by Gur'iev.72 
He suggested that land remain in government hands but that conditions for its 
productivity should be created and the peasants should receive legal and 
economic rights to support economic growth. The plan was based on the Baltic 
reforms, not the recent emancipation reforms but the rejected 1804 measures. 
There is the possibility that Gur'iev viewed 1804 as the necessary prelude to 
emancipation; there is also the possibility that the negative experience of 
emancipation on the Baltic model was beginning to show. There was, however, 
no real departure from imperial policy. The tsar had been consistent in his
70 Ibid., 148-152.
71 N.N.Muraviev, for example, submitted a proposal in 1826 based on nobles owning the land in 
perpetuity but not the peasants on it. The peasants would pay obrok and taxes to the government plus 
a certain amount to the landowner for use of the land. Ibid., 130.
72 Bernhard Schallhorn points to Balug'jansky as the real author of this plan. Bernhard Schallhom, 
Lokalverwaltung und Standerecht in Rufiland zu Beginn der Herrschaft NiklausT Forschungen zur 
osteuropaischen Geschichte vol 26 (Berlin, 1979),189. In this chapter, this work will be referred to as 
Schallhom.
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support of 1804, offering it as a valid alternative to emancipation.73 In practical 
terms, the Russian reform plan took from the 1804 Baltic example hereditary 
tenure, the division of peasants into farmers and workers, with only the former 
entitled to tenure, as well as taxation according to quantity and quality of land. 
This last would, of course, require a survey, an indication that the Russians were 
not yet deterred by the Baltic experience of the time-consuming and costly 
procedure. The most startling change for Russia was Guryev's proposal of 
individual tenure — made just five years after the Gemeinde principle, of 
community responsibility if not land tenure as yet, had been introduced in the 
Baltic. The proposal found support particularly among the Anglophiles who 
viewed the commune as an obstacle to economic progress. The conservative 
arguments were the same as those that had been used in the Baltic discussions: 
hereditary tenure was tantamount to ownership and thus was a breach of the 
landlord's inviolable right to his lands; it would also exclude workers from the 
prospect of land tenure thus creating a class of landless proletariat. The reform 
plan would encourage private serfs to demand the same. Before the plan could 
be discussed by the Senate, however, Alexander died and under the new Minister 
of Finance the emphasis was once more primarily fiscal. The Baltic 1804 model 
was not entirely abandoned and would shortly reappear in diluted form and 
remain a potential model for Russia for the next two decades.
The subject of reform was taken up by Nicholas's first secret committee, 
appointed 6 December 1826.74 The Committee was to examine all proposals
73 See Chapter IV, pp. 291,303 above.
74 Determined to avoid the unrest and false expectations caused, in his opinion, by the openness 
of Alexander's reign, Nicholas insisted on secrecy. During his reign, he appointed no less than nine 
secret committees to deal with the subject of agrarian reform. (Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II,
13.) Secrecy, however, also had the same consequences: unrest and false rumours as well as confusion.
323
found amongst the papers of Alexander and ascertain what had been achieved 
and what still had to be carried out. In addition, it was to examine what changes 
were needed in Russia.75 The focus on the projects of the preceding reign was 
reflected in the choice of the Committee's six members who had all occupied 
prominent positions under Alexander.76 Nicholas himself worked closely with 
the Committee, directing its discussions in such detail that independent opinions 
were often subjected to the imperial will.77 A further control was set by the 
tsar's wish that Gur'iev's successor, E.F.Kankrin,78 be heard in all proposals with 
financial consequences. This was often considered a hindrance since Kankrin, 
trained in German cameralism, believed in administrative efficiency rather than 
reform and his focus, unlike Gur'iev's, was primarily fiscal.79 Kankrin had 
objected to Gur'iev's plan as too complicated but his own plan, which placed the 
state peasants under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance80, had been 
rejected by the Senate in January 1826. A timely letter from Paulucci complaining 
about the poverty of crown peasants in Pskov helped persuade Nicholas, 
however, to allow Kankrin to try a new reform on an experimental basis in the 
provinces of Pskov and St Petersburg in summer 1826. It retained some of the 
protective elements of Gur'iev's plan but was based firmly on the commune and 
on administration through the Ministry of Finance. In the coming decades of
75 Druzhinin 170. See also Schallhom, 102.
76 Kochubey, Count P.A.Tolstoy, Prince A.N.Golitsyn, Michael Speransky, I.V.Vasilchikov, Baron 
Dibich. Schallhom, 100.
77 Ibid., 105.
78 Originally from Hanau in Germany, Kankrin was 22 when he first came to Russia in 1796 with 
his father. See Mertes, Mittorp, Wellenkamp, Drei Deutsche in Rufiland.
79 Schallhom, 102-103.
80 Which meant moving them from the jurisdiction of the local police under a newly created 
District Agricultural Court directly under the Ministry of Finance.
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reform debate, Kankrin would fight to keep the state peasants under his Ministry. 
Within two years of its formation, the new District Agricultural Court was being 
investigated for corruption. It was bureaucratic, unwieldy, expensive and open 
to chinovnik self-interest. The local gentry were against it as usurping their own 
local power and perhaps saw in it a dangerous precedent of local public rather 
than private administration.81
The first session of Nicholas's Secret Committee, from December 1826 to 
May 1827, did not concern itself directly with the agrarian question but with the 
organization of central and local government. The Committee was firmly against 
any dilution of central power. "The desired for order in the Gouvernements can 
only be achieved when exact and uniform regulations are determined for all 
administrative and judicial positions, when these positions are dependent only on 
the highest central government, which will guide each according to the same 
principles ..."82 This policy did not bode well for Baltic provincial privilege but 
exceptions were allowed, and those provinces, especially border ones, which could 
only be ruled by special powers were specifically mentioned. Still, the tendency 
was towards administrative uniformity not only as a means of condensing power 
at the centre but as a necessary background for reform.
The topic of local government did involve the subject of state peasants. 
Fiscal interest demanded efficient administration but the link between reform for 
state peasants and private serfs was clearly expressed. "One of the first and most 
hopeful ways to improve the position of private serfs would be the institution of 
better economic management of crown estates. Such m anagem ent... would serve
81 Druzhinin, 164-170.
82 Cited in Schallhom, 110-111.
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as an example for private owners. The most reasonable, seeing the order and 
contentment in state villages, will quickly follow the example of the government; 
others will be attracted by the general example but if among the landowners there 
are some stubborn and unreasonable people, this small number will easily be 
compelled to conform ... " 83 The Committee recommended the appointment of 
a special commission to examine all previous proposals concerning state peasants 
including both Kankrin's and Gur'iev's proposals.84 It also examined the Livland 
reform, on which Guryev's had been based.85 The commission was headed by 
Prince A.B.Kurakin, president of the economy department of the Senate since 
1821. Kurakin did not think economic management was sufficient. What was 
needed was a basic change in the relationship of peasant to land. Kurakin 
supported Gur'iev's plan rather than Kankrin's but had doubts about the land 
tenure involved. Granting crown lands to the peasants would set a precedent 
which private serfs would want to emulate. Limitless possession, or hereditary 
tenure, could also encroach on landlord rights and would create a landless class 
of "useless and dangerous subjects". For every one satisfied there would be ten 
dissatisfied.86 This argument had been used by the Baltic Ritter to advocate 
emancipation without land. Kurakin, however, recognized the importance of land 
tenure to the economic health of the country and proposed a way of giving the 
peasants land without violating landlord rights. He suggested that state peasants 
in more populated areas should resettle in newly acquired regions in the south
83 Cited in Druzhinin, 171-172.
84 Ibid., 174, Schallhorn, 191.
85 Druzhinin, 175.
86 Schallhorn 191-194.
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east.87 Peasants who resettled in this way would be given hereditary tenure of 
land.88 There would be no communal possession of land but each tax-paying 
settler would receive thirty desyatin89 of land. For those who did not resettle, 
each tax-payer would be allocated not less than ten desyatin of land within the 
commune, to be held in hereditary tenure. This redistribution of the labour force 
would not affect tax revenues since obrok would be transferred from the 
individual to the land, which, unlike the labour force, remained constant.90 The 
idea of resettlement to solve the land question was not new. Alexander, on 
Speransky's suggestion, then governor of Siberia, had permitted the settlement of 
crown peasants in Siberia. In 1824, voluntary resettlement was once more allowed 
and regulated by imperial decree. In May 1827, the State Secretary N.N.Muraviev 
had proposed planned resettlement but the Committee had rejected this, 
preferring voluntary resettlement regulated by economic circumstances. Kurakin's 
plan, however, was linked to the new concept of land tenure and met with the 
Committee's approval. "The effect of this measure would on the one side be the 
gradual, but fairly quick formation of a new ... and useful class of hereditary 
farmers ... along with an end to harmful partitioning of the land ...; on the other 
hand, and no less important, the direct improvement of the situation of the state 
peasants."91 Resettlement suddenly seemed to be the longed-for solution.92
87 Schallhorn, 195; Druzhinin, 176.
88 Druzhinin, 176.
89 See note 69 above.
90 Schallhorn, 195.
91 Cited in Ibid., 197.
92 And would remain so until the Stolypin reforms in 1906-1911 eventually granted individual 
peasant land ownership.
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Nicholas was sufficiently reassured by this suggestion to come out into the 
open with his reform plans. In January 1830 his new public committee, which 
included all the members of the Secret Committee as well as Kankrin, met for the 
first time.93 While the new Committee accepted the premise that improving the 
state peasants' situation would influence the private serfs, there was disagreement 
over the method. Kankrin rejected resettlement on the grounds that the 
government did not have the means to supervise such a venture. He also 
opposed taxing the land instead of the individual on the grounds that it would 
necessitate a costly survey of the land, although Speransky was sure it could be 
completed without.94 Speransky had doubts about abolishing the commune 
principle since it was an integral part of peasant life but was willing to consider 
a gradual approach to individual hereditary tenure.95 Kankrin's opposition was 
effective. The Committee dissolved in the middle of the year without any final 
solution. Reform for state peasants was by now seen as one of the first steps in 
a general policy towards agrarian reform. If it could not be implemented, the 
general policy towards agrarian reform collapsed96
Although Kankrin's opposition was instrumental, Nicholas had already 
reverted to indecision. In March 1830 the Senate, in the course of discussions of 
a proposal submitted anonymously by the Secret Committee, expressed its 
support of emancipation on a voluntary basis with conditions, land or no land, 
to be agreed on between the landowner and the peasants. The Senate's 
recommendation was an adaptation of Gur'iev's plan, the Baltic 1804 model. It
93 Prince P.M.Volonsky, responsible for apanage peasants, was the only addition.
94 Schallhorn, 199.
95 Druzhinin, 183.
96 Schallhorn, 200.
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explicitly mentioned the German Erbpacht as the recommended model, the "best 
if not the only way, little by little without shaking the public order, without 
spreading false expectations among the people, without impoverishing noble 
owners of immovable property, to transfer their peasants out of serfdom into 
another status which would combine the advantages of personal freedom with the 
advantages of their present situation in that they, although not in the legal sense, 
would own house and property. The proposed provisional situation of the 
peasants ... similar to what in Germany is known as Erbpacht97 is in the opinion 
of the Senate more suited to their own needs and the needs of the state than 
emancipation without land ... "98 The tsar, despite the support of the majority, 
hesitated over the publication of the law. N.N.Mordvinov was instrumental in 
persuading him to wait, on the grounds that the law was not liberal enough. "It 
will be said that Russia wanted to be an enlightened European power but turned 
to the obsolete measures of the wild 10th century and renewed them into the 
19th."" Of more concern, however, was the reaction of the nobles on whom the 
monarchy was dependent. 1830 was not an easy year for absolutism. The July 
Revolution in France had repercussions in Belgium and Italy; there were 
revolutions in Switzerland and parts of Germany. There was insurrection in 
Poland in November. At home, a severe cholera epidemic added to social and 
economic difficulties.100 Nicholas took Mordvinov's advice and opted for the 
road of small changes, which Speransky said "did not only fail to cure the disease
97 Not translated in the original Russian text.
98 Cited in Schallhorn, 220.
99 Cited in Ibid., 222.
100 In the course of 1831, for example, 466,000 took ill, of which 42% died. Druzhinin, 196. See 
also R.E.McGrew, Russia and the Cholera, 1823-1832 (Wisconsin, 1965).
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but hid it and made it incurable."101
While actual legislation halted, discussion continued. Kankrin continued 
to oppose the Gur'iev model, fearing the Baltic provinces as the "nutrient 
medium"102 of the democratic movement. His focus was still fiscal and his 
measures increasingly drastic. He extended the tax base by including previously 
exempt groups, improved tax collecting and in 1835 sought and received 
permission to use military punishment on peasants with tax arrears. This was 
repeated in 1836 and 1837 when troops were used in 35 provinces. The results 
were reported to be positive but the peasants had to sell all they possessed to 
pay.103 The 1830s saw more peasant uprisings than in the previous two 
decades.104 Between 1830 and 1836 there were nineteen substantial 
uprisings.105
Paul Kiselev
In March 1835 Nicholas set up another Secret Committee, with a more 
varied membership. Kankrin was once more included, as was Speransky. 
Kochubey was no longer alive. Links to the legislative process were provided by 
the president of the Senate, I.V. Vasilchikov, and the Minister of Justice, Dashkov. 
The most significant addition was Paul Kiselev, a member of the service nobility 
with an outstanding military record. In his youth he had been friendly with some
101 Cited in Druzhinin, 187.
102 Pitatel'naya sreda. Druzhinin, 188.
103 Ibid., 200-202.
104 A total of twelve.
105 For details of the uprisings, see Druzhinin, 207-224.
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of the Decembrists.106 In 1816, he had submitted to Alexander, whose aide-de- 
camp he then was, an essay on the abolition of serfdom. Firmly on the side of 
gentry privilege and absolutism, he recommended the gradual elimination of 
serfdom through measures such as decreasing the number of house serfs, allowing 
serfs to buy their freedom, regulating peasant dues. He explained his philosophy 
of reform in a letter to Count M. Vorontsov in 1852. "Never was there talk of 
absolute emancipation, but only of regulating peasant rights, with the aim of 
taking from the bad landowners the possibility of abusing their rights, which had 
been introduced into our code of laws by chance and were incompatible with 
justice. ... I wish this even now out of fear because the more I observe, the more 
I am afraid of a peasant revolt107 threatening the peace of Russia and the 
existence of the nobility."108 This was the core of Kiselev's approach, not 
emancipation but regulation, motivated by the need to protect the monarchy and 
the nobility from peasant revolt.
Although firmly on the side of landlord privilege, Kiselev rejected the Baltic 
model of emancipation, along with the English and French, since the land 
remained in the hands of the nobles and the peasants became proletariat. He did 
not, however, agree with the reforms in France, Switzerland, and parts of 
Germany, where the peasants were guaranteed some land. He viewed this as a 
violation of the landlords' right to property and the independence of the nobility 
which the crown needed. By the end of the 1830s, he had become so entrenched 
in his defence of land and nobility that he criticized the 1803 free farmers' law as
106 Particularly, Pestel, Michael Orlov, I.Burtsev, N.Basargin. Druzhinin, 257, 265.
107 Jacquerie in the original Russian text.
108 Cited in Druzhinin, 274.
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anti-noble, a measure not to be emulated since "the consequences ... would be the 
destruction of the independence of the nobility and the formation of democracy 
by people emerging from serfdom. ... [T]his measure is contrary to government 
organizaton, in which the nobility is a necessary element, uniting the highest 
power with the people; they must have the exclusive right to own lands so that 
they can maintain their influence on the masses and secure their own existence 
and in this way will be able to fulfil their highest appointment in the service of 
the throne."109 Kiselev found an acceptable model in the Austrian reforms, 
starting with Maria Theresa's Urbarium of 1767, which combined landowner 
monopoly of land with peasant use of land. The nobility retained the land and 
the peasants were granted personal freedom and could use allotments for exactly 
determined dues. This was similar to the Baltic 1804 reforms but lacked the 
essential element of peasant land tenure.
Where Russian landowners would not be affected, Kiselev was prepared 
to  advocate hereditary tenure. His plan for the confiscated Polish estates 
consisted of giving them to Russian nobility. Peasants would have hereditary 
tenure, regulation of dues, court representation, obrok, the right to complain and 
other legal protections similar to the 1804 model.110 The solution to the 
management of estates confiscated in Poland reflects imperial attitudes to 
emancipation, attitudes which may have caused the Baltic Ritter some concern. 
They acknowledged the principles of 1804 which the Ritter had rejected. All 
peasants were to be allocated land, which the landowner could not re-appropriate,
109 Citted in Ibid., 275.
110 Ibiid, 275-277.
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in hereditary tenure and all dues were to be regulated.111 There was also the 
general imperial attitude. The confiscated lands were given to Russian nobility 
in the hope of establishing a Russian influence in the area and to Ukrainian 
nobility in the hope of attracting their loyalty.112
The 1835 Committee agreed that state peasant reform could not be 
undertaken independent of the private serfs and thus set out to find a general 
solution. Kankrin's administrative emphasis was rejected. Speransky said of it, 
"There is one deficiency in the proposal: in it there is a form of administration 
(upravleniye) but not of principle (pravil). In a word, there is institution 
(uchrejdeniye) but no statute (ustav)."n3 The Committee members agreed that 
much more was needed than Kankrin's administrative changes and supported 
principles similar to the Baltic 1804 reforms as advocated by Gur'iev. The general 
principle of the land belonging exclusively to the landowners was upheld with an 
allocation of land for peasant use for dues legally prescribed. Whereas the Baltic 
reforms had been designed for an unfree peasantry, the Russian plan envisaged 
emancipation in this mode. The Committee's agenda did include the Baltic 
emancipation reforms of 1816-1819 to follow the regulation phase114 but it was 
recognized that a landless emancipation would be very difficult for the peasant 
to comprehend.115 The Russian peasant believed in communal ownership of
111 Ibid., 290-292. Nicholas approved this plan on 22 February 1836 but it was apparently never 
published. (Ibid., 292.) Still, the Baltic Ritter would have been aware of its measures as they were put 
into practice.
112 Fiscal interests were not forgotten. The government was to receive five percent of profits from 
the estates.
113 Cited in Druzhinin, 293.
114 I.e., the same time-table as in the Baltic provinces: regulation followed by emancipation.
115 Druzhinin, 283-287.
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land. The lord had control over the land through ownership of the serfs. The 
peasant would now have to learn that the land, not the serf, belonged to the lord. 
In the Baltic provinces, the concept and practice of Ritter ownership of land and 
serfs had always been clear.
As peasant unrest continued, particularly in the Urals, Nicholas was 
anxious for some results. In February 1836, he asked Kiselev to take over. 
Kiselev worked together with Speransky and they settled, not surprisingly, on a 
reform formula similar to the 1804 Baltic model, which Nicholas agreed to in May 
of the same year. Obrok was to be transferred from the individual to the land and 
there would be guaranteed peasant tenure of the land with regulated dues.116 
Individual farming was mentioned as a point for clarification but by September 
Kiselev spoke out against it. Landlessness, the result of family tenure, led to 
revolution. The commune could be kept and strip farming improved, an 
indication that Kiselev saw the root of economic ills not in the former but in the 
latter. The core of his reform thought was the allocation of a sufficient quantity 
of land, the regulation of taxes and labour dues, with obrok on the land rather 
than the individual, the improvement of agriculture and the encouragement of 
industry.117 Nicholas agreed to the reform model and dissolved the Committee 
leaving Kiselev in charge.
After a two-month trip through the provinces of Petersburg, Pskov, and 
Moscow undertaken to gather first-hand information on the peasant situation, 
Kiselev's emphasis changed. He was almost ready to agree with Kankrin that 
reform was primarily dependent on an efficient administration. " ... [T]he
116 Ibid., 297.
117 Ibid., 496.
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immorality of the established authorities and of the peasants themselves has 
reached the highest degree and demands strong measures for uprooting the 
abuses which destroy the economic existence of the peasants at the very 
foundation, giving rise to a disinclination to work ... and in some cases has 
destroyed the appropriate development of state wealth. Huge arrears ... serve as 
sufficient proof of that; but the confusion of these debts and the measures used 
in their collection, often from people and villages not subject to exaction, produce 
indifference in some and in others carelessness towards the correct fulfilment of 
their dues and ... can engender in them feelings unusual to the good Russian 
soul.1'118 As well as noting the corruption of administrators, Kiselev saw the 
rank ignorance of the peasants, their depravity and anarchy as major factors in the 
progressive impoverishment of government estates. The prevailing system was 
not the root cause of economic ills, but the imperfection of the bureaucratic 
apparatus and the lack of a firm policy on the part of the government. Everything 
-- the resolution of the agrarian question, the modification of the tax system, the 
development of agriculture and industry -- stemmed from a good 
administration.119
In May 1837 Kiselev took the first step in this direction. He submitted an 
organizational plan to the tsar. Finances and collection of taxes would be handled 
by the Ministry of Finance while all other matters regarding state peasants wuld 
come under a new Ministry of State Domains. The Ministry would also be 
responsible for the improvement of agriculture in the Empire, thus giving it a 
foothold in the private sector. It would consist of three departments: one for state
118 Cited in Ibid., 477.
119 Ibid.
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peasants on obrok, one for those on corvee and the third for agriculture in general. 
Attention on the Baltic provinces was ensured through the second department 
since it was mainly in the Baltic, Byelorussia, Lithuania and the Ukraine that 
corvee persisted.120 The establishment of the Ministry was followed by a series 
of administrative reforms from 1837 to 1841. In April 1838, local bureaucratic 
apparatus was set up in the thirty-five mainly obrok provinces for the management 
of state lands. By December 1839, the administration of government estates in the 
remaining mainly corvee provinces had begun but was introduced gradually. It 
was not applied to the Baltic provinces until 12 June 1841. Although Kiselev 
aimed in general to replace corvee with money rents, he did not immediately try 
to do this in the Baltic provinces. The reform for government estates in the Baltic 
did stipulate that barshchina should eventually be replaced by obrok, that lands 
would be surveyed for the purpose of regulation and taxation but there was no 
time limit mentioned.121 Kiselev's moves, however, would be a pressure factor 
on the Baltic provinces to consider reforms before the state model was uniformly 
applied to both the public and private sectors.
PART THREE: BALTIC REACTION TO IMPERIAL REFORM PLANS
Up until this point, the Baltic provinces had not been unduly troubled by 
imperial intentions. Not only had most of the discussions been kept secret, but 
there had been no clear reform policy formulated. Those who had opposed 1819
120 Ibid., 526.
121 Ibid., 526, 574-604.
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may have known that the 1804 model was already under discussion in the mid- 
1820s, albeit secretly, in government circles as a potential model for a Russian 
reform but the majority of the Landtag felt no imperial pressure. In 1827, 
Hagemeister tried to introduce for private serfs what had been introduced on 
crown estates in Livland: at the end of a lease period, the leasee had first 
preference for renewal. It was hoped in this way to encourage longer tenancies. 
The Landtag rejected this as a violation of laissez-faire. "It was not advisable to 
set such harmful limits on the unlimited authority of the landlord in leasing his 
lands, since it would be disadvantageous to free competition if the class of 
farmers had preference in the tenure of farms, which would exclude the labourers 
and thus destroy the most beneficial result of emancipation."122 In any case, it 
was added, landowners were free to grant leases of up to fifty years. Samson 
tried in vain to gain support for the abolition of the fifty year limit in favour of 
hereditary tenure. A few years later, however, once hereditary tenure had 
received official government support,123 it received attention in the Baltic, 
particularly in the Livland press,124 but government support was apparently not 
enough to change official policy in the Baltic provinces. In January 1833, the 
Committee of the three provinces set up through the Governor General to ensure 
that the three Baltic emancipation reforms were in harmony,125 firmly opposed 
the idea of hereditary tenure. It would not only exclude many peasants from the 
prospect of a farm but would force private landowners to follow the government's 
example, thereby violating their right to free disposition of their land. A
122 Cited in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 425.
123 The Senate had recommended it in 1830. See p.329 above.
124 Ibid., 426, note 1.
125 Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 176.
337
compromise solution was accepted. Hereditary tenure could be granted at the 
end of twenty-five years'leasing to those who had farmed well.126 At the 
Livland Landtag in the summer of the same year, hereditary tenure was proposed 
and once more rejected.127
Reform on government lands as such would not have affected the Baltic 
provinces as greatly as other parts of the Empire since the numbers of state 
peasants were comparatively small, especially in Estland and Livland. The largest 
percentage was in Kurland, where 64,551 male state peasants accounted for 26.2 
percent of the total male population. In Livland the percentage was 13.8 percent, 
numbering 49,234, and in Estland there were only 2,186 amounting to 1.6 percent 
of the total male population. In comparison, state peasants constituted the 
absolute majority in fourteen of the other provinces of the Empire and in twenty- 
one provinces they outnumbered other peasants.128 The Baltic Ritter, however, 
had correctly surmised that the state peasant policy of the Empire was more than 
fiscal administration. It was an indication of its general policy. Not only did the 
new Ministry of State Domains have a special department to deal with agriculture 
in general, but in November 1839 Kiselev turned his attention to reform in the 
private sector. His idea of peasant land tenure based on regulated norms was 
more in keeping with the rejected 1804 reforms than those currently in effect. In 
addition, his emphasis on transferring obrok from the individual to the land was 
not suited to the provinces where the majority of peasants, unlike most other parts 
of the Empire, were still on corvee.
126 Ibid., 178.
127 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 426.
128 Druzhinin, 311-312
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The provinces had expressed their opposition to the return of hereditary 
tenure but Governor General Baron Pahlen, undoubtedly representing official 
policy, insisted on some sort of security of land tenure for the peasants. Here the 
difference between the Russian idea of landless emancipation and the Baltic 
practice of it was obvious. Whereas the Russians were also unwilling to violate 
landowner rights, they saw a need to protect the landless peasant. In June 1833, 
Pahlen proposed an unwithdrawable amount of land to be leased to peasants, a 
renewal of Rennenkampff's idea, as well as setting a maximum and minimum 
size to peasant plots. At the same time, he made the imperial attitude to the 
current emancipation reforms in the Baltic perfectly clear. "... I am convinced that 
it is imperative to amend the reforms based on limited lease ... so that the peasant 
can be protected from the dangers of ruthless dismissal and appropriation of 
peasant land."129 The Ritterhauptmann Grunewaldt replied on behalf of the 
Estland Ritter that notice was given in nine out of ten cases by the peasant and 
in the tenth the landlord offered another position. Setting limits on lease or land 
would hinder economic progress, in particular the effective distribution of the 
labour force. There was no further imperial insistence and Grunewaldt felt able 
to report to the Landtag in February 1836 that official circles seemed to have given 
up the idea of hereditary tenure.130
Ritter attention, however, had been brought back to imperial intention. 
Ritter disquiet at agrarian reform intentions was added to by what seemed to be 
parallel intentions of Russian dominance in other fields. In February 1839, the 
Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, widely read in the Baltic, published a supposedly
129 Cited in Gemet, Geschichte und System des Agrarrechts, 181.
130 Ibid., 182-183.
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secret letter of the Minister of Education S.S.Uvarov, complaining about a 
regrettable lack of Russian in the provinces, which would necessitate replacing 
local teachers in schools with Russians. Both Kurland and Livland protested, 
causing the tsar to send Prince Volkonsky to the provinces to investigate. In the 
same month, Grunewaldt warned the Estland Landtag of the need for reform. 
The economic position of the peasants, he said, had attracted the attention of 
higher authorities.131 Grunewaldt suggested strengthening the Gemeinde and 
establishing regulating norms for peasant dues. The Landtag appointed a 
committee, which took two years to come up with reform proposals, including a 
return to hereditary tenure,132 which was in keeping with current government 
policy. Some ten days before its final session on 25 November 1841, however, 
Pahlen wrote to inform the Estland Ritter that they should establish contact with 
Livland, where reform discussions were now also taking place under imperial 
guidance and the conclusions would be used as a model for the three 
provinces.133
Once more imperial initiative had been necessary to co-ordinate reform in 
the three Baltic provinces. Despite the Committee of 1830 appointed to compare 
and amend the three Baltic reforms in the interest of unity, new reforms were 
discussed without consultation with the other provinces. This had been the same 
procedure as all previous reforms, with the same result: the imperial government 
took over the role of co-ordinator, often showing a preference for one province, 
although not consistently the same one, to the objection of the others. Unity
131 Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 186.
132 See Ibid., 197-192 for details of the committee's discussions.
133 Ibid., 192.
among the provinces might have provided an effective break against imperial 
intervention, and this was no doubt in Bruiningk's m ind when he complained 
about the lack of co-operation at the 1839 Livland Landtag. As late as 1840, the 
Estland Ritter were apparently not aware for sure that Livland was also working 
on a reform.134 Grunewaldt objected to Pahlen's instruction on the grounds that 
one reform could not be applied to differing local circumstances.135 It was true 
that the new reform process in Livland had been dictated by problems not present 
in Estland.
Livland 1842
Economic problems had not moved the Livland Ritter to change their 
support of 1819, nor had Uvarov's intimations of imperial intervention or 
centralization. There had been a few voices raised136 but the subject was in 
general played down. At the Landtag in the summer of 1839, one member noted: 
"In this matter it is conceivable that absolutely nothing will happen ... the best 
thing now is to let grass grow over it."137
The impetus to take up the subject of agrarian reform came in the summer 
of 1841 when thousands of Baltic peasants streamed to Riga to take advantage of
134 Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 56.
135 Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 193.
136 Bruiningk eventually resigned in protest at his helplessness against Russian plans of interfering
in the shool system in Livland. As well as the official protest against Uvarov's remarks, Karl Ulmann, 
the rector of Dorpat University, on Bruiningk's request, submitted his own complaint against the 
proposed Russian intervention in the education system of the province. Ulmann's attack on Uvarov 
was sharp, accusing him of the ultimate aim of turning the Germans in the province into Russians. 
Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 62-65.
137 Cited in Ibid., 66.
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the rumoured offer of land in a warm country for all those who accepted the faith 
of the tsar.138 Pahlen claimed the conversion of Baltic peasants from 
Lutheranism to Orthodoxy was the result of deliberate interference on the part of 
the Orthodox church. The tsar's investigators claimed the root cause was 
economic -- factors such as high labour dues, appropriation of peasant land, 
dependence on the landlord forced the peasant to seek deliverance through the 
promises of the Orthodox bishop of Riga. The movement could only be quelled 
by force of arms, reputedly 10,000 Russian troops.139 Whatever the perspective 
on the conversion movement, it was the catalyst for the next reform wave in 
Livland. Whether it was attributed to peasant unrest, understandable in light of 
the economic restraints and circumstances of the last two decades, or to a policy 
either directed or at least condoned by the Russian government, believable to 
some in light of recent centralizing tendencies, the end result had to be the same. 
Both scenarios demanded swift legislative action on the part of the Ritter. The 
imperial government, for its part, was able to use the unrest to exert pressure for 
economic reform. A stable economic situation would not have attracted the same 
amount of imperial attention.
In October 1841 Livland set up, with imperial permission, a committee to 
discuss agrarian reform. Its brief was imperially prescribed. Pahlen instructed 
the members to consider the reduction of corvee, the transition to grain and 
money rents, and an end to the arbitrary dismissal of tenants and appropriation 
of land,140 measures in keeping with Kiselev's policies but in direct contradiction
138 Ibid., 71. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 42.
139 Ibid., 43-47.
140 Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 192-193. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 58.
to Li viand's own emancipation reform. In November 1841, before the
Committee's first meeting in Dorpat in January 1842, a group of Ritter141 
gathered on the estate of Friedrich von Sivers at the invitation of a new member 
of the Livland Ritter and Landtag, Hamilkar von Folkersahm.142 Grunewaldt 
was also present and presented the reforms proposed in Estland. Folkersahm's 
group submitted their ideas to the Dorpat Committee. They were based on the 
"radical improvement" of the landlord giving up part of his land in the course of 
thirty to fifty years for hereditary use, with the ultimate aim of ownership, by the 
peasant. Folkersahm, however, still supported the landlord's right to his land and 
underlined the importance of continued German dominance in the Baltic 
provinces. The majority of land must remain in the hands of the German nobility. 
"In a monarchical state, there must be a strong nobility and its strength lies only 
in land ownership."143
These proposals were examined by the Dorpat Committee along with 
Pahlen's instructions, the Estland proposals and several other submissions tending 
towards 1804. At the end of its deliberations, the Committee declared that the 
current economic weakness was not attributable to corvee or to the introduction 
of new agricultural methods but to the insecurity of land tenure. The 
Committee's proposals did not only comply with Kiselev's reforms but revived 
1804 almost completely and adopted several liberal principles from Folkersahm's
141 There were eighteen. Their names are listed in "Notizen," in Tobien, Die Agrargestzgebung, 
vol II, Beilage 2, 381.
142 Folkersahm had been born into the Kurland nobility in 1811. His connections with Livland 
included schooling in Riga, a short period at Dorpat University and marriage to a woman from
Livland. In Baltic historiography, he is generally highly praised as "Livland's most outstanding 
phenomenon" (Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 53), as "the most significant Baltic German politician 
of the century" (Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 162), as "Livland's Mirabeau" (Eckardt, "Hamilcar 
Folkersahm," in Die baltischen Provinzen, 424). He died in 1856.
143 "Notizen," in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, Beilage 2, 383.
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group. All land designated as peasant land by the survey completed in 1832 
should remain so. It should be granted to the peasants in hereditary tenure and 
only ten percent of it could be re-appropriated for manorial use. Labour was to 
be regulated according to the norms of 1804 and 1809. Notice could be given 
from the peasant's side; the landlord could give notice only if he could prove he 
needed the land to advance the manorial economy or if the land was to be sold 
to peasants.144
On 3 February 1842, the Landtag members met in Riga. On 9 February the 
tsar's emissary, Alexander von Benkendorff,145 informed the Landtag of the 
tsar's wish that the deficiencies of the 1819 reforms be rectified in order to 
improve the situation of the peasants.146 The Dorpat proposals had not 
progressed further than the Adelskonvent, which constitutionally had to give an 
opinion first, without great disagreement. The district deputies were of the 
opinion that 1804 and 1819 could not be applied simultaneously; 1804 was 
designed for a time of serfdom and limited landlord power; 1819 for freedom and 
unlimited landlord power. Most of the councillors, on the other hand, were in 
favour of the Dorpat proposals. The Landtag reflected this disagreement. There 
were those like Bruiningk and Bock who still supported 1804, others like von 
Lowis and Baron Nolcken-Lunia who favoured 1819, those who supported the 
Dorpat proposals and various positions in between. Discussions ground to a halt 
on 19 February 1842. The twelve councillors warned that in the absence of 
agreement, the government would impose what the Ritter would not. "What was
144 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 62.
145 Head of what was effectively the secret police, and originally from Estland.
146 Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 80-81. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung Livlands vol 
II, 68.
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now forfeited would be lost for all time."147 The warning did not help and 
Pahlen was forced to intervene and demand that the Landtag reach a decision 
which would protect the peasant from excessive labour demands and from 
dismissal from his land, the same reforms he had recommended to the Dorpat 
Committee.148 Thus, the parameters of reform were once more unequivocally 
set by the government's representative and the Landtag eventually accepted most 
of the Dorpat proposals. The peasant community, not the individual peasant, was 
guaranteed use of the peasant land. 1804 was revived in the form of the 
Wackenbuch norms as the only valid ones. Leases based on kind and cash were 
allowed. Conditions were set to facilitate hereditary tenure and eventual peasant 
ownership of land. The Landtag, however, did not accept the Dorpat 
recommendations that the landlord renounce his right to give notice nor that 
contracts not based on the Wackenbuch norms be automatically invalid. The 
Governor General refused to accept these two objections and demanded a 
provisional clause that no peasant could be dismissed from his land without a 
court decision and that all contracts must be based on the Wackenbuch. The Ritter 
refused to comply.149
Pahlen now took matters into his own hands. From the 111 paragraphs of 
the proposed reform he chose 22, mostly concerning the regulation of norms 
according to 1804 and 1809, and presented them to the tsar for ratification, first 
making several amendments apparently without consulting the Ritter. The tsar 
agreed to the proposals and, under Pahlen's instructions, Samson distributed the
147 Cited in Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 81.
148 Ibid.; Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 76;
149 Ibid., 81.
22 articles in April 1842 to all landowners in Livland. Pahlen also informed all 
district judges that landlords no longer had the right to evict tenants without a 
court order.150 Whether Pahlen was acting on the conviction that his demands 
and amendments would meet with imperial approval since they corresponded to 
the essence of Kiselev's reforms or whether he had received more precise 
instructions, perhaps from the Ministry of State Domains, is not clear. His 
intervention did ensure renewed Russian supervision of the Baltic reform process.
After Pahlen had submitted the complete February 1842 reform, with further 
amendments, to Nicholas in May 1842, Nicholas decided that the whole reform 
should be reviewed by a new committee, based in St Petersburg,151 on which the 
province would be represented by the Land Marshal and two Ritter. Its 
membership reflected the importance Nicholas attached to the reform; supervision 
was of the highest level. Perovsky, Minister of the Interior, was a member as 
were Kankrin, Pahlen and his brother, Benkendorff, and Baron Paul Hahn, a 
member of the Senate, originally from Kurland and ex-Governor of Kurland and 
Livland. Nolcken and Oettingen, who had argued against 1804, represented the 
Ritter, a seemingly unsuitable choice in terms of imperial policy and the Landtag 
decision, which both tended to support 1804.152 The choice, however, turned out 
to suit the changing reform mood in government circles.
150 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 89-90.
151 The Committee would eventually become the Ostseekomitee.
152 Perhaps their choice was indicative of a general tendency among the Ritter to hope for a 
relaxation of imperial pressure and the possibility of rescuing 1819 before it was replaced. Such a 
tendency would not come out in a vote on the Landtag since it was under imperial guidance and 
control. A vote against imperial wishes could be seen as a vote of no confidence in the tsar and could 
provoke imperial intervention. The Ritter followed their usual pattern of minimal concession to 
imperial pressure but had been forced into more by Pahlen's unconstitutional methods. There was 
perhaps the hope that Nolcken and Oettingen could still recover some lost ground. This is what in 
effect happened.
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Pahlen's demands of the Livland Ritter had undoubtedly been shaped by 
official policy but this policy was just about to take on a new emphasis. Kiselev 
had begun an attempt to apply his state peasant reforms to private serfs. The 
landlords would keep the land and the peasant would be freed with the right to 
use gentry land in return for rent in money or kind,153 his dues regulated as in 
the Wackenbuch in the Baltic provinces.154 These proposals were discussed in 
secret committee in March 1840, where they met with opposition, particularly 
from Panin, Stroganov and Menshikov, who were against regulation norms. 
Menshikov, in particular, was against compulsory ties of any kind and also 
objected strongly to the commune, seeing in it a dangerous wedge between the 
landowner and the peasants, especially since the land was to be guaranteed to the 
Gemeinde and not to the individual. Whereas Kiselev saw the danger of revolution 
in the masses of labourers deprived of land through individual rather than 
communal tenure, for Menshikov the danger lay in the commune as a source of 
uprising. His recommendation was "divide et impera."155 Menshikov favoured 
the emancipation reforms in the Baltic, which gave the lords complete freedom 
over their lands. Kiselev eventually compromised by abandoning the principle 
of legal norms of plots and dues and not subjecting private peasants to the 
Ministry of State Domains. The Committee recommended that the reform be 
published as an explanatory ukaz to the 1803 free farmers' law and only in general 
terms. Gur'iev complained about the vagueness and uselessness of the reform, 
seeing in it a hopeless attempt to call on the good will of the landowners. The
153 Labour was not mentioned.
154 Druzhinin, 613-616.
155 Ibid., 624.
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draft proposal, however, caused much discussion at the Senate level and Nicholas 
himself intervened just after the Livland Landtag had adopted the Dorpat 
proposals.
On 30 March 1842, the tsar delivered a speech giving the first clear 
statement of agrarian policy in his reign. He deplored the state of serfdom but 
considered it an even greater evil to abolish it at that time. Such a step would be 
a "criminal attack on the general peace and welfare of the state."156 The correct 
way was "to open the way to a transitional stage, combined with the unshakeable 
right of the nobility to the land."157 The land should always remain in the hands 
of the nobility, a policy he would never deviate from. The new law would allow 
landowners to improve the situation of their serfs without any force. "On the 
other hand, by tying the peasants to the land, it would avoid the shortcomings of 
the reforms valid until now in the Baltic, reforms which have brought the 
peasants into the worst situation, that of labourers, and which have led the 
nobility to ask unanimously for that which is being considered here at 
present."158 Imperial disapproval of the Baltic emancipation reforms was now 
public and official. The February Landtag decisions were implicitly upheld as 
officially acceptable.
The law based on these decisions was promulgated on 2 April 1842 and 
followed Nicholas's recommendations more than Kiselev's proposals. The 
landowner could voluntarily allow his serfs to become hereditary subjects, in 
which case their dues would be regulated. Unlike the 1803 law which allowed
156 "Rede des Kaisers Nikolai des Ersten," in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, Beilage 1, 379.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid., 380.
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the freed peasant to own his land, 1842 allowed the peasant only to use it. In the 
next thirteen years, only 24,708 peasants belonging to three aristocratic families 
were freed.159
Complete emancipation in Russia was thus halted and the way to gradual 
improvement officially adopted. Nicholas had clearly expressed his disapproval 
of the Baltic emancipation reforms 1816-1819 but had at the same time upheld the 
nobles' exclusive right to the land, the main tenet of the 1819 reform. Those who 
opposed 1819 in Livland now had imperial support but could not restore 1804 
since it violated the right to land upheld by the tsar. Not only did the critics of 
1819 now have imperial support, they were also supported by changes in 
economic thinking. Adam Smith's principles no longer went unquestioned.
Changing Economic Attitudes
This was obvious in Russian government circles, where no-one since Storch 
had spoken out for Smith's laissez-faire principles, now deemed unsuitable for 
Russia. Kankrin claimed that "even the principles meant to be general often had 
too much of the individuality of England."160 This reluctance to adopt Adam 
Smith was not confined to Russia. In Germany the Romantic movement, the 
reaction against the rationalism of the Aufklarung, also found expression in 
economic theory. One of Smith's strongest critics, Adam Muller, was a 
representative of the Romantic National Economy school of thought161 and his
159 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 21.
160 Cited in Roscher, Geschichte der National-Oekonomik, 815.
161 Also known as the historical-political school.
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ideas were taught at Dorpat University.162 Muller considered Smith one of the 
few theoretical writers to emerge from Britain, a country which due to its political 
circumstances was usually able to produce practical writers.163 For Muller, 
Edmund Burke personified the successful combination of theory and practice.164 
Although classing him as theoretical, Muller criticized Smith for concerning 
himself only with the concrete, for not taking into account less tangible but 
equally essential elements, and for trying to make a science, a "dead concept" out 
of productivity, exchange value and raw labour.165 Muller himself, consistent 
with the anti-rational direction, placed great emphasis on elements which were 
not always concretely evident.166 "The state is not merely a manufacturer, a 
feudal estate, an insurance institute or a mercantile society; it is the deep linking 
of the total physical and spiritual needs, of the total physical and spiritual wealth, 
of the total inner and outer life of a nation to a large energetic and endlessly 
moving and living whole."167 There were, however, more tangible elements in 
Muller which stemmed less from his philosophical perspective than from his 
feudal standpoint. Smith's theory, claimed Muller, had been developed in Britain, 
where the emphasis was on capital, and could not be applied on the "Continent," 
where the emphasis was most definitely on land.168 Land ownership was of 
paramount importance as a restraint on the town classes, the workers and the
162 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung vol II, 87.
163 Adam Muller, Die Elemente der Staatskunst (Berlin, 1809), vol 1, Book 1, 13.
164 Ibid., 19. Personifications of the predominantly practical were Colbert and Friedrich II. Ibid.,
165 Ibid., vol 2, book 4, 376-378.
166 His perspective was organic and he believed in the dynamism created by opposites.
167 Ibid., vol 1, book 1, 37.
168 Ibid., vol 3, book 5, 16-20.
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growth of industry.169 When Muller spoke of land, his focus was not on the 
peasants. He criticized the physiocrats for their emphasis on farm land (Ackerbau) 
rather than on land as such170 and did not envisage the peasants as a Stand. 
"The peasantry is not a Stand and never should be."171 He was against reforms 
which deprived agriculture of its feudal essence and opposed Stein's reforms.172 
He even criticized money payment for services rendered, which supported the 
Ritter concentration on corvee labour.173 There was much in Muller which was 
compatible with the Ritter concepts of land ownership and the maintenance of 
privilege.174
The counter-reform movement in Germany produced others similar in 
thinking to Muller, for example, Friedrich Gentz or Karl Ludwig von Haller, or 
Ernst von Btilov-Camerov who in 1848 founded a Society for the defence of 
landed property interests.175 In September 1849, Friedrich Julius Stahl warned 
the Prussian Landtag that the land-owning nobility was an indispensable element 
of the state. Without it, the country would be at the mercy of capitalists and 
speculators. He recommended that both noble and peasant land be unsaleable
169 Ibid., 12.
170 Ibid., vol 2, book 4, 374.
171 In a letter to Friedrich Gentz, cited in W.Roscher, Geschichte der National-Oekonomik, 774, note 
3. The three basic estates for Muller were the nobility, the burghers and the gentry. A possible fourth, 
as Roscher noted with an exclamation mark, would be the merchants and not the peasants.
172 Ibid. Muller is said to have compared the three-field system to the Holy Trinity. Ibid., note
2 .
173 Der Verdienst (earnings) was not to be compared to das Verdienst (merit). Roscher, Geschichte 
der National-Oekonomik, 773-77A.
174 There were also elements which would not have appealed to the Ritter, especially those 
stemming from his conversion from Protestantism to Catholicism.
175 Roscher, Geschichte der National-Oekonomik, 1026.
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and indivisible.176 August von Haxthausen, who had journeyed through 
through the Russian Empire in 1843 at the tsar's invitation, supported historical 
Ritter privilege but was also willing to accept some contemporary developments. 
"I have never been a friend or admirer of modern European bureaucracy, I have 
always considered it almost a necessary evil, it has led part of Europe to the 
modern idolatry of the omnipotent state but if bureaucracy were fully destroyed 
in the rest of Europe, obviously nothing would remain but pure anarchy swinging 
back and forth in socialist and communist impulses."177 Haxthausen was not a 
supporter of the Prussian agrarian reforms: "In Prussia, which the rest of Germany 
gradually followed, the peasants were given more freedom [than those in Russia], 
serfdom was abolished everywhere, manorial services and dues were replaced by 
land or money compensation. Manorial authority, patrimonial jurisdiction and 
police were gradually abolished and removed but no new autonomous institutions 
were set up in their place, it was thought enough to issue Gemeinde rules, which, 
however, had more of a police and political character than an organic and social 
one. The peasantry lost all its inner security, all the previous strength of an 
organism. The peasants are no longer guaranteed land ... they are losing it piece 
by piece to the large landowners and to the day workers.. The bonds between 
peasant and noble ... are completely dissolved, there exists between them only 
material interests. The nobility has lost all its previous privileges and prerogatives 
without gaining the welfare of the other classes. Previously, there were laws to 
protect the nobles' lands. The laws are abolished and ... there are provinces...
176 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 208-209.
177 August Freiherr von Haxthausen, Studien iiber die innern Zustande, das Volksleben und 
insbesondere die landliche Einrichtungen Rufilands 3 vols. (Berlin 1847-1852), vol.3, 9. Ernst von 
Biilov-Camerov, for example, was against Prussian bureaucracy. W.Roscher, Geschichte der National- 
Oekonomik, 1026.
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where more than half the noble estates have transferred into the hands of 
burghers."178 After the Russian emancipation reforms of 1861, Haxthausen 
recommended that Russia still uphold its system of communal rather than 
individual land ownership. The latter would lead only to poverty and 
proletarianism, which fed revolution.179 Communal landownership was also a 
natural protection against exploitation by economically stronger groups.180 More 
importantly from the noble point of view, if Russia maintained its communal 
system, the question of who owned the land, in the western sense, need never be 
asked. "The whole land belonged in its entirety to the Russian people."181 The 
idea of communal ownership of land as less of a threat to noble land rights than 
individual ownership would find its way into the Baltic reform amendments.
Changing Reforms in the Baltic 1842-1847
Nicholas's rejection of 1819 principles and his insistence on the right of the 
nobility to the land were in keeping with changing economic attitudes. In terms 
of Baltic reform, however, they presented a paradox. The advocated right of the 
nobility to the land was the basic tenet of the rejected 1819 reform, not of the 1804 
reform implicitly upheld in 1842. The 1840s are characterized by attempts on both 
the imperial and provincial side to come up with a formula that combined the 
landownership principles of 1819 with the protective elements of 1804. The search 
for the right combination of 1804 and 1819 which would satisfy the rather
178 August Freiherr von Haxthausen, Die landliche Verfassung Rufllands. Ihre Entwickelungen und 
ihre Feststellung in der Gesetzgebung von 1861 (Leipzig, 1866), 372-373.
179 Ibid., 419.
180 Ibid., 409.
181 Ibid., 386.
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contradictory wishes of Nicholas led to almost a decade of complicated and 
confusing debates, amendments and decisions in the Baltic. Nicholas's policy 
statement was first used to clear the way for a rejection of the protective measures 
which the February 1842 Landtag had accepted under pressure from the 
government's representative Pahlen. The swing was dramatic. The February 
reform had been supported by 107 against 76; at the Landtag in December of the 
same year only 27 against 102 were in favour of retaining it. Both decisions were 
within the parameters of imperial policy. The first was made under pressure 
from Pahlen representing what the tsar wanted; the second on the basis of the 
tsar's April speech.
The debates in the 1840s although supposed to be concerned with the 
plight of the peasants were in essence debates about how to retain a monopoly 
on the land and at the same time award some concessions which would satisfy 
imperial will and at the same time help productivity by stimulating the peasant 
to work rather than revolt. As earlier noted, the Baltic landowner was unwilling 
to change from corvee to money rents. As late as 1845 the Livland Economic 
Society did not feel able to recommend wage-labour to the country and in 1846 
the Agricultural Society still maintained that well-managed corvee labour could 
still produce sizeable profits.182 These two conditions, the landlord right to do 
as he wished with his land and the continuance of corvee labour, determined the 
nature of any future reforms.
The December 1842 Landtag had placed its trust in Nolcken and Oettingen. 
The "liberals," that is Folkersahm's group, the supporters of February 1842, were 
defeated and Folkersahm himself left for Europe. By April 1843, the St Petersburg
182 Kahk, Peasant and Lord, 90.
Committee, under the influence of Nolcken and Oettinger as representatives of the 
wishes of the Ritter, had worked out 77 amendments to 1819 which effectively 
revived 1819, most importantly the landlord's right to his land, and these were 
submitted to Nicholas.183 After confusion caused by Nicholas first accepting the 
supplements, despite his expressed opposition to 1819, and then withdrawing 
them under Pahlen's pressure, the Landtag met in September 1844. After much 
discussion of the merits and demerits of 1819, the 77 paragraphs were accepted 
mostly because Landrat Baron Meyendorff warned that their rejection would open 
the way for new approaches from St Petersburg, especially dangerous in light of 
recent government intentions of imposing one language, one faith and one law in 
the whole Empire.184 Pahlen fought on for Wackenbuch regulations, which the 
majority of landowners used to regulate their corvee labour, and the St Petersburg 
Committee eventually agreed to allow their validity until the next Landtag. After 
further discussions, the law was ratified in November 1845.185 It was the 
expected mixture of 1804 and 1819 or of 1819 with 1842. Of essential importance 
was the return of the right of the lord to his land. All kinds of contracts were 
allowed, corvee, money or kind on a temporary or hereditary basis, with guiding 
regulations. The Wackenbuch regulations would regulate corvee until the next 
Landtag.
Prevailing economic circumstances did not provide the 77 paragraphs with 
a good beginning. As the Estland Ritter pointed out to the Governor General in
183 The text of this report is given in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung vol II, Beilage 3, pp. 385-388.
184 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 108; Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 99. Not all
members took the warning seriously. One wrote "I think that the man [Meyendorff], even if he might 
be right, paints the matter too black because the tsar is definitely on our side, but his speech did make 
a great impression." Cited in Ibid.
185 The 77 paragraphs of this reform are given in Tobien, Die Agragesetzgebung, vol II, Beilage 4,
pp. 389-401.
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the summer of 1845, 1845 was not a good year to introduce or plan agrarian 
reform.186 Bad harvests had resulted in famine in the winter of 1845-46, causing 
more deaths than the cholera epidemic. Landowners were forced to supply their 
peasants with grain when their stores ran out but help from the imperial 
government was necessary to bridge the crisis. Russia gave subsidies to the value 
of 200,000 rubles to Livland and later 300,000 to Livland and Kurland. It also 
allowed Livland to import grain custom-free from abroad.187
The conversions of the beginning of the decade resumed on a larger scale, 
with hundreds of thousand of peasants converting to the Orthodox church. 
Between 1842 and 1846 the number of conversions has been estimated at 
100,000,188 from 1845 to 1847 at a minimum of 74,000,189 and in 1848 alone at 
106,080.190 Whether the conversions were motivated by the desperation of 
peasants seeking the possibility of a better future, or whether they were due to a 
deliberate Russian policy encouraged by the new Russian-oriented Governor 
General Evgeny Golovin who replaced Pahlen in May 1845,191 their numbers 
were sufficient to act as an impulse on the reform movement in the Baltic itself
186 Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 202.
187 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol.II, 113.
188 K.I.Lander, "Pribaltiiskii krai," 346.
189 Wittram, Baltische Geschichte, 185.
190 G.Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 110.
191 The conversions only took place in Livland, a fact used (by Nolcken and Oettingen, for 
example) to support the theory of deliberate imperial policy since the economic circumstances in 
Estland and Kurland were said to be similar to those in Livland. ("Von Baron Nolcken verfasste 
Eingabe des Herrn Landmarschalls von Lilienfeld, des Herrn Landrath von Oettingen und des Baron 
Nolcken an die Commission," in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, Beilage 5,403.) There is also 
the possibility of a national element in the conversions. Peasants reputedly explained it thus: "We are 
not sure whether we shall profit from the new religion or not, but in any case we shall at least to some 
extent escape the clutches of German oppressors -- the Emperor, with whom we shall from then on 
share the same religion, will become more interested in our sufferings." (Cited in Kahk, Peasant and 
Lord, 103-104.) There was also the aspect of escaping the duties and dues to be paid to the pastor. 
(Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 116.)
and once more brought imperial attention to the area. At this difficult time, 
Folkersahm returned from Europe and began fighting against the 77 paragraphs 
in St. Petersburg. Samson also renewed his interest in reform, if from a different 
perspective from 1819, and also criticized the 77 paragraphs.
Despite economic and increasing political pressure, the different Ritter 
factions -  the supporters and opponents of the 77 paragraphs -- were unable to 
reach agreement. The land question had been solved in favour of the Ritter by 
the tsar's 1842 speech but it had not solved the peasant question which was 
becoming more urgent with unrest, famine and conversions. The imperial 
government and particularly Kiselev's ministry expected improvements, a concern 
in which fiscal considerations played a significant part. Economic productivity 
in the provinces was important to the government as a source of revenue. 
Peasant unrest could disrupt imperial profits of 2.2 million rubles.192
An imperial committee was appointed to deal with the problem and its 
members reflected the different reform perspectives in Livland. The Ritter, 
allowed to appoint two representatives, chose Nolcken and Oettinger,193 a 
possible indication of Ritter support of the 77 paragraphs so recently ratified. The 
tsar maintained the right to nominate two Ritter members and chose Samson and 
Folkersahm,194 a certain reflection either of the government's change of attitude 
to the 77 paragraphs or of the tsar's wish to have all perspectives represented. 
The government did make its wishes clear. Any reform must help create security
192 Yuhan Kahk used the Bernoulli-Carnap method of calculating the maximum profit to show that 
the probability of the individual Baltic landowner being affected by a peasant revolt was less than 0.3 
while that of the imperial government, which stood to lose 1.1 million rubles, was 1. "While every 
Livonian squire could hope that the revolt would pass by his manor, the government institutions had 
to take action in any case." Kahk, Peasant and Lord, 92-93.
193 Lilienfeld as Landmarschall was automatically included. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 118.
194 Ibid., 118, 124.
of land tenure for the peasant, equality between landlord and peasant in contracts 
and the elimination of arbitrariness on both sides.195 The three Ritter 
representatives advocated allowing the 77 paragraphs time to take effect, at least 
until the next Landtag, before changing them196 and offered longer-term 
contracts as the solution to land security.197 The government nominees Samson 
and Folkersahm, although opposed in ideas, were united in the belief that a new 
reform was necessary immediately. Samson was supported by the Minister of the 
Interior Perovsky, who favoured a return to 1804 elements.198
Folkersahm rejected the 77 paragraphs which had revived the essence of 
1819 but he did not advocate a return to 1804.199 He agreed with the basic 
principles of 1819 of land ownership and free contracts but saw the final solution 
in peasant ownership of land. Before this ideal situation could be attained, 
however, a transitional stage had to be regulated. To protect the peasant while 
facilitating his move to ownership, peasant land should be separated from 
manorial land and guaranteed to the peasant community, not the individual, for 
peasant use. The landlord, however, would be granted the right to appropriate 
a quota of one-sixth for future economic needs.200 Although the aim was to 
change from corvee to money rents towards ownership, corvee could not be
195 Samson was reputedly the drafter of these guidelines, which, he said, he intentionally made 
general so as to allow room for all opinions to be expressed. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 124.
196 And apparently thought the onus was on the government to point out the deficiencies. Ibid.,
123.
197 Minimum contracts of six years, preference for renewal to tenant, and hereditary contracts as 
a possibility. "Von Baron Nolcken verfasste Eingabe," in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 
Beilage 5, 402-404.
198 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 121.
199 For Folkersahm's reform plan in full, see "Das Agrarprogramm Hamilkar von Folkersahm's vom 
Jahre 1846," in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, Beilage 7, 410-421.
200 The Dorpat Committee had recommended ten percent. See p.39 above.
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abolished suddenly but should be regulated, not by the Wackenbuch norms, as he 
had proposed to the Dorpat Committee, but by new regulations which would 
facilitate the removal rather than the strenghtening of corvee. As long as corvee 
existed, it would be difficult to eliminate landlord exploitation. Folkersahm's 
ideas were based on the belief that: "... the right of the peasants to exist is not 
disputed, but it is not defined where he should exist." 201 Folkersahm was a 
firm supporter of the social order created by Stand and did not plan any political 
sharing of power for the peasants. The Ritter should lead the way and retain 
control. In May 1846 the rights of the lord over the Gemeinde as defined by 1819 
were reaffirmed.202
Folkersahm's most serious opponent was not Nolcken or any of his faction 
but Samson, one of 1819's strongest supporters. Samson was much affected by 
the events of 1845, particularly the conversions,203 and by what he perceived in 
government circles as jealousy over the special privileges enjoyed by the Baltic 
provinces.204 He was also sure that reform plans under discussion in Russia 
would be tried out, as in the past, experimentally in the provinces first. When 
the imperial commission investigating the cause of the conversion unrest 
requested Samson to propose economic improvements, he responded in the 
context of Russian policy, in the knowledge of Kiselev's regulation plans. His 
response was almost a reversal of 1819, although he himself described his reform
201 Ibid., 411.
202 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 165; also Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 94- 
95. For the 1819 rights of the lord over the Gemeinde, see pp. 2-4 above.
203 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung vol II, 127.
204 Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 101.
plan perhaps more accurately as a combination of 1804 and 1819205 While he 
proposed free contracts based on labour, money or kind, he recommended that 
labour contracts be regulated by the Wackenbuch norms (which was the practice 
in any case) and that hereditary tenure of 1804 be revived.206 Samson 
considered Folkersahm's idea of separating peasant land as a "provocation that 
the state government take an exact look at the Wackenbuch and regulations to be 
certain if and how the peasant could exist under the legal dues." The result 
would be the cancellation of all norms hitherto applied.207 This fear was not 
unfounded. Kiselev would soon try to impose a Russian land evaluation in the 
province. Samson also perceived the tsar's policy to be the same as Folkersahm's 
plan. " ... [T]he tsar's main idea, worked out by his ministers Perovsky and 
Kiselev, is to grant a quota of land to the peasants for their exclusive use."208 
Samson preferred the creation of a strict order for the peasants with limited 
mobility which would provide the framework for concessions to the peasants as 
individuals. His objections to Folkersahm's proposals were based not only on the 
fear of Russian intervention but on practical considerations. He failed to see how 
a credit bank could work efficiently in a country where capital was lacking, how 
the peasant could sell on an unstable market, how the peasant could cope with
205 "Das Agrarprogramm des Landraths Reinhold von Samson-Himmelstjema vom Jahre 1846," in 
Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, Beilage 6, 407. This was also the conclusion reached by Juri 
Samarin as a member of a sub-committee of the St Petersburg Committee formed in 1846 to investigate 
reform possibilities in Livland. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 118-119.
206 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 117. See also "Das Agrarprogramm des Landraths 
Samson-Himmelstjema," in Ibid., Beilage 6, 405-409.
207 Cited in Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 102.
208 Cited in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 127.
the proposed financial burdens.209 It was better, in Samson's opinion, to be a 
corvee peasant protected by Wackenbuch norms than an indebted owner.210 
Samson's thoughts about Russian intervention and his practical emphasis joined 
to form, for him, the most important criterion of reform. It could only satisfy the 
imperial government if it was effective and practicable. Nicholas himself had 
intimated so much. "Until now the government has left the reform of the peasant 
situation to the nobles, trusting in their better knowledge and good will; it will 
have to intervene itself, however, if results continue to remain unsatisfactory."211
The Committee, consisting of the five Ritter members and three 
government representatives, did not reach any decisive conclusions. They decided 
to leave the question of landownership to the Landtag. The question of the 
Wackenbuch regulations had also caused much disagreement. According to 
Kiselev's calculations, land in Livland had been valued too high while labour had 
been valued too low. A new survey was deemed necessary for any plan which 
was based on Wackenbuch norms. Folkersahm succeeded in persuading the 
Committee members to accept his reform plan since it did not make use of the 
Wackenbuch norms, and thus would not necessitate a new survey.
In the absence of satisfactory conclusions from the Committee, Kiselev took 
the matter directly into his own hands in May 1846. The Minister of State 
Domains found it necessary to offer the next Landtag "firm direction."212 Kiselev
209 15-20% purchase price of the necessary inventory, plus 60% of the land price plus 4% interest 
on his loans. Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 105. Also Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 
vol II, 163.
210 "Landrath von Samson's Gedanken iiber den LandtagsschluG vom Jahre 1847 in Betreff der 
Verbesserung des Bauerstandes in Livland," in Tobien, Die Agrargestzgebung, vol II, Beilage 11, 447.
211 Cited by Samson in Ibid., 455.
212 "Antrag des Domanenministers Graf Kisselew vom 19. Mai 1846," in Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 428.
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saw three deficiencies in the Livland system: 1) the peasant was not guaranteed 
security of land tenure 2) free contracts were not limited by the Wackenbuch 3) 
the Swedish land surveys were out of date and in need of revision.213 His 
advice was unequivocal. First, he intended to apply his policy of land tax rather 
than tax on the person to the "Western provinces" once the necessary survey had 
been completed. He then instructed the Ritter to adopt what they had decided 
on in February 1842: "The firm foundation of a class of peasants whose future 
welfare will be guaranteed by the allocation of a quota of land in hereditary 
tenure and that at the same time there would be a change to leases in money and 
kind." The dues payable by the peasant would be regulated by contracts and 
Wackenbuch regulations after they had been revised and corrected. Kiselev also 
spoke out against legalizing landlord appropriation of any part of peasant 
land.214 These recommendations were clearly based on the reforms already 
worked out for state peasants.
The idea of granting the peasants a land quota was also supported by the 
Ritter of Estland. The reactionary mood of 1842 had caused Estland to break with 
its 1839 proposal of hereditary tenure, except on a voluntary basis, and reaffirm 
the landlord's full right to the land. The Landtag in September 1842, however, 
decided that peasants should be guaranteed a quota of land for their use. 
Although the Estland Ritter had called their Landtag before the Livland Ritter, 
they were forced to wait until the Livland reform was worked out. As Pahlen 
had intimated, the tsar wished the Livland model to be applied to all three
213 Ibid., 428-429.
214 Ibid., 429-430.
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provinces.215 It was June 1845 before the Estland Ritter received further imperial 
instruction. The Livland 77 paragraphs were to be used as a basis for reform. 
The Estland Ritter refused to comply on the grounds that the paragraphs were not 
yet imperially ratified, that they deviated too much from Estland's own proposal 
and that it was in any case a bad time to decide on new laws since the economic 
situation was particularly bad due to famine. The Estland Ritter continued to 
press for ratification of their own reform based on a peasant quota of land and 
eventually in April 1846, Perovsky accepted it and the tsar approved of it. It 
should, however, be submitted to the committee which was in the process of 
discussing the Livland reform.216 The opponents of the land quota did not greet 
the added pressure from the Estland example. Samson noted that the Estland 
Ritter were only taking advantage of imperial policy "in the hope that a voluntary 
acceptance of the land quota will prevent all further questions about their high 
labour dues."217
The reform matter was now in the hands of a main committee, which 
became known as the Ostseekomitee, a committee which would serve as a 
supervisory agency for the Baltic provinces. It was composed of the Governor 
General, the five members of the preparatory committee, Perovsky, Kiselev as well 
as additional Ritter and government representatives. The Estland example may 
have encouraged Perovsky and Kiselev to apply more pressure for the acceptance 
of the quota plan218 but the dispute on the committee was less about the portion 
of land to be allotted to the peasants, which the Ritter by then may have viewed
215 Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 201.
216 Ibid., 195-204.
217 Cited in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 127.
218 Implied by Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 140-141.
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as inevitable imperial policy in any case, but about the right of the landowners to 
appropriate part of the peasant-allotted land for future economic needs, a move 
opposed by Kiselev. Those who supported the right of the landowner to 
appropriate a quota of peasant land offered various qualifications to it. Several 
members of the Committee prepared a written rejection of Kiselev's 
guidelines.219 The landlords should be allowed to appropriate a certain quota 
of peasant land, from now on to be called taxable land (manorial land was still 
tax-free) to support farm labourers (Knechte) when the transition to rents in money 
or kind were made. The land would remain taxable. Folkersahm had supported 
the landlord's legal appropriation of a quota of land but was against specifying 
its use. Guaranteeing land for the use of labourers would "once more open gate 
and door to arbitrariness; the principle of having to guarantee land for labourers 
is dangerous." Unity was important, however, if the complete survey of land and 
dues necessitated by Kiselev's plan was to be avoided. The last long, costly and 
unsettling survey had been completed only in 1832. It had also been intimated 
that the Russian survey would yield results unfavourable to the landlords. Even 
Nolcken, Oettingen and Lilienfeld were willing to support the proposal against 
Kiselev. Kiselev, however, agreed to allow the Landtag to decide if and in what 
way a new land evaluation was necessary. Under Folkersahm's influence, he also 
agreed that the Landtag could regulate under what circumstances landlords could 
take a portion of taxable land for support of labourers or for the expansion of the 
manorial economy.220 Governmental policy had not completely overridden
219 "Antrag des Prasidenten des Ostseekomitees Graf Peter von der Pahlen vom Mai 1846," in
Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, Beilage 8, 422-427.
220 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 145-146.
provincial will. The Ritter were allowed to form a committee221 to prepare 
the reform. Government participation was limited to the appointment of two 
Ritter of the Governor General's choice but the guidelines were those prepared by 
the Ostseekomitee. In principle, the Ostseekomitee had upheld the exclusive right 
of the landlord to all his land and his free disposal of it but in practice had 
advocated that "a part of the land belonging to the nobility be granted for always 
to the peasant community for its unwithdrawable use."222 There were also 
contradictory elements in Folkersahm's reform. While upholding the principle of 
free contract, he believed that the peasant should be protected by regulations. 
Governmental policy was based on the principle and practice of peasant 
protection. By basing his protection on a different principle, however 
contradictory, Folkersahm could avoid the restoration of the 1804 Wackenbuch 
norms and a new imperial survey. The Committee worked from 25 October 1846 
to 18 March 1847 and out of the various reform guidelines and their inherent 
inconsistencies, came up with 1206 articles for consideration by the Landtag, 
which was called for 26 August 1847.
By this time, the Ritter were aware that their continued difference of 
opinion could leave the way open for imperial intervention. The previous year, 
Nicholas had himself spoken of the perceived lack of trust on the part of the 
Ritter, which he found incomprehensible in light of the privileges they enjoyed. 
Since 1819 had not borne the fruits it promised, he expected something to be done
221 The membership was to consist of the five Ritter from the Ostseekomitee, two nominated by the 
Adelskonvent as well as the two appointed by the Governor General. The conservative representation 
was weakened by the death of Oettingen in September 1846 and by the resignation of Nolcken on 
grounds of ill health. Members are listed in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 148, note 4.
222 Cited Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 147.
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for the peasants.223 Marshal Karl von Lilienfeld opened the Landtag with the 
warning that "unity is the first requirement to bring the matter to a successful 
end."224 The Landtag accepted without discussion the designation of a certain 
amount of land for peasant use. The matter of free contracts brought more 
disagreement. The Committee had proposed free contracts to determine dues 
paid in labour, money or kind but the Landtag tended towards keeping the labour 
dues separate and having them governed by the Wackenbuch norms.225 This 
attitude reflected the reality of the situation. The Ritter were not concerned about 
how money rents were regulated because the majority of estates were still run on 
corvee labour. Despite the 1819 principle of free contract based on mutual 
agreement between lord and peasant, most landowners drew up the contracts 
themselves, regulated, if at all, by the norms of the Wackenbuch.226 Regulating 
corvee labour would affect the economic base of most of the estates in the Baltic 
provinces and deprive landlords of contractual freedom over their peasants. 
Folkersahm, however, argued that regulating the labour contracts would leave the 
way open for a new revision under Kiselev and would contradict the principle of 
the reform which was to tolerate labour contracts as a transitional necessity to 
money contracts. Norms would strengthen corvee rather than facilitate its 
eventual and unforced disappearance. His most convincing argument was that the 
Ostseekomitee had found the Wackenbuch norms deficient and insistence on their 
continued use would bring about a new survey. The Landtag did eventually
223 He reputedly also reminded the Ritter that they were Russian not German. Tobien, Die 
Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 121-122.
224 Cited in Pistohlkors, Ritterschaftliche Reformpolitik, 83.
225 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 169.
226 J.Kahk, Peasant and Lord, 96, partially citing a report of Benckendorff in March 1838.
accept all of the Committee's proposals. The new reform was based on the 
principles of free contract, the allocation of peasant land with a quota reserved for 
future landlord use and the agreement that corvee should end, as designed by 
Folkersahm. The mood of the Landtag, however, was obviously not completely 
in favour of Folkersahm, while his favour in government circles — even those 
perceived as harmful to the interests of the province -- was made obvious. After 
the election for a vacant Landrat position had placed him as second choice, the 
Governor General Golovin saw fit to seek the tsar's permission to give the post 
to Folkersahm rather than to the majority candidate.
The reform had hardly been submitted to the Governor General on 15 
November 1847 when objections to it began. These complaints originally came 
from the ranks of the Ritter themselves. Samson submitted a report to the 
Governor General expressing his disagreement with the reform and his continued 
support of the Wackenbuch norms, even if they did entail a new survey.227 The 
son of the former Landmarschall Buddenbrock submitted directly to the tsar 
strong objections against the reform, which he considered more harmful than 
beneficial to the welfare of the peasants.228 By the time Folkersahm arrived in 
St. Petersburg to accompany the reform through the ratification process,229 there 
were doubts about the reform in government circles. These were increased by the 
revolution in France in February, which halted the reform process in Russia and
227 The report submitted to Golovin presumably contained the same arguments as "Landrath von 
Samson's Gedanken fiber den Landtagsschluss vom Jahre 1847 in Betreff der Verbesserung des 
Bauerstandes in Livland," in Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, Beilage 11, 439-455. Most of 
Samson's arguments were against the credit bank (Rentenbank) which was designed to help the 
peasants finance land purchases. Samson had always opposed the idea on the grounds that the 
country had no capital, that almost every estate was indebted, and that the peasant would not be able 
to keep up with the payments.
228 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung vol II, 177.
229 As official Landtag representative.
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moved Nicholas to still unrest among his nobility by once more, on 21 March 
1848, publicly proclaiming his belief in the inviolable and sacred right of the 
nobility to the land.230 Kiselev reverted to his 1846 stance against Livland, 
advocating a new land evaluation to establish new norms, a swift change from 
corvee to money rents and a quota of peasant land for the landlords for the 
exclusive use of landless labourers and not for undefined future economic use.231
Financial Perspectives of Reform
An important perspective to the government's attitude was the financial 
one. Reform was necessary to ensure an efficient fiscal process and to curb any 
unrest which might adversely affect imperial revenues, but finance was essential 
to the reform under discussion. Before the peasants could own land, the 
expressed aim of the 1847 reform, they had to be financed. The existing Credit 
Society, to which most landlords were indebted,232 was not prepared to let part 
of a mortgaged estate be sold, especially to peasants with no security. The Dorpat 
Commission had suggested that the Credit Society should allow peasant 
purchasers to take over the percentage of the landlord debt which corresponded 
to the value of the farm bought, the amount then being subtracted from the 
landlord debt. The peasant would be responsible for repayment to the landlord, 
who would have the right to sequester the peasant's land for default of payment 
or deterioration of land (an effective way of ensuring that free labourers remained
230 Ibid., 178.
231 Ibid., 178-179.
232 See page 311 above.
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tied to the lord and his land). The February 1842 Landtag supported this idea of 
selling mortgaged land to peasants by transferring landlord debt to them but 
agreed that the Credit Society's opinion should be sought first. The Society came 
up with a credit plan which agreed in essence with the Dorpat proposals but 
failed to attract purchasers because, Folkersahm claimed, the credit offered was 
too low. Folkersahm then proposed setting up a separate Peasant Bank to afford 
peasants credit to buy land in small instalments, an idea based on recent German 
models. The German peasant banks were managed by the government but 
Folkersahm suggested that administration costs be covered by compulsory debtor 
contribution,233 thus ensuring continual funding.234 The Credit Society was 
against another credit institute and tried to improve its credit terms, a measure 
supported by Samson and Buddenbrocks,235 but the Peasant Bank proposal, with 
some amendments, received majority support236 at the 1847 Landtag on the 
condition, however, of government financial participation in the form of a loan of 
one million rubles.
The state bank was not supportive of a separate Peasant Bank, particularly 
the idea of a private bank issuing interest-free cash notes, tantamount to money, 
and the practice of selling land already mortgaged to another credit institute.237 
In June 1848, the Finance Minister forbade the issuing of such cash notes. He did 
offer a subsidy of 4,750 rubles towards administration costs for three to six years
233 Of one percent.
234 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, 153-158.
235 Samson eventually recognized it as being unfeasible. Ibid., 168, 176, 177.
236 106 votes for, 33 against. Ibid., 172, note 3.
237 Ibid., 171, note 3.
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but the Ritter asked for double the amount.238 The tsar, asked to arbitrate, 
supposedly asked the Ritter to pay the amount themselves and eventually 4,750 
rubles was agreed to.239 It was obvious that the Ritter could not finance the 
reforms they suggested without imperial financial help but the dispute over this 
relatively small sum reveals an insistence on imperial participation which perhaps 
reflects the provincial attitude that the government should pay for the reforms it 
wished to see applied in the provinces240
The Estland Ritter addressed the financial responsibilities of reform quite 
openly. The 1847 Landtag had decided to choose hereditary tenure until such 
times as the financial aspects of peasant landownership were satisfactorily worked 
out. The Committee appointed by the Landtag to deal with the cost of a reform 
on the Livland model saw the responsibility for financing peasant ownership of 
the land divided equally among the state, the Ritter, the landowners and the 
peasants. The Ritter had no resources left and even under the best conditions 
could not finance the redemption of the whole peasant land which amounted to 
the value of fourteen million rubles. The Committee did not recommend a new 
credit institute, as in Livland, on the grounds that the landowners were already 
indebted to the Credit Society and could not stand surety for peasant purchases 
of land, almost all of which was in any case already mortgaged. The peasants 
themselves were not in any situation to enter into money debts. The only source 
left was the state, and the government was eventually asked for an interest-free 
loan of one million rubles over forty years for the peasant purchase of land, which
238 Ibid., 180.
239 Ibid., 184.
240 Not that the Peasant Bank was an imperial idea, but it was necessitated by the government's 
insistence on peasant ownership of land.
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would enable all peasant land to be bought in that time.241 Thus, reform in both 
Livland and Estland was made dependent on imperial financial good will.
The 1849 reform
After two years of objections, difficulties and discussions on the 
Ostseekomitee and on the Landtag, the Livland 1847 reform eventually became law 
on 9 July 1849. It restored to the peasantry a certain amount of the protection lost 
in 1819. The individual peasant still lacked security of land tenure and was not 
protected from dismissal but peasant land could only be leased to members of the 
Gemeinde.242 Leases had to be concluded in writing and had to be valid for a 
minimum period of six years. Although the peasants were allocated a certain 
amount of unwithdrawable land, the landlord was given the right to appropriate 
a quota of this land to use as he saw fit.243 The exact amount of the quota was 
difficult to define since it was expressed in terms of the haken but amounted to at 
least one-fifth of the total peasant land.244
The final 1849 version supposedly differed little from the 1847 draft but 
there were obvious concessions made to the objections raised from the 
government side. Kiselev's wish for protective regulations was evident in the 
acceptance of the Wackenbuch norms in cases of dispute over labour contracts. 
Folkersahm's Peasant Bank plan was modified so that it was subjected to limited
241 Gernet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 226-232. The request was eventually refused in 1854 on the 
grounds that the state treasury at that point had no spare funds (due to the demands of the Crimean 
War). Ibid., 248.
242 The Gemeinde, however, was now open to non-peasants as long as they undertook all the duties 
of the peasant class. Not many were willing to assume corvee labour and subjection to the lord in 
order to acquire land. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 191.
243 Kiselev had wanted the quota restricted for use of landless labourers.
244 Ibid., 202-204.
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financing for a limited period of time under state control.245 Although successful 
at first,246 it would eventually fail due to lack of secure financing.247 The 
concessions did not satisfy the government, however. Its attitude was reflected 
in the fact that the law was given only provisional force for six years.248
The 1849 reform did not survive its probationary period. It was judged too 
liberal by the Ritter and in 1856 was replaced by a reform which restored the 
feudal elements of corvee labour and condemned peasant ownership of land. The 
reaction had begun soon after 1849's promulgation. In 1851, Folkersahm's term 
of office as Land Marshal came to an end and he was replaced by his opponent 
Nolcken, who opposed peasant landownership and favoured labour contracts over 
money contracts.249 Such thinking was not limited to the Baltic area. The ranks 
of German conservatism already discussed250 were reinforced by reaction to 
Prussia's agrarian reform of March 1850 and growing socialist tendencies.251 A 
German economic history in 1856 claimed that a money economy could only lead 
to impoverishment. It expressed opposition to free competition, industry, 
railways, machines and factories. Its author had elsewhere upheld the virtues of
245 Ibid., 187,188.
246 By the end of 1857, the bank had financed 229 peasant plots to the value of 336,6000 rubles, 
which represented sixty percent of the land value. This amounted to about one percent of total 
peasant land. C.Hehn, Die Intensitat der livlandischen Landwirthschaft, 104.
247 W.von Bock, "Suum Cuique!" in Baltische Monatsschrift, vol 9, 1864; 84.
248 The minimum period for a peasant-lord contract.
249 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung II, 221. See Ernst Freiherr von Nolcken-Lunia, Russland hat 
noch die Wahl (Berlin, 1857) where he warns Russia against the liberal agrarian laws of Western 
Europe.
250 See pp.350-354 above.
251 The reactionaries eventually established their own publication in 1855, the Berliner Revue.
labour contracts.252
Perhaps more important than the German influence on Baltic conservative 
trends was the fact that Russia's attention was increasingly required by 
international disputes in the Near East, culminating in full involvement in the 
Crimean War from 1853 to 1856. The Baltic provinces could return to the policies 
followed before imperial intervention required them to change. This seemed all 
the more necessary as the Ritter saw their interests threatened by the growth of 
towns and non-noble German interests.253 The ethnic population was also 
beginning to find voice.254 The reaction to the 1849 reform was extreme.
The Committee set up by the Livland Ritter in May 1854 to prepare for the end 
of the reform's probationary period came up with recommendations in complete 
contradiction to 1849. Its main recommendation was not only to allow labour 
contracts, condemned in principle by 1849, but to give them preference over 
money contracts. The transfer of money contracts into labour contracts, strictly 
forbidden by 1849, was to be allowed. Peasant ownership was not to be 
recommended since it caused the partitioning of the land into small parcels. The 
Peasant Bank was to be abolished.255 The minimum size of a noble estate was 
changed so that most estates would remain inviolable and it was made difficult 
for non-Ritter to buy land. These principles may have been in keeping with
252 W.Roscher, Geschichte der National-Oekonomik, 1025-1026.
253 In 1864, non-Ritter German elements protested publicly that the history of Livland perceived 
by the Ritter to be that of concessions from their side for the benefit of all other classes was actually 
the history, since 1765, of landowner concessions to peasants and, since 1710, of the decrease in the 
rights of the burghers to the benefit of the Ritter. "Pro ordine civico," 267-268.
254 The emergence of the Latvian voice in Livland in the mid-nineteenth century is dealt with in 
Andrejs Plakans, "Peasants, Intellectuals, and Nationalism in the Russian Baltic Provinces, 1820-1890," 
in Tournal of Modern History no.3 (September 1974):445-475.
255 It was claimed that over the past six years, only 73 of 317 farms had been sold with the help 
of the Peasant Bank. Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung, vol II, 218. Compare note 246 above.
373
current German conservatism but they were in direct contradiction to what Russia 
had recommended in 1849. The Landtag voted for their acceptance in November 
1856. 1849 had no defenders, its main architect Folkersahm having died in April 
1856. The reform tried to exclude any competition, especially from town 
capitalism, to Ritter monopoly of land. The purchase of estate land was limited 
to the Ritter, only one-third of peasant-allocated land could be bought by 
peasants, but non-peasants were excluded. Non-peasants were also excluded 
from the Gemeinde despite the objections from the Riga Biirgermeister, Otto 
Muller. Labour contracts received equality with other contracts and hereditary 
tenure, forbidden by 1849 as a hindrance to peasant landownership, was 
reinstated as a lesser threat than peasant landownership as such.256 The reform 
of 1856 gave priority to Ritter economic interests. The measures insisted on by 
the Russian government in the 1849 reform to protect the interests of the peasants 
were eliminated.
Reactionary Baltic factions had always been most successful when Russian 
pressure was most relaxed and Russia's involvement in the Crimean War had 
provided such an opportunity. The disastrous defeat in the war, however, 
brought attention swiftly and irrevocably back to agrarian reform as a means of 
strengthening the Empire and in March 1856 Nicholas's successor, Alexander II, 
made his plans clear. "It is better to destroy serfdom from above than to wait 
until that time when it begins to destroy itself from below."257
While various government committees sought an emancipation model for 
Russia, Russia's policy towards agrarian reform in the Baltic provinces continued
256 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung vol II, 222-224.
257 Cited in J. Blum, Lord and Peasant, 578.
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on pre-Crimean lines. In July 1856, a reform proposed by the Estland Landtag 
and similar to the 1849 Livland reform was ratified.258 All land which had been 
in de facto peasant possession on 9 June 1846 was designated as unwithdrawable 
peasant land and its demarcation to be completed within ten years. A minimum 
and maximum size for peasant plots was set. Peasant land could only be leased 
to members of the Gemeinde, but membership was not limited to peasants. Labour 
contracts were allowed but were viewed as provisional, and conditions more 
favourable to contracts in kind and money were created. Hereditary tenure was 
allowed.259 The reform, however, did not please the peasants and there were 
several peasant uprisings which had to be quelled by force of arms,260 thus 
necessitating imperial intervention in provincial reform legislation once more.
The reactionary 1856 Livland reform did not meet with imperial favour. 
Although imperial demands consistently concerned themselves with the removal 
of corvee and the assurance of land use for the peasants while provincial efforts 
were still aimed at retaining corvee and Ritter monopoly of land, the dynamics 
of the interaction were changed by Russia's involvement in its own reform. By 
the late 1850s, it was feasible that a new Russian reform would be imposed on the 
whole Empire. The Estland reform of 1859, the result of amendments to the 1856 
reform, received only temporary ratification for three years. Between January and 
March 1860 the Senate discussed whether it was worth ratifying a reform for 
Livland when a Russian one would soon be promulgated. It was eventually 
decided to allow Livland to have its own reform but not the one proposed by the
258 It was not promulgated until 21 April 1858 due to the two years required to prepare the German 
and Estonian translations.
259 Gemet, Geschichte des Agrarrechts, 254-261.
260 Ibid., 262-263.
1856 Landtag. The Senate rejected the reactionary elements in the Landtag draft 
and the ensuing reform of November I860261 was almost the same as the 
imperially-approved 1849 reform which the Landtag had attempted to replace. 
Once more, imperial intervention had forced Baltic conservatism on to a more 
liberal road. Imperial policy had been restored; provincial will had been forced to 
concede but a liberal Baltic law was preferable to a liberal Russian one.
Although Russia was now set on its own course of reform, the pattern of 
imperial pressure on agrarian reform in the Baltic continued. The ratification of 
the Li viand reform of November 1860 was swiftly followed by an imperial 
directive reminding the Ritter to abolish labour contracts, to abolish house 
discipline and to allow freedom of movement for their peasants.262 A few 
months later, on 19 February 1861, Russia declared its own emancipation.
There had been little doubt about Russia's dissatisfaction with the Baltic 
emancipation reform. The government had constantly exerted pressure to replace 
the principles of 1819 with those of 1804 and it was, therefore, never very likely 
that the Baltic emancipation would serve as a model for Russia.263 At the same 
time, the Senate's decision implicitly acknowledged that the Russian reform was 
not applicable to circumstances in the Baltic (although certain of the non-noble 
German population, particularly in Riga, would have welcomed a Russian reform
261 It did not become law until 1863.
262 Tobien, Die Agrargesetzgebung vol II, 241-242.
263 Boris Chicherin reflects the Russian awareness of the implications of various reform plans. He 
viewed emancipating the serfs without land as justified in that it represented a return to what had 
existed before the peasants were compelled to serve their masters. Nevertheless, such a method faced 
"insurmountable difficulties," in particular, the terrible poverty of the lower levels of the population, 
as the Baltic provinces had experienced. They had tried to alleviate the situation with long-term 
contracts and peasant banks but the cause of the problem was that a landless emancipation rendered 
"the population, who should be settled owners, into homeless vagrants." Golosa iz Rossii, (London, 
1856), 177. As late as 1860, however, A.Richter considered the reforms in the Baltic instructive for 
Russia. A.Richter, Istoriya krest'yanskago sosloviya, 6.
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as a desirable alternative to reform based on Ritter privilege264). This did not 
imply imperial satisfaction with the situation in the Baltic. Imperial supervision 
of events in the provinces continued parallel to the development and execution 
of the Russian reform. The Russian government continued to demand 
improvements in the Baltic reforms and the Ritter found it increasingly difficult 
not to concede in the face of the very real alternative of the Russian reform.
The pattern of imperial impulse and provincial concession, however, was 
being changed by interaction with other factors by the middle of the nineteenth 
century and the imperial/provincial parameters of reform were being broadened 
and complicated by new developments. The concepts of Empire and provincial 
privilege were anachronisms in the nineteenth century and their practice had 
assumed aspects alien to their feudal origins. Confrontation was assured by 
Russia's consistent efforts to control its vast territories and the Baltic Ritter's 
insistent claims, as late as 1870, that their "privileges contain a nucleus, the proper 
understanding of which can now, after 160 years, propel the people to greater 
freedom and morality than all the reforms that the humanity and enlightenment 
of the monarch provide for the remainder of the empire."265
264 Anders Henriksson, The Tsar's Loyal Germans. The Riga German Community: Social Change 
and the Nationality Question, 1855-1905) (New York, 1983); 9.
265 L.Pezold, Die Offentlichkeit in den baltischen Provinzen (Leipzig, 1870), cited in A.Henriksson, 
The Tsar's Loyal Germans, 11.
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Imperial/provincial interaction in the process of agrarian reform in the 
Baltic provinces between 1765 and 1849 was a complicated chain of cause and 
effect involving the Empire and each of the provinces separately. It was greatly 
influenced by a wide variety of factors such as the ideas of the Enlightenment, 
economic theories and realities, the European trade market, agricultural 
technology, the demands of war, agrarian reform in other countries, practical 
Christianity as well as the personalities of the tsars and of individuals in the 
Baltic. There are, however, certain consistent factors amidst the various dynamics 
involved.
The relationship of the Baltic provinces to the Russian Empire between 1765 
to 1849 was primarily one of dependence. While this is obvious, it is often 
overlooked as a parameter of the relationship. The provinces had little experience 
of any other status, their political independence limited to the early feudal days 
of the Knights of the Sword. There were no realistic prospects of future political 
independence and no ambitions towards it. The history and the future of the 
Baltic provinces lay in accommodation to a foreign power. Within the absolutism 
of the Russian Empire, there was no prospect or expectation of sharing power. 
Policies had to be gained by shrewd diplomacy, an area in which the Ritter, as 
representatives of the provinces, had long and varied experience. Dependence 
meant that some degree of compliance with the will of the Empire was inevitable. 
Non-compliance was not a feasible political alternative.
Since security was a prime consideration of the Empire, the success of 
Baltic diplomacy was dependent on stability within the provinces. Internal strife,
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the disruption of imperial revenues by inefficient economy, social unrest or 
political disunity warranted imperial intervention. Imperial interests took 
precedence over provincial interests. For provincial interests to be respected by 
the Empire, the provinces had to function efficiently and peacefully.
The Ritter were the official representatives of provincial interests but 
perceived them to be synonymous with their own political and economic 
privileges. The welfare of the provinces, in their view, depended on the 
maintenance of these privileges. Their skills of diplomacy were required to 
ensure that their privileges were imperially recognized with each change in ruler 
and that they were not viewed as incompatible with imperial interests. This was 
not always an easy task since provincial privilege was dependent on imperial 
good will, which tended to view such privilege as temporary and conditional 
within an Empire that was absolute and permanent. The protection of privilege 
was the prime motivating force in the policies of the Ritter. Tied by their 
centuries old privileges to a feudal context, however, the Ritter were rendered 
static and anachronistic against the dynamism of the Empire.
The task of defending feudal privileges was challenged not only by external 
political and economic changes but also by internal dynamics. Those sectors of 
provincial society deprived of political and economic power by Ritter monopoly 
had little to defend, but much to gain through any decrease in Ritter privilege. 
The non-matriculated nobility benefited from imperial decrees which were issued 
with the Russian service nobility in mind and not the closed ranks of the 
matriculated Baltic nobility. In the mid-eighteenth century, Russia recognized the 
rights of the Landsassen, and Catherine's Charter to the Nobility, for example, 
suited their aspirations to the detriment of Ritter monopoly. The Statthalterschaft,
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the most extreme form of imperial intervention, was a dynamic of change which 
favoured the interests of non-Ritter groups in the Baltic provinces. Anti-Ritter 
factions were thus imperially rather than provincially inclined. Imperial power 
may have affirmed the privileges of the Ritter but in effect did not actively work 
to protect them.
This was most evident in the process of agrarian reform. Any instability 
in agrarian relations threatened the security of the Empire and demanded imperial 
attention. The basis of Ritter privilege was land, however, and any change in land 
ownership or peasant relations meant a change in internal power relations. 
Pressure for agrarian reform, either Russian or domestic, whatever the motivation, 
could only be perceived as a threat to Ritter privilege. For the Ritter, therefore, 
protecting privilege meant resisting reform. In terms of dependence, resistance 
was not a policy sure of long-term success.
The Ritter knew this from experience gained from a history of resistance 
to imperial pressure for agrarian reform. They had managed to concede little 
under Poland but lost almost everything under Sweden. Russia may have 
restored their lost privileges but by the mid-eighteenth century had resumed the 
imperial tradition by issuing very clear directives to provincial authorities on the 
necessity of reform for serfs in the Baltic provinces. The Ritter responded with 
evasion and procrastination and compliance, when it came, was only to the degree 
they considered politically pragmatic. The degree of provincial compliance to 
imperial demands increased, however, in proportion to the development of a clear 
agrarian policy on the imperial side. Imperial pressure to reform was not just a 
call for general improvement but came with specific criticisms and practical 
suggestions. The reform demands of the Empire actually evidenced a remarkable
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consistency under four different rulers from 1765 through to 1849. The 
consistency was assured partly because of the Ritter refusal to comply fully. It is 
also important to note that the Ritter, in evading compliance, were in fact rejecting 
specific agrarian reforms rather than a vague idea of imperial intervention. 
Paradoxically, however, fear of the application of imperial reforms moved the 
Ritter to concede, albeit partially, to those very reforms they were trying to avoid 
while at the same time protecting as much of their privilege as they could.
Although the Empire had specific reforms in mind, it did not impose them 
forcibly. Imperial will did not override provincial rights. Over almost a century, 
Russian rulers used different tactics to urge the reluctant Ritter to reform 
voluntarily and according to their own political procedures. The Governors 
General played an important part in endeavouring to have the Ritter comply with 
imperial will. When their guidance was ignored, they resorted to more dramatic 
pressure. Browne threatened imperial intervention for non-compliance, Paulucci 
threatened resignation and Pahlen by-passed the Landtag. The Ritter's pragmatic 
approach to compliance was not always successful. There were miscalculations. 
By 1802, for example, Alexander I in rejecting the Ritter's partial compliance with 
imperial reform wishes proclaimed the Livland Landtag incapable of introducing 
the reforms he expected. He increased the imperial role in the legislation process 
by relegating the reform question to an imperial committee, a serious diminishing 
of Ritter political management of affairs in their own province. While there was 
always Ritter representation on imperial reform committees, they were more 
easily controlled than a complete Landtag and ensured imperial representation 
and guidance from the very outset, which was not possible under provincial 
legislative procedure. The committee approach took over to such an extent that
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the Kurland 1817 reform was not discussed by the Landtag. It was mainly 
imperial pressure in various forms which provided the impetus for agrarian 
reform in the provinces. In those periods when the attention of the Empire was 
diverted, especially by war, the reform process halted or regressed. T h e  
nature of imperial policy, or at least inclination, was evident in the instructions 
given regularly to each Landtag, in the open criticism of Baltic affairs often 
expressed by the tsars themselves, in public essay competitions on the subject of 
serfdom and in certain decrees such as Alexander's 1803 free farmers' reform. 
The development of reforms for the state peasants provided an important 
reflection of intended imperial policy for private estates. While labels are always 
relative, it is obvious that the Russian reform plans were liberal in comparison 
with the Ritter defence of privilege. Those in the provinces willing to reform at 
the expense of Ritter privilege, some of them Ritter themselves, found it an 
effective strategy to appeal to the tsar to act against conservative majorities, thus 
increasing the imperial role in agrarian legislation. In the period under study, 
there is a definite link, a certain co-operation, between provincial liberals and 
imperial power.
Imperial agrarian policy in the Baltic, developed in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century, was clearly expressed in the 1804 reform. The principles of 
the reform formed the core of imperial agrarian policy in the Baltic over the next 
fifty years. The reform was an imperial rather than a provincial one and had 
almost been forced on Livland. Estland successfully avoided it by offering a 
seemingly more liberal alternative, but one which would not interfere with Ritter 
economic privilege. The 1817-1819 emancipation reforms in the Baltic were to a 
large extent reactions to the imperially-guided 1804 reforms. In the next half
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century, the Empire defended the principles represented by 1804 against those 
which it had allowed, in a flush of enlightened enthusiasm, by the 1817-1819 
reforms. It sought to restore to the peasants those elements of protection which 
had been removed by the emancipation reforms.
The main difference between the imperial reform policy and that of the 
Ritter stemmed from different attitudes to peasant land security. Both agreed on 
the inviolable right of the nobles to their land but the Russian policy recognized 
the need for some form of land security for the freed peasant. Its search for 
viable alternatives to land grants ended in the policy of peasant hereditary tenure 
of the land. The Baltic Ritter viewed this as a violation of their land privileges 
and sought to guarantee their sole right to own the land by a landless 
emancipation. Such an emancipation was clearly seen by the Ritter as the only 
way to secure their right to the land which was threatened by the imperial policy 
of hereditary tenure. The Baltic emancipation reforms applied laissez-faire 
principles to a feudal context of Ritter privilege. The Empire, for its part, was 
intent not only on finding a way to protect the landless peasants but on 
eradicating the feudal practices expressed by such privilege: corvee, short 
contracts, appropriation of peasant-farmed land, dismissal of peasants, 
unregulated labour dues and landlord jurisdiction. Basically, the Russian policy 
sought a way to give the freed peasants some kind of land security and protection 
from exploitation; the Baltic barons sought their own land security and complete 
control over their labour force.
Finally, it should be noted that it is somewhat misleading to talk of Baltic 
agrarian policy since each province acted separately, pursuing its own interests 
and evading any united representation. Attempts to unite the provinces under
one reform, or one administration, came from the imperial side. Livland and 
Estland had different histories, different economic conditions, different needs. 
Kurland remained outside the Russian Empire until 1795. The main factors 
governing the provincial/imperial interaction, however, were present in each. 
The lack of unity amongst them allowed the Empire more flexibility in using one 
province as an example or incentive against another. Their different levels of 
compliance contributed to the complicated chain of cause and effect. A united 
front would have deprived the process of some of its catalysts and the Empire of 
some of its leverage. By its static nature, however, provincial privilege was not 
destined in any case to survive in a changing world. That it did so long is 
testimony to the skilful diplomacy of the Ritter and the respect of the Empire for 
provincial rights.
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